A SYSTEM OF INDIAN LOGIC

The Nyāya Theory of Inference

John Vattanky

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Nyāya is the most rational and logical of all the classical Indian philosophical systems. In the study of Nyāya philosophy, *Kārikāvalī* with its commentary *Muktāvalī*, both by Viśvanātha Nyāyapañcānana, with the commentaries *Dinakarī* and *Rāmarudrī*, have been of decisive significance for the last few centuries as advanced introductions to this subject. The present work concentrates on inference *(anumāna)* in *Kārikāvalī*, *Muktāvalī* and *Dinakarī*, carefully divided into significant units according to the subject, and translates and interprets them. Its commentary makes use of the primary interpretations in Sanskrit contained especially in the *Rāmarudrī* and *Subodhinī*. The book begins with the Sanskrit texts of *Kārikāvalī* and *Muktāvalī*, followed by an English translation of these texts. Next is given the Sanskrit text of *Dinakarī* which comments on the first two texts, followed by its English translation. Lastly, the book contains a commentary on all the texts included.

John Vattanky was educated at Oxford and Vienna and also trained in the rigorous ways of traditional Indian learning. His main interest is classical Indian Philosophy, especially logic (Nyāya). His major works are *Gaṅgeśa's Philosophy of God* and *Nyāya Philosophy of Language*. He is Professor Emeritus of Indian Philosophy and Sanskrit at Jñāna Deepa Vidyapeeth, Pune, India.

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Analysis, Text, Translation and Interpretation of the *anumāna* section of *Kārikāvalī*, *Muktāvalī* and *Dinakarī*

John Vattanky

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to my brother Kuriakose
and his family
with affection and gratitude

Contents

Foreword

Ancient Indian education consisted of four main disciplines: Logic (*anvīkṣī*), Vedas (*trayī*), Commerce or Economics (*vārtā*), Administration and Politics (*daṇḍanīti*).[1] Kautilya also mentions logic (*anvīkṣī*) as the lamp which enlightens all disciplines. 'Logic is always considered as the lamp of all branches of knowledge, the means to accomplish all works, the support of all religious duties'.[2] Such a logic is considered as Nyāyavidyā or Nyāyaśāstra by Vātsyāyana Pakṣilaswamin as mentioned by him in his *Nyāyabhāṣya*, "it is also called *anvīkṣā* (investigation) becaue it consists in the reviewing (*anu-īkṣaṇa*) of a thing previously apprehended (*īkṣita*) through Perception and Verbal Cognition; the science that proceeds by this 'investigation' is *anvīkṣikī, nyāyavidyā, nyāyaśāstra*, the 'Science of Reasoning' (Logic)".[3]

The beginnings of the Nyāya system can be found in the *Nyāyasūtras* of Gautama. The development of Nyāya system took place through commentaries and subcommentaries by Vātsyāyana, Uddyotakara and Vācaspati Miśra who wrote their *Bhāṣyam*, *Vārttikam* and *Tātparyaṭīkā* respectively. Udayana, one of the greatest of Indian philosophers and certainly one of the most important philosophers in the history of Nyāya stands between the time of the so called old Nyāya and the modern Nyāya. However, Nyāya did not develop in a linear way; it developed especially in the early period through prolonged and persistent polemics with the Buddhist philosophers, especially Diṅnāga

[1] *anvīkṣī trayī vārtā daṇḍanītiśca śāśvatī vidyā catasraya evetāḥ lokasaṃgraha-sthitihetavaḥ* is an ancient verse mentioning these four disciplines.

[2] *pradīpaḥ sarvavidyānām upāyaḥ sarvakarmaṇām āśrayaḥ sarvadharmāṇām śaśvad anvīkṣakī matā*, Kautilya, *Arthaśāstra*, p.11, ed. by Sri Vachaspati Gairola Varanāsi, 1977.

[3] *pratyakṣāgamābhyām īkṣitasyānvīṣaṇam anvīkṣā tayā pravartate iti anvīkṣikī nyāyavidyā nyāyaśāstram ityarthaḥ* (Cfr. *Nyāyabhāṣyam* to Nyāyasūtra 1)

and Dharmakīrti and his school of logicians. The conflict however, was most intense regarding the nature of Inference.

Navyanyāya proper begins with the monumental work of *Tattvacintāmaṇi* of Gaṅgeśa in which he discusses in detail the four means of valid knowledge viz. Perception, Inference, Comparison and Verbal testimony. However, in the course of time the main interest of Navyanaiyāyikas centered round the problems concerning Inference. The discussions on the definition of Inference, the conditions of Inference, the fallacies of Inference and allied problems occupied their minds.

Apart from *Tattvacintāmaṇi* and its various commentaries, which form the foundation of Navyanyāya there have been specific works dealing with doctrines (*prakaraṇagranthas*) of Navyanyāya. *Kārikāvalī* with its commentary *Siddhāntamuktāvalī* both by Viśvanātha Pañcānana with the commentaries *Dinakarī* and *Rāmarudrī* by Dinakara and Rāmarudra respectively have been extremely important for the last few centuries as advanced introductions to the subject matter. In fact, their importance is only next to that of *Tattvacintāmaṇi* and its standard commentaries.

Prof. John Vattanky has initiated the project of translating *Kārikāvalī* with its commentary *Muktāvalī* and a further commentary on both of them called *Dinakarī* by Dinakara. Prof. Vattanky's work is not merely a translation, but it contains a detailed commentary on each of the lines and important expressions of *Kārikāvalī*, *Muktāvalī* and *Dinakarī* making extensive use of the sub-commentaries *Rāmarudrī* by Rāmarudra and *Subodhinī* by Parīkṣit Thampurān, the late Mahārāja of Cochin. He also has used *Tattvacintāmaṇi* and its important commentaries for the explanations of K.M.D. Prof. Vattanky has already published a significant book entitled *Nyāya Philosophy of Language* in which he has translated the section on Word (*śabda*) of *Kārikāvalī*, *Muktāvalī* and *Dinakarī* with a valuable commentary. This work has been highly appreciated by scholars both in India and abroad.

Now I have the privelege to present the book of Prof. John Vattanky entitled *A System of Indian Logic: Nyāya Theory of*

Inference to the world of scholars and the devoted students of Nyāya. This book is a translation and interpretation of the section on Inference (*anumāna*) of *Kārikāvalī* and *Muktāvalī* of Viśvanātha Pañcānana and its commentary *Dinakarī* by Dinakara. Although these works are quite important in the study of Nyāya, systematic translation and interpretation of these works have not appeared in any modern language. It should also be emphasized that this is the first time *Dinakarī* is translated into any modern language Indian or Western.

I have gone through the translation very carefully; it is accurate. The commentary is lucid and exhaustive. I am equally happy that the book is free from all errors (*apasiddhānta*) regarding the various aspects of the Nyāya doctrine. Prof. Vattanky has an excellent mastery of the technicalities and subtlities of Navyanyāya and he has explained them with rare competence and genuine insight. Anyone who studies this work carefully will acquire an accurate knowledge of the whole of Navyanyāya theory of Inference. Therefore I have great pleasure in recommending this work to the serious students and scholars interested in Navyanyāya.

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Pune
February 2001

Preface

Right reasoning plays a significant role in every form of successful human activitiy. And that probably is the reason, why in India and in the West creative thinkers have developed systems of logic. While the basic contours of Western logic is fairly well known, both the history and the content of logic in India have not been systematically explored and explained. Therefore they are not known as they should be in the world of scholars and students of Philosophy. In this book it is not my intention to describe the development of logic in India but to present the actual contents of logic as developed in the Navyanyāya tradition.

The most fundamental text of Navyanyāya is the *Tattva-cintāmaṇi* of Gaṅgeśa. The commentaries on this work like *Dīdhiti* and a further commentary like *Gādādharī* and so on are the staple sources for advanced Navyanyāya studies. However, in the the study of Navyanyāya, *Kārikāvalī* with its commentary *Sidhantha-muktāvalī*, both by Visvanātha Pañcānana with the commentaries *Dinakarī* by Dinakara and *Rāmarudrī* by Rāmarudra have been widely used as the advanced introductions to the subject matter. This practice has been followed throughout India in the last few centuries. It shows therefore, the intrinsic worth of these works. In fact, any one who carefully and systematically studies these treatises will marvel at the precision and depth which the Naiyāyikas show when they deal with the various problems of Philosophy. And yet no systematic translation and interpretation of these books are available in any modern language.

In this context, with a view to make available the richness of thought contained in these works to all those who are interested in Indian Philosophy in general and in Navyanyāya in particular I decided to translate the whole of *Kārikāvalī* and *Muktāvalī* and interpret them in the light of *Ramarudrī* and *Subodhinī*. A few years back I brought out the translation and interpretation of the

upamāna and *śabda* sections of *Kārikāvalī*, *Muktāvalī* and *Dinakarī*. Now I have great pleasure in presenting the translation and interpretation of the *anumāna* section of *Kārikāvalī*, *Muktāvalī* and *Dinakarī* to all those who are desirous of learning Indian logic at a more advanced level.

The present work is much more than a translation. There is an elaborate commentary on each significant line and expression of *Muktāvalī* and *Dinakarī* taking into account all the important points and subtleties to be found in *Rāmarudrī*. I have also made ample use of *Subodhinī*, a brilliant commentary on *Kārikāvalī*, *Muktāvalī*, *Dinakarī* and *Rāmarudrī* by Parīkṣit Thampurān, one of the most creative Navyanaiyāyikas of recent times and who was also the Maharāja of Cochin. *Subodhinī* was also particularly helpful to establish the correct readings of *Kārikāvalī*, *Muktāvalī*, *Dinakarī* and *Rāmarudrī*.

Yet for all these, the present work is not an easy one. This is chiefly due to the difficulties inherent in the study of Navyanyāya itself. It is well known that this discipline makes use of a high degree of abstraction and a rigorously exact terminology. There is also the problem arising from inadequate or not yet standardized translations of technical terms. If one wants to study Navyanyāya in any depth, one has necessarily to get oneself familiar with these aspects of the subject, much in the same way as when one sets out to study mathematics one has to become quite acquainted with mathematical terms and concepts. And just as in spite of proficiency in English one cannot understand a book on mathematics though in English unless one knows mathematics, even so a person who can read easily and even speak fluently classical literary Sanskrit will not be in a position to follow the technical discussions in *Dinakarī* or even in *Muktāvalī* unless he systematically studies Navyanyāya. It is useful to bear these facts in mind when one starts on this book.

However, it is not at all impossible to master Navyanyāya; one has to set about it step by step systematically. A good starting point for this purpose would be to study thoroughly *Tarkasaṃgraha* by Annambhaṭṭa with his own commentary, *Dīpikā*, rather than any other work in any modern language about

Navyanyāya. A mastery of the good deal of elementary knowledge that is contained in these texts is presupposed to work through the present book successfully.

At the first reading one should get a general idea of the topics discussed. For this purpose the portions dealing with the *Muktāvalī* should be sufficient. The discussions in *Dinakarī* and *Rāmarudrī* are much more subtle and sophisticated. One should come back to these discussions again and again until one fully grasps them. For this purpose, constant perusal of the original texts in Sanskrit or their translations and the commentaries is indispensable. One who thus carefully works through this book will acquire a first hand knowledge of all the salient features of Nyāya Theory of Inference.

In conclusion, I would like to thank all those who have helped me in preparing this work. I am particularly grateful to Dr. Baliram Shukla, who was kind enough to discuss with me each line of this Sanskrit text. Dr. Shukla is a well known traditional scholar in Navyanyāya who has also assimilated the methods of modern research. I am equally greatful to him for writing an enlightening Foreword to this book. I also thank Mr. Venugopalan and Mr. Nixon for assisting me in the preparation of the manuscript at various stages.

Pune **John Vattanky**
February 2001

Abbreviations

K.	*Kārikāvalī*
M.	*Muktāvalī*
D.	*Dinakarī*
R.	*Rāmarudrī*
S.	*Subodhinī*
T.C.	*Tattvacintāmaṇi*

क.	कारिकावली
मु.	मुक्तावली
दि.	दिनकरी

Note: References in the commentary are to the pages and lines of this book

I. Introduction

It is well known that the Nyāya system admits four means of valid knowledge: Perception, Inference, Comparison and Word. K.M.D.R. treat about the true nature and scope of these means of valid knowledge in detail and in depth. What follows is a connected presentation of the basic ideas found in K.M.D.R. on Inference (*anumāna*), in ordinary language, without making use of Nyāya tehnical terms as far as possible. A careful study of this section will enable the reader to follow more easily the technical discussions found in the translation and in the commentary.

Nature of Inferential Knowledge

Although K. and M. straightaway discuss the nature and process of inferential knowledge, D. and R. point out the Relevance (*saṅgati*) for the treatment of Inference here. R. especially gives a fairly comprehensive treatment of the nature and kinds of Relevance which are not to be found anywhere else in K.M.D.R. Following D. and R. we give here a short account of the nature and kinds of Relevance. In itself the notion of Relevance is simple; it is the question why one topic is discussed after another or what is the connection of what is going to be treated with what has already been treated.

Rāmarudra defines Relevance as *anantarābhidhānaprayojakajijñāsājanakajñānaviṣayasmaraṇānukūlasaṃbandho nirūpaṇīyaniṣṭhā saṅgatiḥ*, i.e. Relevance that is in the subject to be treated is a relation which is conducive to the remembrance of the object of a particular instance of knowledge which is the cause of the desire to know.

Basic to the whole definition of Relevance is that it is a kind of relation (*saṃbandha*). This relation is conducive to the remembrance of the object of a particular instance of cognition. This particular instance of cognition is the cause of

producing the desire to know (*jijñāsā*) and this desire in its turn is the reason why a certain topic is treated after another topic. Applying all this to the present case, viz. the treatment of inference after perception, we get the following picture of the causal relationship that is envisaged.

The desire to know which is the cause of treating inference after perception has the following form: 'let me have knowledge of inference (*anumānajñānaṃ me bhavatu*)'. The knowledge which produces this desire to know is in the following form: 'the knowledge of inference produces what is desirable for me (*anumānajñānaṃ madiṣṭasādhanam*)'. The object of such a knowledge is inference; the relation which is conducive to remember inference is the fact that it is produced by perception.

In simpler language this just means that after perception has been treated, a person remembers inference because it is produced by perception and so he thinks that knowledge of inference is a means of obtaining what is desirable for him. Therefore he has the desire to know about inference. This desire to know (on the part of the pupil) is the reason why inference is treated (by the teacher).

Therefore, the succession of events in the order of time is the following: knowledge of perception (*pratyakṣājñāna*), remembrance of inference (*anumānasmaraṇa*) because it is an effect of perception, knowledge that the knowledge of inference is the means of fulfilling one's desire (*iṣṭasādhanatā-jñāna*) and therefore finally the desire to know inference (*jijñāsā*). Then the treatment of inference follows.

This description of Relevance should not be taken in the sense that whatever is relevant should be treated after another topic, but in the sense that what is to be treated must be relevant to what has been treated. Thus if one has the knowledge of an effect or a cause, then one may enquire what is its cause or what is its effect respectively. Therefore 'being a cause (*upajīvyatva*)' and 'being an effect (*upajīvakatva*)' are forms of Relevance. Hence it is also appropriate that in

Tattvacintāmaṇi after the treatment of inferential knowledge (*anumiti*) its cause, inferential process (*anumāna*) is discussed.

Rāmarudra discusses also the six kinds of Relevance usually held in the Nyāya tradition. *saprasaṅga upodghāto hetutāvasaras tathā nirvāhakaikyaṃ kāryaikayaṃ ṣoḍhā saṅgatīr iṣyate* i.e. there are six kinds of Relevance: Connection (*prasaṅga*), Introduction (*upodghāta*), Cause (*hetutā*), Occasion (*avasara*), Having the same Cause (*nirvāhakaikya*) and Having the same effect (*kāryaikya*).

Connection (*prasaṅga*) is defined as a relationship which is conducive to the remembrance of the subject that is going to be treated and which is different from the instances of Relevance such as Introduction (*upodghāta*) and so on (*upodhātādibhinnaḥ smaraṇaprayojakasaṃbandhaḥ prasaṅgaḥ*). Introduction (*upodghāta*) is defined as that which explains the topic under discussion (*prakṛtopapādakatvam upodghātaḥ*). This means that when a subject is being treated another topic has also to be discussed in order that the present topic may be properly understood. Causeness (*hetutā*) is another kind of Relevance which occurs in two ways. By the relation of the state of being substratum (*āśrayatāsaṃbandha*) causeness exists in cause. But by the relation of the state of being indicated (*nirūpakatāsaṃbandha*) causeness is in the state of being effect. Therefore the state of being an effect is also a form of Relevance; but this is included in *hetutā* as pointed out. Occasion (*avasara*) is defined as follows: when the hindrance in the form of desire to know has been removed, what is necessary to be treated next is occasion (*pratibandhakībhūtajijñāsānivṛttau avaśya-vaktavyatvam*). Having the same cause (*nirvāhakaikya*) occurs in the following instance: if one cause produces two effects, one effect is treated after the other by the Relevance of having the same cause. Having the same effect (*kāryaikya*) occurs when two causes together produce one and the same effect.

After the discussion on Relevance the authors describe the process of inference. Knowledge of invariable concomitance is the instrumental cause of inferential knowledge. Operation

(*vyāpāra*) is consideration (*paramarśa*). But now an objection may be raised: invariable concomitance of fire with smoke was grasped in the instance of smoke in the kitchen, but this knowledge does not exist when the same person sees smoke on the mountain, and so because of the absence of invariable concomitance consideration cannot be produced. This objection is answered by pointing out that when one perceives smoke on the mountain the impression (*saṃskāra*) of the previous knowledge of invariable concomitance is in the soul and this gives rise to the remembrance of the knowledge of invariable concomitance. This knowledge of invariable concomitance in the form of remembrance produces consideration.

A further difficulty arises as follows: consideration is in the form of a qualified knowledge (*viśiṣṭavaiśiṣṭyajñāna*). But one can have consideration which is not an instance of qualified knowledge. This occurs when the various elements of the cognition are not in the form of the relationship of a qualified thing with something else. This objection is answered by pointing out that when consideration is in the form of a qualified knowledge it is not necessary to mention explicitly that the knowledge of invariable concomitance is in the form of a certainty, since one can have a qualified knowledge only if one has the definite knowledge of its qualification. But the other kind of consideration which consists of different instances of qualifiers and qualificands cannot give rise to inferential knowledge without also asserting that it is an instance of definite knowledge. But this is a cumbersome process and therefore consideration is to be accepted as an instance of qualified knowledge (*viśiṣṭavaiśiṣṭyajñāna*).

A further objection is that if consideration is in the form of remembrance there is no knowledge of invariable concomitance and so there is deviation. This is answered by stating that where consideration is in the form of remembrance, impression of the invariable concomitance exists and through this impression there comes about the knowledge of invariable concomitance.

The opinion of modern Naiyāyikas is that the instrumental cause of inferential knowledge is mind, but both Dinakara and Rāmarudra seem to reject this opinion.

Knowledge of the Reason is not the Instrumental Cause

The instrumental cause of inferential knowledge according to the old Naiyāyikas is the reason being known. An argument in support of this position is that when a qualified knowledge (i.e. consideration of reason) is accepted as the cause of inferential knowledge then the qualifier, here the reason, is also a cause, and therefore reason which has consideration as its operation should be accepted as the instrumental cause of inferential knowledge.

This opinion is rejected because in that case there would be no inferential knowledge by means of a reason which will exist only in the future or which has ceased to exist. Dinakara argues that there is cumbersomeness also in the view of the old Naiyāyikas. The cumbersomeness occurs because in their view the relation of cause and effect between reason and inferential knowledge will have to be stated in such a way that the reason which is the object of consideration with respect to one person is the cause of the inferential knowledge of that same person. Therefore the view of the old Naiyāyikas is rejected.

Consideration

Consideration which produces inferential knowledge is defined as the knowledge that that which has invariable concomitance exists in the subject (*vyāpyasya pakṣavṛttitva-jñānaṃ parāmarśaḥ*). This means consideration is in the form of a knowledge which has as object the relationship of that which is qualified by invariable concomitance with the subject (*pakṣeṇa saha vyāptiviśiṣṭasya vaiśiṣṭyāvagāhijñānam*). Such a consideration itself can be in two forms: that which has invariable concomitance is in the subject or the subject has that which has invariable concomitance. From the first form of consideration,

inferential knowledge is in the form that the *sādhya* is in the subject (*pakṣe sādhyam*) and from the second form of consideration, inferential knowledge is in the form that the subject has the *sādhya* (*pakṣaḥ sādhyavān*). However the modern Naiyāyikas hold that inferential knowledge is always in the form that the subject has the *sādhya* (*pakṣaḥ sādhya-vān*). The determinant of causality which is present in both forms of consideration is the state of being definite knowledge which has as object the relationship of both subject and that which has the invariable concomitance. This means that in both kinds of considerations the relationship of the subject with the reason is also the object. Such a consideration is in the form of definite knowledge. Here Rāmarudra has an intricate discussion on how one and the same characteristic of the state of being definite knowledge can be present in both forms of considerations together. The details of this discussion can be found in the commentary to this section.

According to some other Naiyāyikas, however, the causality for inferential knowledge is in the following form: for the inferential knowledge which comes about immediately after a particular consideration that consideration in that particular form is the cause. However, according to Dinakara and for Naiyāyikas in general, the consideration which has the subject as the qualificand is the cause of inferential knowledge, and this is the reason why all accept application (*upanaya*) in which the subject is always the qualificand, as for instance 'this has smoke which is invariably connected with fire (*vahni-vyāpyadhūmavāṃścāyam*)'.

The Mīmāṃsakas however reject this position of the Naiyāyikas and argue that consideration in the form of an instance of knowledge which has as object the relationship of that which is qualified by the invariable concomitance with subject (*pakṣeṇa saha vyāptiviśiṣṭasya vaiśiṣṭyāvagāhi jñānam*) is not always necessary for inferential knowledge; as for instance someone has first of all the perceptual knowledge that mountain has smoke and then he remembers that smoke is pervaded by fire. Then it is a matter of common experience that

the same person has also the inferential knowledge that the mountain has fire. Therefore *vyāptiviśiṣṭavaiśiṣṭyāvagāhijñānam* is not always the cause of inferential knowledge. And even when such a qualified knowledge is the cause of inferential knowledge it is not cause as qualified knowledge (*viśiṣṭa-vaiśiṣṭyāvagāhijñānatvena*) but as knowledge of the state of being the attribute of the subject in which the qualifier is the determinant of pervadedness (*vyāpyatāvacchedakaprakāra-pakṣadharmatājñānatvena*), in the present instance as *dhūmaḥ parvatavṛttiḥ*. Thus the cause of inferential knowledge is the two instances of knowledge, knowledge that the reason is in the subject and the recollection of invariable concomitance; and therefore to postulate a further instance of knowledge which has as object the relationship of that which is qualified by invariable concomitance with the subject as cause of inferential knowledge is cumbersome.

The Naiyāyikas reject these arguments of the Mīmāṃsakas because in that case even from the knowledge that mountain has that which is pervaded by fire (in which the determinant of pervadedness is not known) can also produce inferential knowledge.

Further the Naiyāyikas point out that there is no cumbersomeness in their position because they accept *viśiṣṭasya vaiśiṣṭyāvagāhijñānam* as cause of inferential knowledge. This is because they have already established the cause and effect relationship between *viśiṣṭasya vaiśiṣṭyajñānam* and *anumiti*; and once this is established one cannot argue that this is cumbersome.

Provisional Definition of Invariable Concomitance

Invariable concomitance is defined in a provisional manner as the absence of the relation of the reason with anything other than that which has the *sādhya*; for instance, in the inference 'mountain has fire because of smoke', that which is to be established (*sādhya*) is fire, that which has *sādhya* is kitchen etc.; water, lake etc. are different from that which has *sādhya*; in them the reason which is smoke does not exist. In this way

the definition is applied. In such false inferences as 'there is smoke because of fire', the *sādhya* is smoke; that which has *sādhya* is mountain and so on; heated iron ball etc. are different from that which has *sādhya* since they do not have smoke; but the reason (fire) exists in them. Hence the definition cannot be applied here.

Further the relation by which that which has the *sādhya* has the *sādhya* should be the same as the relation by which the *sādhya* exists in the subject. Otherwise the definition would suffer from the fault of too narrow application. Both Dinakara and Rāmarudra have intricate discussions on how this fault of too narrow application arises and how it should be avoided. All these explanations can be seen in the commentary to this section.

Again the expression 'other than that which has the *sādhya* (*sādhyavadanya*)' is to be understood as that which has the mutual absence the counterpositiveness of which is determined by the state of being that which has *sādhya*. On this explanation also Rāmarudra offers subtle comments which should be read from the commentary on the corresponding section. The expression 'non-existence of the reason in that which is other than that which has the *sādhya* (*sādhyavadanyāvṛttitva*)' should be understood as the absence of the general state of being existent indicated by the substratum of the absence of *sādhya* and not merely the absence of the particular state of being existent indicated by the substratum of the absence of *sādhya*. Rāmarudra again has further intricate comments on this also.

Because of valid inferences such as 'it is a substance because it has existence which is different from the existence in quality and movement' the definition of invariable concomitance has to be refined further. Thus the non-occurrence of the reason in that which is other than that which has *sādhya* is to be understood as determined by the determinant of the state of being reason. The final meaning of this explanation is

that the determinant of the state of being reason is not the determinant of occurrence (*vṛttitā*).

Final Definition of Invariable Concomitance

Invariable concomitance was provisionally defined as the absence of the relation of the reason with anything other than that which has that which is to be established. However this definition suffers from the fault of too narrow application because when that which is to be established is purely affirmative in nature, that which is different from that which has that which is to be established (*sādhyavadanya*) is unestablished. As for instance, in such inferences as 'it is knowable because it is nameable' that which is to be established is knowability and this is a purely affirmative characteristic, since knowability exists in everything and therefore that which is different from that which has knowability is unestablished. However, if we accept the opinion of the old Naiyāyikas that subjectness is doubt about the existence of that which is to be established then it follows that if that which is to be established is a purely affirmative characteristic, then there can be no doubt about its existence and so there would be no subjectness. Hence there would also be no inferential knowledge. Therefore this objection against the provisional definition of invariable concomitance is not correct. Further there could be another objection against the provisional definition. In such valid inferences as 'it has existence because it has universal' that which is different from that which is to be established are such things as universal etc. where there is no occurrence of anything by the relation of inherence which is the relation of the determinant of the state of being reason; and therefore the provisional definition of invariable concomitance cannot be applied in these kinds of inferences.

However it may be pointed out as indicated by Rāmarudra that according to the modern Naiyāyikas subjectness is the absence of certainty of that which is to be established qualified

by the absence of desire to establish that something (*siṣādhayiṣāvirahaviśiṣṭasiddhyabhāvaḥ pakṣatā*). Subjectness in this form is present even if that which is to be established is purely affirmative. Hence in this way no objection can be raised against the provisional definition. Therefore Rāmarudra asserts that the second objection against the provisional definition is raised by Muktāvalīkāra because of the opinion of the Mīmāṃsakas according to whom there can be no inference in which that which is to be established is purely affirmative.

It may be noted however that Dinakara has relatively a long discussion on the nature of the second objection. He notes that when the inference is 'it has existence because it has universal' the provisional definition of invariable concomitance is to be understood as the state of being indicator of the mutual absence of the substratum of that which is to be established which (i.e. mutual absence) does not occur in the substratum of the reason (*svādhikaraṇāvṛttisādhyavadanyonyābhāvakatva*). This means only *sādhyavadanyonyābhāva* does not exist in the susbtratum of the reason, and in the inference 'it has existence because it has universal' the substratum of the reason is substance, quality and movement which are also substrata of that which is to be established, i.e. existence and therefore they are not the substrata of *sādhyavadanyonyābhāva*. Hence the provisional definition of invariable concomitance can be applied here. But when the provisional definition is interpreted like this there will be the fault of too narrow application in such inferences as 'it has fire because it has smoke', because in this case *sādhyavadanyonyābhāva* exists in the substratum of smoke by the relation of temporality. Therefore it is necessary to accept the non-occurrence of the mutual absence in the substratum of the reason by the relation which determines the state of being the hindering factor for the knowledge of the state of being that which has the *sādhya* (*sādhyavattāgrahavirodhitāniyāmakasaṃbandhena anyonyābhāvasya avṛttitva*).

But then there would be the fault of too narrow application in such valid inferences as 'it has absence of existence because it has absence of universal'. The reason is that in the substratum

of the absence of the universal nothing occurs by the relation of inherence which is the relation which determines the state of being the hindering factor for the knowledge of the state of being that which has that which is to be established (*sādhya-vattāgrahavirodhitāniyāmakasaṃbandha*).

This objection may be answered by pointing out that in such inferences as 'it has existence because it has universal' the meaning of the provisional definition of invariable concomitance is to be understood as *svādhikaraṇāvṛttisādhya-vadanyonyābhāvakatva* and in such inferences as 'it has absence of existence because it has absence of universal' as *sādhya-vadanyāvṛttitva*. But even then there would be the fault of too narrow application in the inference 'knowledge has the absence of jar by the relation of conjunction because it has jar by the relation of having object (*jñānaṃ saṃyogasaṃbandhena ghaṭābhāvavat viṣayitāsaṃbandhena ghaṭāt*)'. Here the meaning of the provisional definition of invariable concomitance as *svādhikaraṇāvṛttisādhyavadanyonyābhāvakatva* cannot be applied because nothing occurs by the relation of conjunction (which is the *sādhyavattāgrahavirodhitāniyāmakasaṃbandha*) in the knowledge which is the substratum of the reason by the relation of *viṣayitā*. Nor can the meaning of the provisional definition as *sādhyavadanyāvṛttitva* can be applied because in this inference that which is to be established is *ghaṭābhāva* and *ghaṭābhāvavadanya* is *ghaṭavadbhūtala* in which nothing exists by the relation of *viṣayitā* which is the *hetutāvacchedakasaṃbandha*. Therefore the final definition of invariable concomitance is given by Muktāvalīkāra.

Invariable concomitance is the co-occurrence of the reason with that which is to be established which is not a counter-positive of the absence that exists in that which has the reason. As for instance, in the inference 'mountain has fire because of smoke', the *sādhya*, viz. fire, is not the counterpositive of the absence of jar etc. which exists on the mountain which is the substratum of the reason, viz. smoke. The co-occurrence of such a *sādhya* with the reason is invariable concomitance.

An objection may be raised against this definition: although the mountain has fire still it has the absence of particular instances of fire such as fire as existing in the kitchen etc. Fire is the counterpositive of the absence of fire existing in the kitchen. Hence the definition has the fault of too narrow application. A possible answer to this objection is that the invariable concomitance is between fire and smoke as existing in the same substratum. This answer is not correct, because even in that case there could be the absence of two things of which one is that particular fire, i.e. although there is fire on the mountain still on the mountain there is an *ubhayābhāva* (absence of two things, e.g. mountain-fire and jar) the counterpositive of which is fire also which is not the mountain-fire. Further even on the mountain which has fire there is the absence of fire qualified by the state of being related to the kitchen (*mahānasīyatvaviśiṣṭavahnyabhāva*). Hence also there is the fault of too narrow application. These objections may be easily answered by pointing out that the absence on the substratum of reason should not be an instance of *viśiṣṭābhāva* or *ubhayābhāva*.

But then another objection may be raised. In the inference 'earth has quality because it is a substance', the earth has the quality of smell but it does not have other qualities such as oiliness etc. Therefore the substratum of substanceness which is the reason is also the substratum of the absence of the *sādhya*. Hence there is the fault of too narrow application.

Because of these possible objections the definition is made more exact: invariable concomitance is the co-occurrence of the reason with that which is determined by that which is the determinant of the state of being that which is to be established which is not the determinant of the counterpositiveness of the absence existing on the substratum of the reason (*pratiyogitānavacchedakaṃ yat sādhyatāvacchedakaṃ tadavacchinnasāmānādhikaraṇyaṃ vyāptiḥ*). When the definition is made more precise like this, then there is no fault of too narrow application in the case of the inference 'earth has quality because it is a substance'. The reason is that qualityness is

never the determinant of counterpositiveness of the absence which exists in the substratum of substanceness. Rāmarudra raises further a series of objections even against this refined definition and answers them. Details of these discussions can be found in the commentary to this section.

A further objection against the final definition of invariable concomitance is raised: in the inference 'it has that which has universal which is pervaded by colourness because it is earth (*rūpatvavyāpyajātimadvān pṛthvītvāt*)' that which is to be established is *rūpatvavyāpyajātimat* i.e. *śuklatva, nīlatva* and so on; those with such *rūpatvavyāpyajātis* are such colours as white, blue and so on and so, that which is to be established is white colour or any other colour. Therefore the determinants of those which have to be established *(sādhyatāvacchedakas)* are whiteness and so on which are universals pervaded by the universal colourness (*rūpatvavyāpyajātayaḥ*). But then they can also be the determinants of the counterpositiveness of the absence which exist in blue jar and so on which are also the substrata of the reason *pṛthvītva*. In this manner the *sādhyatāvacchedaka* becomes *pratiyogitāvacchedaka* and so there is the fault of too narrow application. This objection is rejected because here it is considered that the *sādhyatāvacchedaka* is not *rūpatvavyāpyajāti* i.e. *śuklatva* and so on but by indirect relation *rūpatvavyāpyajātitva* is taken as the *sādhyatāvacchedaka.*

Another answer to this objection is that the nature of invariable concomitance is different according to the difference in *sādhya* etc. Therefore in the inference *rūpatvavyāpyajātimadvān pṛthvītvāt* the form of invariable concomitance is that the determinant of the state of being determinant of that which is to be established is not the determinant of the state of being determinant of counterpositiveness of the absence existing in the substratum of the reason (*sādhyatāvacchedakatāvacchedakaṃ hetusamānādhikaraṇābhāvapratiyogitāvacchedakatānavacchedakam*). Here the *sādhyatāvacchedakatāvacchedaka* is *rūpatvavyāpyajātitva* and this is not the *abhāvapratiyogitāvacchedakatāvacchedaka* (i.e. *śuklatvatva* etc.). This is because in the earth there is no absence of that which has universal

pervaded by colourness and which is determined by the characteristic of universal (*rūpatvavyāpyajātitvāvacchinnajātimān pṛthivyāṃ nāsti iti pratītyabhāvaḥ*). Therefore there is no fault of too narrow application.

Further, the substratum of the reason should be understood as the substratum of that reason which is really qualified by the determinant of the state of being reason (*hetutāvacchedakena viśiṣṭasya adhikaraṇam*). Otherwise there would be the fault of too narrow application in the inference 'it is a substance because it has existence which is qualified by the difference from that existence which exists in quality and movement (*dravyaṃ guṇakarmānyatvaviśiṣṭasattvāt*). But when it is stated that the substratum of the reason should be qualified by the determinant of the state of being reason, then there is no fault. This is because the substratum which is qualified by the determinant of the state of being reason, i.e. here *guṇakarmānyatvaviśiṣṭasattātva* is only substance and not quality or movement.

In the definition of invariable concomitance the expression 'absolute absence which occurs in the same substratum of the reason (*hetusamānādhikaraṇātyantābhāva*)' is used. The precise meaning of the absence mentioned here is to be understood as not occurring along with its counterpositive (*pratiyogivyadhikaraṇābhāvaḥ*). Otherwise there would be the fault of too narrow application in such inferences as 'it has conjunction with a monkey because it is this tree'. In this inference 'treeness (*vṛkṣatva*)' is the reason and its substratum is 'this tree'. But in this tree though there is the conjunction of monkey on its branches, there is the absence of the conjunction of monkey on its roots. Therefore the conjunction of monkey is also the counterpositive of that absence. Hence there is the fault of too narrow application. When the absence in the substratum of the reason is taken as not occurring along with its counterpositive, then the absence of the conjunction of monkey on the roots of the tree cannot be taken. This is because this absence of monkey on the roots of the tree occurs

along with its counterpositive on the same substratum, this tree. Therefore there is no fault of too narrow application.

Now a further question is what exactly is the meaning of the expression 'not occurring in the same substratum of the reason (*pratiyogivyadhikaraṇatva*)'. One meaning of the expression is 'occurrence on something which is not the substratum of the counterpositive of the absence (*pratiyogyanadhikaraṇavṛttitva*)'. If this meaning is accepted then there would be the same fault of too narrow application, because the absence of conjunction of monkey in quality is the same as the absence of conjunction of monkey on the roots of the tree, since difference in absence is not accepted according to the difference in the substratum of the absence. Therefore the *sādhya* of the inference viz. conjunction of monkey becomes the counterpositive of the absence existing in the substratum of the reason. And so there would be the fault of too narrow application.

Another meaning of the expression *pratiyogivyadhikaraṇatva* is *pratiyogyadhikaraṇāvṛttitva* i.e. non-occurrence of the absence on the substratum of the counterpositive of the same absence. But then there would be the fault of over-extension in the false inference *saṃyogī sattvāt*, i.e. this has conjunction because it has existence.

Therefore the accepted meaning of *pratiyogivyadhikaraṇatva* is the absence existing in the substratum of the reason which (*substratum)* is not the substratum of the counterpositive of the absence (*svapratiyogyanadhikaraṇībhūtahetvadhikaraṇavṛttyabhāva*). By taking the expression in this way all the faults can be avoided.

It was stated that the meaning of *pratiyogivyadhikaraṇatva* is *svapratiyogyanadhikaraṇībhūtahetvadhikaraṇavṛttyabhāva* and *pratiyogyanadhikaraṇatva* in this expression is to be understood as *pratiyogitāvacchedakāvacchinnānadhikaraṇatvam.* Now the question is what is the precise meaning of *pratiyogitāvacchedakāvacchinnānadhikaraṇatvam.* First of all we cannot take it in the sense of *anadhikaraṇa* of any one of *pratiyogitāvacchedakāvacchinna* (i.e. *pratiyogin*), because

then there would be the same fault of too narrow application in the inference 'it has conjunction of monkey because it is this tree'. Further the expression cannot be taken in the sense of *anadhikaraṇa* of the *pratiyogitāvacchedakāvacchinna* in general, because in that case there would be no instance of *pratiyogivyadhikaraṇābhāva*, since all instances of absence are co-existent with their counterpositives in the form of the absence of its absence which is qualified by occurrence in the previous moment. Further the meaning cannot be *anadhikaraṇatva* of something which is determined by any one of the *pratiyogitāvacchedakas*, because there would be fault of too narrow application in the inference 'it has the absence of conjunction with monkey because it is a soul'. Hence the expression *pratiyogitāvacchedakāvachinnānadhikaraṇatvam* cannot be taken in any of these three meanings. Therefore the meaning of the definition should be understood in the following way: the substratum of the reason is not the substratum of that which is determined by the determinant of a particular counterpositiveness of the absence. And the *sādhyatāvacchedaka* is not the determinant of that counterpositiveness.

A further objection is that even if *pratiyogivyadhikaraṇatva* is accepted, there would be the fault of too narrow application in the inference 'time has jar because it (time) has the dimension of time (*kālo ghaṭavān kālaparimāṇāt*)', since infinite time is the substratum of all things and therefore also of all the counterpositives of all absences. One answer to this objection is that the absence of jar qualified by the difference from infinite time should be here taken as *pratiyogivyadhikaraṇābhāva*, since though infinite time is the substratum of jar it is not the substratum of the jar qualified by difference from infinite time.

But the real answer is that invariable concomitance should be defined as: in the counterpositiveness in general of the absence which occurs in the substratum of the reason which is not the substratum of the counterpositive by the relation of the determinant of counterpositiveness exists the absence of both the state of being determined by a particular characteristic

(*sādhyatāvacchedakadharma*) and the state of being determined by a particular relation (*sādhyatāvacchedakasaṃbandha*). The state of being pervader of a particular reason is that which is qualified by that particular characteristic by that same relation.

The last objection is that in the inference 'it has knowable fire because it has smoke (*prameyavahnimān dhūmāt*)', the state of being determined by knowable fireness (*prameya-vahnitvāvacchinnatva*) is unestablished because a cumbersome property cannot be the determinant of counterpositiveness. This is answered by pointing out that a property which is cumbersome also is accepted as the determinant of counter-positiveness.

Subjectness

K. defines subject as that thing where the certainty of that which is to be established without the absence of the desire to establish the same does not exist. Since this is the definition only of the subject, M. provides a definition of subjectness itself: subjectness is the absence of the certainty of that which is to be established qualified by the absence of the desire to establish the same. According to the old Naiyāyikas, subjectness is the doubt of *sādhya*. This opinion is rejected because even without the doubt of *sādhya* inferential knowledge arises as in the case of the inferential knowledge of cloud from the roar of the thunder.

Now it may be objected that the absence of the desire to establish cannot be a qualifier of certainty since there is no possibility of the simultaneous existence of the desire to establish the *sādhya*, consideration and certainty in the soul. This is because of the Nyāya principle that the special qualities of omnipresent substances do not exist simultaneously. This objection is rejected because it is possible to have an instance of consideration in which certainty is also a constituent part. Hence when there is perception or remembrance in the form that the mountain which has smoke that is pervaded by fire has fire and then there is the desire to establish the *sādhya*, there

would be inferential knowledge. And here subjectness can only be the absence of certainty which is qualified by the absence of the desire to establish the *sādhya*.

M. further makes the given definition of subjectness more precise in the following way: by the existence of which types of desire to establish the *sādhya* when there is the existence of certainty, inferential knowledge arises from which reason, for that instance of inferential knowledge, the absence of certainty which is qualified by the absence of those kinds of desires to establish is subjectness. By means of this precision of the definition of subjectness, the various forms of the desire to establish *sādhya* (*anumitsā*) which bring about the inferential knowledge when there is the certainty of the *sādhya* are included in the stimulating factors for bringing about inferential knowledge. By this precise definition of subjectness, other forms of desires which do not bring about inferential knowledge are also excluded.

Further the conditions under which the certainty of *sādhya* is considered as a hindering factor for inferential knowledge are specified. Even if there is the certainty of the *sādhya* in one subject, there can be inferential knowledge of the *sādhya* in all instances of the subject. Therefore, the hindering factor for inferential knowledge in all instances of subject is the certainty of the *sādhya* in all instances of the subject. But for the inferential knowledge of the *sādhya* in any one of the subjects the hindering factor is the certainty of the *sādhya* in all the subjects or in that particular subject.

Further, just as when there is the certainty of the *sādhya* inferential knowledge does not arise, similarly when there is the causal complex of the perceptual knowledge of a particular thing, the inferential knowledge of that particular thing does not arise. Therefore, Yajñapati Upādhyāya has included the absence of the causal complex of perceptual knowledge also in the definition of subjectness. This is rejected since according to the Naiyāyikas in general the presence of the causal complex of the perceptual knowledge of a particular thing is an independent hindering factor for the inferential

knowledge of that particular thing. This is because the causal complex of perceptual knowledge and the certainty of the *sādhya* cannot be hindering factors having one and the same consecutive characteristic. Therefore, they are considered as separate hindering factors. The reason for this is that the instances of desires which are stimulating factors for inferential knowledge do not have a consecutive characteristic.

General Definition of Fallacy

hetvābhāsaḥ is the Sanskrit word for fallacy and this word is explained in two ways. In K., the compound *hetvābhāsaḥ* is taken as meaning *hetuvad ābhāsante iti hetvābhāsāḥ* i.e. the reasons which appear as valid reasons; but in fact they are fallacious reasons. Another derivation of the compound *hetvābhāsāḥ* as *ṣaṣṭhītatpuruṣa* is *hetor ābhāsāḥ* i.e. the defects of reason. And this is the interpretation followed by M. and D. So the definition of fallacy as given in M. is *yadviṣaya-katvena jñānasya anumitivirodhitvam tattvam* i.e. a fallacy is the state of having something as the object of an instance of knowledge which prevents inferential knowledge. Thus for instance, the knowledge of Deviation and so on prevents inferential knowledge and so they are fallacies. As for example, in the invalid inference, 'there is smoke because of fire', we have the knowledge of Deviation in the form that fire deviates from smoke (wherever there is fire there is no smoke). Such a knowledge of Deviation prevents the inferential knowledge 'there is smoke because of fire'. Hence Deviation etc. which are objects of such instances of knowledge and which prevent the inferential knowledge in question are called fallacies.

Now an objection may be raised against this definition as follows: here, the meaning of the instrumental case (*yadviṣa-yakatvena*) is the state of being determinant.[1] As for example,

[1] Here, the meaning of the term *avacchedaka* i.e. determinant, should be clearly understood. When I say that I have the knowledge of jar (*ghaṭa-jñānam*), there is the characteristic of *viṣayatā* in jar since jar is the object of knowledge. In Nyāya terminology, in order to get precisely this meaning, we

the inferential knowledge *hrado vahnimān* is prevented by the knowledge *hrado vahnyabhāvavān*. Hence, the *anumitipratibandhakatāvacchedaka* i.e. the determinant of the state of being preventer of inferential knowledge is *vahnyabhāvavaddhradaviṣayakatva*. Accordingly, with reference to such inferences as 'mountain has fire because of smoke', there would be overextension in the absence of smoke. This is because even the erroneous definite knowledge of the absence of fire on the mountain is also a hindering factor for the inferential knowledge of fire on the mountain. Hence *vahnyabhāvaviṣayakatva* i.e. the state of having the object in the form of the absence of fire can also be considered as the determinant of the state of being preventer of inferential knowledge. Therefore valid reasons also would become fallacious.

In order to avoid this difficulty, M. interprets the expression *yadviṣayakatva* as *yādṛśaviśiṣṭaviṣayakatva* i.e. the state of having the object qualified by that characteristic. Therefore, even though the erroneous knowledge of contradiction prevents inferential knowledge, the mountain qualified by the absence of fire is not established. Therefore, *vahnyabhāvaviśiṣṭaparvataviṣayakatva* cannot be taken as *pratibandhakatāvacchedaka* and so there would not be any fault of overextension in *vahnyabhāva* etc.

Still it may be objected that there could be overextension in the absence of fire in the following way: one can take by the expression *yādṛśaviśiṣṭa* the absence of fire qualified by the state of being the absence of fire (*vahnyabhāvatvaviśiṣṭavahnyabhāvaḥ*). But this cannot be admitted because if the expression *yadviṣayakatva* is interpreted as *yādṛśaviśiṣṭaviṣayakatva*, the

assert that the *viṣayatā* in jar is determined by *ghaṭatva*, i.e. jarness. *ghaṭaniṣṭhaviṣayatā ghaṭatvāvacchinnā.* Here, the determinant (*avacchedaka*) of *viṣayatā* existing in jar is jarness (*ghaṭatva*). In non-technical language, this only means that we are talking here only of the instance of knowledge in which the object is jar and nothing else. It is this precision of meaning that is brought about by these technical terms. Similar is the meaning of the word *avacchedaka* in such expressions as *pratiyogitāvacchedaka, adhikaraṇatāvacchedaka* etc.

pratibandhakatāvacchedaka here is to be understood as *anatiriktavṛttitva*. But *vahnyabhāvatvaviśiṣṭaviṣayakatva* exists in the knowledge of mere *vahnyabhāva* which is not a hindering factor and so it is *atiriktavṛtti*. Hence *vahnyabhāvatvaviśiṣṭa-viṣayakatva* cannot be taken as *pratibandhakatāvacchedaka*. Therefore there is no overextension.

It may be further objected that there would be the fault of too narrow application in lake which is qualified by the absence of fire. This is because, *vahnyabhāvaviśiṣṭaviṣayakatva* exists in the knowledge of mere lake since mere lake does not differ from lake qualified by the absence of fire.

In order to avoid all these difficulties, D. interprets *yādṛśa-viśiṣṭaviṣayakatva* as *yadrūpāvacchinnaviṣayakatva* and *tattvam* in the definition is taken as *tadvattvam*. In this way, there would not be the fault of too narrow application because if *vahnyabhāvavaddhradatva* is taken by the word *yadrūpa*, then in the knowledge of mere lake there would not be *vahnya-bhāvavaddhradatvāvacchinnaviṣayakatva* because there is no *vahnyabhāvāvacchinnaviṣayakatva* in the knowledge *hrada* i.e. the knowledge of *hrada* has only *hradatvāvacchinna-viṣayakatva* and not also *vahnyabhāvācchinnaviṣayakatva*. Only the knowledge *vahnyabhāvavaddhrada* has *hradatvā-vacchinnaviṣayatā* and *vahnyabhāvāvacchinnaviṣayatā*. And *tattva* is interpreted as *tadvattvam* and so the definition means *vahnyabhāvahradatvavān* which is the same as *vahnyabhāva-vaddhrada* and this is a fallacy.

There are further objections also to this refined definition of fallacy and they too are answered. These objections and answers are given by Rāmarudra and they could be seen in the commentary to this section.

Individual Fallacies

There are five kinds of fallacious reasons: Deviant (*anaikānta*), Opposite (*viruddha*), Unestablished (*asiddha*), that which has a Counterthesis (*satpratipakṣa*) and Contradictory (*bādhita*).

1. Fallacy of Deviant Reason (*anaikānta*)

The first of these fallacious reasons is Deviant (*anaikānta*). This term is used by the old Naiyāyikas (*nyāyasūtras* 1.2.46). Modern Naiyāyikas usually denote *anaikānta* with the expression *savyabhicāra*. The term *anaikānta* means *ekaḥ antaḥ sapakṣo vipakṣo vā yasya saḥ ekāntaḥ sa na bhavatityanekāntaḥ.* The fallacy of Deviation (*anaikānta* or *vyabhicāra*) is defined as anyone among Common (*sādhāraṇa*), Uncommon (*asādhāraṇa*) or Inconclusive (*anupasaṃhārin*) fallacies.

a) *Common (sādhāraṇa)*

The first of the deviant fallacious reasons is Common. Common is defined as that which exists also in something which is different from that which has the *sādhya* (*sādhyavadanyavṛttiḥ*). As for instance, in the inference 'it has smoke because of fire', the reason, fire exists in red hot iron ball which has no *sādhya* viz. smoke. This fallacy prevents the knowledge of invariable concomitance i.e. the knowledge of the fallacy of Deviation prevents the knowledge of non-deviation which is a part of the definition of invariable concomitance. In this case, invariable concomitance is to be understood as *sādhyavadanyāvṛttitve sati sādhyasāmānādhikaraṇyam.* And in this definition of invariable concomitance, *sādhyavadanyāvṛttitvam* is a constituent part and this is prevented by the fallacy of Common which is *sādhyavadanyavṛtti.*

b) *Uncommon (asādhāraṇa)*

The fallacy of Uncommon exists in a reason which does not co-exist with the *sādhya* (*sādhyāsamānādhikaraṇam*). As for example in the inference 'sound is eternal because it has soundness', eternity exists in the soul where soundness does

not exist. Therefore the reason soundness is not co-existent with *sādhya.* Hence the co-existence of *sādhya* with *hetu* which is a part of invariable concomitance is not grasped. Therefore the reason has the fallacy of Uncommon.

c) *Inconclusive (anupasaṃhārin)*

The Inconclusive false reason is a reason the *sādhya* of which is not the counterpositive of the absolute absence (*atyantā-bhāvāpratiyogisādhyakādi*). This fallacy prevents the knowledge of negative invariable concomitance. The idea here is that in an inference where the *sādhya* is only affirmative (*kevalā-nvayi*) the inferential knowledge arises only through the knowledge of purely affirmative invariable concomitance. Here, it should be noted that the usual doctrine of the Naiyāyikas is that the *kevalānvayisādhyakahetu* is a valid reason but inferential knowledge is brought about by such a reason by means of the knowledge of invariable concomitance in the form of *vyāpakasāmānādhikaraṇya*, co-occurrence with the pervader of the reason. In this way, acceptance of Inconclusive as a false reason does not conflict with the Nyāya doctrine. This means that the *kevalānvayisādhyakahetu* is a false reason only in the opinion of those who hold that the knowledge of negative invariable concomitance is also necessary for inferential knowledge.

It should be noted here that the fallacies of Common, Uncommon and Inconclusive are considered as one type of fallacy because they all prevent the knowledge of invariable concomitance. The fallacy of Common prevents the knowledge of non-deviation which is a part of invariable concomitance, Uncommon hinders the knowledge of the co-existence of the reason with the *sādhya* which (co-existence) is a part of invariable concomitance and Inconclusive obstructs the knowledge of negative invariable concomitance.

2. Fallacy of Opposite Reason (*viruddha*)

The fallacious reason of Opposite is defined as that which is the counterpositive of the absence which is the pervader of

sādhya (*sādhyavyāpakībhūtābhāvāpratiyogitvam*) as for example 'the mountain has fire because of water'. Here water is the counterpositive of the absence which pervades fire, i.e. 'wherever there is fire there is the absence of water'. Such a fallacious reason prevents inferential knowledge since it is the causal complex for the knowledge of the absence of *sādhya*. Here, it may be asked: if the false reason of Opposite establishes the absence of *sādhya*, and the false reason having Counterthesis also brings about the knowledge of the absence of *sādhya*, what is the difference between these two kinds of false reasons? The answer is that when there is the fallacy of Counterthesis, it is another reason in the form of counter-reason that establishes the absence of *sādhya* whereas when there is the fallacy of Opposition, the same reason which is used to establish *sādhya* establishes actually the absence of *sādhya*.

3. Fallacy of Counterthesis (*satpratipakṣa*)

The fallacy of Counterthesis is the subject which is pervaded by the absence of *sādhya* (*sādhyābhāvavyāpyavān pakṣaḥ*). As for example, when one argues that 'the earth and so on have an agent because they are effects (*kṣityaṅkurādikaṃ sakartṛkaṃ kāryatvāt*)', the opponent argues that 'the earth and so on have no agent because they are not produced by someone having a body (*kṣityaṅkurādikaṃ na sakartṛkaṃ śarīrājanyatvāt*)'. And so according to the opponents, the reason 'being an effect (*kāryatva*)' suffers from the fallacy of Counterthesis. Here the fallacy of Counterthesis is that the earth and so on have the characteristic of not being produced by someone having a body and such a characteristic is pervaded according to the opponent by the absence of having an agent.

Now the question is why Counterthesis should be considered as a fallacy or in other words, what is the defect (*dūṣakatābījam*) which makes Counterthesis a fallacy. It is the fact that each of the considerations prevents the inferential knowledge caused by the other consideration. As for example, in the inference 'sound is eternal because it has soundness', there is the fallacy of Counterthesis since it can be argued also that

'sound is not eternal because it is produced'. Here the consideration 'sound has soundness' which is pervaded by eternity prevents the inferential knowledge that sound is non-eternal and the consideration that the sound has the state of being produced which is pervaded by non-eternity prevents the inferential knowledge that the sound is eternal. In this way, when there is the fallacy of Counterthesis, no inferential knowledge arises.

According to Ratnakośakāra, Counterthesis is a fallacy because it produces inferential knowledge in the form of a doubt and not because it prevents inferential knowledge. Such an opinion is rejected because the knowledge of the state of having that which is pervaded by the absence of a particular thing hinders all instances of knowledge which are not produced by ordinary apprehensional connection and some particular defect and in which that particular thing is the object. Hence that which is hindered includes all instances of knowledge which are produced by the apprehensional connection in the form of knowledge, all instances of verbal knowledge and all instances of inferential knowledge.

4. Fallacy of Unestablishedness of Reason (*asiddhi*)

The fallacy of Unestablishedness of reason is defined as one of the fallacies beginning with Unestablishedness of the subject and so on. This means that Unestablishedness is either Unestablishedness of the subject (*āśrayāsiddhi*), Unestablishedness of nature (*svarūpāsiddhi*) or Unestablishedness of invariable concomitance (*vyāpyatvāsiddhi*).

a) *Unestablishedness of the Subject (āśrayāsiddhi)*

The Fallacy of Unestablishedness of the subject is the absence of the determinant of the subjectness in the subject (*pakṣe pakṣatāvacchedakasyābhāvaḥ*). As for instance, in the inference 'golden mountain has fire', if there arises the knowledge that mountain is not golden, then such a knowledge prevents the knowledge that the golden mountain has that which is pervaded by fire. In this way, the absence of the knowledge of

the goldenness of the mountain hinders the inferential knowledge 'golden mountain has fire' by preventing the consideration that the golden mountain has that which is pervaded by fire. Unestablishedness of the subject prevents inferential knowledge directly also. As for instance, the knowledge of the absence of the goldenness of the mountain prevents the inferential knowledge 'golden mountain has fire'.

b) *Unestablishedness of Nature (svarūpāsiddhi)*

The Fallacy of the Unestablishedness of nature (*svarūpāsiddhi*) is the absence of that which is considered as pervaded by *sādhya* in the subject (*pakṣe vyapyatvābhimatasyābhāvaḥ*). As for example, in the inference 'lake is a substance because it has smoke', there is the fallacy of Unestablishedness of nature. The reason is that in the subject viz. lake, when the absence of the reason viz. smoke which is considered to be pervaded by substanceness which is the *sādhya* is apprehended, consideration in the form 'lake has smoke' which is pervaded by substanceness does not arise. In this way, by preventing consideration, the fallacy of Unestablishedness of nature hinders inferential knowledge, 'lake is a substance'.

It may be asked why in the definition mention is made of the absence of that which is considered to be pervaded by the absence of *sādhya* instead of the absence of that which is pervaded by *sādhya* (*vyāpyatvābhimatasyābhāvaḥ na tu vyāpyābhāvaḥ*). The answer is that just as the absence of that which is pervaded, so also the absence of that which is determined by the determinant of the state of being reason also is to be considered as the fallacy of the Unestablishedness of nature even though it may not be actually pervaded by the *sādhya*. Other Naiyāyikas give different definitions of the fallacy of Unestablishedness of nature.

c) *Unestablishedness of Invariable Concomitance (vyāpyatvāsiddhi)*

The fallacy of Unestablishedness of invariable concomitance occurs in such inferences as 'it has fire because it has blue

smoke'. Here, the determinant of the state of being reason is blue smokeness. This is a cumbersome property and so this cannot be accepted as the real determinant of the state of being reason. This is because when there is a property which is less cumbersome, a cumbersome property cannot be accepted as the determinant of the state of being reason. Here, blue smokeness is cumbersome in comparison with mere smokeness which can really be accepted as the determinant of the state of being reason. Hence, in the inference, 'it has fire because it has blue smoke', there is the fallacy of Unestablishedness of invariable concomitance.

5. Fallacy of Contradiction (*bādha*)

The fallacy of Contradiction is defined as the absence of *sādhya* and so on in the subject (*pakṣe sādhyābhāvādiḥ bādhaḥ*) and such a fallacy directly prevents inferential knowledge. As for example, the inferential knowledge 'the lake has fire' is prevented by the knowledge 'the lake has no fire'. Therefore, the absence of fire in the lake (*hrade vahnyabhāvaḥ*) is the fallacy of Contradiction. Similarly the lake is different from that which has fire (*hrado vahnimadanyaḥ*), fire not existing in the lake (*hradāvṛttiḥ vahniḥ*) are given as further examples of Contradiction.

The fallacy of Contradiction directly prevents inferential knowledge because of the general principle that the definite knowledge of the absence of a particular thing in a particular substratum contradicts all instances of knowledge of that particular thing in that particular substratum. This instance of knowledge which is contradicted should not be produced by ordinary apprehensional connection and by a particular defect (*taddharmikatadabhāvaniścayo laukikasannikarṣājanyadoṣaviśeṣājanyataddharmikajñānamātre virodhī*). The exact way in which this principle is to be understood is a subject of detailed discussions in advanced Nyāya texts.

Means of Grasping Invariable Concomitance

In the section on qualities, K.M.D.R. examine also some topics which directly deal with various aspects of inference.[1] First of all there is a short section on the means of grasping invariable concomitance. Since the nature of invariable concomitance has been elaborately dealt with in the earlier sections of K.M.D.R., by the Relevance of Connection (*prasaṅga*), now the texts deal with the means of grasping invariable concomitance. They are non-apprehension of deviation and apprehension of co-existence of the *sādhya* with reason. Apprehension of deviation is a hindrance for the knowledge of invariable concomitance since it prevents the knowledge that the *sādhya* is the pervader. Therefore, the absence of the knowledge of deviation is the cause for grasping invariable concomitance. Similarly the knowledge of the co-existence of the *sādhya* with reason through agreement and disagreement is also a cause of grasping invariable concomitance.

Repeated perception of the reason along with the *sādhya* is not a cause of grasping invariable concomitance because there could arise the knowledge of invariable concomitance even by one perception of reason and *sādhya* provided there is no knowledge of deviation. But repeated perception is useful when there is doubt of deviation. When many perceptions of reason and *sādhya* do not remove the doubt of deviation, one has to make use of hypothetical reasoning (*tarka*) which will remove the knowledge of anything opposed to the knowledge of invariable concomitance.

Hypothetical reasoning is a kind of imposition in the form of an assumed knowledge. 'If smoke deviates from fire, smoke would not be produced from fire' is an instance of hypothetical reasoning. Here imposition is the knowledge of deviation of fire in smoke, and this is a kind of assumed knowledge. Hypothetical reasoning is of two kinds: that which examines

[1] The text, translation and interpretation of the parts dealing with these topics are given in the appendix since they are not treated in the section on Inference in K.M.D.R.

the existence of a particular thing (*viṣayapariśodhakatarka*), as for instance 'if something has no fire, it will have no smoke'; and that which brings about the knowledge of invariable concomitance (*vyāptigrāhakatarka*), as for instance, 'if smoke deviates from fire, it would not be produced by fire'. Naturally the second kind of hypothetical reasoning is discussed in K.M.D.R.

Such a hypothetical reasoning removes the doubt of deviation and in this way helps one grasp invariable concomitance. Here it may be objected that the basis of hypothetical reasoning is the knowledge of that which imposes which is pervaded by that which is imposed. In order to establish the invariable concomitance involved in this, another hypothetical reasoning is needed and thus there would be infinite regress. This objection is answered by pointing out that there is no such infinite regress because where there is no causal complex of doubt of deviation there is also no doubt and there is no need of hypothetical reasoning.

A further objection is that hypothetical reasoning does not remove doubt of deviation because such a doubt is removed by the knowledge of invariable concomitance which is the cause of hypothetical reasoning. D. summarises three answers to this objection, the most satisfactory of which seems to be the following: it may be conceded that a non-assumed doubt (*anāhāryaśaṅkā*) may be removed by the knowledge of invariable concomitance. But an assumed doubt (*āhāryaśaṅkā*) cannot be removed by the knowledge of invariable concomitance; such an assumed doubt can be removed only by hypothetical reasoning because hypothetical reasoning produces aversion for the knowledge which imposes an unacceptable thing. The details of this answer as well as other answers to this objection can be found in the commentary to this section.

Additional Condition (*upādhi*)

After discussing the means of grasping invariable concomitance, one remembers additional condition since it produces the doubt of deviation. Therefore, additional condition is treated here by the Relevance of Occasion (*prasaṅga*). K. defines additional condition as that which is the pervader of that which is to be established and that which is not the pervader of the reason. M. refines this definition as follows; "while being the pervader of that which is considered as that which is to be established that which is not the pervader of that which is considered as the reason". D. explains that M. adds the expression 'that which is considered (*abhimata*)' as the qualification of both *sādhya* and the reason because when there is actually an additional condition, there is in fact no real *sādhya* and reason. But then the difficulty is that when there is no such consideration in the form of an erroneous knowledge (*abhimāna*), there is no possibility of additional condition. Therefore, D. makes the definition of additional condition more precise; when there is the state of being the pervader of something which is qualified by some particular characteristic, that which is not the pervader of something which is qualified by some (other) particular characteristic, is the additional condition in the reason which is qualified by that particular characteristic and which has that which is to be established qualified by that particular characteristic. As for example, in the inference 'it has smoke because it has fire' there is an additional condition in the form of conjunction with wet fuel. This conjunction with wet fuel is the pervader of that which is qualified by smokeness and it is the non-pervader of that which is qualified by fireness. It should be noted that in the definition of additional condition being the pervader of *sādhya* and not being the pervader of reason should be understood by the same qualifier and by the same relation.

But this definition will not apply in case of the invalid inference 'he is of dark complexion because he is the son of Mitrā'. Because here, the additional condition in the form of

the state of being produced by the digestion of vegetables does not pervade the dark colour in jar and so on. There will be other faults also in other instances of additional condition and therefore M. gives a more precise definition of additional condition; additional condition is the pervader of that which is to be established which is determined by the particular characteristic and at the same time not the pervader of the reason which is determined by that particular characteristic (*yaddharmāvacchinnasādhyavyāpakatvam taddharmāvacchinnasādhanāvyāpakatvam*). Thus the state of being produced by the digestion of vegetables is the pervader of dark colour qualified by the state of being the son of Mitrā and it is at the same time not the pervader of the state of being the son of Mitrā. The implication of this definition is made explicit by M. itself. An additional condition will pervade the *sādhya* as qualified by the state of being one of the two viz. the substratum of the additional condition which (viz. substratum) is the substratum of the *sādhya* or that which is the substratum of deviation of that which is to be established but bereft of additional condition. Thus in the inference 'there is smoke because of fire', the additional condition is conjunction with wet fuel (*ārdrendhanasaṃyogaḥ*); the substratum of additional condition is kitchen; kitchen is also the substratum of *sādhya* viz. smoke. Red hot iron ball is bereft of additional condition. But it is also the substratum of the deviation of *sādhya* which is determined by the state of being red hot iron ball. The additional condition viz. conjunction with wet fuel pervades the *sādhya* which is determined by the state of being either kitchen or red hot iron ball. At the same time, such an additional condition does not pervade the reason, viz. fire. The purpose of various elements in the definition is explained by D. This can be seen in the commentary to this section.

Defined in this way, the nature of the additional condition is that it is co-existent with the *sādhya*. In one of the substratum of the reason, there will be the deviation of the additional condition and of the *sādhya*. As for example, in the inference 'there is smoke because of fire', there is always the

co-existence of conjunction with wet fuel which is the additional condition with smoke which is the *sādhya*. In red hot iron ball which is one of the substrata of fire which is the reason here, there is neither conjunction with wet fuel which is the additional condition nor with smoke which is the *sādhya*. Further the purpose of additional condition is to bring about the knowledge of deviation of *sādhya* in the reason. In other words, the deviation of additional condition in the reason brings about the inferential knowledge of the deviation of *sādhya* in the reason.

When it is sure that there is no contradiction in the subject the thing which is different from the subject (*pakṣetara*) is not an additional condition. But when it is sure that there is contradiction in the subject, *pakṣetara* can be taken as an additional condition. When it is doubted whether the additional condition pervades the *sādhya* or not there is doubtful additional condition.

According to some Naiyāyikas, the purpose of additional condition is to point out a Counterthesis. With reference to the inference 'red hot iron ball has smoke' the Counterthesis is 'red hot iron ball has no smoke because it has no conjunction with wet fuel'. Parīkṣit Thampurān shows the incongruity in this opinion since in that case, it would not be possible to consider a thing which is different from the subject (*pakṣetara*) as additional condition. The reason for this statement can be seen from the commentary to this section.

Kinds of Inference

There are three kinds of inference. They are purely affirmative (*kevalānvayī*), purely negative (*kevalavyatireki*) and affirmative cum negative (*anvayavyatireki*). The purely affirmative inference is that in which there is no contradicted subject (*vipakṣa*). As for instance, 'jar is nameable because it is knowable'. Here there is nothing where there is the absence of knowability; hence there is no contradicted subject viz. a subject where there is no *sādhya*. The purely negative inference is that

inference in which there is no definite subject (*sapakṣa*), as for example, the 'earth' is different from other things because it has 'smell'. This is because it is not established earlier that there is something which is different from the thirteen categories (five categories i.e. quality, movement, universal, particularity, inherence and eight other substances, i.e. water, fire, air, ether, time, space, soul and mind) and so no example of definite subject (*sapakṣa*) can be given. That which has the mutual absence of these thirteen categories is earth. The inference which is positive cum negative (*anvayavyatireki*) is that where there are both definite subject and definite contradicted subject. As for instance, in the case of the inference 'it has fire because of smoke', the definite subject is kitchen and so on and the definite contradicted subject is lake etc.

A negative inference is produced by the knowledge of negative invariable concomitance. Therefore, a definition of negative invariable concomitance is given; when the absence of reason is the pervader of that which is to be established, there is negative invariable concomitance. As for instance in the case of the inference 'there is fire because of smoke', the form of the negative invariable concomitance is the following: 'wherever there is the absence of fire, there is the absence of smoke'.

M. also describes the precise sense in which this definition of negative invariable concomitance is to be understood. The point of this technical explanation in M. is that where there is smoke by the relation of conjunction there is also fire by the relation of conjunction and therefore where there is the absence of fire by the relation of conjunction there is also the absence of smoke by the relation of conjunction. Therefore where there is the absence of the difference from the thing different from the earth (*itarabhedābhāva*) existing in water etc. there is the absolute absence of smell. But where in the absence of smell, the pervadedness of the thing different from earth is grasped by the relation of identity, there the absence of the thing different from the earth is established by the relation of identity. This means that in mutual absence, the counter-

positiveness is determined by the relation of identity. Thus where there is the mutual absence of that which is different from the earth, there is the absence of smell. In this way, the mutual absence of that which is different from the earth is established.

According to Udayana, through the negative co-existence, only positive invariable concomitance is grasped. Hence, negative invariable concomitance is not a cause of inferential knowledge. This opinion of Udayana is rejected because of incongruity since the knowledge of negative invariable concomitance is not needed for the knowledge of positive concomitance.

Presumption is Included in Negative Invariable Concomitance

The Naiyāyikas aruge that presumption is not an independent means of valid knowledge. The Mīmāṃsakas on the contrary hold that Presumption is an independent means of valid knowledge. As for example if one knows that Devadatta is alive and if he is not in the house, then it is presumed that he is somewhere outside the house. The Mīmāṃsakas hold that in instances of knowledge such as this a separate means of valid knowledge is to be accepted. This is rejected by the Naiyāyikas because such a knowledge can be obtained through negative invariable concomitance. As for example if it is known that Devadatta is alive, then it is also known that he is either in the house or outside the house. If he is not in the house, then it is inferred that he is outside the house.[1] Similarly there are instances of knowledge such as 'the fat Devadatta does not eat during the day'; but here it is known that fatness is pervaded by eating. Hence the necessity of the fact of eating is

[1] The form of the inference is: Devadatta is outside the house because being alive he is not in the house. That which is not so is not so (*Devadattaḥ bahirsattvavān jīvitve sati gṛhāsattvāt; yannaivam tannaivam*). But he is not in the house; therefore he is outside the house.

established. Therefore, when it is not perceived that Devadatta is eating during the day it is concluded that he is eating during the night.

Further, according to Naiyāyikas non-perception (*anupa-laṃbha*) is also not a means of valid knowledge as the Bhāṭṭa Mīmāṃsakas and the Vedāntins hold. The reason is that non-apprehension of jar is considered as the cause of the knowledge of the absence of jar. But if non-apprehension itself is not known earlier, then the knowledge which arises from non-apprehension would be perceptual knowledge. This is because knowledge which does not arise from another knowledge is defined as perceptual knowledge. If the non-apprehension however is known earlier, then for this knowledge of non-apprehension there should be another instance of the knowledge of non-apprehension. In this way there would be the fault of infinite regress. Similarly, bodily gesture is also not to be considered as a different means of valid knowledge. This is because gesture bringing about the remembrance of the word appropriate to it, like a script gives rise to the remembrance of the appropriate word. In this way, gesture is included in word, one of the valid means of knowledge. Although a person who is deaf and dumb from birth onwards, cannot remember the word, he infers the intention of the person from his gesture. Therefore, this is included in inferential knowledge.

II. Analysis of *anumānakhaṇḍa*

Nature of Inferential Knowledge

Analysis of Kārikāvalī and Muktāvalī: *Kārikās* 66cd and 67a describe the process of inferential knowledge: first of all it is mentioned that knowledge of invariable concomitance is the instrumental cause of inferential knowledge and consideration is its operation. M. first describes the process of cognizing the invariable concomitance and then points out the manner in which consideration arises by means of an example. (Text 1A, p.61, ln 3 – p.62, ln 2)

Analysis of Dinakarī: D. points out the relation of cause and effect (*upajīvayopajīvakabhāva*) as the Relevance in treating inference after perception. Further D. shows the reason why M. gives an example in order to explain how consideration arises. It is because at the actual time of inference the knowledge of invariable concomitance which has been obtained does not exist any more and therefore because of the absence of the cause, inference cannot arise. D. answers this difficulty pointing out that the perception of the reason in as far as it is a reviver is the cause of the remembrance of invariable concomitance. Further D. explains that a particular kind of smoke with a particular characteristic would serve as a reviver of the remembrance of invariable concomitance and therefore the expression 'not cut off from its origin (*avicchinnamūlām*)' is used. D. also mentions a further objection and answers it. It is objected that consideration in the form of a qualified knowledge is not always necessary to bring about inferential knowledge. Inferential knowledge can also be brought about by consideration in which there is no knowledge of the relationship of that which is qualified by something else. This objection is answered by pointing out that if consideration is not an instance of qualified cognition then it should be specified that it is in the form of certainty; but if consideration

is accepted as a qualified knowledge then the qualification of certainty need not be added, since every instance of qualified knowledge has necessarily to be certain. (Text 1A, p.62, ln 3 – p.64, ln 3)

D. further mentions the opinion of the modern Naiyāyikas that mind is the instrumental cause of Inferential knowledge and not the knowledge of invariable concomitance. (Text 1A, p.64, lns 4–6)

Knowledge of Reason is not the Instrumental Cause

Analysis of Kārikāvalī and Muktāvalī: *Kārikā* 67bcd refutes the opinion of the old Naiyāyikas that the instrumental cause of inferential knowledge is the reason which is being known. The reason for rejecting this opinion is that in that case there would be no inferential knowledge by means of a reason which will exist only in the future or which has ceased to exist. M. just adds the reason why there would not be any inferential knowledge: at the time of inference there will be no reason if the reason will exist only in the future or if it has ceased to exist. (Text 1B, p.81, lns 4–10)

Analysis of Dinakarī: D. first of all explains the arguments of the old Naiyāyikas. D. further argues that the position of the old Naiyāyikas cannot be supported by pointing out that a past reason can exist in the present by means of a relation in the form of consideration because a reason which has ceased to exist or which will exist in future cannot produce consideration. However D. presents also an additional reason why the view of the moderns is to be preferred. The reason is that according to the moderns for inferential knowledge by the relation of inherence, consideration by the relation of inherence is the cause and this is logically simpler than the opinion of the old Naiyāyikas. (Text 1B, p.82, ln 1 – p.83, ln 2)

Definition and Form of Consideration

Analysis of Kārikāvalī and Muktāvalī: *Kārikā* 68ab gives the definition of consideration: it is the knowledge that that which has the invariable concomitance exists in the subject. M. describes the two forms of consideration viz. that which has invariable concomitance is in the subject and the subject has that which has invariable concomitance. It also points out the form of inferential knowledge from these two considerations. M. provides also the outlines of the argument between the Mīmāṃsakas and the Naiyāyikas on consideration. According to the Mīmāṃsakas the knowledge which has as object the relationship of that which is qualified by invariable concomitance (*vyāptiviśiṣṭavaiśiṣṭyajñāna*) is not always necessary for inferential knowledge whereas according to the Naiyāyikas such a knowledge is indispensable to produce the inferential knowledge. The reason in support of the position of the Naiyāyikas is that first of all even where there is no knowledge of the determinant of that which is pervaded, there could be inferential knowledge. There is also simplicity in the position of the Naiyāyikas. (Text 2, p.88, ln 3 – p.91, ln 5)

Analysis of Dinakarī: After explaining the meaning of the M. text Dinakara concludes that only that consideration which has the subject as qualificand is the cause of inferential knowledge and he further points out that this is the reason why in the application (*upanaya*) the subject (*pakṣa*) is the qualificand (*vahnivyāpyadhūmavāṃścāyam*). D. describes the exact position of the Naiyāyikas: the cause of inferential knowledge is the knowledge in which the qualificandness of the subject is indicated by the qualifierness of the reason, which is indicated by the qualifierness of the invariable concomitance. Therefore from such instances of knowledge as 'smoke is pervaded by fire' and 'mountain has light' or from the knowledge 'smoke is pervaded by fire' and 'mountain has smoke' inferential knowledge does not arise. (Text 2, p.91, ln 4 – p.97, ln 2)

Provisional Definition of Invariable Concomitance

Analysis of Kārikāvalī and Muktāvalī: *Kārikā* 68cd gives the provisional definition of invariable concomitance; it is the absence of the relation (of the reason) with any thing other than the *sādhya*. Muktāvalīkāra shows how this definition is applied pointing out the particular relation of the reason with the subject (*pakṣa*) etc. which have to be specifically taken into account in applying the definition in order to avoid the faults of too narrow application or overextension. (Text 3A, p.114, ln 3 – p.116, ln 4)

Analysis of Dinakarī: Dinakara examines more closely how the faults of too narrow application and overextension can arise and concludes that the definition has no such faults. (Text 3A, p.116, ln 5 – p.117, ln 4)

Final Definition of Invariable Concomitance

Analysis of Kārikāvalī and Muktāvalī: *Kārikā* 69 gives the final definition of invariable concomitance: it is the co-occurrence of the reason with that which is to be established which is not the counterpositive of an absence that exists in that which has the reason.

M. first of all gives the reason why this final definition is given. This is because the provisional definition does not apply in the case of inferences where that which is to be established is purely affirmative such as knowability and so on. Besides, there will be the fault of too narrow application in such inferences as 'it has existence because it has universal'. This is because in universal and so on which are other than that which is to be established nothing occurs by the relation of inherence which is the relation of the determinant of the state of being reason.

Now M. raises certain difficulties against this definition of invariable concomitance. In the inferences such as 'the mountain has fire because of smoke', on the mountain there is the absence of the particular instances of fire such as fire in the kitchen etc. Therefore, the fire in the kitchen is the counterpositive of the absence of the fire on the mountain. Therefore there is

the fault of too narrow application. The argument that the invariable concomitance is between smoke and fire as existing in the same substratum cannot be accepted because then there would be the absence even of particular instance of fire in the form of the absence of both. This is because although one is there both are not there. Further there is the fault of too narrow application in such inferences as 'it has quality because it is a substance'. Therefore a new definition of invariable concomitance is given: it is the occurrence of the reason with that which is determined by that which is the determinant of the state of being that which is to be established and which is not the determinant of counterpositiveness. (Text 3B, p.127, ln 3 – p.128, ln 7)

A further objection is that in such inferences as 'it has that which has universal pervaded by colourness because it is earth' the determinants of that which is to be established are the universals which are pervaded by colourness. These universals, whiteness etc., are the determinants of the counterpositiveness of the absence which occurs in blue jar etc. and so the definition would suffer from the fault of too narrow application. This objection is answered pointing out that here the determinant of that which is to be established is indirectly the universalness in that which is pervaded by colourness. Another answer is that because of the difference of that which is to be established there is difference of invariable concomitance and so the definition of invariable concomitance in these instances is that the determinant of the state of being determinant of the state of being that which is to be established is not the determinant of the state of being the determinant of the counterpositiveness. (Text 3B, p.128, ln 7 – p.129, ln 7)

Further the substratum of reason is to be understood as the substratum of that which is qualified by the determinant of the state of being reason. Therefore there will not be the fault of too narrow application in such inferences as 'it is a substance because it has existence which is qualified by the difference from quality and movement'. Further the substratum of reason is to be understood by the relation of the determinant of the state of being reason and so there is no fault of too narrow application

in such inferences as 'it has fire because it has smoke' although there is absence of fire in parts of smoke by the relation of inherence. (Text 3B, p.129, ln 7 – p.130, ln 3)

Now the absence occurring in the substratum of the reason should be understood as the absence not occurring along with its counterpositive. (*pratiyogivyadhikaraṇābhāva*). The absence not occurring along with its counterpositive can be understood in two ways: (1) the occurrence on something which is not the substratum of the counterpositive (*pratiyogyanadhikaraṇa-vṛttitva*) and (2) non-occurrence in the substratum of the counterpositive (*pratiyogyadhikaraṇāvṛttitva*). Both these meanings of the absence occurring along with the counterpositive cannot be admitted because of faults. Hence the meaning of the absence not occurring along with the counterpositive is to be understood as the absence in the substratum of the reason of that which is qualified by the occurrence in something which is not the substratum of the counterpositive (of the same absence). This means that the absence occurs in the substratum of the reason which is not the substratum of its counterpositive.(Text 3B, p.130, ln 3 – p.131, ln 5)

The state of not being the substratum of the counterpositive means the state of not being the substratum of that which is determined by the determinant of counterpositiveness. Hence there is no fault of overextension in such inferences as 'it has qualified existence because it has universal'.

Further the state of not being the substratum of the counterpositive is to be understood by the relation of the determinant of the state of being that which is to be established. Hence in such inferences as 'it has knowledge because it has existence' there is no fault of overextension. Similarly in such inferences as 'it has fire because it has smoke' there is no fault of too narrow application although there is the absence of fire by the relation of inherence in the substratum of smoke. (Text 3B, p.131, ln 5 – p. 132, ln 4)

Now the question is whether the state of not being the substratum of the counterpositive refers to any one of the counterpositives which are determined by the determinants of

the counterpositiveness or does it refer to the counterpositives in general or does it refer to the state of not being the substratum of that which is determined by any determinant of the counterpositiveness. In the first case as before there would be the fault of too narrow application in such inferences as 'it has contact with monkey because it is this tree'. In the second instance the absence which does not exist with its counterpositive is unestablished. In the third case, there would be the fault of too narrow application in such inferences as 'it has absence of conjunction with monkey because it is a soul'. These difficulties are solved by pointing out that the definition is to be understood in the sense that the substratum of the reason is not the substratum of that which is determined by the particular determinant of counterpositiveness (of the absence). This determinant of the counterpositiveness (of the absence) is not the determinant of the state of being that which is to be established. (Text 3B, p.132, ln 4 – p.134, ln 8)

A further objection is that in such inferences as 'time has jar because it has the dimension of time' the absence which does not exist along with its conterpositive is unestablished. One answer to this objection is that the absence of jar qualified by the difference from infinite time is an absence which does not occur along with its counterpositive. But in fact the answer is that in the counterpositiveness in general of the absence which occurs in the substratum of the reason which is not the substratum of the counterpositive by the relation of the determinant of counterpositiveness exists the absence of both the state of being determined by a particular characteristic and the state of being determined by a particular relation. The state of being the pervader of a particular reason is to be understood as that which is qualified by that particular characteristic by that same relation. (Text 3B, p.135, ln 1 – p.136, ln 5)

The last objection is that in such inferences as 'it has knowable fire because it has smoke' the state of being determined by knowable fireness is unestablished because a property which is cumbersome cannot be a determinant. This objection is answered

by stating that a property which is cumbersome is also accepted as a determinant. (Text 3B, p.136, ln 5–9)

Analysis of Dinakarī: Dinakara first of all gives a reason why a second objection is raised against the provisional definition. The reason is that when that which is to be established is purely affirmative there can be no doubt about its existence in anything whatever, and doubt about the existence of that which is to be established is subjectness according to the old Naiyāyikas. If there is the absence of the knowledge that the reason is purely affirmative then inferential knowledge arises from erroneous knowledge.

An objection is raised against the possibility of the fault of too narrow application in the case of the provisional definition of invariable concomitance. The objection is that the provisional definition is to be understood as the state of being the indicator of the mutual absence of the substratum of that which is to be established which (i.e. the mutual absence) does not occur in the substratum of the reason (*svādhikaraṇāvṛttisādhyavadanyonyā-bhāvakatvam*).

This objection cannot be admitted because non-occurrence of the mutual absence in the substratum of the reason is to be accepted necessarily by the relation which determines the state of being the hindering factor for the knowledge of the state of being that which has that which is to be established (*sādhya-vattāgrahavirodhitāniyāmakasaṃbandhena anyonyābhāvasya avṛttitvaṃ avaśyaṃ vivakṣaṇīyam*). But then there would be the fault of too narrow application in such inferences as 'it has absence of existence because it has absence of universal'. Further explanations of this objection and answers to them are to be seen in the commentary to this section. (Text 3B, p.137, ln 1 – p.139, ln 2)

Dinakara points out that on the mountain there is besides the *ubhayābhāva* (absence of two things e.g. mountain fire and jar), there is also the absence of the qualified (*viśiṣṭābhāva*) i.e. there is the absence of fire qualified by the state of being related to kitchen. Another instance of valid inference where the given

definition of invariable concomitance cannot be applied is given: 'earth has quality because it is a substance'. Further comments on this are to be seen in the commentary to this section. (Text 3B, p.139, ln 2 – p.141, ln 4)

Now Dinakara explains the M. statement that the substratum of reason should be understood as the substratum of that reason which is really qualified by the determinant of the state of being reason. He rejects also the faults of too narrow application etc. (Text 3B, p.141, ln 4 – p.142, ln 5)

After explaining some expressions of the M. text Dinakara raises the following objection: the state of being non-substratum of its counterpositive should be understood by the relation of the determinant of its counterpositiveness and by means of this the overextension in such cases as 'it has knowledge because it has existence' can be avoided. But then there would be the fault of too narrow application in valid inferences such as 'it has fire because it has smoke'. Therefore the state of not being the substratum of the couterpositive is to be understood by the relation of the determinant of the state of being that which is to be established. If in order to avoid this fault of too narrow application the second counterpositiveness (*pratiyogitā*) is accepted as determined by the relation determining the state of being that which is to be established (*sādhyatāvacchedaka-saṃbandha*) then there would be cumbersomeness due to the double usage of relation with reference to the counterpositiveness. (Text 3B, p.142, ln 6 – p.144, ln 7)

Dinakara gives some explanations for some expressions in the M. text and gives an answer to the possible objection with reference to the absence qualified by existence in the previous moment. The objection is that *pūrvakṣaṇavṛttitvaviśiṣṭaghaṭā-bhāvābhāva* is the counterpositive of *pūrvakṣaṇavṛttitvaviśiṣṭa-ghaṭābhāva* and not of *ghaṭābhāva*. The answer is that *pūrva-kṣaṇavṛttitvaviśiṣṭaghaṭābhāvābhāvābhāva* and *pūrvakṣaṇavṛtti-tvaviśiṣṭaghaṭābhāva* are the same and therefore *pūrvakṣaṇa-vṛttitvaviśiṣṭaghaṭābhāva* is not different from mere *ghaṭābhāva*. Hence that which is the counterpositive of *pūrvakṣaṇavṛttitva-viśiṣṭaghaṭābhāva* is also the counterpositive of mere *ghaṭābhāva*.

Therefore there is the fault of impossibility of *pratiyogivyadhikaraṇābhāva*. Dinakara continues the explanations of various expressions in the M. text. (Text 3B, p.144, ln 7 – p.148, ln 2)

Dinakara now takes up the objection in M. viz. there would be the fault of too narrow application in such inferences as, 'time has jar because it (time) has dimension of time'. Here Dinakara just comments on some expressions in M. text and shows the more precise meanings of the same. (Text 3B, p.148, ln 2 – p.150, ln 4)

Finally Dinakara takes up the objection in M. that in such inferences as 'it has knowable fire because it has smoke', the state of being determined by knowable fire is unestablished because a property which is cumbersome cannot be the determinant of counterpositiveness. Here Dinakara explains what is intended by the expression 'summary' in M. If it is asserted that *kaṃbugrīvādimatpratiyogikābhāva* only is understood and not also *kaṃbugrīvādimattva* as *abhāvapratiyogitāvacchedaka*, then the statement *kaṃbugrīvādimān nāsti* referring to the substratum which has any one jar would become valid. (Text 3B, p.150, lns 4–8)

Subjectness

Analysis of Kārikāvalī and Muktāvalī: *Kārikā* 70 gives the definition of subject (*pakṣa*): where the certainty of that which is to be established without the absence of the desire to establish the same does not exist, that is subject.

M. explains the significance of the various elements of this definition and refutes some other definitions of subjectness. (Text 4, p.201, ln 3 – p.202, ln 5)

M. further raises an objection against this definition: desire to establish the *sādhya*, certainty of the *sādhya* and consideration cannot exist at the same time in the same person and therefore the qualification of certainty of the *sādhya* is useless. This is answered by pointing out an instance where all the three requisites are present at the same moment in the same person. (Text 4, p.202, ln 5 – p.203, ln 5)

M. describes in detail the nature of the desire to establish, and the certainty of the *sādhya*. (Text 4, p.203, ln 5 – p.204, ln 5)

M. points out more precisely the exact situations in which the certainty of the *sādhya* prevents the inferential knowledge. (Text 4, p.204, ln 5–9)

But M. shows the causal complex of perception without the desire for inference is a hindering factor for inferential knowledge and similarly the causal complex of inferential knowledge is hindering factor for the perception of an object different from the object of inferential knowledge. (Text 4, p.204, ln 9 – p.205, ln 5)

Analysis of Dinakarī: D.first of all points out the Relevance of the discussion on subjectness. It is in the form of Introduction (*upodghāta*) and also in the form of the state of being the cause of one effect (*ekakāryakāritva*).

Then D. continues to explain the text of M. When D. comments on the final definition of subjectness as given in M. an objection is raised and answered. The objection is that at the time of the desire in the form 'let there be some instance of knowledge', even if there is certainty, inferential knowledge would arise. This is rejected because by the mental perception of the self for which the causal complex is necessarily present, this desire is fulfilled. D. further states that stimulating factors for inferential knowledge would be the individual instances of desires, as having those consecutive characteristics; in other cases the desires are stimulating factors as individual instances of desires. (Text 4, p.205, ln 5 – p.212, ln 3)

After further explanation of the texts, D. gives the definition of subjectness according to Yajñapati Upādhyāya: subjectness is the absence either of the causal complex of perception or of the certainty qualified by the absence of the desire to establish. This opinion of Upādhyāya is rejected and the consequences of this rejection are also pointed out. (Text 4, p.212, ln 3 – p.215, ln 4)

General Definition of Fallacy

Analysis of Kārikāvalī and Muktāvalī: *Kārikā* 71 enumerates the five kinds of Fallacies. They are Deviant, Opposite, Unestablished, that which has a Counterthesis and Contradictory.

M. gives a first definition of fallacy: a fallacy is the state of having that object of knowledge which prevents inferential knowledge. Thus knowledge of Deviation and so on prevents inferential knowledge and so they are considered fallacies. M. further refines this definition because of certain difficulties and therefore fallacy is defined as the state of having the object qualified by a certain type of characteristic in an instance of knowledge which prevents inferential knowledge. By this definition of fallacy, M. also shows objections against the definition of fallacy can be answered. This is the opinion of the modern Naiyāyikas. (Text 5, p.241, ln 3 – p.242, ln 3)

Other Naiyāyikas hold that fallacy is the state of having that particular thing which is the object of that instance of knowledge which has the state of being opposed to inferential knowledge. M. further explains this definition.

Further, to prevent an inferential knowledge means to prevent either the inferential knowledge or to prevent the instrumental cause of inferential knowledge and therefore there is no fault of too narrow application in the case of Deviation. M. concludes with the final definition of fallacy: a fallacy is that which is different from that which is different from all fallacies that exist in a particular reason as connected with the subject and that which is to be established. (Text 5, p.242, ln 4 – p.243, ln 7)

Analysis of Dinakarī : In the definition of fallacy, M. uses the instrumental case in the expression *yadviṣaykatvena.* D. points out that the meaning of this instrumental case is the state of being determinant in the form of the relation of selfsameness or in the form of the relation of occurrence in something which is not different from itself.

D. further shows that the expression *yadviṣayaktvena* which is used in M. in the definition of fallacy and which is interpreted by M. itself as *yādṛśaviśiṣṭaviṣayakatvena* is to be understood

more precisely as *yadrūpāvacchinnaviṣayakatvena*. D. gives also the reason for this interpretation. (Text 5, p.243, ln 8 – p.247, ln 5)

Further D. shows that the word *jñānasya* in the definition of fallacy (*yadviṣayakatvena jñānasyānumitipratibandhakatvam*) is to be interpreted as *anāhāryāprāmāṇyajñānāskanditaniścayasya*. After this, D. just explains the M. text. (Text 5, p.247, ln 5 – p.250, ln 3)

Further D. explicitly mentions the incongruity in the opinion of the other Naiyāyikas: in the case of Counterthesis, there is the usage that the reason has Counterthesis and in the case of erroneous knowledge of Contradiction there is no usage that the reason has Contradiction. This is based just on one's experience and it cannot be the basis of a conclusive argument. D. further mentions that an objection may be made against the given definition that it suffers from the fault of overextension in *prameyatvaviśiṣṭavyabhicāra*. This objection is answered pointing out that the *anumitipratibandhakatāvacchedaka* should be qualified by *viśiṣṭāntarāghaṭitatva*. (Text 5, p.250, ln 3 – p.252, ln 5)

D.further mentions certain difficulties against accepting the position that the state of being preventer of inferential knowledge means either the state of being preventer of inferential knowledge or the state of being preventer of the instrumental cause of inferential knowledge and points out that this is the reason why M. gives a new definition of fallacy. (Text 5, p.252, ln 5 – p.254, ln 3)

Individual Fallacies

Deviation

Analysis of Kārikāvalī and Muktāvalī: *Kārikā* 72 enumerates the three kinds of Deviant fallacy. They are Common, Uncommon and Inconclusive. M. gives the definitions of these three kinds of fallacies. The fallacy of Common is defined as that which exists also in something which is different from that which has the *sādhya*. The fallacy of Uncommon occurs in a reason which does not co-exist with *sādhya*. The Inconclusive false reason

is a reason the *sādhya* of which is not the counterpositive of the absolute absence. (Text 6, p.311, ln 3 – p.312, ln 2)

Analysis of Dinakarī: After explaining some of the expressions in M., D. points out that the fallacy of Common prevents the knowledge of non-deviation; Uncommon prevents the knowledge of co-occurrence with the *sādhya* and Inconclusive prevents the knowledge of negative invariable concomitance. D. further points out also the opinion of the old Naiyāyikas on this matter. (Text 6, p.312, ln 3 – p.314, ln 2)

Opposite Reason

Analysis of Muktāvalī: M. continues to deal with other fallacies also according to the opinion of the modern Naiyāyikas. Thus the fallacy of Opposite is defined as the counterpositve of the absence which is the pervader of that which is to be established. (Text 7, p.318, lns 3–6)

Analysis of Dinakarī: D.shows the difference between the fallacy of Opposite and Counterthesis. The fallacy of Opposite shows the incompetence of the one who uses the reason because the reason which he uses establishes the absence of *sādhya* and not its existence. (Text 7, p.318, ln 7 – p.319, ln 5)

Counterthesis

Analysis of Muktāvalī: M. defines the fallacy of Counterthesis as the subject which is pervaded by the absence of *sādhya*. After giving the opinion of some other Naiyāyikas also M. gives the opinion of Ratnakośakāra and refutes it with the words *atra kecit*. According to Ratnakośakāra, in the case of Counterthesis, there arises an instance of inferential knowledge in the form of doubt. (Text 8A, p.322, lns 3–6 and Text 8B, p.327, ln 3 – p.328, ln 8)

Analysis of Dinakarī: D. points out that the definitions given by other Naiyāyikas are useful only for practical discourse. D. explains the arguments contained in the M. text. Further D. rejects the opinion of Ratnakośakāra. (Text 8, p.322, ln 7 – p.324, ln 2 and Text 8, p.329, ln 1 – p.330, ln 9)

Unestablishedness of Reason

Analysis of Muktāvalī: M. further defines the different kinds of the fallacy of Unestablishedness of reason. The fallacy of being Unestablishedness of subject is the absence of the determinant of the state of being subject in the subject. The fallacy of Unestablishedness of nature is the absence in the subject of that which is considered as pervaded by *sādhya.*

Finally, the fallacy of Unestablishedness of invariable concomitance occurs in such inferences as 'it has fire because it has blue smoke' where blue smokeness is not the determinant of the state of being reason because of cumbersomeness.(Text 9, p.336, ln 3 – p.337, ln 7)

Analysis of Dinakarī: After explaining some expressions in M., D. raises a possible objection that since there is invariable concomitance of fire in blue smoke also, blue smoke cannot be considered as having the fallacy of Unestablishedness of invariable concomitance. This objection is answered by pointing out that Unestablishedness of invariable concomitance need not be considered as a fallacy but the person who uses a reason which has superfluous qualification is defeated in the disputation. (Text 9, p.338, ln 1 – p.340, ln 2)

Contradiction

Analysis of Muktāvalī: The fallacy of Contradiction is defined as the absence of *sādhya* and so on in the subject. M. also gives the basic principle of Contradiction: the definite knowledge of the absence of a particular thing in a particular substratum contradicts all instances of knowledge of that particular thing in that particular substratum. The instance of knowledge which is contradicted should not be produced by ordinary apprehensional connection and by a particular defect.

An objection is raised against this; Contradiction can be considered as a fallacy because it opposes the connection of *sādhya* with the subject, which is the cause of inferential knowledge. This is rejected because in that case, there would be no possibility of negative inference since in such inferences the

connection of *sādhya* with the subject is not established. Besides there can be inferential knowledge even without the doubt of *sādhya*. Similarly knowledge of validity of the absence of *sādhya* in the subject is not a hindering factor for inferential knowledge. The reasons for rejecting this opinion are also given. A further objection may be raised; fallacy of Contradiction can be included either in Deviation or in Unestablishedness of nature. This objection also is answered. (Text 10, p.350, ln 3 – p.352, ln 3)

Analysis of Dinakarī: D. gives in detail the implications of the principle of Contradiction. D. explains the purpose of each of the expressions used in the enunciation of the principle as given in M.; D. also raises objections to the interpretation of the purposes of various expressions and gives answers to them. Further D. explains the meaning of various expressions of M.; D. explains the logical cumbersomeness involved in accepting the definite knowledge of the validity of the knowledge of the absence of *sādhya* in the subject as a hindering factor for inferential knowledge. D. continues to explain the M. text answering possible objections too. (Text 10, p.352, ln 4 – p.364, ln 5)

Fallacies According to the Old Naiyāyikas: Definitions of Common, Uncommon and Inconclusive

Analysis of Kārikāvalī: *Kārikā* 73 gives definitions of Common and Uncommon and 74ab gives the definition of Inconclusive. These definitions are according to the old Naiyāyikas. Reason which exists both in a definite subject and in a definite contradicted subject is Common. The reason which does not exist in both is considered Uncommon. The reason the subject of which is only affirmative is Inconclusive.

Analysis of Muktāvali: M. gives the explanations of these definitions giving also at the same time definitions of such terms as *sapakṣa* and *vipakṣa* etc. Further M. points out that the fallacy of Inconclusive exists where the *sādhya* is purely affirmative and not where the subject is not purely affirmative. (Text 11, p.390, ln 4 – p.392, ln 2)

Analysis of Dinakarī: D. explains various ideas in M. when it discusses the fallacy of Inconclusive; further D. points out that the subjectness here should be understood as doubt of *sādhya* and therefore there is no overextension in the case of the valid inference 'everything is nameable because everything is knowable'. Further D. explains how Inconclusive is a fallacy because it prevents the knowledge of invariable concomitance. D. continues to explain the M. text. (Text 11, p.392, ln 3 – p.395, ln 6)

Opposite Reason

Analysis of Kārikāvalī: *Kārikā* 74cd gives the definition of the fallacy of Opposite Reason. That which never exists in that which has that which is to be established is called the fallacy of Opposite Reason.

Analysis of Muktāvalī: M. shows that the purpose of the particle 'indeed (*eva*)' is to show the absence of the reason as determined by the state of having that which is to be established. (Text 12, p.401, lns 5–6)

Analysis of Dinakarī: D. states that therefore there is no overextension in the fallacy of Uncommon. (Text 12, p.401, ln 7)

Unestablishedness of Reason

Analysis of Kārikāvalī and Muktāvalī: *Kārikā* 75, 76 and 77ab give the definitions of the various kinds of the fallacy of Unestablishedness according to the old Naiyāyikas. Unestablishedness of subject occurs where the subject is golden mountain, etc. The fallacy of Unestablishedness of nature occurs in such inferences as 'lake is a substance because it has smoke' and the fallacy of Unestablishedness of invariable concomitance occurs where 'blue smoke and so on' are the reasons. M. just explains some of the expressions of K. and points out that blue smokeness cannot be the determinant of the state of being reason because of cumbersomeness. This is because the determinant of the state of being pervaded is accepted as that which is not constituted by another characteristic which is the determinant of the state of

being pervaded and which is co-occurrent with itself. (Text 13, p.402, ln 4 – p.403, ln 3)

Analysis of Dinakarī: D. shows how by explaining in this way what is the determinant of the state of being pervaded, prior absence also can be used as reason. D. explains further the purpose of various other expressions used in the formulation of the nature of the determinant of the state of being pervaded. (Text 13, p.403, ln 4 – p.405, ln 4)

Counterthesis

Analysis of Kārikāvalī and Muktāvalī: *Kārikā* 77cd defines the fallacy of Counterthesis as the consideration of two opposite reasons.

M. points out that the fallacy of Counterthesis occurs only when there is opposition between *sādhya* and *sādhyābhāva*. (Text 14, p.411, lns 4–8)

Analysis of Dinakarī: D. points out that the fallacy of Counterthesis is not one consideration having two opposite reasons; but two considerations with opposite reasons establishing the *sādhya* and the absence of *sādhya*. (Text 14, p.412, ln 9 – p.412, ln.2)

Contradiction

Analysis of Kārikāvalī and Muktāvalī: *Kārikā* 78 defines the fallacy of Contradiction as the subject bereft of that which is to be established.

M. shows that the subject should be actually qualified by the determinant of the state of being subject. (Text 15, p.414, lns 4–9)

Analysis of Dinakarī: D. just points out that both time and place should be considered as determinants of subjectness. (Text 15, p.414, ln 10 – p.415, ln 4)

Means of Cognizing Invariable Concomitance[1]

Analysis of Kārikāvali and Muktāvalī: *Kārikā* 137 points out that the means of grasping invariable concomitance are non apprehension

[1] The text, translation and interpretation of these sectons can be found in the Appendix.

of deviation and apprehension of the coexistence of *sādhya* with reason. In some cases hypothetical reasoning prevents the doubt of deviation.

M. gives the reason why the non-apprehension of deviation and apprehension of coexistence of *sādhya* with reason are the means of grasping invariable concomitance. Apprehension of deviation is a hindrance for the knowledge of invariable concomitance. Therefore the absence of the knowledge of deviation is the cause of grasping invariable concomitance. Further, knowledge of coexistence of *sādhya* with reason is also cause of grasping invariable concomitance through agreement and disagreement, i.e. through the knowledge that wherever there is reason there is the *sādhya* and wherever there is the absence of *sādhya* there is the absence of the reason.

M. further points out that repeated perception of the reason along with *sādhya* is not a cause of grasping invariable concomitance since there may arise the knowledge of invariable concomitance even by one perception. Repeated perception is sometimes useful because it eliminates doubt. But even when repeated perception does not remove doubt of deviation, one has to make use of hypothetical reasoning. M. concludes that if hypothetical reasoning does not remove doubt, then such a doubt is to be removed by the experience of obstacle to practical activity i.e., one would not try to get fire in order to produce smoke. When there is no doubt of deviation, then there is no need of hypothetical reasoning also. (Text 16A, p.419, ln 3 – p.420, ln 9)

Analysis of Dinakarī: D. first of all discusses the Relevance of treating the means of grasping invariable concomitance. M. has earlier discussed the nature of invariable concomitance and so it is relevant to point out the means of grasping invariable concomitance. Afterwards, D. just explains the M. text and at the end raises an objection: hypothetical reasoning does not remove doubt of deviation because such a doubt is removed by the knowledge of invariable concomitance, which is the cause of hypothetical reasoning. Three different answers are given to this objection: (1) Although non-assumed doubt (*anāhāryaśaṅkā*)

may be removed by the knowledge of invariable concomitance, an assumed doubt (*āhāryaśaṅkā*) cannot be removed by the knowledge of invariable concomitance; such an assumed doubt can be removed only by hypothetical reasoning. (2) The absence of doubt of deviation qualified by the absence of hypothetical reasoning brings about the knowledge of invariable concomitance. In this way, hypothetical reasoning brings about the absence of doubt of deviation. (3) Hypothetical reasoning prevents the doubt of deviation which is common to both assumed and non-assumed instances of knowledge. (Text 16A, p.421, ln 1 – p.425, ln 3)

Additional Condition (*upādhi*)

Analysis of Kārikavalī and Muktāvalī: *Kārikā* 138, 139 and 140a decribe the nature and purpose of additional condition. K. defines additional condition as that which is the pervader of that which is to be established and that which is not the pervader of the reason. But M. refines this definition as follows: that which being the pervader of that which is considered as that which is to be established, that which is not the pervader of that which is considered as reason. Because of certain defects especially of the fault of too narrow application M. makes the definition of additional condition more precise: additional condition is the pervader of that which is to be established which is determined by a particular characteristic and at the same time not the pervader of the reason which is determined by that particular characteristic.

The purpose of additional condition is to bring about the knowledge of the deviation of *sādhya* in the reason; in other words, the deviation of additional condition in reason brings about the knowledge of deviation of *sādhya* in the reason. According to some other Naiyāyikas, the purpose of additional condition is to point out a Counterthesis. (Text 16B, p.432, ln 3 – p.437, ln 5)

Analysis of Dinakarī: D. first of all expressly mentions that the Relevance for treating additional condition (*upādhi*) is Occasion (*prasaṅga*). D. also gives a more exact definition of additional condition: when there is a state of being pervader of something, which is qualified by some particular characteristic, that which

is not the pervader of something which is qualified by some other particular characteristic is the additional condition in the reason which is qualified by that particular characteristic and which has that which is to be established qualified by that particular characteristic. Further D. points out that additional condition should be the pervader of *sādhya* and it should not be the pervader of reason by the same qualifier and by the same relation. Then after explaining the meaning of certain expressions in M., D. gives the purpose of various elements of the final definition of additional condition in M.

D. further points out that according to the modern Naiyāyikas for reasons of simplicity, additional condition is to be defined as that through the absence of which or through the difference of which from that which has that (i.e, additional condition), the absence of that which is to be established in that which has reason is inferred.

D. also points out that the state of being that which is different from the subject (*pakṣetaratva*) cannot be considered as that which is to be defined since the definition of additional condition cannot be applied to it. Further, when it is sure that there is no contradiction in the subject, then the state of being that which is different from the subject is not an additional condition because there is no means of knowing that the additional condition of the state of being that which is different from the subject pervades the *sādhya*. Besides if this is considered as an additional condition then no inference is possible. (Text 16B, p.437, ln 6 – p.446, ln 2)

Kinds of Inference

Analysis of Kārikāvalī and Muktāvalī: *Kārikā* 142. mentions that there are three kinds of inferences viz. purely affirmative etc.; this is based positive and negative invariable concomitance. *Kārikā* 143 it also gives the definition of negative invariable concomitance.

M. explicitly points out the three kinds of inferences viz. purely affirmative, purely negative and affirmative cum negative. M. further gives the definition of each of these kinds

of inferences and points out that the cause of negative inference is the knowledge of negative invariable concomitance and therefore, M. gives the definition of negative invariable concomitance: negative invariable concomitance is the state of being the counterpositive of the absence which is the pervader of the absence of the *sādhya*. M. further explains the implications of this definition in detail. M. concludes finally giving the opinion of certain other Naiyāyikas according to whom through negative coexistence, only positive invariable concomitance is grasped and therefore knowledge of negative invariable concomitance is not the cause of inference. (Text 16C, p.462, ln 3 – p.465, ln 3)

Analysis of Dinakarī: In M. the purely affirmative inference is defined as that inference which has no definite contradicted subject. D. points out the difficulty against this definition and provides an answer for it. Similarly the definition of purely negative inference as given in M. is that inference which has no definite subject. Because of possible difficulty against this definition, D. explains how this definition is to be properly understood. D. further gives the purpose of the various elements by which M. makes the definition more precise and then raises an objection: how can there be knowledge of negative invariable concomitance since there is no knowledge of the coexistence of *sādhya* and the reason. The answer to this objection is given by D. but various objections are raised against this answer also and they are also answered. D. further explains the opinion of some Naiyāyikas according to whom through negative coexistence, only positive invariable concomitance is grasped. D. concludes giving the reasons for rejecting this opinion. (Text 16C, p.465, ln 4 – p.470, ln 9)

Presumption is Included in Negative Invariable Concomitance

Analysis of Kārikāvalī and Muktāvalī: *Kārikā* 144 states the Nyāya position: Presumption is not a means of valid knowledge; this is because it is included in negative invariable concomitance.

M. explains how Presumption is included in negative invariable concomitance. If it is known that Devadatta is alive and his

absence in the house is known through perception, then his existence outside the house is presumed. This kind of presumption is included in negative inference. This is because the state of being alive is understood as pervaded either by existence outside or by existence within the house; then since the existence in the house is contradicted, existence outside becomes the object of inferential knowledge. This section in M. concludes by rejecting non-apprehension and bodily gesture as different means of valid knowledge. (Text 16D, p.479, ln 4 – p.480, ln 7)

Analysis of Dinakarī: D. just gives further examples of Presumption which can be included in inference which is both negative and positive. (Text 16D, p.480, ln 9 – p.481, ln 5)

III. Anumānakhaṇḍa
Text, Translation and Interpretation

Text 1 A
Process of Inferential Knowledge

का. व्यापारस्तु परामर्शः करणं व्याप्तिधीर्भवेत् ॥६६cd॥
अनुमायां ॥६७a॥

मु. अनुमितिं व्युत्पादयति **व्यापारस्तु** इति । **अनुमायां** अनुमितौ व्याप्तिज्ञानं करणं, परामर्शो व्यपारः । तथा हि येन पुरुषेण महानसादौ धूमे वह्निव्याप्तिर्गृहीता, पश्चात् स एव पुरुषः कश्चित्पर्वतादावविच्छिन्नमूलां धूमलेखां पश्यति, तदनन्तरं 'धूमो वह्निव्याप्यः' इत्येवंरूपं व्याप्तिस्मरणं तस्य भवति, पश्चाच्च 'वह्नि-

K. In inferential knowledge consideration is only operation. Instrumental cause is knowledge of invariable concomitance.
(*Kārikā* 66cd, 67a)

M. (The author) explains inferential knowledge, (with the words) **operation** (*vyāpārastu iti*). (The word) *anumāyām* means: for inferential knowledge (*anumāyām anumitau*). (For inferential knowledge) knowledge of invariable concomitance is the instrumental cause. Consideration is the operation. As for instance, a man who has cognized the invariable concomitance of fire in smoke in a kitchen etc. later that very same person sees a trail of smoke which is not cut off from its origin on a hill and so on. Afterwards he remembers the invariable concomitance in the form that smoke is invariably connected with fire. Then he knows that this (hill).

मु. व्याप्यधूमवानयम्' इति ज्ञानं भवति, स एव परामर्श इत्युच्यते, तदनन्तरं 'पर्वतो वह्निमान्' इत्यनुमितिर्जायते ।

दि. अनुमितिम् इति । संगतिश्चात्र प्रत्यक्षेणोपजीव्योपजीवकभावो बोध्यः । करणे निर्दिष्टे एव व्यापारे जिज्ञासोदयान्मूले पश्चान्निर्दिष्टमपि करणं प्रथमं दर्शयति **व्याप्तिज्ञानम्** इति । **परामर्शो व्यापारः** इति । ननु व्यापारत्वं तज्जन्यत्वे सति तज्जन्यजनकत्वं, तच्च परामर्शे न संभवति, 'वह्निव्याप्यधूमवान्पर्वतः' इति परामर्शे व्याप्तिज्ञानजन्यत्वस्याभावात्, महानसीयवह्निव्याप्तिज्ञानस्य तदानीमभावेन व्यभिचारादतस्तदुपपादयति **तथा हि** इत्यादिना ।

M. has smoke which is invariably connected with fire. This knowledge is called consideration (*parāmarśa*). Afterwards there arises the inferential knowledge 'the hill has fire'.

D. Inferential knowledge (*anumititim iti*). Relevance is to be understood here as the relationship of cause and effect between perception (and inference). Only after the instrumental cause is specified there would arise the desire to know what the operation is. Therefore (by the words) **knowledge of invariable concomitance** (*vyāptijñānam iti*), (the author) mentions first the instrumental cause which is pointed out afterwards in the basic text. **Consideration is operation** (*parāmarśo vyāpāraḥ iti*). Now, however, being an operation means while being produced by something, being the cause of that which is produced by it. This is not the case with regard to consideration, because consideration in the form 'this mountain has smoke which is invariably connected with fire' is not produced by the knowledge of invariable concomitance since at that time there is no knowledge of the invariable concomitance of fire in the kitchen and therefore there is deviation. Hence this (i.e. the fact of being produced by knowledge of invariable concomitance) is now explained (with the words) **as for instance** (*tathāhi ityādinā*).

दि. **पश्यति** इति । धूमदर्शनस्य व्याप्तिस्मरणे उद्बोधकविधया हेतुत्व-संपत्त्यर्थम् । यादृशविशेषणविशिष्टस्य धूमस्य संबन्धितया ज्ञानं तादृश-धूमदर्शनस्यैव व्याप्तिस्मृतावुद्बोधकत्वमित्यभिप्रायेणाविच्छिन्नमूलत्वमुक्तम् । **एवंरूपं व्याप्तिस्मरणम्** इति । उद्बुद्धसंस्कारस्य पूर्वं सत्त्वादिति भावः। **स एव परामर्शः** इति । तथा च स्मरणात्मकज्ञानस्य पूर्वं सत्त्वान्न व्यभिचार इति भावः । न च तथापि यत्र व्याप्तिघटकानां पदार्थानां विशृङ्खलोपस्थिति-मूलको विशेष्ये विशेषणं तत्रापि विशेषणमिति रीत्या परामर्शस्तत्र विशिष्ट-व्याप्तिज्ञानस्य व्यभिचारो दुरुद्धर एवेति वाच्यम् । व्याप्त्यंशे निश्चयत्वा-निवेशप्रयुक्तलाघवेन विशिष्टस्य वैशिष्ट्यमितिरीत्या परामर्शस्यैवानुमिति-

D. Sees (*paśyati iti*). (This is) in order to establish that perception of smoke, in as far as it is a reviver, is the cause of remembering invariable concomitance. Smoke has a particular characteristic, and the perception of the same kind of smoke as having that characteristic is the reminder for the remembrance of invariable concomitance. With this idea in mind, it is mentioned 'a trail (of smoke) which is not cut off from its origin'. **Then he remembers invariable concomitance in the form** *(evaṃrūpaṃ vyāptismaraṇam iti)*. The idea is that the impression which is revived was already there. **This knowledge is called consideration** (*sa eva parāmarśaḥ iti*). Thus because there is already knowledge in the form of remembrance, there is no deviation. This is the idea. Nor should it be objected that when there is consideration (the objects of which) are various things which are elements of invariable concomitance (and which) are cognized in the form of unconnected instances of knowledge in the manner that there is a qualifier for the qualificand and it has a further qualifier, the deviation of the knowledge of qualified invariable concomitance is indeed unavoidable. This (objection) is rejected because consideration in the form of the cognition of the relationship of that which is qualified is simple since in this case there is no need of adding 'being certain' in the enunciation of the invariable concomitance and therefore, only such consideration

दि. हेतुत्वादित्यभिप्रायात्। स्मरणात्मकपरामर्शे व्याप्तिज्ञानस्य व्यभिचार इत्यपि न, संस्कारसंबन्धेन पूर्वं व्याप्तिज्ञानस्य सत्त्वात्।

अत्र नव्याः व्याप्तिज्ञानत्वस्य परामर्शत्वव्यापकतयानुमितिं प्रति कारणत्वमेव नास्ति कुतः करणत्वम्, अन्यथा कपालादेर्घटं प्रति द्रव्यत्वेन हेतुतापत्तिः, तस्मादनुमितिं प्रति मनस्त्वेनैव करणत्वमित्याहुः।

D. is accepted as the cause of inference. Nor can it again be objected that there is deviation if consideration is in the form of remembrance because by the relationship of impression there exists already the knowledge of invariable concomitance.

On this point (the opinion of) the moderns is the following: the state of being knowledge of invariable concomitance pervades the state of being consideration. And therefore, (knowledge of invariable concomitance) is not even the cause of inferential knowledge. Hence how can it be the instrumental cause (of inferential knowledge)? Otherwise the two parts etc. of a pot, in as far as they are substances, would have to be considered as causes of the pot and therefore they hold that the state of being mind is the determinant of the state of being the instrumental cause of inferential knowledge.

Commentary

(p.62, ln 3) After the treatment of perception, when the discussion on inference is introduced, Rāmarudra raises the question of Relevance (*saṅgati*). In itself the notion of Relevance is simple; it is the question why one topic is to be discussed after another or what is the connection of what is going to be treated with what has been already treated? This is also an appropriate place to tackle this question since perception has been adequately dealt with and the next topic to be taken up is inference. Hence naturally the question arises, what is the connection of inference with perception, or in technical Nyāya terms what is the Relevance (*saṅgati*) in treating inference? Dinakara states that there is the relationship of cause and

effect between perception and inference. Rāmarudra explains this, pointing out first of all the real nature of Relevance; he then enumerates the kinds of Relevance and describes in detail the true characteristics of each one. We shall take up these questions one by one.

Rāmarudra defines Relevance in the following words: *anantarābhidhānaprayojakajijñāsājanakajñānaviṣayasmaraṇā-nukūlasaṃbandho nirūpaṇīyaniṣṭhā saṅgatiḥ*. This may be translated as follows: Relevance that is in the subject to be treated is a relation which is conducive to the remembrance of the object of a particular instance of knowledge which is the cause of the desire to know. This desire to know causes the treatment (of a topic) after (the previous topic has been treated). Now let us analyse this definition and bring out its meaning part by part.

Basic to the whole definition of *saṅgati* is that it is a kind of relation *(saṃbandha)*. This relation is conducive to the remembrance of the object of a particular instance of cognition. This particular instance of cognition is the cause of producing the desire to know *(jijñāsā)* and this desire in its turn is the reason why a certain topic is treated after another topic. Applying all this to the present case, viz. the treatment of inference after perception, we get the following picture of the causal relationship that is envisaged.

The desire to know which is the cause of treating inference after perception has the following form: 'let me have the knowledge of inference (*anumānajñānaṃ me bhavatu*)'. The knowledge which produces this desire to know is in the following form: 'the knowledge of inference produces what is desirable for me (*anumānajñānaṃ madiṣṭasādhanam*)'. The object of such a knowledge is inference; the relation which is conducive to remember inference is the fact that it is produced by perception.

In simpler language this just means that after perception has been treated, a person remembers inference because it is produced by perception and so he thinks that knowledge of inference is a means of obtaining what is desirable for him. Therefore he has the desire to know about inference. This desire

to know (on the part of the pupil) is the reason why inference is treated (by the teacher).

Therefore the succession of events in the order of time is the following: knowledge of perception (*pratyakṣajñāna*), remembrance of inference (*anumānasmaraṇa*) because it is an effect of perception, knowledge that the knowledge of inference is the means of fulfilling one's desire (*iṣṭasādhanatājñāna*) and therefore finally the desire to know inference (*jijñāsā*). Then the treatment of inference follows.

Now by means of a series of objections and answers Rāmarudra elucidates the real meaning of this definition of Relevance. First of all it should be noted that the knowledge which is the cause of the desire to know (i.e. *anumānajñānaṃ madiṣṭasādhanam*) which in turn is the reason that a particular topic is treated after another topic, should be qualified by being produced by the knowledge that indicates Relevance. This just means that the knowledge *anumānajñānaṃ madiṣṭasādhanam* should be brought about by *pratyakṣajñāna*. The need for this stipulation is the following: one treats about jar and after this has been treated one remembers perception by means of some particular relation, as for instance, jar is the object of perception. And perception produces inference. Therefore, after the treatment of a jar one can treat inference; but in this case there will not be any Relevance since knowledge of inference is not brought about by knowledge of jar. But if as in the present instance, inference is treated after perception, there is Relevance. This is because, the knowledge of invariable concomitance (i.e. *vyāptijñāna* = *anumāna*) is perceptual and so it is brought about by means of the eyes and so on. Similarly inferential knowledge is produced by perceptual knowledge in the form of consideration (*parāmarśa*). Therefore there is Relevance in the form of *upajīvakatva* in treating inferential knowledge after perceptual knowledge.

But then there could be the following objection: according to the Vedic belief, offering a light to a particular god in a particular temple is good for the eye. This offering of light is done through an inference, viz. the offering of light is indeed a means of obtaining eyes because it has been enjoined by the

Vedas that offering of light is good for eyes. After such an inference one offers light and one gets the eyes which are the instrument of perception. Hence since perception (i.e. instrument of perception) is brought about by inference, inference is to be treated first and then perception. This is the objection.

Someone may answer this objection in the following way: Relevance in the form of being an effect (*upajīvakatva*) should be in the form of an immediate effect (*kāryatārūpa*) and not in the form of a mediate effect (*prayojyatārūpa*). In this way eyes etc. are not produced directly by inference, but only indirectly through the unseen (*adṛṣṭa*) and therefore, there is no question of treating perception after inference.

But such an answer to the earlier objection cannot be accepted for the following reason: knowledge from Comparison (*upamiti)* is in the form of the knowledge of denotative function of words (*śaktijñānātmikā eva upamitiḥ*). Such a Comparison produces directly only the recollection of the meaning of words and not verbal cognition. Therefore, it would not be proper to treat Verbal testimony after Comparison.

Another way of answering the objection is the following: the subject that is treated after another topic should be produced by the latter without the instrumentality of the unseen (*adṛṣṭa*). In the case of the production of the eyes through the offering of lights, first the unseen is produced and through the unseen the eyes, the instrument of perception. Hence perception need not be treated after inference; whereas inference is produced directly by perception without the instrumentality of the unseen and so inference can be treated after perception.

However, this argument also cannot be admitted. One can operate on the eye after an inference that the eye after the operation produces what is desirable. Here the eye that is produced after the operation has not been brought about through the unseen, but this eye is also instrument of perception. Since such an instrument of perception is caused by inference in the way explained, perception can be treated after inference.

Another argument to show that inference should be treated after perception is brought forward. All instances of perception

do not depend on inference since according to Nyāya, mind and the organ of hearing are eternal. On the other hand all instances of inference depend upon perception, since all instances of knowledge are produced by mind which is the internal sense organ. Therefore, inference should be treated after perception. But this argument also cannot be admitted because God has knowledge of invariable concomitance and such a knowledge has the ability to produce inferential knowledge in us.[1] Such an inference (i.e. knowledge of invariable concomitance) of course, does not depend on perception; therefore inference need not be treated after perception.

Rāmarudra rejects this argument pointing out the real meaning of the definition of Relevance given in the beginning. It should not be understood in the sense that inference must be treated after perception, or more generally, the definition should not be taken in the sense that whatever is relevant should be treated after another topic. In this sense after treating inference one can treat perception, but the real meaning of Relevance is that what is to be treated must be relevant to what has been treated. Thus if one has the knowledge of an effect or a cause, then one may enquire what is its cause or what is its effect respectively. Therefore, 'being a cause (*upajīvyatva*)' and 'being an effect (*upajīvakatva*)' are forms of Relevance. Hence, it is also appropriate that in *Tattvacintāmaṇi* after inferential knowledge (*anumiti*) is treated, its cause, inferential process (*anumāna*) is discussed.

Rāmarudra also explains here the six kinds of Relevance traditionally held and points out that accepting 'being an effect'

[1] It may be noted here that according to the Nyāyavaiśeṣika theory, knowledge of God is the *sādhāraṇakāraṇam* for every effect; *kāryamātraṃ prati sādhāraṇakāraṇāni īśvaraḥ tajjñānecchākṛtayaḥ prāgabhāvakāladigadṛṣṭāni.* (*Tarkāmṛtam* by Jagadīśa, p.9, lns 27–8. ed. Asiatic Society 1974). Therefore knowledge of invariable concomitance of God is also the cause of our inferential knowledge. But knowledge of invariable concomitance of God produces inferential knowledge in us only when we also have the knowledge of invariable concomitance. Therefore R. says *īśvarīyavyāptijñānaṃ svarūpayogyatvenānumāpakam* i.e. *anumitijanakam.*

and 'being a cause' as kinds of Relevance does not imply that there are seven kinds of Relevance. He first of all quotes a verse from the old school enumerating the different kinds of Relevance.

saprasaṅga upodghāto hetutāvasaras tathā
nirvāhakaikyaṃ kāryaikyaṃ ṣoḍhā saṅgatir iṣyate.

There are six kinds of Relevance: Connection (*prasaṅga*), Introduction (*upodghāta*), Cause (*hetutā*), Occasion (*avasara*), Having the same cause (*nirvāhakaikya*) and Having the same effect (*kāryaikya*).[1]

First of all Connection (*prasaṅga*) is defined as a relationship which is conducive to the remembrance of the subject that is going to be treated and which is different from the instances of Relevance such as Introduction (*upodghāta*) and so on (*upodghātādibhinnaḥ smaraṇaprayojakasaṃbandaḥ prasaṅgaḥ*). This definition is actually a refinement of the usual definition of Connection (*prasaṅga*), viz. that which is remembered and cannot be left unmentioned (*smṛtasya upekṣānarhatvam*). This is actually a definition of Relevance in general and therefore the definition applies to instances of Relevance other than Connection (*prasaṅga*) also. Thus there is the fault of overextension. In order to avoid this the words *upodghātādibhinna* is added to the definition of the Relevance of Connection. The fallacies (*hetvābhāsa*) are treated after the treatment of reason (*hetu*) by the Relevance of Connection. Actually all other forms of Relevance such as contradiction, similarity, conjunction, concomitance, etc. which are not included in any other kind of Relevance can also be included in this kind of Relevance.

Introduction (*upodghāta*), the second kind of Relevance, is defined as that which explains the topic under discussion (*prakṛtopapādakatvam upodghātaḥ*). This means that when a subject is being treated another topic has also to be discussed in order that the present topic may be properly understood. This could happen in two ways: first, the topic to be treated is a part of the topic that is being treated; secondly, without being a part

[1] In what follows Rāmarudra is actually summarising the discussion on *saṅgati* by Gadādhara. Cfr. *Gādādharī*, pp. 4–20.

of the topic that is being treated, the topic that is to be treated is very necessary to explain fully the topic that is being treated.[1] The first kind of Introduction (*upodghāta*) occurs when treating invariable concomitance (*vyāpti*). The knowledge in the form of consideration (*parāmarśa*) has as its object invariable concomitance (*vyāpti*) and the state of being the attribute of the subject (*pakṣa-dharmatā*). In this way, after the treatment of consideration, invariable concomitance is treated since it is a part of consideration and so we have here the Relevance in the form of *upodghāta*.[2]

Such *upodghāta* cannot be included in Causeness (*hetutā*). The reason is that while *hetutā* is the relationship of cause and effect, *upodghāta* is only explanatory (*upapādaka*), i.e. to explain properly that which is being discussed, one has to explain another topic also. The relationship of the latter to the former is the first kind of *upodghāta*. As for instance, inferential knowledge is defined as knowledge which is produced by consideration (*parāmarśajanyajñānam anumitiḥ*). Now in order to understand this definition of inferential knowledge properly one should know what consideration (*parāmarśa*) is and how it is the cause of inferential knowledge and therefore consideration is treated by the Relevance of *upodghāta*. It is not by the Relevance of *hetutā* because it is not yet established that consideration is the cause of inferential knowledge. It is only when consideration is properly discussed it is possible to establish its causality with reference to inferential knowledge.

Similarly a cause is defined as 'that which precedes invariably while not being superfluous (*anyathāsiddhiśūnyatve sati niyatapūrvavartitvam*)'. In order to understand this definition properly one has to understand what 'being superfluous (*anyathā-siddhi*)' means though *anyathāsiddhi* is not a part of the definition. But absence of *anyathāsiddhi* is a part of the definition and in order to understand the absence of *anyathāsiddhi* one has to

[1] Cfr. *Gādādharī*, p.16, lns 22–6.

[2] Cfr. *vyāpyapakṣobhayavaiśiṣṭyāvagāhijñānasya vyāptijñānasādhyatvenopod-ghātasaṅgatyā parāmarśanirūpaṇānantaraṃ vyāptinirūpaṇam iti bhāvaḥ* (K.M.D.R. p.293, lns 16–17).

understand what *anyathāsiddhi* is. Therefore it is treated before the discussion on cause. This is an example of the second kind of *upodghāta*.

Causeness (*hetutā*) is the third kind of Relevance. This occurs in two ways. By the relation of the state of being substratum (*āśrayatāsaṃbandha*) causeness exists in cause. But by the relation of the state of being indicated (*nirūpakatāsaṃbandha*), causeness is in the state of 'being effect.' Therefore the state of 'being an effect' is also a form of Relevance; but this is included in *hetutā* as pointed out.

Occasion (*avasara*) is the fourth kind of Relevance. This is defined as follows: 'when the hindrance in the form of desire to know has been removed what is necessary to be treated next is Ocassion (*pratibandhakībhūtajijñāsānivṛttau avaśyavaktavyatvam*)'.[1] This can best be explained by an example. According to Vaiśeṣikas, there are seven categories: substance, quality, movement, etc. And so after substance has been treated, quality is discussed; and after quality, movement. Thus the order of discussion is to take the topics which are enumerated one after the other. The second topic for instance, cannot be treated before the first. This is the order. The reason is that the desire to know the first topic is a hindrance to the treatment of the second. Hence, when the desire to know the first topic is fulfilled, then naturally the second topic is taken up. Such a treatment of the second topic is by the Relevance of Occasion. Hence it may be stated in general that the Relevance of Occasion occurs wherever there is an enumeration of topics to be treated one after the other. The example which Rāmarudra himself gives is the following: both Inference and Comparison are effects of Perception and so Inference is first treated since more schools of philosophy accept it. Afterwards Comparison is treated by the Relevance of Occasion since fewer schools accept it.

Having the same cause (*nirvāhakaikya*), the fifth kind of Relevance, is easy to explain. If one cause produces two effects

[1] Cfr. K.M.D.R. p.351, lns 17–18.

one effect is treated after the other by the Relevance of Having the same cause. Thus, according to Udayana, the purpose of establishing the existence of God is to defeat the opponents and also to obtain merit through the worship of God. And if both the effects are of equal importance one is treated after the other by Relevance of Having the same cause.

Having the same effect (*kāryaikya*), the sixth kind of Relevance, occurs when two causes together produce one and the same effect. As for instance, one gains victory over the opponents when one knows true reason as also when one knows false reason. Thus the knowledge of both true reason and false reason bring about the same effect of victory over the opponents. Therefore after true reason has been treated, false reason is treated by the Relevance of Having the same effect.

There are various points in the discussion on Relevance which deserve careful attention. From the fact that an early verse has been quoted enumerating the various kinds of Relevance, it is clear that the discussion on Relevance had a long history. However, we are not yet in a position to trace the origin of this verse. Further this verse itself must have been a condensation of a long history of discussion on the subject. We are still not in a position to give a picture of the historical development of these discussions. It would indeed be intriguing to establish how and in what context the discussions on Relevance arose and how precisely the discussions developed and reached the stage we find in Rāmarudra. One point however is certain. The Naiyāyikas have given us a most accurate description of the various forms of Relevance. One just cannot find any other form of Relevance which cannot be included in any one of these. This shows the admirable accuracy of their observations in this regard.

Instrumental Cause of Inferential Knowledge

(p.61, ln 3 – p.62, ln 2 ; p.62, ln 3 – p.64 ln 2) After the discussions on the question of Relevance, the authors enter into the subject proper and begin to describe the actual process of

inference. Nyāya considers inferential knowledge as an effect produced in the soul of man. Therefore, they try to explain this effect of knowledge after the model of any other effect that comes into being in the world. Thus for instance a tree is felled by means of an axe by the woodcutter or words are written on the paper by means of the movements produced in the pen by the writer. Hence the axe and the pen are the instruments (*karaṇa*) respectively for felling the tree or for writing. The movements both in the axe and in the pen are considered to be the operation (*vyāpāra*) in the respective instruments for bringing about the respective effects. This analogy of bringing about an effect in the world at large is applied by Muktāvalīkāra to the effect of knowledge that is brought about in the soul. Thus for inferential knowledge, the instrument is knowledge of invariable concomitance (*vyāptijñāna*) and the operation is consideration (*parāmarśa*). Now the text explains each of these elements systematically. And first of all it shows how the knowledge of invariable concomitance (*vyāptijñāna*) is the instrumental cause of inferential knowledge.

Knowledge of invariable concomitance is the instrumental cause of inferential knowledge (*karaṇaṃ vyāptidhīḥ*). It is only after the instrumental cause is first ascertained, there would be the desire to know what the operation is and therefore, first of all, the instrumental cause is stated to be the knowledge of invariable concomitance. But in order to know that something is an instrumental cause, one should also know what its operation is. Therefore the operation of the instrumental cause in question (viz. knowledge of invariable concomitance) is also mentioned. The operation (*vyāpāra*) in the present case is stated to be consideration (*parāmarśa*).[1]

[1] Here the force of the particle *tu* in the expression *vyāpārastu* is as follows: the later Naiyāyikas accept consideration as the instrumental cause of inferential knowledge, but the earlier Naiyāyikas regard consideration as operation and K. follows this opinion. Hence the meaning is that consideration is operation only and not instrumental cause (Cfr. *navīnamatasiddhaparāmarśaniṣṭhakaraṇatvam svasya nābhimatam iti sūcayitum ādau vyāpāram āha mūle vyāpārastu parāmarśaḥ*

But then immediately an objection arises. Invariable concomitance of fire with smoke was grasped in the instance of smoke in the kitchen. Such a knowledge does not exist when the same person sees smoke on the mountain. And since it does not exist, it cannot also give rise to the consideration in the form that this mountain has smoke which is invariably connected with fire. Hence consideration which is the operation cannot arise because an operation is produced by the instrument and at the same time it produces the effect. Here the consideration is to be produced by the knowledge of invariable concomitance which is the instrument, but it has ceased to exist as pointed out already. It is to answer this objection that the author gives the following description of inferential process and shows how the knowledge of invariable concomitance is present and how it gives rise to the operation of consideration.

A person grasps the invariable concomitance of fire with smoke in the kitchen. Afterwards that very same person sees a continuous trail of smoke on a mountain and so on (*paścāt sa eva puruṣaḥ kvacit parvatādāvavicchinnamūlāṃ dhūmalekhāṃ paśyati*).[1] Then the same person remembers the invariable concomitance that smoke is pervaded by fire. Then he knows

ityādi. atra tuśabdo'vadhāraṇārthakaḥ. tathā ca parāmarśo vyāpāra evetyarthaḥ, Prabhā, p.471, lns 19–20).

[1] Parīkṣīt Thampurān points out (S., p. 148, ln 12) that someone may doubt that this sentence in M. is useless and it is to remove this doubt that D. explains that this sentence is added in order to show that the perception of the smoke is the cause of remembering the invariable concomitance, in as far as the perception of smoke is a reviver (of the remembrance of the invariable concomitance). 'Trail of smoke which is not cut off from its origin (*avicchinna-mūlāṃ dhūmalekhām*)'. D. explains that the purpose of this qualification is to show that only a particular kind of smoke with a particular characteristic would serve as a reviver of the remembrance of invariable concomitance and therefore the qualification of 'not cut off from its origin' is added. This explanation implies, as the words of D. 'with this idea in mind (*ityabhiprāyeṇa*)' suggest, that there are some who do not accept the invariable concomitance of fire with smoke. They point out that particles of smoke which are carried aloft by air do not have invariable concomitance of fire and so in order to avoid this deviation, the qualification 'not cut off from its origin' is added.

that the hill (on which he has seen the smoke) has smoke which is invariably connected with fire. This is called consideration (*parāmarśa*). Afterwards he has the inferential knowledge that this hill has fire.

This is the answer to the previous objection. Although the knowledge of invariable concomitance derived from the cognition of smoke in the kitchen is absent, when one perceives smoke on the hill, still the impression (*saṃskāra*) of that knowledge is in the soul. Therefore the remembrance of that knowledge takes place. Thus the knowledge of the invariable concomitance in the form of remembrance is present there and this is enough to produce the consideration. Hence there is no deviation.

But then another difficulty arises. It has been stated that knowledge of invariable concomitance gives rise to consideration which is in the form of a qualified knowledge (*viśiṣṭavaiśiṣṭya-jñāna*), i.e. in the form of a knowledge in which the relationship of a qualified thing to another thing is known. In the present instance of consideration it means that the relationship of smoke which is qualified by the invariable concomitance of fire is cognised in the mountain. Thus smoke is the qualified thing (i.e. qualified by invariable concomitance) and its relationship with the mountain is the object of knowledge. According to M. such a knowledge (which is *viśiṣṭavaiśiṣṭyajñāna* and which in the present case is in the form: *vahnivyāpyavān ayam*) is essential for inferential knowledge.

Now the point of the objection is that such a knowledge is not always necessary for bringing about inferential knowledge. One can have consideration as an instance of knowledge in which there is no knowledge of the relationship of that which is qualified to something else. In the present instance, instead of the knowledge that smoke which is qualified by the invariable concomitance of fire is related to the mountain, one can have a knowledge of the various elements of this cognition none of which is a qualified cognition. Such a cognition will be in the following form: first there is the perception of hill, then the cognition that the hill has smoke, then the knowledge that smoke has the invariable concomitance of fire. Such an instance of

knowledge is certainly not a knowledge of the relationship of a qualified thing with something else and yet it has as object all the elements which are the objects of such a cognition. Hence the objection is that even such a knowledge which is not an instance of qualified knowledge in the sense in which it has been just explained could give rise to inferential knowledge.

The answer to this objection is that such a knowledge cannot be taken as an instance of consideration and therefore it does not also produce inferential knowledge. The reason for this is that, according to Nyāya analysis, both doubt and certainty are types of knowledge. Hence both the knowledge of the invariable concomitance of fire in the smoke and of the existence of smoke in the mountain can be in the form of doubt. Obviously such instances of doubtful knowledge cannot give rise to inferential knowledge. If you doubt about the invariable concomitance of fire with smoke or if you doubt about the existence of smoke on the hill, you cannot infer that there is fire on the mountain. Therefore in order to show that the knowledge of invariable concomitance and the knowledge of smoke on the mountain are true causes of inferential knowledge, it is necessary to add that they are instances of knowledge in the form of certainty.

Now when the consideration is in the form of a qualified knowledge it is not necessary to mention that the knowledge of invariable concomitance is in the form of a certainty. This is because, according to Nyāya, one can have a qualified knowledge only if one has the definite knowledge of its qualification. For example, one can have an instance of qualified knowledge 'this person is having a red stick'. But such a knowledge is possible only if one has already the definite knowledge of 'red stick.' If the knowledge of 'red stick' is in the form of a doubt, then there can be no knowledge in the form 'this person is having a red stick.' In Nyāya terminology, this idea is expressed as a general principle stating *viśiṣṭavaiśiṣṭyāvagāhijñānaṃ prati viśeṣaṇatā-vacchedakaprakārakanirṇayaḥ kāraṇam*, i.e. the cause of a

qualified cognition is the definite knowledge the qualifier of which is the determinant of qualifierness.[1]

Now applying this principle to the case in question, we get the following picture of the situation. In order to have the consideration 'this mountain has smoke which is invariably connected with fire,' (this is in the form of a *viśiṣṭavaiśiṣṭya-jñāna*) one should have the definite knowledge the qualifier of which is the determinant of qualifierness. In the present case, it is the definite knowledge the qualifier of which is invariable concomitance of fire. Without this definite knowledge there is no possibility of having a qualified knowledge in the form 'this mountain has smoke which is invariably connected with fire'. Therefore when the consideration is in the form of a qualified knowledge there is no need of expressing explicitly that the knowledge of invariable concomitance is a certainty, for, such a definite knowledge is a necessary condition for having a qualified knowledge. Therefore it has simplicity (*lāghava*).

The other kind of consideration which is a non-qualified knowledge and which consists of different instances of knowledge of qualifiers and qualificands as related to one another without ever being the knowledge of the relationship of a qualified thing with something else cannot give rise to inferential knowledge without explicitly asserting that each element in the consideration is an instance of definite knowledge. This is a cumbersome process and therefore it is not a real cause of inferential knowledge, whereas the other kind of consideration in the form of a qualified knowledge is simple (*laghu*) in the way in which it has been explained above and therefore only this kind of consideration is the cause of inferential knowledge.

[1] In the enunciation of this principle the word *jñānam* in the expression *viśiṣṭa-vaiśiṣṭyāvagāhijñānam,* means *niścayaḥ*: for if the knowledge in question were doubt, then there is no need of the definite knowledge the qualifer of which is the determinant of qualifierness. Note also that *viśiṣṭavaiśiṣṭyāvagāhijñānam* is quite different from *viśiṣṭajñānam* which is simply the knowledge the object of which is jar etc. A jar is known as qualified by jarness. *viśiṣṭajñāna* is the same as *savikalpakajñāna.*

It could however be further objected in the following way: when consideration is in the form of remembrance, there is no knowledge of invariable concomitance immediately preceding consideration, because invariable concomitance was known long ago and it is not present now before consideration. Yet an instance of inferential knowledge arises even when there is consideration in the form of remembrance. Therefore there is negative deviation (*kāraṇābhāve api kāryasattvāt*). The answer to this objection is that where the consideration is in the form of remembrance, the impression (*bhāvanā*) of invariable concomitance necessarily exists. Through this impression which is the operation, there comes about consideration in the form of remembrance. Where there is knowledge of invariable concomitance in the form of experience (*anubhava*) it directly gives rise to consideration. Hence in technical terms, the definite knowledge of invariable concomitance the qualifier (*prakāra*) of which is the determinant of qualifierness (*viśeṣaṇatāvacchedaka-prakāra*) is the cause of consideration in the form of a qualified knowledge either through the relationship of inherence (if the knowledge of invariable concomitance is in the form of experience) or through the relationship of impression which is produced by it (*svajanyasaṃskārasaṃbandhena*) (if consideration is produced through the impression of the knowledge of invariable concomitance).

(p.64, lns 3–5) Now the opinion of the modern Naiyāyikas is discussed.[1] According to them the mind is the instrument of inferential knowledge and not the knowledge of invariable concomitance. Their reason for this opinion is presented as follows: knowledge of invariable concomitance is the pervader of consideration since wherever there is consideration there is the knowledge of invariable concomitance by the relation of non-difference. According to Nyāya theories, when a characteristic

[1] By the use of the term 'modern Naiyāyikas,' it is not implied that the opinions expressed earlier were those of old Naiyāyikas (*prācīnanaiyāyikas*). By the term 'modern Naiyāyikas (*navyāḥ*)' only the more recent among them is meant; here probably the term refers to Raghunāthaśiromaṇi and his school.

that is pervaded (*vyāpyadharma*) can be taken as the determinant of causeness (*kāraṇatāvacchedaka*) then it should be accepted as the determinant of causeness and not a characteristic that is the pervader (*vyāpakadharma*). Otherwise a stick in as far as it is a substance could be considered the cause of jar. This is not admitted by anybody because it is a pervader-characteristic and hence there is deviation. But a stick is the cause of jar[1] in as far as it is stick (*daṇḍatvena*). Hence in the present case too the pervaded-characteristic of being consideration should be considered the determinant of causeness and not the pervader-characteristic of being invariable concomitance.[2] Hence knowledge of invariable concomitance is not even a cause (*kāraṇa*), how can it then be an instrumental cause (*karaṇa*)? Therefore the modern Naiyāyikas hold that mind (*manas*) is the instrumental cause of inference.

However by the word *āhuḥ*, there is an indication that the opinion of the modern Naiyāyikas has disadvantages. Neither Dinakara nor Rāmarudra explains this. However the reason may be that if mind is considered to be the instrumental cause of inferential knowledge , there is overextension (*ativyāpti*) since, in this way, mind also could be said to be the instrument of perception and verbal cognition. If it is pointed out that mind is the instrument of perception with the help of the connections of

[1] If a stick as a substance is the cause of jar, then a jar could be brought about by other substances, e.g. water. Then of course there is deviation, since such substances do not bring about jar.

[2] *Textual remarks*: according to Rāmarudra the text of D. is *vyāptijñānatvasya parāmarśavyāpakatayā* and he explains the pervadedness (*vyāpyatvam*) of consideration by the relation of non-difference (*tādātmya*). This is necessary because if consideration is by the relation of inherence, then the consideration is in the soul and there there is no 'state of being invariable concomitance.' Hence there is deviation. When however consideration is taken by the relation of non-difference there is no such fault because by the relation of non-difference consideration is in consideration and there there is 'the state of being invariable concomitance'. Following Parīkṣit Thampurān (S., p.148, lns 20f.) we take the text as follows: *vyāptijñānatvasya parāmarśatvavyāpakatayā*. In this case, of course there is no deviation since wherever there is *parāmarśatva*, there is also *vyāptijñānatva*: *parāmarśatva* is in *parāmarśa* where there is also *vyāptijñānatva*.

senses with the object, and it is the instrument of verbal cognition with the help of the knowledge of the word, since the latter characteristics are the pervaded (*vyāpya*) characteristics (for, wherever there are these characteristics there is mind), they should be considered the determinant of causeness. If however it is pointed out that that which has operation is not rendered superfluous by operation (*vyāpāreṇavyāpāriṇo nānythāsiddhatva*) then knowledge of invariable concomitance be as well considered the instrumental cause of inferential knowledge (S., p.148, ln 21 – p.149, ln 1).

Text 1 B

Knowledge of the Reason is not the Instrumental Cause

का. ज्ञायमानं लिङ्गं तु करणं न हि।
अनागतादिलिङ्गेन न स्यादनुमितिस्तदा ॥६७ bcd॥

मु. अत्र प्राचीनास्तु व्याप्यत्वेन ज्ञायमानं लिङ्गमनुमितिकरणमिति वदन्ति, तद्दूषयति **ज्ञायमानम्** इति। लिङ्गस्यानुमित्यकरणत्वे युक्तिमाह **अनागतादीति**। यद्यनुमितौ लिङ्गं करणं स्यात्तदानागतेन लिङ्गेन विनष्टेन चानुमितिर्न स्यादनुमितिकरणस्य लिङ्गस्य तदानीमभावादिति।

K. The reason which is being known is not the instrumental cause for, in that case, there would be no inferential knowledge from a reason which has not yet come into existence and so on. (*Kārikā* 67bcd)

M. With reference to this the old Naiyāyikas assert that the reason which is being known as pervaded is the instrumental cause of inferential knowledge. The faults of this opinion are pointed out (with the words) **being known** (*jñāyamānam iti*). An argument is adduced (to show) why the reason is not the instrumental cause of inferential knowledge (by the words) **which has not come into existence and so on** (*anāgatādīti*). If reason is the instrumental cause of inferential knowledge, then a reason which has not yet come into existence or which has ceased to exist would not produce inferential knowledge, since the reason which is the instrumental cause of inferential knowledge is then absent.

दि. लिङ्गमनुमितिकरणम् इति । अनुमितौ परामर्शमात्रं न हेतुः, अपि तु लिङ्गपरामर्शः । तथा च विशिष्टस्य कारणताग्रहे विशेषणस्यापि कारणताग्रहात् परामृश्यमानलिङ्गस्य लिङ्गपरामर्शस्य वा हेतुतेत्यत्र विनिगमनाविरहादुभयोर्हेतुतासिद्धौ तत्र च व्यापाराभावान्न परामर्शस्य करणता किं तु लिङ्गस्यैवेत्याशयः । **लिङ्गस्य तदानीमभावात्** इति । न च परामर्शरूपव्यापारसंबन्धेन तदानीं लिङ्गमस्त्येवेति वाच्यम् । अतीतादिलिङ्गस्य परामर्शाजनकतया परामर्शस्य तद्व्यापारत्वासंभवात् । इदमुपलक्षणम् । लिङ्गस्य हेतुत्वे चैत्रीयपरामर्शविषयाल्लिङ्गान्मैत्रस्यानुमितिप्रसङ्गः तत्तत्पुरुषीयत्वनिवेशे

D. Reason is the instrumental cause of inferential knowledge (*lingam anumitikaraṇam iti*). Mere knowledge (of anything) is not the cause of inferential knowledge but the knowledge of the reason. And thus, when that which is qualified is understood as the cause, the qualifier is also understood as the cause. Therefore, there would be no clinching argument (to decide) whether the reason which is being considered or the consideration of the reason is the cause. Hence both are to be taken as reasons. However, the latter (i.e. the consideration of the reason) has no operation and therefore it is not the instrumental cause but only the reason (is the instrumental cause). This is the idea. **Since the reason is then absent** (*lingasya tadānīm abhāvāt*). Nor should it be said that the reason exists there by the relation of the operation in the form of consideration. This is because a reason which existed in the past and so on does not produce consideration and therefore consideration is not its operation. This is indicative (of the following also). If the reason is considered as the cause, then by means of the reason which is the object of the consideration of Caitra there would be inferential knowledge for Maitra. In this way there would be overextension. If it is stated that a particular person (having consideration, has inferential knowledge)

दि. गौरवम्। अस्मन्मते सामानाधिकरण्यप्रत्यासत्त्या हेतुहेतुमद्भावेनैवाति-प्रसङ्गाभावान्न तत्पुरुषीयत्वनिवेश इति लाघवमित्यपि बोध्यम्।

D. then it is cumbersome. In our opinion the relation of cause and effect is by the relation of coexistence in the same substratum and therefore there is no overextension. Hence there is no need of mentioning the qualifier in the form of that particular person. Therefore it should also be known that there is simplicity.

Commentary

(p.81, lns 4–10; p.82, ln 1 – p.83, ln 2) Now M. D. and R. discuss the instrumental cause of inferential knowledge according to the old Naiyāyikas. M. following K. points out that, according to the old Naiyāyikas, the instrumental cause of inferential knowledge is the reason which is being known. D. explains the arguments of the old Naiyāyikas supporting their position. The cause of inferential knowledge is not any kind of knowledge, but the knowledge of the reason. Hence when the qualified knowledge viz. the consideration of reason (*liṅgaparāmarśa*) is accepted as the cause of inferential knowledge, then naturally the qualifier, i.e. reason (*liṅga*), is also the cause. Here it should be noted that the reason (*liṅga*) is a qualifier to consideration by the relation of the state of being object (*viṣayitāsaṃbandhena*) since the reason is the object of consideration which is an instance of knowledge.[1] Nor can it be argued that there is no clinching argument to show whether the reason which is being considered or consideration of the reason[2] is the instrumental cause of

[1] The principle here is that the means of knowledge which establishes causality for the qualified establishes also the causality for the qulaifier when there is no hindering factor. As for instance it is enjoined by the Mīmāṃsakas that one should buy *soma* with a cow which is one year old and which is reddish brown in colour and which has yellowish brown eyes. Here the qualifiers of the cow, reddish brown colour etc. are also to be considered as instrumental causes of the buying of *soma*.

[2] Both *parāmṛśyamānaliṅga* (the reason which is being considered) and *liṅgaparāmarśa* (consideration of the reason) are *viśiṣṭapadārthas*. The difference

inferential knowledge. This is because consideration which is an instance of knowledge directly produces inferential knowledge and there is no operation in between. But reason (*liṅga*) can have an operation in the form of consideration which produces inferential knowledge. Therefore, reason which is being known, i.e. reason which has consideration as its operation, is to be accepted as the instrumental cause of inferential knowledge.

This opinion of the old Naiyāyikas is rejected because in that case there would be no inferential knowledge by means of a reason which will exist only in the future or which has ceased to exist, as for instance, 'this place had fire because it had smoke'. This is because at that time there is no instrumental cause (in the form of the reason which is being known) in order to bring about inferential knowledge.

But an objection may be raised against this position by pointing out that even in such an instance the reason can exist in the present by means of the relation in the form of consideration. This means that if consideration exists, then that which is related to it, viz. reason, should also exist. This objection is rejected because a reason which has ceased to exist or which will only exist in the future cannot produce consideration, as for instance, when consideration was produced by means of verbal testimony the reason does not exist at that moment. As for example, when somebody asserts that smoke which was here was pervaded by fire, the hearer has verbal knowledge in the form of consideration but the reason, viz. smoke, does not exist there. Therefore, the reason which existed in the past or which will exist in the future cannot be a cause of consideration. Hence consideration cannot be considered as the operation of the reason which existed in the past or which will exist in the future.

A further argument against this opinion of the old Naiyāyikas is that if their opinion is accepted, there would be overextension. This comes about in the following way: if reason is considered

between the two is that in the former (*parāmṛśyamānaliṅga*) *liṅga* is the qualificand and in the latter (*liṅgaparāmarśa*) *parāmarśa* is the qualificand. And therefore *parāmṛśyamānaliṅga* and *liṅgaparāmarśa* are two different entities.

as the cause of inferential knowledge, then the reason which is known only by Caitra could produce inferential knowledge for Maitra. Here it should be noted also that the old Naiyāyikas have to accept that the relation of cause and effect that exists between inferential knowledge and reason is in the following way: for inferential knowledge by the relation of subjectness, the reason is cause by the relation of the determinant of the state of being cause (*uddeśyatāsaṃbandhena anumitiṃ prati hetutāvacchedakasaṃbandhena liṅgaṃ kāraṇam*). The reason for accepting such a relation of cause and effect is that in inferential knowledge such as 'the mountain has fire because of smoke' the cause of inferential knowledge, viz. smoke, is in the mountain, whereas the effect in the form of inferential knowledge is in the soul. Therefore there cannot be any cause and effect relationship between smoke and inferential knowledge. But when it is accepted that by the relation of subjectness (*uddeśyatā*) the inferential knowledge is in the mountain and there by the relation of conjunction which is the relation of the determinant of the state of being the reason (*hetutāvacchedakasaṃbandha*) there is smoke, then there can be the relation of the cause and effect between smoke and inferential knowledge. But then the above mentioned fault of overextension arises: Caitra can have the knowledge of reason, viz. smoke as existing on the mountain by the relation of conjunction and Maitra can have inferential knowledge in the form 'mountain has fire'. Even in this case, the relation of cause and effect between the reason which is being known and the inferential knowledge would be the same (*uddeśyatāsaṃbandhena anumitiṃ prati hetutāvacchedakasaṃbandhena liṅgaṃ kāraṇam*).

In order to avoid this overextension, if the relation of cause and effect between reason and inferential knowledge is stated that the reason which is the object of the consideration of one particular person is the cause of the inferential knowledge of that same person, then there is cumbersomeness. This is because, in that case, there would be infinite number of cause and effect relation.

In the opinion of the modern Naiyāyikas however, there would be no overextension and so there would also be no cumbersomeness. This is because, according to them, the relation of cause and effect obtaining between reason and inferential knowledge is in the following form: for inferential knowledge by the relation of inherence, consideration by the relation of inherence is the cause (*samavāyasaṃbandhena vyāptiprakārakapakṣadharmatājñānaṃ samavāyasaṃbandhenānumitiṃ janayati*).

Here it may be noted that, according to Parīkṣīt Thampurān, (S., p.149, lns 5ff) this argument of Dinakara showing cumbersomeness in the position of the old Naiyāyikas is not quite appropriate. This is because the opinion of the modern Naiyāyikas may be shown to be more cumbersome. The reason is that even consideration cannot be accepted as the cause of inferential knowledge by the relation of inherence, but by the relation of the state of being the object. This is because it is not possible to accept the relationship of cause and effect between consideration and inferential knowledge in the form 'by the relation of inherence consideration is the cause of inferential knowledge by the relation of inherence'. The reason is that because in that case there could be inferential knowledge of fire on the mountain by means of the consideration of fire as connected with smoke in the kitchen because it also exists by the relation of *samavāya* in the person concerned. But such a position cannot obviously be held. Therefore one has to admit the relation of cause and effect in the following manner: *viṣayatāsaṃbandhena anumitiṃ prati viṣayatāsaṃbandhena parāmarśaḥ kāraṇam*. This means that in the inferential knowledge *parvato vahnimān, uddeśyatāsaṃbandhena* (*viṣayatāsaṃbandhena*) *anumiti* exists in *parvata* and consideration also exists in *parvata* by the same relation since the form of consideration is *vahnivyāpyadhūmavān parvataḥ*.

Now in the universe there are more objects which are the objects of the knowledge of persons rather than persons themselves. Therefore the instances of cause and effect relationship between inferential knowledge and consideration

by the relation of the state of being the object (*viṣayatāsaṃ-bandhena*) are more numerous than the instances of the relationship of cause and effect between consideration and inferential knowledge when it is stated that the consideration of one particular person is the cause of the inferential knowledge of that particular person. Hence the position of the modern Naiyāyikas is more cumbersome. Therefore there is no cumbersomeness in the position of the old Naiyāyikas as pointed out by Dinakara. Hence according to Parīkṣit Thampurān the argument of Muktāvalīkāra against the position of the old Naiyāyikas that if reason is accepted as the cause of inferential knowledge, then there would be no inferential knowledge from a reason which is lost or which will exist in the future, is to be preferred rather than that of Dinakara.

Text 2

Definition and Form of Consideration

का. व्याप्यस्य पक्षवृत्तित्वधीः परामर्श उच्यते। ॥६८ ab॥

मु. व्याप्यस्य इति। व्याप्तिविशिष्टस्य पक्षेण सह वैशिष्ट्यावगाहिज्ञानमनुमितौ जनकम्। तच्च 'पक्षे व्याप्यः' इति ज्ञानं 'पक्षो व्याप्यवान्' इति ज्ञानं च। अनुमितिस्तु 'पक्षे व्याप्यः' इति ज्ञानात् 'पक्षे साध्यम्' इत्याकारिका, 'पक्षो व्याप्यवान्' इति ज्ञानात् 'पक्षः साध्यवान्' इत्याकारिका। द्विविधादपि परामर्शात् 'पक्षः साध्यवान्' इत्येवानुमितिरित्यन्ये । ननु 'वह्निव्याप्यधूमवान्पर्वतः' इति ज्ञानं विनापि यत्र 'पर्वतो धूमवान्' इति प्रत्यक्षं ततो 'वह्निव्याप्यो धूमः'

K. The knowledge that that which has invariable concomitance exists in the subject is called consideration. (*Kārikā* 68ab)

M. That which has invariable concomitance (*vyāpyasya iti*). The knowledge the object of which is the relation of that which is qualified by invariable concomitance with the subject, is the cause of inferential knowledge. Such a knowledge is in the form that that which has invariable concomitance is in the subject and in the form that the subject has that which has invariable concomitance. From the knowledge that that which has invariable concomitance is in the subject, the inferential knowledge is in the form that that which is to be established is in the subject. From the knowledge that the subject has that which has invariable concomitance, the inferential knowledge is in the form that the subject has that which is to be established. Others assert that even from both forms of considerations the inferential knowledge is in the form that the subject has that which is to be established. It may be objected that even without the knowledge that the mountain has smoke which is pervaded by fire, where there is

मु. इति स्मरणं तत्र ज्ञानद्वयादेवानुमितेर्दर्शनात् व्याप्तिविशिष्ट-वैशिष्ट्यावगाहिज्ञानं सर्वत्र न कारणं, किं तु व्याप्यतावच्छेदकप्रकारकपक्षधर्मताज्ञानत्वेन कारणत्वम्, आवश्यकत्वात् तत्र, विशिष्टवैशिष्ट्यज्ञानकल्पने गौरवाच्चेति चेन्न । व्याप्यतावच्छेदकाज्ञानेऽपि 'वह्निव्याप्यवान्' इति ज्ञानादनुमित्युत्पत्तेर्लाघवाच्च व्याप्तिप्रकारकपक्षधर्मताज्ञानत्वेन हेतुत्वम् । किं च 'धूमवान् पर्वतः' इति ज्ञानादनुमित्यापत्तिः व्याप्यतावच्छेदकीभूतधूमत्वप्रकारकस्य पक्षधर्मता-

M. the direct perception that the mountain has smoke and then the recollection that the smoke is pervaded by fire, there we observe inferential knowledge as arising only from these two instances of knowledge. Therefore the knowledge which has as object the relationship of that which is qualified by invariable concomitance is not everywhere the cause (of inferential knowledge), but the state of being cause is determined by the state of being knowledge of the state of being the attribute of the subject which (knowledge) has as qualifier the determinant of the state of being pervaded. This is so because of necessity there and because of cumbersomeness in assuming the knowledge of the relationship with that which is qualified.

This objection cannot be admitted, because even when the determinant of the state of being pervaded is not known, from the knowledge that this has that which is pervaded by fire inferential knowledge arises, and because of simplicity, the state of being the cause (of inferential knowledge) is determined by the state of being the knowledge of the state of being the attribute of the subject the qualifier of which is invariable concomitance. Besides there could be inferential knowledge from the knowledge that the mountain has smoke because there is the knowledge of the state of being the attribute of the subject the qualifier of which is smokeness which is the determinant of the state of being pervaded.

मु. ज्ञानस्य सत्त्वात् । न च गृह्यमाणव्याप्यतावच्छेदकप्रकारक-पक्षधर्मताज्ञानस्य हेतुत्वमिति वाच्यम् । चैत्रस्य व्याप्तिग्रहे मैत्रस्य पक्षधर्मताज्ञानात् अनुमित्यापत्तेः । यदि तत्पुरुषीयगृह्यमाणव्याप्यता-वच्छेदकप्रकारकं तत्पुरुषीयपक्षधर्मताज्ञानं तत्पुरुषीयानुमितौ हेतु-रित्युच्यते तदानन्तकार्यकारणभावः । मन्मते तु समवायसंबन्धेन व्याप्तिप्रकारकपक्षधर्मताज्ञानं समवायसंबन्धेनानुमितिं जनयतीति नानन्तकार्यकारणभावः । यदि तु व्याप्तिप्रकारकं ज्ञानं पक्षधर्मता-ज्ञानं च स्वतन्त्रं कारणमित्युच्यते तदा कार्यकारणभावद्वयम्, 'वह्नि-

M. Nor can it be argued that the cause of inferential knowledge is the knowledge the object of which is the state of being the attribute of the subject the qualifier of which is the determinant of the state of being pervaded which is being actually perceived. This is because if Caitra has the knowledge of invariable concomitance there could be inferential knowledge for Maitra from his knowledge of the state of being the attribute of the subject. If it is argued that the knowledge of the state of being the attribute of the subject of a particular person having as qualifier the determinant of the state of being pervaded which is being grasped by that person is the cause of inferential knowledge of that particular person, then there is infinite number of cause and effect relationships. In my opinion, however, there would be no infinite number of cause and effect relationships because by the relation of inherence, the knowledge the object of which is the state of being the attribute of the subject and the qualifier of which is invariable concomitance produces inferential knowledge by the relation of inherence. If it is argued that the knowledge the qualifier of which is invariable concomitance and the knowledge of the state of being the attribute of the subject are independent causes (of inferential knowledge) then there are two relationships of cause and effect. (Besides) there would be

मु. व्याप्यो धूमः' 'आलोकवान् पर्वतः' इति ज्ञानादप्यनुमितिः स्यात्। इत्थं च यत्र ज्ञानद्वयं तत्रापि विशिष्टज्ञानं कल्पनीयं फल-मुखगौरवस्यादोषत्वात्।

दि. तच्च व्याप्यस्य पक्षेण सह वैशिष्ट्यावगाहिज्ञानं च। ननु परस्परं व्यभि-चार इत्यत आह **अनुमितिस्तु** इति। कार्यतावच्छेदकस्य परस्परानुमिति-व्यावृत्तत्वान्न व्यभिचार इति भावः। पक्षविशेष्यकत्वमेव सर्वत्रानुमितौ नियत-मिति नवीनमतमाह **द्विविधादपि** इति। पक्षविशेष्यकव्याप्यविशेष्यकोभय-परामर्शादपीत्यर्थः। कारणतावच्छेदकं च परामर्शद्वयसाधारणं व्याप्यपक्षो-

M. inferential knowledge also from the knowledge that smoke is pervaded by fire and mountain has light. In this way where there are two instances of knowledge there also (from these two), an instance of qualified knowledge is to be assumed (as originating) because there is no fault in accepting cumbersomeness depending on the result.

D. Such a knowledge (*tacca*) means the knowledge the object of which is the relationship of that which has invariable concomitance with the subject. Now it could be objected that there is mutual deviation and therefore (the author) says **inferential knowledge** (*anumitistu iti*). The idea is that there is no deviation because the determinant of the state of being an effect is absent from the inferential knowledge (which is caused) by the other (consideration). Now (the author) mentions the opinion of the modern Naiyāyikas that in every instance of inferential knowledge, the subject is invariably the qualificand (with the words) **even from both forms** (*dvividhādapi iti*). From both forms of considerations i.e. that which has the subject as qualificand and that which has that which has invariable concomitance as qualificand. This is the meaning. And the determinant of the state of being cause is the state of being definite knowledge which has as object the relationship of both subject and that

दि. भयवैशिष्ट्यावगाहिनिश्चयत्वमतो न व्यभिचार इति भावः। द्विविध-योरपि परामर्शयोः स्वस्वाव्यवहितोत्तरानुमितिं प्रति ताद्रूप्येण हेतुत्वमित्यपि केचित्। वस्तुतस्त्वनुभवानुरोधात् पक्षविशेष्यकपरामर्शस्यैव हेतुत्वमत एव 'वह्निव्याप्यधूमवांश्चायम्' इत्याकारकः पक्षविशेष्यक एवोपनयः सर्वसंमत इति ध्येयम्। मीमांसकः शङ्कते ननु इति। 'ज्ञानं विनापि' इत्यस्य 'अनुमिते-दर्शनात्' इत्यनेनान्वयः। **ज्ञानद्वयादेव** ज्ञानद्वयादपि। **विशिष्टवैशिष्ट्यावगाहिज्ञानं** इति। भावप्रधानो निर्देशः। **सर्वत्र न कारणं** इति। अनुमितित्वावच्छिन्नं प्रति न कारणतावच्छेदकम्। **आवश्यकत्वात्** इति।

D. which has invariable concomitance and which is common to both forms of considerations. Therefore, there is no deviation. This is the idea. Some are of opinion that for both forms of considerations the causality is (in the following form): for the inferential knowledge which comes about immediately after (a particular consideration that consideration) in that form is the cause. In fact it is to be understood that according to experience only that consideration which has the subject as the qualificand is the cause (of inferential knowledge). Therefore that application (*upanaya*), which has the subject as the qualificand in the form 'this has smoke which is invariably connected with fire' is accepted by all.

The Mīmāṃsakas raise the doubt (with the words) **it may be objected** (*nanu iti*). (The expression) 'even without the knowledge' is to be syntactically connected with (the expression) 'we observe inferential knowledge as arising'. **Only from these two instances of knowledge** (*jñānadvayādeva*) (means) even from these two instances of knowledge. **The knowledge which has as object the relationship of that which is qualified** (*viśiṣṭa-vaiśiṣṭyāvagāhijñānaṃ iti*). This is to be taken in the abstract sense. **It is not everywhere the cause (of inferential knowledge)** (*sarvatra na kāraṇam iti*). It is not the determinant of the state of being cause for that which is determined by the state of being inferential knowledge. **Because of necessity** (*āvaśyakatvāt iti*).

दि. व्याप्यतावच्छेदकप्रकारकपक्षधर्मताज्ञानत्वस्योभयमतसिद्धनियतपूर्व-वृत्तितावच्छेदकताकत्वादित्यर्थः । ननु ज्ञानद्वयस्थलेऽपि विशिष्टज्ञानं कल्प-नीयमतो न व्यभिचार इत्यत आह **विशिष्टवैशिष्ट्यज्ञानेति** । **व्याप्यता-वच्छेदकेति** । 'अयमालोको धूमो वा' इति संदेहदशायां व्याप्यतावच्छेदक-प्रकारकनिर्णयाभावेऽपीत्यर्थः। **वह्निव्याप्यवान्** इति । वह्न्यभाववद-वृत्तिमानित्यर्थः । न तु धूमसमानाधिकरणेत्यादिरूपव्याप्तिविशिष्टवा-नित्यर्थः । अत्र हेतुतावच्छेदकभाननैयत्यात् । **अनुमित्युत्पत्तेः** इति । तथा च व्याप्यतावच्छेदकप्रकारकपक्षधर्मताज्ञानस्य तत्र व्यभिचारान्न

D. This means that the state of being knowledge of the state of being the attribute of the subject the qualifier of which (i.e. knowledge) is the determinant of the state of being that which has invariable concomitance indicates the state of being the determinant of the state of being invariably antecedent which is accepted by both (Mīmāṃsakas and Naiyāyikas).

Now it may be objected that even where there are two instances of knowledge, the knowledge of the qualified is to be assumed, and therefore there is no deviation; hence (the author) says **knowledge of the relationship with that which is qualified** (*viśiṣṭavaiśiṣṭyajñāneti*). **The determinant of the state of being pervaded** (*vyāpyatāvacchedaketi*). When there is doubt whether this is light or smoke even though there is the absence of definite knowledge the qualifier of which is the determinant of the state of being pervaded. This is the meaning. **This has that which is pervaded by fire** (*vahnivyāpyavān iti*). The meaning is that this has no existence in that which has the absence of fire and not that this has the characteristic which has the invariable concomitance in the form that this coexists with smoke and so on. The reason is that here there is the invariability of the knowledge of the determinant of the state of being reason. **Because inferential knowledge arises** (*anumi-tyutpatteḥ iti*). In this way there there is the deviation of the knowledge of the state of being the attribute of the subject the

दि. तेन रूपेण हेतुत्वमिति भावः । ननु तत्र फलबलाद् व्याप्यतावच्छेदकप्रकारकं ज्ञानं कल्पनीयमतो न व्यभिचार इत्यत आह **लाघवाच्च** इति । व्याप्यतावच्छेदकप्रकारकत्वापेक्षया व्याप्तिप्रकारकत्वस्य लघुत्वादित्यर्थः । नन्वस्तुतवावच्छेदकलाघवं तथापि पूर्वोक्तकल्पनलाघवमेव मीमांसकानां मूलयुक्तिर्भविष्यतीत्यत आह **किं च** इति । **न च गृह्यमाणेति** । अत्र ज्ञानचाग्रहस्य वर्तमानताया अभिधानान्न कालान्तरीयतादृशग्रहमादाय दोषः । 'व्याप्तिप्रकारकं ज्ञानम्' इति 'स्वतन्त्रं कारणम्' इत्यनेनान्वयि । **इत्युच्यते** इति । इत्थं च न तत्पुरुषीयत्वं निवेश्यते चैत्रस्य व्याप्तिग्रहकाले तच्छून्यस्य मैत्रस्या-

D. qualifier of which is the determinant of the state of being pervaded and therefore in that form it is not the cause (of inferential knowledge). This is the idea.

It may be objected that on the strength of the result (in the form of inferential knowledge), knowledge the qualifier of which is the determinant of the state of being pervaded is to be assumed there and so there is no deviation. Therefore (the author) says **because of simplicity** (*lāghavācca iti*). The meaning is that it is simpler to accept invariable concomitance as qualifier (to the knowledge) in comparison with accepting the determinant of the state of being pervaded as qualifier (to it). Let there be simplicity according to you with reference to the determinant; still the basic argument of the Mīmāṃsakas would be the simplicity of assumption which has been mentioned; therefore (the author) says **besides** (*kiṃ ca iti*). **Nor which is actually being perceived** (*na ca gṛhyamāṇeti*). Here by the present participle the knowledge is indicated as actually present and therefore one cannot find fault (with the position) taking the knowledge that exists in another time. The expression 'knowledge the qualifier of which is invariable concomitance' is to be syntactically connected with the expression 'independent cause'. **It is argued** (*ityucyate iti*). In this way the expression 'that particular person' is not included and so when Caitra has the knowledge of invariable concomitance it cannot be objected

दि. नुमित्यापत्तेरभावान्मैत्रात्मनि स्वतन्त्रहेतुभूतव्याप्तिज्ञानाभावादिति न गौरवमिति भावः । ननु व्याप्तिप्रकारकपक्षधर्मताज्ञानत्वेन पक्षधर्मताविषयक-व्याप्तिप्रकारकज्ञानत्वेन वा हेतुतेत्यत्र विनिगमनाविरहेण हेतुताद्वयं तवापि, इत्यत आह **वह्निव्याप्यः** इति । **अनुमितिः स्यात्** इति । न्यायनये तु व्याप्तिप्रकारतानिरूपितहेतुप्रकारतानिरूपितपक्षविशेष्यताशालिज्ञानत्वेन हेतुत्वस्य विवक्षितत्वान्न तादृशज्ञानान्न वा 'धूमो वह्निव्याप्यः' 'धूमवान् पर्वतः' इति ज्ञानादनुमित्यापत्तिस्तत्र व्याप्तिप्रकारतानिरूपितधूमविशेष्य-तायाः पर्वतविशेष्यतानिरूपितप्रकारतानात्मकत्वादिति भावः ।

D. that Maitra who does not have such a knowledge would have inferential knowledge because in the soul of Maitra there is the absence of the knowledge of invariable concomitance which is a separate cause (for inferential knowledge) and therefore there is no cumbersomeness. This is the idea.

It may be objected that even in your opinion there are two causes (for inferential knowledge) because of the absence of any clinching argument to decide whether the knowledge of the state of being the attribute of the subject in which the qualifer is invariable concomitance or the knowledge in which the qualifier is invariable concomitance and the state of being the attribute of the subject is the object. Therefore (the author) says **pervaded by fire** (*vahnivyāpyaḥ iti*). **There would be inferential knowledge** (*anumitiḥ syāt iti*). In the opinion of the Naiyāyikas, the cause (of inferential knowledge) is considered as the knowledge in which the qualificandness of the subject is indicated by the qualifierness of reason which is indicated by the qualifierness of invariable concomitance. Hence from such a knowledge (i.e. 'smoke is pervaded by fire' and 'mountain has light') or from the knowledge 'smoke is pervaded by fire' and 'mountain has smoke' inferential knowledge does not arise. This is because in this instance of knowledge the qualificandness of smoke which is indicated by the qualifierness of invariable concomitance is not identical with the qualifierness which is indicated by the

दि. ननु ज्ञानद्वयस्थले विशिष्टज्ञानकल्पनागौरवं न्यायमते दूषणं भविष्यतीत्यत आह **इत्थं च** इति । **फलमुखगौरवस्यादोषत्वात्** इति । फलं कार्यकारणभावग्रहः, तन्मुखं तदधीनं, गौरवं गौरवज्ञानमित्यर्थः । विशिष्टज्ञानत्वावच्छेदेन कारणत्वग्रहे विशिष्टज्ञानत्वधर्मिकगौरवनिश्चयो विरोधी वाच्यः । तच्च गौरवं प्रमाणान्तरासिद्धतत्तदनुमित्यव्यवहितपूर्ववर्तिस्वाश्रयकत्वमेव, तादृशगौरवनिश्चयो विशिष्टज्ञानत्वेन कारणत्वनिश्चयाधीनस्वघटकीभूततत्तदनुमित्यव्यवहितपूर्ववर्तिस्वाश्रयनिर्णयं विना न संभवतीति

D. qualificandness of mountain. This is the idea. Now it may be objected that in both instances of knowledge the assumption of qualified knowledge is cumbersome; this will be the fault in the opinion of the Naiyāyikas and so (the author) says **in this way** (*ittham ceti*). **Because there is no fault in accepting cumbersomeness depending on the result** (*phalamukhagauravasyādoṣatvāt iti*). Result (*phalam*) is the knowledge of the relationship of cause and effect. *tanmukham* means *tadadhīnam* i.e. depending on it. Cumbersomeness (*gauravam*) means knowledge of cumbersomeness. The definite knowledge of cumbersomeness in which the state of being the knowledge of the qualified is the qualificand hinders the apprehension of causality as determined by the state of being the knowledge of the qualified. This cumbersomeness is existence on its substratum which is not established by any other means of valid knowledge as existing immediately before that particular inferential knowledge. Such a definite knowledge of cumbersomeness cannot happen without the definite knowledge of the substratum of cumbersomeness which (i.e. substratum) exists immediately before that particular inferential knowledge which is a part of the definition of cumbersomeness and which (i.e. definite knowledge of substratum) is dependent on the definite knowledge of causality which is determined by the knowledge of the state of being the knowledge of the qualified. And therefore such a cumbersomeness is not a fault because there is the absence of

दि. कार्यकारणभावनिर्णयात् पूर्वं गौरवनिर्णयाभावान्न तादृशगौरवं दोष इति भावः ।

D. the knowledge of cumbersomeness before the definite knowledge of the relationship of cause and effect. This is the idea.

Commentary

(p.88, ln 3–9 ; p.91, ln 4 – p.92, ln 5) In general, consideration is the knowledge that that which has invariable concomitance exists in the subject (*vyāpyasya pakṣavṛttitvajñānaṃ parāmarśaḥ*). Here the expression 'that which has invariable concomitance (*vyāpya*)' is used rather than the term 'reason (*hetu*)', in order to show that here the author deals with a valid reason (*saddhetu*) which has invariable concomitance and not an invalid reason (*asaddhetu*) having no invariable concomitance.[1] Further the expression *vyāpyasya pakṣavṛttitva* means only *vyāpyasya pakṣasaṃbandha* (Cfr. S., p.149, lns 13–15). Hence in such inferences as *idaṃ dravyam ākāśāt*, the reason *ākāśa* cannot exist in anything. But still the inference is valid since the reason, *ākāśa*, is related to the subject (*idam*) by the relation of identity (*tādātmya*).

Such a consideration itself can be in two forms: that which has invariable concomitance is in the subject or the subject has that which has invariable concomitance. If in this way two forms of considerations are admitted, then there could be deviation with reference to the principle of causality. The reason is that when the consideration having the subject as qualificand (*pakṣa-viśeṣyakaparāmarśa*) produces an instance of inferential knowledge, such an inferential knowledge is not obviously produced by the consideration having the *vyāpya* as qualificand (*vyāpyaviśeṣyakaparāmarśa*). Therefore there is deviation. Similarly when the consideration having *vyāpya* as the qualificand produces an instance of inferential knowledge, such an inferential knowledge

[1] This implies that the term *hetu* is used both for *saddhetu* and *asaddhetu*. But the term *vyāpya* is used only for *saddhetu*.

is not produced by the consideration having the subject as the qualificand. Hence again there is deviation.

In order to avoid such deviations, Muktāvalīkāra says that from the consideration in the form that that which has invariable concomitance is in the subject, the inferential knowledge is in the form that the *sādhya* is in the subject (*pakṣe sādhyam*) and that from the consideration in the form that the subject has that which has invariable concomitance the inferential knowledge is in the form that the subject has *sādhya* (*pakṣaḥ sādhyavān*).

According to the modern Naiyāyikas, from both kinds of considerations, the inferential knowledge is in the form that the subject has *sādhya* (*pakṣaḥ sādhyavān*). This means that in every instance of inferential knowledge the subject is the qualificand. This is to be understood in the sense that in every instance of inferential knowledge where *sādhya* is known to be established in some place other than the subject (*prasiddhasādhya*) the subject is the qualificand. This is because it is accepted that from negative consideration (*vyatirekaparāmarśa*) the *sādhya* is the qualificand in the inferential knowledge.[1]

Still there could be deviation in the sense that when inferential knowledge is produced by one kind of consideration, it is not produced by the other kind of consideration. In order to

[1] The definition of *vyatirekavyāpti* is *sādhyābhāvavyāpakībhūtābhāvapratiyogitvam*, i.e. the state of being the counterpositive of the absence which is the pervader of the absence of *sādhya*. As for instance, in the *anvayavyatireki* inference 'mountain has fire because of smoke,' *sādhya* is fire, the absence of smoke is the pervader of the absence of fire and the counterpositive of the pervading absence is smoke. In the case of the *vyātireki* inference 'the earth is different from all other things because it has smell (*pṛthvī itarabhinnā gandhavattvāt*)', the *sādhya* is 'being different from other things (*itarabheda*)', *sādhyābhāva* is *itarabhedābhāva*, i.e. *itaratva*. Absence of *gandha* is the pervader of the absence of *itarabheda*. And so the *parāmārśa* is negative in the form *pṛthvītaratva-vyāpakābhāvapratiyogigandhavatī pṛthvī*, i.e. the earth having smell is the counterpositive of the absence which is the pervader of the state of being different (*itaratva*). And from this kind of *parāmarśa*, the inferential knowledge is *prthivyām itarabhedaḥ*. Here since *itarabheda* which is the *sādhya* is not established earlier anywhere, the inferential knowledge has as qualificand *itarabheda*. In this way in the *vyatireki* inferential knowledge the *sādhya* is the qualificand.

avoid such a deviation the common determinant of causality which is present in both forms of considerations is pointed out by Dinakara; it is the state of being definite knowledge which has as object the relationship of both subject and that which has invariable concomitance and which (i.e. the state of being definite knowledge) is common to both forms of considerations. This just means that in both kinds of considerations the relationship of subject with reason is also the object. Such a consideration is in the form of a definite knowledge.

Now Rāmarudra raises a possible objection against this and answers it. The objection is that it is difficult to explain the state of being definite knowledge (*niścayatva*) which is common to both forms of considerations. This is because definite knowledge is defined as that knowledge in which the absence of the qualifier of the object is not the qualifier of the knowledge and at the same time the qualifier of the object is the qualifier of the knowledge (*tadabhāvāprakārakatve sati tatprakārakatvaṃ niścayatvam*). In the consideration in the form *vahnivyāpya-dhūmavān parvataḥ, dhūma* is *prakāra*, and in the consideration in the form *vahnivyāpyadhūmaḥ parvate, parvata* is *prakāra*. Therefore the definition of *niścayatva* cannot be applied in the same way to both forms of considerations. They have different qualifiers and so the application of the definition of *niścayatva* will be different in both forms of considerations.

Further, the relationship of the qualifiers to the subject are different in both forms of considerations; in the consideration *vahnivyāpyadhūmavān parvataḥ*, the relation of the qualifier (i.e. *dhūma*) with the qualificand (i.e. *parvata*) is *saṃyoga*; in the consideration *vahnivyāpyadhūmaḥ parvate,* the relation of the qualifier (i.e. *parvata*) with the qualificand (i.e. *dhūma*) is *adheyatā*.[1] Hence the nature of definite knowledge will be

[1] Here it may be asked why *saṃyoga* is not the relation of the qualifier even in the case of *vahnivyāpyadhūmaḥ parvate*, since smoke exists in the mountain by the relation of *saṃyoga*. The answer is that here *parvata* is the *prakāra* in the knowledge by the relation of *ādheyatā* and *saṃyoga* is only *ādheyatā-vacchedakasaṃbandha*. It may be further noted that in the knowledge arising from the expression *parvate dhūmaḥ, dhūma* is *viśeṣya* and *parvata* is *prakāra,*

different in both types of considerations. If the relationship of the qualifier is not included in the definition of definite knowledge, there could be inferential knowledge from the consideration in which that which has invariable concomitance is known as existing in the subject through such relations as temporality etc.[1]

The answer of Rāmarudra to this objection is as follows: basically what he does is to find a consecutive characteristic (*anugatadharma*) in both kinds of considerations. He does so in the following manner: the *niścaya* common to both kinds of considerations, viz. (a) *vahnivyāpyadhūmavān parvataḥ* and (b) *vahnivyāpyadhūmaḥ parvate* is in the form *parvate vahnivyāpyasya, vahnivyāpyasya parvatavṛttitvasya ca niścayaḥ.* Hence the form of this *niścaya* as explained by Rāmarudra is *parvatābhāvāprakārakatve sati vyāpyadhūmābhāvāprakārkatve sati parvataviṣayakatvam vyāpyaviṣayakatvam ca.* Rāmarudra describes technically how such a form of *niścaya* comes about from both forms of considerations taken together.

In both forms of considerations there is a *viṣayatā* which exists in *parvata* which is the *pakṣa* and which is determined by *parvatatva.* Although in the consideration (a), *vahnivyāpyadhūmavān parvataḥ, parvata* is *viśeṣya*, and in the consideration (b), *vahnivyāpyadhūmaḥ parvate, parvata* is *prakāra*, still in both forms of considerations the *viṣayatā* is *pakṣatāvacchedakāvacchinnā.* Further this *viṣayatā* is not determined by any relation other than *ādheyatā* relation (*ādheyatvasaṃbandhānyasaṃbandhānavacchinnā*). In the first form of consideration

and *prakāra* always exists in the *viśeṣya;* as for instance, in the knowledge arising from the expression *nīlo ghaṭaḥ, nīla* is *prakāra* and *ghaṭa* is *viśeṣya* and *nīla* exists in *ghaṭa.* So also, *parvata* being *prakāra* exists in (i.e. is related to) *dhūma* by the relation of *ādheyatā,* since the relation exists in the *anuyogin,* and here *dhūma* is the *anuyogin* of the relation of *ādheyatā.*

[1] In less technical language the argument here is the following: if the relationship of the reason with the subject is not specifically mentioned then it would come about that even if it is known that the mountain has smoke by the relation of temporality (*kālikasaṃbandha*) there could arise inferential knowledge that the mountain has fire by the relation of conjunction (*saṃyogasaṃbandha*). This obviously is wrong.

(a), *vahnivyāpyadhūmavān parvataḥ*, this *viṣayatā* is in the form of *viśeṣyatā* and so it is not determined by any relation.[1] In the second form of consideration (b), *vahnivyāpyadhūmaḥ parvate*, the *viṣayatā* in *parvata* is in the form of *prakāratā* and it is determined by the relation of *ādheyatva* and so it is not determined by any relation other than *ādheyatva*. This *ādheyatva* should further be determined by the relation of the determinant of the state of being reason (*hetutāvacchedakasaṃbandhāvacchinnādheyatvam*) which (relation) is *saṃyoga*. All this is explained by Rāmarudra by the expression *hetutāvacchedakasaṃbandhāvacchinnādheyatvasaṃbandhānyasaṃbandhānavacchinnā pakṣatāvacchedakāvacchinnā viṣayatā*. In this way a part of *tatprakārakatvam* in the definition of *niścaya*, viz. *parvataprakārakatvam*, is applied.

Further such a *viṣayatā* common to both forms of considerations is not indicated (*anirūpitā*) by the state of being qualifier (*prakāratā*) in the absence of that which has invariable concomitance (*vyāpyābhāvaprakāratvānirūpitā viṣayatā*). It should be noted here that the counterpositiveness (*pratiyogitā*) of this absence is determined by the relation of the determinant of the state of being reason (*hetutāvacchedakasaṃbandhāvacchinnapratiyogitā*). All this is indicated by Rāmarudra by the expression *hetutāvacchedakasaṃbandhāvacchinnapratiyogitākavyāpyābhāvaprakāratvānirūpitā*). In this way a part of *tadabhāvāprakārakatve sati* in the definition of *niścaya*, viz. *vyāpyābhāvāprakārakatve sati*, is applied.

Further the *pakṣatāvacchedkāvacchinnaviṣayatā* which is common to both forms of considerations is indicated by the *viṣayatā* which is determined by the invariable concomitance which is not determined by any relation other than the relation which is the determinant of the state of being reason (*hetutāvacchedakasaṃbandhānyasaṃbandhānavacchinnavyāptyavacchinnā viṣayatā tannirūpitā*).

[1] This is because according to the accepted doctrines of the Naiyāyikas *prakāratā* only is determined by a relation and not *viśeṣyatā* (*prakāratāyām eva saṃsargāvacchinnatvam na viśeṣyatāyām api* (K.M.D.R. p. 288, lns 30–1).

In the first form of consideration (a), *vahnivyāpyadhūmavān parvataḥ*, this *vyāptyavacchinnaviṣayatā* is in the form of *prakāratā* and therefore it is determined by *saṃyogasaṃbandha*. Hence it is not determined by *hetutāvacchedakasaṃbandhānyasaṃbandha*. In the second form of consideration (b), *vahnivyāpyadhūmaḥ parvate*, this *vyāptyavacchinnaviṣayatā* is in the form of *viśeṣyatā* and so it is not determined by any relation. Hence it is also not determined by *hetutāvacchedakasaṃbandhānyasaṃbandha*. All this is expressed by Rāmarudra in his statement *hetutāvacchedakasaṃbandhānyasaṃbandhānavacchinnā vyāptyavacchinnā viṣayatā tannirūpitā*. In this way a part of *tatprakārakatvam* of the definition of *niścaya* i.e. *vyāpyaprakārakatvam* is applied.

Further this latter *viṣayatā* is not indicated by the state of being qualifier in the absence the counterpositiveness of which is determined by the determinant of the state of being subject and which is determined by the relation of *ādheyatā* which is determined by the relation of the state of being reason. The implication of this statement is that *vyāptyavacchinnaviṣayatā* in both forms of considerations is not indicated by *parvatābhāvaprakāratā* because in both kinds of considerations *parvatābhāva* is not the *prakāra*. This is because in the first form of consideration viz. *vahnivyāpyadhūmavān parvatah, parvata* is *viśeṣya* and *vahnivyāpya* is *prakāra* and so *parvatābhāva* is not *prakāra*. In the second form of consideration, viz. *vahnivyāpyadhūmaḥ parvate*, *parvata* is *prakāra* and so *parvatābhāva* is not *prakāra*. In this way a part of *tadabhāvāprakārakatvam* of the definition of *niṣcaya*, viz. *parvatābhāvāprakārakatvam* is applied. All this is expressed by Rāmarudra by the statement *hetutāvacchedasaṃbandhāvacchinnādheyatvasaṃbandhāvacchinnapratiyogitākapakṣatāvacchedakāvacchinnābhāvaprakāratvānirūpitā*.

In this way the form of *niścaya*, viz. *parvatābhāvāprakārakatve sati vyāpyadhūmābhāvāprakārakatve sati parvataviṣayakatvam vyāpyadhūmaviṣayakatvam ca* which is common to both forms of considerations, *vahnivyāpyadhūmavān parvataḥ* and *vahnivyāpyadhūmaḥ parvate*, is explained in detail.

Even then in the definition of *niścaya* which is common to both forms of considerations, if *vyāpyābhāva* is taken as *vyāpyapratiyogikābhāva* (absence of any one *vyāpya*) then the definite knowledge in which smoke and absence of light are qualifiers (*ālokābhāvavān dhūmavān*, i.e. *ālokābhāvavati dhūma-prakārakaniścayaḥ*) would not become *vyāpyaniścaya*. This is because in this *niścaya* also, the absence of light is a qualifier and therefore there is no *vyāpyābhāvāprakārakatva*. In order to avoid this difficulty, if *vyāpyābhāva* is taken as *vyāpyasāmānyā-bhāva* (i.e. *vyāpyatvāvacchinnapratiyogitākābhāva*), then the doubt in the form *parvato dhūmavān na vā* i.e. *parvato dhūmavān dhūmābhāvavān vā*, would also be an instance of definite knowledge. This is because here also the absence of *vyāpya-sāmānyābhāva* is not a qualifier but *vyāpyaviśeṣābhāva* (i.e. *dhūmā-bhāva)* is qualifier. Hence *vyāpyasāmānyābhāvāprakārakatva* exists and at the same time there is *vyāpyaprakārakatva*. Therefore it will not be doubt; it will be an instance of definite knowledge.

Further only an instance of consideration which is not qualified by the knowledge of invalidity is the cause of inferential knowledge (*aprāmāṇyajñānānāskanditaparāmarśa eva anumitiṃ prati kāraṇam*). Now the instances of knowledge of invalidity are different in different places. Therefore the cause of inferential knowledge will not have a consecutive character.

Because of these difficulties Dinakara gives the opinion of some other Naiyāyikas. According to them the causality for inferential knowledge is in the following form: for the inferential knowledge which comes about immediately after a particular consideration, that consideration in that particular form is the cause. This implies that the consideration may have the subject or the *sādhya* as the qualificand and the inferential knowledge also may have the subject or the *sādhya* as qualificand. All that matters is that the inferential knowledge is produced by the consideration which immediately precedes it.

However Dinakara further gives the opinion as accepted by Naiyāyikas in general. According to this opinion only that consideration which has the subject as the qualificand is the cause

of inferential knowledge. This is the reason why everybody accepts application[1] in which the subject is always the qualificand, as for instance 'this has smoke which is invariably connected with fire (*vahnivyāpyadhūmavāṃścāyam*)'.

(p.88, ln 9 – p.91, ln 3; p.92, ln 5 – p.97, ln 2) Now the Mīmāṃsakas raise an important objection. According to them it is not always necessary that consideration is in the form of a knowledge which has as object the relationship of that which is qualified by invariable concomitance with the subject (*pakṣeṇa saha vyāptiviśiṣṭasya vaiśiṣṭyāvagāhijñānam*). If someone has first of all the perceptual knowledge that the mountain has smoke and then he remembers that the smoke is pervaded by fire, then it is a matter of common experience that the same person has also the inferential knowledge that the mountain has fire. Hence it follows that consideration the object of which is the relationship of the reason as qualified by invariable concomitance (*vyāptiviśiṣṭavaiśiṣṭyāvagāhijñānam,* as for instance, *vahnivyāpyadhūmavān parvataḥ*) is not always the cause of inferential knowledge. And even when such a knowledge is the cause of inferential knowledge, it is not the cause of inferential knowledge as qualified knowledge (*viśiṣṭavaiśiṣṭyāvagāhijñānatvena*) but as a knowledge of the state of being the attribute of the subject in which the qualifier is the determinant of pervadedness (*vyāpyatāvacchedakaprakārakapakṣadharmatājñānatvena,* as for instance, *dhūmaḥ parvatavṛttiḥ*).

This means that the cause of inferential knowledge is the two instances of knowledge which we mentioned already, viz. the knowledge that the reason is in the subject and the recollection of invariable concomitance. Therefore the argument is that in order to have inferential knowledge there is no need for combining these two forms of knowledge into one and have a knowledge in the form that the mountain has smoke which is

[1] It may be noted here that the technical term *upanaya* signifies the fourth step in a syllogism. This is always a sentence and the verbal knowledge arising from this sentence is *parāmarśa. anumitikāraṇatṛtīyaliṅgaparāmarśajanakāvayavatvam upanayatvam,* T.C., p.749, lns 1–2.

invariably connected with fire. In this way in the opinion of both the Naiyāyikas and the Mīmāṃsakas the knowledge of the state of being the attribute of the subject in which the determinant of pervadedness is the qualifier (*vyāpyatāvacchedakaprakāra-pakṣadharmatājñāna*) is necessary for inferential knowledge. Since the process of inferential knowledge can be explained in this way, to postulate further the knowledge which has as object the relationship of that which is qualified by invariable concomitance with the subject (*pakṣeṇa saha vyāptiviśiṣṭasya vaiśiṣṭyāvagāhijñāna*) as cause of inferential knowledge is cumbersome.

The Naiyāyikas however, reject these arguments of the Mīmāṃsakas. This is because someone may have the knowledge that the mountain has that which is invariably pervaded by fire. Such a knowledge, obviously, does not have as object such things as smokeness and so on which are the determinants of pervadedness.[1] Yet this knowledge (i.e. the knowledge that the mountain has that which is pervaded by fire) also produces inferential knowledge. Hence it follows that we can have inferential knowledge even without the knowledge of the determinant of pervadedness.

Now it may be argued against this answer that whenever inferential knowledge occurs, the knowledge in which the determinant of pervadedness is the qualifier is to be postulated since the latter is the cause of the former. But this argument cannot be accepted because it is logically simpler to admit the knowledge of the subject in which the invariable concomitance is the qualifier as the cause of inferential knowledge, rather than the knowledge of the state of being the attribute of the subject in which the determinant of pervadedness is the qualifier

[1] Here invariable concomitance is to be understood as *sādhyābhāvavadavṛttitvam* and not *dhūmasamānādhikaraṇātyantābhāvāpratiyogivahnisamānādhikaraṇatvam*. This is because in the second definition of *vyāpti*, *dhūmatva*, i.e. *vyāpyatāvacchedaka* becomes the object of that knowledge, whereas it is not the case in the first definition of *vyāpti*.

(*vyāpyatāvacchedakapakṣadharmatājñānatvāpekṣayā vyāptiprakārakapakṣadharmatājñānatvaṃ laghu*).[1]

The Mīmāṃsakas argue against this position of the Naiyāyikas pointing out that there is indeed simplicity in the opinion of Naiyāyikas in as far as the Naiyāyikas do not admit the knowledge in which the determinant of pervadedness is the qualifier (*vyāpyatāvacchedakajñāna*) as the cause of inferential knowledge. But on the other hand, there is simplicity in the opinion of the Mīmāṃsakas in another way. They do not assume *viśiṣṭavaiśiṣṭyajñāna* as the cause of inferential knowledge. Hence there is simplicity of assumption in their position.

Therefore the Naiyāyikas give another argument in support of their position. If the opinion of the Mīmāṃsakas is admitted, then there could be inferential knowledge even from the knowledge 'the mountain has smoke' (i.e. from the knowledge of mere smoke without the knowledge that it is invariably connected with fire), because this knowledge also is knowledge of the state of being the attribute of the subject in which smokeness which is the determinant of pervadedness is the qualifier. Obviously this cannot be admitted since no one can accept that there can arise inferential knowledge only from the knowledge of the reason without the knowledge also of invariable concomitance.

Here the Mīmāṃsakas argue against the position of the Naiyāyikas pointing out that the cause of inferential knowledge is the knowledge the object of which is the state of being the attribute of the subject and the qualifier of which is the determinant of the state of being pervaded which is being actually perceived.

[1] *vyāptiprakārakapakṣadharmatājñānam*, as for instance, *vahnivyāpya(dhūma)vān parvataḥ* is simpler in comparison with *vyāpyatāvacchedakaprakārapakṣadharmatājñānam* because in the former *vyāpyatāvacchedaka* is not a part of the object of the knowledge, but in the latter it is part of the object of the knowledge. This is because in the former instance of knowledge the reason is not apprehended as smoke (*dhūmatvena*) but as the pervaded (*vyāpyatvena*); in the latter instance of knowledge *dhūma* is apprehended as smoke (*dhūmatvena*). Therefore *dhūmatva* is also the object of knowledge. In both instances of knowledge *vyāpti* is the object. Otherwise there can arise no inferential knowledge. Therefore the instance of knowledge where *dhūmatva* is not also the object is simpler.

This means that although the pervaded (*vyāpya*) is not perceived as pervaded (*vyāpyatvena*) but the reason (*hetu*) is perceived as the determinant of the state of being reason (*hetutāvacchedakena*), as for instance, smokeness (*dhūmatva*) which is at the same time the determinant of the state of being pervaded (*vyāpyatāvacchedaka*). Therefore although the form of knowledge is 'the mountain has smoke (*parvato dhūmavān*)', and not 'the mountain has smoke which is pervaded by fire (*parvato vahnivyāpyadhūmavān*)', still there is also the knowledge of invariable concomitance. Therefore there can be inferential knowledge. And since it is explicitly mentioned by the present participle (*gṛhyamāṇa*) that the determinant of pervadedness is actually being perceived, there will be no fault because by means of its knowledge in the past or in the future there would be no inferential knowledge.

The Naiyāyikas do not accept this argument because if Caitra has the knowledge of invariable concomitance there could be inferential knowledge for Maitra from his knowledge of the state of being the attribute of the subject. This obviously is impossible since the same person should have the knowledge both of invariable concomitance and the state of being the attribute of the subject, in order to have inferential knowledge.

In order to avoid such a possibility of inferential knowledge, if it is argued by the Mīmāṃsakas that the knowledge of the state of being the attribute of the subject and of invariable concomitance of a particular person produces inferential knowledge for that particular person, then there would be infinite number of relations of cause and effect. In the opinion of the Naiyāyikas however, there is only one instance of cause and effect relationship: by the relation of inherence the knowledge of the state of being the attribute of the subject in which invariable concomitance is the qualifier produces inferential knowledge by the relation of inherence.

The Mīmāṃsakas argue against this position of the Naiyāyikas in the following manner: by the relation of inherence the knowledge of that which has invariable concomitance is the cause of inferential knowledge by the relation of inherence. Similarly by the relation of inherence the knowledge of the state

of being the attribute of the subject (*pakṣadharmatājñāna*) is also the cause of inferential knowledge. Therefore the two instances of knowledge are separate causes of inferential knowledge existing in the same person. Hence in the enunciation of the relation of cause and effect for inferential knowledge, the expression 'of that particular person (*tatpuruṣīya*)' need not be introduced. In this way there would be no inferential knowledge for Maitra who has no knowledge of invariable concomitance. But still the Naiyāyikas argue that although the same person will be having the knowledge of invariable concomitance and of the knowledge of the state of being the attribute of the subject, yet there are two instances of relation of cause and effect. This is cumbersome.

Against this argument of the Naiyāyikas, the Mīmāṃsakas point out that even in the opinion of the Naiyāyikas, there would be two instances of the relation of cause and effect. This is because there is no clinching argument to decide whether the knowledge the qualificand of which is the state of being the attribute of the subject which is qualified by the qualifierness of invariable concomitance (*vyāptiprakārakatvaviśiṣṭapakṣadharmatāviśeṣyaka-jñāna* as for instance, *vahnivyāpyadhūmavān parvataḥ*) or the knowledge in which the qualifier is invariable concomitance which is qualified by the qualificandness of the state of being the attribute of the subject (*pakṣadharmatāviśeṣyakatvaviśiṣṭa-vyāptiprakārakajñāna,* as for instance, *parvato vahnivyāpya-dhūmavān*), is the cause of inferential knowledge.[1]

Now Rāmarudra points out that although the Mīmāṃsakas have shown *vinigamanāviraha* between the two alternatives, in the Mīmāṃsā position the *vinigmanāviraha* occurs because of four possible positions, since they admit *vyāptijñāna* and *pakṣa-*

[1] In both forms of knowledge *vyāpti* is *prakāra* and *pakṣadharmatā* is *viśeṣya*. The absence of *vinigamaka* comes about because we are not sure whether *vyāptiprakārakatva* qualifies *pakṣadharmatāviśeṣyakatva* or *pakṣadharmatā-viśeyakatva* qualifies *vyāptiprakārakatva.* In the first instance of knowledge *vahnivyāpyadhūma* is first grasped and in the second instance *parvata* is first grasped. Since there is doubt which instance of knowledge is the cause of inferential knowledge both are to be taken as causes of inferential knowledge.

dharmatājñāna as separate causes of inferential knowledge. Now *vyāptijñāna* means *vyāptiviśiṣṭahetujñāna* i.e. *vyāptiprakāraka-hetuviśeṣyakajñāna*. This occurs in two forms: *vyāptiprakāra-katvaviśiṣṭahetujñāna* and *hetuviśeṣyakatvaviśiṣṭavyāptiprakāraka-jñāna*. There is *vinigamanāviraha* between these two. Similarly *pakṣadharmatājñāna* also occurs in two forms: *pakṣadharmatā-viśiṣṭahetujñāna* i.e. *hetuviśeṣyakatvaviśiṣṭapakṣadharmatāpra-kārakajñāna* or *hetuprakārakatvaviśiṣṭapakṣadharmatāviśeṣyaka-jñāna*. There is *vinigamanāviraha* between these two. Therefore the position of the Mīmāṃsakas is extremely cumbersome.

But the Mīmāṃsakas show that the Nyāya position is still more cumbersome. This is because according to the Naiyāyikas the *viśiṣṭaparāmarśa* is the cause of inferential knowledge, e.g. *vahnivyāpyadhūmavān parvataḥ*. This occurs in three forms: *vyāptiprakārakatvaviśiṣṭahetuprakārakatvaviśiṣṭapakṣaviśeṣya-kajñānam* or *pakṣaviśeṣyakatvaviśiṣṭahetuprakārakatvaviśiṣṭa-vyāptiprakārakajñānam* or *vyāptiprakārakatvaviśiṣṭapakṣaviśe-ṣyakatvaviśiṣṭahetuprakārakajñānam*. This means that in the first form of knowledge *vyāpti* is first cognised, then *hetu* and then *pakṣa*; in the second instance of knowledge *pakṣa* is first cognised, then *hetu* and then *vyāpti;* in the third form of knowledge *vyāpti* is first cognised, then *pakṣa* and then *hetu*. And this is more cumbersome.

Therefore the Naiyāyikas give another argument against the Mīmāṃsakas: there could be inferential knowledge from two instances of knowledge such as *vahnivyāpyo dhūmaḥ* and *ālokavān parvataḥ*. Here the first instance of knowledge expresses invariable concomitance of a reason which will establish the *sādhya*; the other instance of knowledge expresses *pakṣadharmatā* of another reason which will establish the same *sādhya*. Therefore since there is the knowledge of invariable concomitance and of the knowledge of the state of being the attribute of the subject, there should be inferential knowledge of fire. But such a possibility is not accepted by anyone. Nor can it be argued that the knowledge of the state of being the attribute of the subject in which smokeness is the qualifier (*dhūmatva-*

prakārakapakṣadharmatājñāna) with the help of the knowledge of invariable concomitance in which smoke is the qualificand (*dhūmaviśeṣyakavyāptijñāna*) produces the inferential knowledge of fire. This is because in that case there would be infinite number of cause and effect relations since there is an infinite number of the determinants of the state of being pervaded (*vyāpyatāvacchedaka*), because there are infinite number of reasons having invariable concomitance.

But such a possibility will not arise in the Nyāya position. This is because, according to the Naiyāyikas, the cause of inferential knowledge is the knowledge in which the qualificandness of the subject is indicated by the qualifierness of the reason which is indicated by the qualifierness of invariable concomitance (*vyāptiprakāratānirūpitahetuprakāratānirūpitapakṣa-viśeṣyatāśālijñāna*). Therefore from the knowledge 'smoke is pervaded by fire' and 'mountain has light', there cannot arise inferential knowledge of fire. This is because the qualificandness in smoke is not indicated by the qualifierness in light (*dhūma-niṣṭhaviśeṣyatāyāḥ ālokaniṣṭhaprakāratānirūpitatvābhāvāt*). Similarly from the knowledge that smoke is pervaded by fire and 'mountain has smoke' there cannot be any inferential knowledge of fire. Again the reason is that the qualificandness in smoke which is indicated by the qualifierness in invariable concomitance is not identical with the qualifierness which is indicated by the qualificandness in the mountain (*vyāptiprakāratānirūpitadhūma-viśeṣyatāyāḥ parvataviśeṣyatānirūpitadhūmaprakāratānātma-katvāt*). This just means that even if one knows that 'smoke is pervaded by fire (*dhūmo vahnivyāpyaḥ*)' and 'mountain has smoke (*parvato dhūmavān*)' no inferential knowledge in the form 'mountain has fire' arises. The reason is that one may know that smoke is pervaded by fire, but unless one knows that the instance of smoke actually present on the mountain is pervaded by fire one cannot have inferential knowledge in the form 'mountain has fire'. In other words the smoke on the mountain should be cognised as pervded by fire (*vyāpyatvena*) and not merely as smoke (*dhūmatvena*) in order to have the inferential knowledge 'mountain has fire'.

These arguments are based on the doctrine that the qualificandness in smoke is identical with the qualifierness in it. Here Dinakara follows the opinion of Jagadīśa according to whom the qualificandness and the qualifierness existing in the same thing are identical with each other (*ekaniṣṭhaviśeṣyatā-prakāratayoḥ abhedaḥ*).[1]

[1] It may be noted here that according to Gadādhara Bhaṭṭācārya (K.M.D.R., p.292, lns. 21–5) the qualificandness and qualifierness existing in the same reality have the relationship of the determinant and that which is determined (*ekaniṣṭhaviśeṣyatāprakāratayoḥ avacchedyāvacchedakabhāvaḥ*). The reason is that otherwise for the instance of knowledge *raktadaṇḍavān puruṣaḥ*, the instance of knowledge *daṇḍābhāvavad raktarūpam* would have to be considered as the hindering factor (*pratibandhaka*). This comes about in the following way.

The general principle is that an instance of knowledge becomes a hindering factor for another instance of knowledge only when two conditions are fulfilled. (1) The qualificand of the instance of knowledge which is the hindering factor should be the same as in the instance of knowledge which is hindered. (2) The qualifier of the instance of knowledge which is the hindering factor should be the absence of the qualifier of the instance of knowledge which is hindered. As for example, for the instance of knowledge *ghaṭavad bhūtalam,* the instance of knowledge *ghaṭābhāvavad bhūtalam* is the hindering factor. And in this latter instance of knowledge, the qualificand *bhūtala* is the same as in the former, but the qualifier *ghaṭābhāva* is the absence of the qualifier in the former.

Now according to this principle for the instance of knowledge *rakta-daṇḍavān*, the instance of knowledge *daṇḍābhāvavad raktarūpam* would have to be considered as the hindering factor. The reason is that in the latter instance of knowledge, *raktarūpa* is the qualificand and the same qualificand is also in the former instance of knowledge since in the knowledge of *rakta, raktatva* is qualifier and *rakta*, i.e. *raktarūpa* is the qualificand. And in *daṇḍābhāvavad raktarūpam, daṇḍābhāva* is qualifier which is the absence of the qualifier in the instance of knowledge *raktadaṇḍavān* in which *daṇḍa* is also the qualifier. Such a possibility is not accepted by anybody.

But if one follows the opinion of Jagadīśa according to whom the qualificandness and the qualifierness existing in the same thing are identical with each other, then such a possibility cannot be avoided. This is because in both instances of knowledge the qualificand i.e. *raktarūpa* is the same and the qualifier in the *pratibadhyajñāna* viz. *raktadaṇḍavān puruṣaḥ* is *daṇḍa* and the qualifier in the *pratibandhakajñāna* viz. *daṇḍābhāvavad raktarūpam* the qualifier is its absence viz. *daṇḍābhāva.* This comes about because in the instance of knowledge *raktadaṇḍavān* which is the *pratibadhyajñāna*, the qualificandness in *raktarūpa* which is indicated by the qualifiereness in

For these reasons the conclusion of the Naiyāyikas is that even where there are two instances of knowledge such as *vahnivyāpyo dhūmaḥ* and *dhūmavān parvataḥ* there does not arise any inferential knowledge, but even where there are these two instances of knowledge, there should be a third instance of knowledge in the form *vahnivyāpyadhūmavān parvataḥ* in order that an inferential knowledge may arise. Hence even where apparently from these two instances of knowledge inferential knowledge arises, one has to assume that there was a third instance of knowledge of the reason in the form of a *viśiṣṭajñāna* in order that inferential knowledge arises.

raktatva, is identical with the qualifierness indicated by the qualificandness in *daṇḍa.* Such a condition can be seen in the instance of knowledge *daṇḍavad raktarūpam* which is the actual *pratibandhakajñāna* for *daṇḍābhāvavad raktarūpam* since *raktarūpa* is the qualificand. In other words if one accepts the opinion of Jagadīśa (*ekaniṣṭhaprakāratāviśeṣyatayoḥ abhedaḥ*) then the two instances of knowledge *raktadaṇḍavān* and *daṇḍavad raktarūpam* would be the same. This is because in the first instance of knowledge *raktadaṇḍavān,* in *raktarūpa* there is the qualificandness indicated by qualiferness in *raktatva,* and at the same time there is also qualifierness indicated by the qualifcandness in *daṇḍa.* In the second instance of knowledge *daṇḍavad raktarūpam,* in *raktarūpa* there is qualificandness indicated by the qualifierness in *raktatva.* If the qualificandness in *raktarūpa* is accepted as identical with the qualifierness in the same, then it means there is only qualificandness and this qualificandness exists in *raktarūpa* in the instance of knowledge *daṇḍavad raktarūpam* also. Therefore *daṇḍavad raktarūpam* would be identical with *raktadaṇḍavān.* Therefore when *daṇḍavad raktarūpam* is contradicted by the knowledge of *daṇḍābhāvavad raktarūpam* the knowledge *raktadaṇḍavān* would also be contradicted by the same knowledge *daṇḍābhāvavad raktarūpam.* But this is impossible.

But if Gadādhara's opinion that *ekaniṣṭhaviśeṣyatāprakāratayoḥ avacchedyāvacchedakabhāvaḥ* is accepted, then there would be difference between the two instances of knowledge *raktadaṇḍavān* and *daṇḍavad raktarūpam.* This is because in the instance of knowledge *raktadaṇḍavān,* the *raktarūpaniṣṭhaprakāratā* is determined by *raktarūpaniṣṭhaviśeṣyatā.* But in the instance of knowledge *daṇḍavad raktarūpam* the *viśeṣyatā* in *raktarūpa* does not determine the *raktarūpaniṣṭhaprakāratā* because there is no *prakāratā* in *raktarūpa.* For detailed discussion of these problems, cfr. Balirām Śukla, *Navyanyāya ke Pāribhāṣika Padārtha,* Parāmarsha Prakashan, Pune University, pp.122–5 and 164–7.

Now the Mīmāṃsakas object that since the Naiyāyikas insist on a third instance of knowledge in the form of a *viśiṣṭajñāna* in order that inferential knowledge may arise, there is the fault of cumbersomeness. The Naiyāyikas answer that when a result has already been established by means of valid arguments, one cannot further argue against the result pointing out that there is cumbersomeness in accepting the result. Here the result is the establishment of cause and effect relationship between *viśiṣṭa-jñāna* and inferential knowledge. Now such a cause and effect relationship has already been established by means of valid arguments as described earlier. Once this has been done, it is not possible to argue against it pointing out that there is cumbersomeness in accepting *viśiṣṭajñāna* as the cause of inferential knowledge.

This can be explained accurately making use of Nyāya technical terms as follows: the cause of inferential knowledge is *viśiṣṭajñāna* and the causality residing in *viśiṣṭajñāna* is grasped as determined by the state of being the knowledge of the qualified (*viśiṣṭajñānatvāvacchedena kāraṇatvagraha*). For this knowledge of causality that *viśiṣṭajñānatvāvacchedena kāraṇatvam* the hindering factor is the knowledge that *viśiṣṭajñāna-tvaṃ guru*. Therefore cumbersomeness is in the form of existence on its substratum; i.e. cumbersomeness exists in *viśiṣṭajñāna* which is the substratum (*gauravāśrayaviśiṣṭajñānavṛttitvaṃ gauravam*). And a substratum must be first established before it can be stated that it has a particular attribute. The substratum of this *gaurava* is *viśiṣṭajñāna,* the cause of inferential knowledge and it is established only by the effect in the form of inferential knowledge (*anumitirūpakāryaliṅgakānumāna*) and not by any other means of valid knowledge. But the knowledge of cumber-someness which exists in *viśiṣṭajñāna* can occur only after the establishment of causality in *viśiṣṭajñāna*. Therefore the knowledge of cumbersomeness which occurs after the establishment of causality in *viśiṣṭajñāna* is not a fault.

Text 3 A

Provisional Definition of Invariable Concomitance

का. व्याप्तिः साध्यवदन्यस्मिन्नसंबन्ध उदाहृतः ॥६८ cd॥

मु. व्याप्यो नाम व्याप्त्याश्रयः, तत्र व्याप्तिः केत्यत आह **व्याप्तिः** इति । 'वह्निमान् धूमात्' इत्यादौ साध्यो वह्निः साध्यवान् महानसादिः, तदन्यो जलह्रदादिः, तदवृत्तित्वं धूमस्येति लक्षण-समन्वयः । 'धूमवान् वह्नेः' इत्यादौ साध्यवदन्यस्मिन् तप्तायः-पिण्डादौ वह्नेः सत्त्वान्नातिव्याप्तिः । अत्र येन संबन्धेन साध्यं तेन संबन्धेन साध्यवान् बोध्यः । अन्यथा समवायसंबन्धेन वह्निमान्-वह्नेरवयवः, तदन्यो महानसादिः, तत्र धूमस्य विद्यमानत्वाद-

K. Invariable concomitance is described as the absence of relation (of the reason) with anything other than that which has that which is to be established. (*Kārikā* 68cd)

M. 'That which is pervaded' means that which is the substratum of invariable concomitance. Here what is invariable concomitance? Therefore (the author) says **invariable concomitance** (*vyāptir-iti*). In such inferences as 'there is fire because of smoke' that which is to be established is fire. That which has that which is to be established is kitchen etc. Different from those are water, lake, etc. In them there is non-existence of smoke. In this way the definition is applied. In such (false) inferences as 'it has smoke because it has fire,' in heated iron ball etc. which are other than those which have the thing to be established there is the existence of fire and therefore there is no overextension. Here that which has that which is to be established has it by the relation by which that which is to be established exists (in the subject). Otherwise parts of fire have fire by the relation of inherence; other than those are kitchen etc.; in them there is

मु. व्याप्तिप्रसङ्गात् । साध्यवदन्यश्च साध्यवत्त्वावच्छिन्नप्रतियोगिताकभेदवान् बोध्यः । तेन यत्किंचिद्वह्निमतो महानसादेर्भिन्ने पर्वतादौ धूमसत्त्वेऽपि न क्षतिः । येन संबन्धेन हेतुः तेनैव संबन्धेन साध्यवदन्यावृत्तित्वं बोध्यम् । तेन साध्यवदन्यस्मिन् धूमावयवे धूमस्य समवायसंबन्धेन सत्त्वेऽपि न क्षतिः । साध्यवदन्यावृत्तित्वं च साध्यवदन्यवृत्तित्वत्वावच्छिन्नप्रतियोगिताकाभावः। तेन 'धूमवान्-वह्नेः' इत्यत्र साध्यवदन्यजलह्रदादिवृत्तित्वाभावेऽपि नातिव्याप्तिः ।

M. existence of smoke; therefore the definition would have (the fault of) too narrow application. The expression 'other than that which has that which is to be established' is to be understood as that which has mutual absence the counterpositiveness of which is determined by the state of being that which has that which is to be established. Therefore there is no harm even if there is the existence of smoke in the hill which is different from kitchen etc. which have particular (instances of) fire. The non-existence (of reason) in the thing other than that which has that which is to be established is to be understood by that relation by which the reason exists (in the subject). Therefore by the relation of inherence, even if there exists smoke in the parts of smoke which is other than that which has that which is to be established, there is no harm. The non-existence (of the reason) in that which is other than that which has that which is to be established means the absence the counterpositiveness of which is determined by the state of being the state of being existent in that which is other than that which has that which is to be established. Therefore in such (false) inferences as 'it has smoke because it has fire,' although (in reason) there is the absence of the state of being existent in water, lake and so on which are other than that which has that which is to be established, there is no overextension.

मु. अत्र यद्यपि 'द्रव्यं गुणकर्मान्यत्वविशिष्टसत्त्वात्' इत्यादौ विशिष्टसत्तायाः शुद्धसत्तायाश्चैक्यात् साध्यवदन्यस्मिन् गुणादावृत्तित्वं नास्ति, तथापि हेतुतावच्छेदकरूपेणावृत्तित्वं वाच्यम् । हेतुतावच्छेदकं वृत्तितानवच्छेदकमिति फलितोऽर्थः ।

दि. मूले परामर्शलक्षणानन्तरं व्याप्तिनिरूपणे सङ्गतिमुपोद्घातं निरूपयति **व्याप्यो नाम** इति । **तत्र** इति । घटकत्वं सप्तम्यर्थः । **अव्याप्तिप्रसङ्गात्** इति । अव्याप्त्यभिधानमिदं येन केनचित्संबन्धेन साध्यवत्त्वविवक्षणाभिप्रायेण । यदि च संबन्धसामान्येन साध्यवत्त्वं विवक्ष्यते तदा

M. Here although in such inferences as 'it is a substance because it has existence which is different from the existence in quality and movement' there is no non-occurrence (of existence) in qualities and so on which are other than that which has that which is to be established because pure existence and qualified existence are the same, still the non-occurrence is to be understood as determined by the determinant of the state of being the reason. The final meaning is that the determinant of the state of being the reason is not the determinant of the state of being occurrent.

D. In the primary text, after the definition of consideration in order to treat invariable concomitance, the author points out the Relevance in the form of Introduction, (with the words) **that which is pervaded means** (*vyāpyo nāma iti*). **Here** (*tatra iti*). The meaning of the locative case is the state of being the constitutive part. **Would have (the fault of) too narrow application** (*avyāptiprasaṅgāditi*). The mention of too narrow application (of the definition) means that the state of having that which is to be established is to be understood by means of any particular relation. If the state of having that which is to be established is understood by means of relation in general, then

दि. 'धूमवान् वह्नेः' इत्यादावतिव्याप्तिर्बोध्या। **अवृत्तित्वं नास्ति** इति। विशिष्टाधेयताया अनतिरिक्तत्वादिति भावः। **फलितोऽर्थः** इति। तथा च तन्निष्ठाधिकरणतानिरूपकतावच्छेदकस्यैव तन्निरूपिताधेयतावच्छेदकत्व-नियमेन विशिष्टसत्तात्वस्य गुणाधेयतानवच्छेदकत्वान्नाव्याप्तिरिति भावः।

D. it should be understood that there is overextension in such (false) inferences as 'it has smoke because it has fire.' **There is no non-occurrence** (*avṛttitvam nāsti iti*): because qualified occurrence is not different (from pure occurrence). This is the idea. **The final meaning** (*phalito'rthaḥ iti*). In this way (the definition has) no (fault of) too narrow application since the state of being qualified existence is not the determinant of the occurrence indicated by quality. This is because of the rule that the determinant of the state of being indicator of the state of being substratum existing in a particular thing is the same as the determinant of the state of being superstratum which is indicated by that particular thing. This is the idea.

Commentary

(p.116, lns 5–6) First of all the Relevance of treating invariable concomitance after the discussion on consideration is shown. Dinakara points out that the Relevance is in the form of Introduction (*upodghāta*). *upodghāta* is defined as *prakṛtopapādakatvam* i.e. that which explains the topic under discussion. This means that when a subject is being treated, another topic has also to be discussed in order that the present topic may be properly understood. Here invariable concomitance is a part[1] of consideration,

[1] R. defines being part of something (*ghaṭakatvam*) as being not an object of an instance of knowledge in which that thing is not an object (*svāviṣayaka-pratītyaviṣayatatkatvam*). As for instance, invariable concomitance is a part of the object of consideration: when an instance of knowledge does not have as object the object of consideration, invariable concomitance is also not an object of that knowledge; e.g. knowledge of jar does not have as object the objects of consideration viz. *vyāpti* and *pakṣadharmatā*, and so *vyāpti* is not a part of the object of the knowledge of the jar.

because the knowledge in the form of consideration has as its object invariable concomitance (*vyāpti*) and the state of being the attribute of the subject (*pakṣadharmatā*). Hence without a proper understanding of invariable concomitance, we cannot understand the real nature of consideration. Hence by the Relevance of Introduction (*upodghāta*) invariable concomitance is being treated.

(p.114, ln 3 – p.116, ln 4; p.116, ln 6 – p.117, ln 4) Now a definition of invariable concomitance is given in K. 'Invariable concomitance is described as the absence of relation (of reason) with anything other than that which has that which is to be established'. For instance in the inference 'mountain has fire because it has smoke,' that which is to be established (*sādhya*) is fire, that which has *sādhya* is kitchen etc., water, lake etc. are different from that which has *sādhya*; in them the reason which is smoke does not exist. In this way the definition is applied.

In such (false) inferences as 'there is smoke because of fire,' the *sādhya* is smoke; that which has *sādhya* is mountain and so on; heated iron ball etc. are different from that which has *sādhya* since they do not have smoke; but the reason (fire) exists in them. Hence the definition does not apply here.

It should be noted that that which has *sādhya*, should have it by the relation by which the *sādhya* exists in the subject. As for example in the inference 'it has fire because it has smoke', the relation of *sādhya* to the subject is conjunction. Hence kitchen is taken as the example for that which has *sādhya* since there is fire in the kitchen by the same relation of conjunction. Water, lake etc. are different from that which has the *sādhya*; there is no reason (i.e. smoke) in them and so the definition can be applied. If *sādhyavān* is not taken by the same relation as that of the *sādhya* to the subject, then the given definition of *vyāpti*

The purpose of defining *ghaṭakatvam* as *svāviṣayakapratītyaviṣaya-tatkatvam* with double negatives is the following: if *ghaṭakatvam* is defined as *svaviṣayakapratītiviṣayatatkatvam* then there can be an instance of knowledge the object of which is *vyāpti* and *ghaṭa*. In this way *ghaṭa* will also be a part of *vyāpti*. This cannot be admitted.

would be of too narrow application. This is because with reference to the same inference 'this has fire because it has smoke', when the definition of invariable concomitance is to be applied one can take as that which has the *sādhya* (*sādhyavat*) parts of fire which have fire by the relation of inherence (*samaāyasaṃbandhena vahneravayavāḥ vahnimantaḥ*); different from the parts of fire etc. are kitchen and so on where there is the existence of smoke. Hence the definition is of too narrow application.

Further the statement that the given definition has the fault of too narrow application, is to be understood on the supposition that the *sādhyavān* is to be taken by a particular definite relation. Rāmarudra points out the reason why the *sādhyavān* is to be taken by a particular definite relation. This is because, if as Dinakara says, *sādhyavān* is taken just by any relation (*yena kena saṃbandhena*), with reference to the same inference 'there is fire because of smoke', kitchen can be taken as the example for *sādhyavān* since there is fire in kitchen by the relation of conjunction. Other than kitchen is lake where there is no smoke and so the definition can be applied. Hence the definition has no fault of too narrow application.

Therefore Rāmarudra points out that the *yenakenacitsaṃbandhena* (i.e. by any relation) in Dinakarī is to be understood in the sense of *yatkiṃcitsaṃbandhena* (i.e. by a particular definite relation). Then the given definition of invariable concomitance would have the fault of too narrow application. This is because the relation of inherence is taken as the particular definite relation; the parts of fire have fire by this relation of inherence; other than these are kitchen etc. where there is the existence of smoke and so the definition cannot be applied.

Now Rāmarudra raises a possible objection against asserting that the given definition of invariable concomitance suffers from the fault of too narrow application. In fact it could be held that the definition suffers from the fault of impossible application (*asaṃbhava*) i.e. the definition cannot be applied anywhere. This is because in all instances of inference the *sādhya* exists in knowledge, desire and effort by the relation of the state of

having object (*viṣayitāsaṃbandhena*); other than these are all those things where the reason exists. As for instance, with reference to the inference 'mountain has fire because of smoke' we can take as *sādhyavat* (that which has *sādhya*) knowledge in which the object is the *sādhya*; other than such a knowledge are kitchen etc. where smoke exists. Hence there is no non existence of the reason, smoke, in *sādhyavadanya*. Similarly as examples of *sādhyavat*, we can take desire and effort also where the *sādhya* exists by the relation of the state of having the object. Hence there will be the fault of too narrow application in all instances of valid inference. Therefore there will be the fault of impossibility.

The answer to this objection is that still in certain inferences the definition can be applied. As for instance take the inference 'it has that colour which is qualified by the difference of that thing which has object, because it has that taste (*saviṣayakānyatva-viśiṣṭatadrūpavān tadrasāt*)'. Here the *sādhyavān* cannot be taken by the relation of *viṣayitā* because the *sādhya* is qualified by *saviṣayakānyatva*. Hence in this instance the given definition of invariable concomitance can be applied. Therefore the definition does not suffer from the fault of impossible application but only of too narrow application.

Similarly in the inference 'it has that colour which is qualified by the difference which is different from that jar because it has that taste (*tadghaṭabhinnānyatvaviśiṣṭatadrūpavān tadrasāt*)', the definition can be applied. Here the *sādhya* cannot exist in anything other than that jar.[1] The reason, viz., 'that taste (*tadrasa*)' exists only in that jar. Hence it does not exist in anything other than that which has *sādhya*. Therefore the given definition of invariable concomitance can be applied here.

In order to avoid this fault of too narrow application, if it is stated that the *sādhyavān* is to be taken by relation in general (*saṃbandhasāmānya*), then there would be the fault of over-

[1] Here it may be noted that *tadghaṭabhinnānyatvaviśiṣṭa* is not the same as *tadghaṭatvaviśiṣṭa*. This is because *tadghaṭabhinnānyatvaviśiṣṭatadrūpa* exists only in *tadghaṭa*, whereas *tadghaṭatvaviśiṣṭatadrūpa* can exist also in knowledge of *tadghaṭatvaviśiṣṭatadrūpa* by the relation of *viṣayitā*.

extension in such inferences as 'there is smoke because of fire'. This is because in heated iron ball also smoke can exist by the relation of temporality. Hence only that thing which does not exist at the time of smoke is that which is different from that which has *sādhya*, viz. smoke. And such a thing which has fire, is unestablished (*aprasiddha*) because there can be smoke always somewhere. Therefore there is the fault of overextension.

But it may be argued that the movement of the atoms at the time of dissolution does not exist at the same time as smoke. Therefore this movement of the atoms is something other than that which has *sādhya*. And in this movement nothing exists by the relation of the determinant of the state of being reason, viz., conjunction. Hence the occurrence determined by the relation of conjunction is unestablished. Therefore there is no overextension.

Rāmarudra however points out the possibility of overextension in another way. In such inferences as 'it has smoke because it has the qualificandness of valid knowledge in which the qualifier is the state of being the substratum of fire (*vahnimattvaprakārakapramāviśeṣyatvāt*)'. Here the relation of the determinant of the state of being reason is selfsameness (*svarūpasaṃbandha*). By this relation something or other can exist in the movement of atoms at the time of dissolution[1]. Hence there is overextension of the given definition of invariable concomitance. Therefore the occurrence of something in the movement is not unestablished.

Now in the given definition of invariable concomitance, the expression 'other than that which has *sādhya* (*sādhyavadanya*)' is to be understood as that which has the mutual absence the counterpositiveness of which is determined by the state of being that which has *sādhya*. Therefore in the same inference 'it has fire because it has smoke', there is no fault of too narrow

[1] The idea here is that even at the time of dissolution there is *Īśvara* and he can have the valid knowledge of *vahnimān*; the *viśeṣyatā* of such a valid knowledge exists by the relation of *svarūpasaṃbandha* in *vahniparamāṇus* at the time of dissolution. Therefore *sādhyavadanyavṛttitva* is established. Hence it is not possible to assert that there is no overextension because *sādhyavadanyavṛttitva* is unestablished.

application even if there is the existence of smoke in the mountain which is different from a particular object which has fire such as kitchen. This is because mountain is also included in the class of things which are *sādhyavat*; other than such things which have *sādhya* are lake etc. where there is neither *sādhya* nor reason. And so the definition of invariable concomitance can be applied.

Rāmarudra further points out that the expression 'that which has the mutual absence the counterpositiveness of which is determined by the state of being that which has *sādhya* (*sādhyavattvāvacchinnapratiyogitākabhedavān*)' is to be understood in a more precise sense as follows: that which has the mutual absence the counterpositiveness of which is indicated by the state of being determinant which exists by the relation of collective extensity (*paryāpti*) in the thing determined by the determinant of the state of being *sādhya* (*sādhyatāvacchedakāvacchinnaparyāptapratiyogitāvacchedakatākabhedavān*).[1] This means that *sādhyavadanya* is something that has a mutual absence of *sādhyavat*. The state of being determinant of the counterpositiveness (*pratiyogitāvacchedkatā*) exists in the determinants of counterpositiveness of the mutual absence collectively in all instances of the *sādhya* by the relation of *paryāpti*. Therefore in our example of inference 'kitchen has fire because of smoke', mountain cannot be taken as an example of *sādhyavadanya* because the mountain also is the substratum of the substratum of the state of being determinant which exists in the *sādhya* which has *sādhyatāvacchedaka* (*sādhyatāvacchedakāvacchinnaparyāptāvacchedakatāvadvān*). According to Rāmarudra if *sādhyavadanya* is taken only as *sādhyavattvāvacchinnapratiyogitākabhedavān* as stated in M. then it is impossible to avoid the fault of too narrow application. The reason is that one can take *tattadvyaktimadbheda* (the mutual absence of that which has a particular *sādhya*) and *mahānasīyavahnimadbheda* (the mutual abscence of that which has kitchen fire). This is because *sādhya-*

[1] This means *sādhyatāvacchedakāvacchinne paryāptisaṃbandhena vidyamānā pratiyogitānirūpitāvacchedakatā tādṛśāvacchedakatānirūpakabhedavān* (i.e. *sādhyavān na iti bhedavān*).

vattvam (the state of having *sādhya*) means just *sādhya* itself and the particular fire viz. kitchen fire is *sādhya*; other than that which has this *sādhya* is mountain where smoke exists and therefore there is the fault of too narrow application. According to this opinion of Rāmarudra *gurudharma* is also accepted as the determinant of the counterpositiveness, as for instance, when *dravyatva* is *sādhya, dravyatvatva* is *sādhyatāvacchedaka* and therefore the *paryāptāvacchedakatā* existing in *dravyatvatva* also does not exist because *dravyatvatva* is a *gurudharma*. But since Rāmarudra accepts *gurudharma* also as *pritiyogitāvacchedaka* there is no fault because of this.

Further the non-existence of the reason in that which is different from that which has *sādhya* is mentioned as a part of the definition of invariable concomitance. But non-existence of the reason means absence of the existence of the reason. This existence of the reason must be determined by the relation by which the reason exists in the subject (*sādhyavadanyavṛttitāvacchedakasaṃbandhaḥ hetutāvacchedakasaṃbandhaḥ*). Therefore even though smoke exists by the relation of inherence in parts of smoke which are other than that which has *sādhya*, viz. fire, there is no fault of too narrow application of the definition. This is because smoke exists in parts of smoke by the relation of inherence and not by conjunction which is the relation by which smoke exists in the mountain.

Now the part of the definition 'the non-existence (of the reason) in that which is other than that which has that which is to be established (*sādhyavadanyāvṛttitvam*)' is explained. This means the absence of the general state of being existent (indicated by the substratum of the absence of *sādhya*) and not merely absence of a particular state of being existent (indicated by the substratum of the absence of *sādhya*). Therefore in such false inferences as 'there is smoke because of fire', although there is the absence of a particular state of being existent indicated by water, lake and so on which are the substrata of the absence of *sādhya*, there is no overextension. Although in fire there is a particular absence of existence indicated by the substratum of the absence of *sādhya* such as water, lake and so on, still in fire

there is no absence of existence indicated by heated iron ball which is the substratum of the absence of smoke. Such an absence also is included in the general absence indicated by the substratum of the absence of *sādhya*. Hence there is no overextension.

Rāmarudra further points out that the *sādhyavadanyā-vṛttitva* should be taken as *sādhyavadanyavṛttitvatvaparyāptāva-cchedakatākapratiyogitākābhāva*. Otherwise the overextension of the definition mentioned earlier cannot be avoided. This is because *sādhyavadanyajalahradādivṛttitvābhāva* is also *vṛttitvatvāva-cchinnapratiyogitākābhāva*. Hence the overextension still stands. Therefore Rāmarudra says that *sādhyavadanyavṛttitvāvachinna-pratiyogitākābhāva* is to be understood as *sādhyavadanyavṛtti-tvatvaparyāptāvacchedakatākābhāva*. Now *jalahradādinirūpita-vṛttitvābhāva* is not *vṛttitvatvaparyāptāvacchedakatākābhāva* because the *avacchedakatā* of this absence exists in *sādhya-vadanyāyogolakanirūpitavṛttitva* also. That *vṛttitva* exists in fire and therefore there is no overextension.

Similarly *sādhyavadanyavṛttitva* should be understood as *sādhyavadanyānuyogikatvaviśiṣṭahetutāvacchedakasaṃbandha-pratiyogitva*. This means that here *vṛttitva* is identical with *pratiyogitva* of a particular relation. Here *vṛttitva* refers to the *vṛttitva* in the expression *sādhyavadanyāvṛttitva* and it means *sādhyavadanyavṛttitvābhāva*. Hence *vṛttitva* is the counter-positive (*pratiyogi*) of the absence. And this *vṛttitva* is in the form of *pratiyogitva* of relation. Every relation has two elements: one is *anuyogin*, the other is *pratiyogin*. Generally that which exists is *pratiyogin*, and that on which something exists is *anuyogin*. Therefore here that which exists by the relation of *hetutāvacchedaka* is the *pratiyogin* of that relation. For example fish etc. exist in water etc. by the relation of conjunction. Therefore fish etc. are *pratiyogin*s of the relation. The *prati-yogitva* in these *pratiyogin*s is identical with *vṛttitva*.[1]

[1] Here the difference between *abhāvapratiyogin* and *saṃbandhapratiyogin* should be carefully noted. The *pratiyogin* of *abhāva* is that which is absent, viz. the counterpositive of the absence, whereas the *pratiyogin* of a relation is one of the relata of the relation. Usually that which exists by a particular

Hence *vṛttitva* is not *sādhyavadanyanirūpitahetutāvacchedakasaṃbandhāvacchinnādheyatvam*. According to this opinion *vṛttitva* is considered as identical with *ādheyatva*. This *ādheyatva* is to be understood as determined by the relation by which the reason exists in the subject. Such an interpretation of *vṛttitva* is not acceptable. This is because there are certain instances where the reasons related by occurrence non-exacting relation (*vṛttyaniyāmakasaṃbandha*, e.g. *tādātmya*, *svatva*, etc.) where there is no *vṛttitva* determined by that relation.

The definition of invariable concomitance has to be made still more precise. This is because in such inferences as 'it is a substance because it has existence which is different from the existence in quality and movement,' there is no non-occurrence of existence (which is the reason in the present inference) in qualities and so on which are other than that which has *sādhya* because pure existence and qualified existence are the same. Therefore the definition would be of too narrow application. In order to avoid this fault, the non-occurrence of the reason in that which is other than that which has *sādhya* is to be understood as determined by the determinant of the state of being the reason. Obviously here what is determined by the determinant of the state of being the reason is occurrence (*vṛttitā*) which is the counterpositive of the absence of occurrence (*vṛttitvābhāva*). Hence although there is no difference between pure existence and qualified existence, still the *vṛttitā* which is indicated by quality and action is not determined by *viśiṣṭasattātva*. Hence there is no fault of too narrow application.

The final meaning of this explanation is that the determinant of the state of being reason is not the determinant of *vṛttitā*. As for instance in the inference 'there is fire because of smoke,' the determinant of the state of being reason is smokeness which is not the determinant of *vṛttitā* indicated by lake and so on which are other than that which has *sādhya*. This is based on the

relation is its *pratiyogin*, and that on which something exists is the *anuyogin* of the relation.

principle that the determinant of the state of being indicator of the state of being substratum existing in a particular thing is the same as the determinant of the state of being superstratum which is indicated by that particular thing. As for example in the instance of knowledge *bhūtale ghaṭaḥ*, the *tanniṣṭhādhikaraṇa-tānirūpakatāvacchedaka* (the determinant of the state of being indicator of the state of being substratum) is *ghaṭatva* and it is also the determinant of the state of being superstratum (*tannirūpitā-dheyatāvacchedaka*). Because of this rule *viśiṣṭasattātva* cannot be the determinant of the state of being superstratum indicated by quality and so on.

It should also be noted here that Dinakara and Rāmarudra give a further meaning to the statement of Muktāvalīkāra that pure existence and qualified existence are the same. According to them even if they are the same, the *ādheyatā* in *viśiṣṭasattā* is different from the *ādheyatā* in *śuddhasattā*. This is because the *ādheyatā* in *śuddhasattā* is indicated by quality and so on while the *ādheyatā* existing in *viśiṣṭasattā* is not indicated by quality and so on. Therefore in the present inference, there is no fault of too narrow application. Hence Dinakara points out that *viśiṣṭā-dheyatā* (i.e. *viśiṣṭaniṣṭhādheyatā*) and *śuddhādheyatā* (i.e. *śuddha-niṣṭhādheyatā*) are the same. Hence there is *avyāpti*, the fault of too narrow application. This fault is avoided by the arguments in M. which have been explained above.

Text 3 B

Final Definition of Invariable Concomitance

का. अथ वा हेतुमन्निष्ठविरहाप्रतियोगिना ।
साध्येन हेतोरैकाधिकरण्यं व्याप्तिरुच्यते ।। ६९ ।।

मु. ननु केवलान्वयिनि ज्ञेयत्वादौ साध्ये साध्यवदन्यस्याप्रसिद्ध-त्वादव्याप्तिः । किं च 'सत्तावान् जातेः' इत्यादौ साध्यवदन्यस्मिन् सामान्यादौ हेतुतावच्छेदकसंबन्धेन समवायेन वृत्तेरप्रसिद्धत्वाद-व्याप्तिरित्यत आह **अथ वा** इति । हेतुमति निष्ठा वृत्तिर्यस्य सः, तथा विरहोऽभावः, तथा च हेत्वधिकरणवृत्तिर्योऽभावः तदप्रति-

K. Or else the co-occurrence of the reason with that which is to be established which is not a counterpositive of the absence that exists in that which has reason, is called invariable concomitance. (*Kārikā* 69)

M. Now it may be objected that when universally affirmatives such as knowability etc. are those which are to be established, then that which is different from that which has that which is to be established is unestablished and so there would be the fault of too narrow application. Besides in such inferences as 'it has existence because it has universal', in universal and so on which are other than that which has that which is to be established, occurrence of anything by the relation of inherence which is the relation of the determinant of the state of being reason, is unestablished and hence there is the fault of too narrow application. Therefore (the author) says **or else** (*athvā iti*). (The expression *hetumanniṣṭhavirahaḥ* in K.) means the absence the occurrence of which is in that which has the reason. Therefore the co-occurrence of the reason with that which is to be

मु. योगिना साध्येन सह हेतोः सामानाधिकरण्यं व्याप्तिः । अत्र यद्यपि 'वह्निमान् धूमात्' इत्यादौ हेत्वधिकरणपर्वतादिवृत्त्यभावप्रतियोगित्वं तत्तद्वह्न्यादेरस्तीत्यव्याप्तिः । न च समानाधिकरणवह्निधूमयोरेव व्याप्तिरिति वाच्यम् । तत्तद्वह्न्यादेरप्युभयाभावसत्त्वात् 'एकसत्त्वेऽपि द्वयं नास्ति' इति प्रतीतेः 'गुणवान् द्रव्यत्वात्' इत्यादावव्याप्तिश्च । तथापि प्रतियोगितानवच्छेदकं यत् साध्यतावच्छेदकं तदवच्छिन्नसामानाधिकरण्यं व्याप्तिरिति वाच्यम् । ननु 'रूपत्वव्याप्यजातिमद्वान् पृथिवीत्वात्' इत्यादौ साध्यतावच्छेदिका

M. established which is not a counterpositive of the absence which occurs on the substratum of the reason is invariable concomitance.

Now it may be objected: in such inferences as 'there is fire because of smoke', particular instances of fire may be the counterpositive of the absence which occurs in mountain and so on which are the substrata of the reason. Hence there is the fault of too narrow application. Nor can it be argued that the invariable concomitance is between smoke and fire existing in the same substratum. This is because there would be absence even of particular instances of fire in the form of the absence of both because one can have the knowledge that although one is there both are not there and also there is the fault of too narrow application in such inferences as 'it has quality because it is a substance'. However invariable concomitance is to be defined as the co-occurrence of *sādhya*, which is determined by that which is the determinant of the state of being that which is to be established which is not the determinant of counterpositiveness.

Now it may be objected that in inferences such as 'it has that which has universal which is pervaded by colourness because it is earth', the determinants of that which is to be established are the universals which are pervaded by colourness. These universals, whiteness and so on are determinants of the counterpositiveness

मु. रूपत्वव्याप्यजातयस्तासां च शुक्लत्वादिजातीनां नीलघटादि-वृत्त्यभावप्रतियोगितावच्छेदकत्वमस्तीत्यव्याप्तिरिति चेन्न। तत्र परम्परया रूपत्वव्याप्यजातित्वस्यैव साध्यतावच्छेदकत्वात्। न हि तादृशधर्मावच्छिन्नाभावः क्वापि पृथिव्यामस्ति 'रूपत्वव्याप्य-जातिमान्नास्ति' इति बुद्ध्यापत्तेः। साध्यादिभेदेन व्याप्तेर्भेदात् तादृशस्थले साध्यतावच्छेदकतावच्छेदकं प्रतियोगितावच्छेदकता-नवच्छेदकमित्येव लक्षणघटकमित्यपि वदन्ति। हेत्वधिकरणं च हेतुतावच्छेदकविशिष्टाधिकरणं वाच्यम्। तेन 'द्रव्यं गुणकर्मा-न्यत्वविशिष्टसत्त्वात्' इत्यादौ शुद्धसत्ताधिकरणगुणादिनिष्ठाभाव-

M. of the absence which occurs in blue jar and so on and therefore the definition would have the fault of too narrow application. This cannot be admitted because here the determinant of that which is to be established is indirectly the universalness in that which is pervaded by colourness. There is no such absence of that which is determined by such a characteristic any where in earth because otherwise there would be the possibility of knowledge that that which has the universal which is pervaded by colourness does not exist. Some even say that because of the difference of that which is to be established there is the difference of invariable concomitance and so the constitutive part of the definition in these instances is only that the determinant of the state of being determinant of that which is to be established is not the determinant of the state of being determinant of counter-positiveness.

The substratum of reason is to be understood as the substratum of that which is qualified by the determinant of the state of being reason. Therefore in such inferences as 'it is a substance because it has existence which is qualified by the difference of quality and movement', although substanceness is the counterpositive of the absence which exists in quality and so

मु. प्रतियोगित्वेऽपि द्रव्यत्वस्य नाव्याप्तिः । हेतुतावच्छेदकसंबन्धेन हेत्वधिकरणं बोध्यम् । तेन समवायेन धूमाधिकरणतदवयवनिष्ठा-भावप्रतियोगित्वेऽपि वह्नेर्नाव्याप्तिः । अभावश्च प्रतियोगिव्यधिकरणो बोध्यः । तेन 'कपिसंयोगी एतद्वृक्षत्वात्' इत्यत्र मूलावच्छेदेनैत-द्वृक्षवृत्तिकपिसंयोगाभावप्रतियोगित्वेऽपि कपिसंयोगस्य नाव्याप्तिः । न च प्रतियोगिव्यधिकरणत्वं यदि प्रतियोग्यनधिकरणवृत्तित्वं तदा तथैवाव्याप्तिः, प्रतियोगिनः कपिसंयोगस्यानधिकरणं गुणादौ वर्तमानो योऽभावस्तस्यैव वृक्षे मूलावच्छेदेन सत्त्वात् । यदि तु प्रतियोग्यधि-

M. on which are the substrata of pure existence, still there is no fault of too narrow application.

The substratum of reason is to be understood by the relation of the determinant of the state of being reason. Therefore there is no too narrow application of the definition although fire is the counterpositive of the absence which exists in parts of smoke which is the substratum of smoke by the relation of inherence.

The absence should be understood as not occurring along with its counterpositive. Therefore in such inferences as 'it has conjunction with a monkey because it is this tree', there is no fault of too narrow application of the definition even though the conjunction of monkey is the counterpositive of the absence of the conjunction of monkey which occurs in the tree as limited by its roots. Nor can it be argued that if the non-occurrence (of the absence) together with its counterpositive means the occurrence on something which is not the substratum of the counterpositive, then there would be the same fault of too narrow application. This is because the same absence which exists in qualities and so on which are not the substrata of conjunction of monkey, exists in the tree as limited by its roots. If (the non-occurrence of the absence together with its counterpositive) means the non-occurrence in the substratum of the counterpositive, then in such

मु. करणावृत्तित्वं तदा 'संयोगी सत्त्वात्' इत्यादावतिव्याप्तिः, सत्ताधिकरणे गुणादौ यः संयोगाभावस्तस्य प्रतियोग्यधिकरणद्रव्य-वृत्तित्वादिति वाच्यम् । हेत्वधिकरणे प्रतियोग्यनधिकरणवृत्तित्व-विशिष्टस्य विवक्षितत्वात् । स्वप्रतियोग्यनधिकरणीभूतहेत्वधिकरण-वृत्त्यभाव इति निष्कर्षः । प्रतियोग्यनधिकरणत्वं प्रतियोगिता-वच्छेदकावच्छिन्नानधिकरणत्वं वाच्यम् । तेन 'विशिष्टसत्तावान् जातेः' इत्यादौ जात्यधिकरणगुणादौ विशिष्टसत्ताभावप्रतियोगि-सत्ताधिकरणत्वेऽपि न क्षतिः । अत्र साध्यतावच्छेदकसंबन्धेन

M. (false) inferences as 'it has conjunction because it has existence', there would be (the fault of) overextension (of the definition). This is because that absence of conjunction which exists in quality and so on which are the substrata of existence, occurs in substance which is the substratum of the counter-positive. (Non-occurrence of the absence together with its counterpositive) should be taken in the sense of (an absence) in the substratum of the reason of that which is qualified by the occurrence in something which is not the substratum of the counterpositive (of the same absence). The exact position is that the absence occurs in the substratum of the reason which is not the substratum of its counterpositive.

The state of not being the substratum of counterpositive means the state of not being the substratum of that which is determined by the determinant of counterpositiveness.Therefore in such inferences as 'it has qualified existence because it has universal', although in qualities and so on which are the substrata of universal, there is the state of being the substratum of existence which is the counterpositive of the absence of qualified existence, there is no harm.

Here the state of not being substratum of the counter-positive is to be understood by the relation of the determinant

मु. प्रतियोग्यनधिकरणत्वं बोध्यं। तेन 'ज्ञानवान् सत्त्वात्' इत्यादौ सत्ताधिकरणघटादेर्विषयतया ज्ञानाधिकरणत्वेऽपि न क्षतिः। इत्थं च 'वह्निमान् धूमात्' इत्यादौ धूमाधिकरणे समवायेन वह्निविरह-सत्त्वेऽपि न क्षतिः। ननु प्रतियोगितावच्छेदकावच्छिन्नस्य यस्यकस्य-चित्प्रतियोगिनोऽनधिकरणत्वं तत्सामान्यस्य वा यत्किंचित्प्रति-योगितावच्छेदकावच्छिन्नानधिकरणत्वं वा विवक्षितम्। आद्ये 'कपिसंयोगी एतद्वृक्षत्वात्' इत्यत्र तथैवाव्याप्तिः कपिसंयोगाभाव-प्रतियोगितावच्छेदकावच्छिन्नो वृक्षावृत्तिकपिसंयोगोऽपि भवति तदनधिकरणं वृक्ष इति। द्वितीये तु प्रतियोगिव्यधिकरणाभावा

M. of the state of being that which is to be established. Therefore in such inferences as 'it has knowledge because it has existence' although by the relation of the state of being object there is the state of being substratum of knowledge in jar and so on which are the substrata of existence, there is no harm. In this way in such inferences as 'there is fire because of smoke', although there is the absence of fire by the relation of inherence in the substratum of smoke, there is no harm.

Now it may be asked whether the state of not being the substratum of the counterpositive refers to any one of the counterpositives which are determined by the determinant of the counterpositiveness or does it refer to counterpositives in general or does it refer to the state of not being the substratum of that which is determined by any determinant of counterpositiveness?

In the first alternative in such inferences as 'it has conjunction with a monkey because it is this tree', there would be the fault of too narrow application as before. This is because tree is other than the substratum of conjunction with monkey which (i.e. conjunction) does not exist on the tree (and which) is also determined by the determinant of the counterpositiveness of the absence of conjunction with monkey.

मु. प्रसिद्धिः सर्वस्यैवाभावस्य पूर्वक्षणवृत्तित्वविशिष्टस्वाभावात्मक-प्रतियोगिसमानाधिकरणत्वात् । न च 'वह्निमान् धूमात्' इत्यादौ घटाभावादेः पूर्वक्षणवृत्तित्वविशिष्टस्वाभावात्मकप्रतियोग्यधिकरणत्वं यद्यपि पर्वतादेस्तथापि साध्यतावच्छेदकसंबन्धेन तत्प्रतियोग्य-नधिकरणत्वमस्त्येवेति कथं प्रतियोगिव्यधिकरणाभावाप्रसिद्धिरिति वाच्यम् । घटाभावे यो वह्न्यभावस्तस्य घटाभावात्मकतया घटा-भावस्य वह्निरपि प्रतियोगी तदधिकरणे च पर्वतादिरित्येवं क्रमेण प्रतियोगिव्यधिकरणस्याप्रसिद्धत्वात् । यदि घटाभावादौ वह्न्यभावा-दिर्भिन्न इत्युच्यते तथापि 'धूमाभाववान् वह्न्यभावात्' इत्यादाव-

M. In the second alternative the absence which does not exist along with its counterpositive is unestablished because every instance of absence is coexistent with its counterpositive in the form of the absence of that instance of absence which is qualified by occurrence in the previous moment. Nor can it be argued that in such inferences as 'it has fire because of smoke' although mountain and so on are the substrata of the counterpositive of the absence of jar in the form of the absence of the absence of jar which (i.e. the absence of jar) is qualified by the occurrence in the previous moment, still (the mountain and so on) are not the substrata of that counterpositive by the relation of the determinant of the state of being that which is to be established. Therefore how can an absence which does not exist in the substratum of the counterpositive be unestablished? This is because the absence of fire which exists in the absence of jar is considered to be identical with absence of jar and therefore fire also is the counterpositive of the absence of jar and its substratum is mountain and so on. In this way an absence which is not coexistent with its counterpositive is unestablished. If it is argued that the absence of fire existing in the absence of jar is different (from the absence of jar), then in such inferences as 'it has the absence of smoke because

मु. व्याप्तिः, तत्र साध्यतावच्छेदकसंबन्धः स्वरूपसंबन्धस्तेन सर्वस्यैवाभावस्य पूर्वक्षणवृत्तित्वविशिष्टस्वाभावात्मकप्रतियोग्यधिकरणत्वं हेत्वधिकरणस्येति । तृतीये तु 'कपिसंयोगाभाववानात्मत्वात्' इत्यादावव्याप्तिः, तत्रात्मवृत्तिः कपिसंयोगाभावाभावः कपिसंयोगस्तस्य गुणत्वात् तत्प्रतियोगितावच्छेदकं गुणसामान्याभावत्वमपि तदवच्छिन्नानधिकरणत्वं हेत्वधिकरणस्यात्मन इति । मैवम् । यादृशप्रतियोगितावच्छेदकावच्छिन्नानधिकरणत्वं हेतुमतस्तादृशप्रतियोगितानवच्छेदकत्वस्य विवक्षितत्वात् ।

M. it has the absence of fire' and so on there is the fault of too narrow application. This is because here the relation of the determinant of the state of being that which is to be established is self-sameness. And by this relation the substratum of the reason is the substratum of the counterpositive of every absence in the form of the absence of that absence which is qualified by occurrence in the previous moment.

In the third alternative, there is the fault of too narrow application in such inferences as 'it has absence of conjunction with monkey because it is a soul'. Here the absence of the absence of conjunction with monkey existing in the soul is conjunction with monkey. And because it is a quality, the determinant of its counterpositiveness is the state of being absence of quality in general. The soul which is the substratum of the reason is not the substratum of that which is determined by that (i.e. the state of being absence of quality in general).

It is not so. (The definition) is understood in the sense that the substratum of the reason is not the substratum of that which is determined by the particular determinant of counterpositiveness (of the absence). This determinant of the counterpositiveness (of the absence) is not (the determinant of the state of being that which is to be established).

मु. ननु 'कालो घटवान् कालपरिमाणात्' इत्यत्र प्रतियोगि-व्यधिकरणाभावाप्रसिद्धिः हेत्वधिकरणस्य महाकालस्य जगदा-धारतया सर्वेषामेवाभावानां साध्यतावच्छेदकसंबन्धेन कालिक-विशेषणतया प्रतियोग्यधिकरणत्वात् । अत्र केचित् महाकालभेद-विशिष्टघटाभावस्तत्र प्रतियोगिव्यधिकरणः महाकालस्य घटाधार-त्वेऽपि महाकालभेदविशिष्टघटानाधारत्वात् महाकाले महाकाल-भेदाभावात् । वस्तुतस्तु प्रतियोगितावच्छेदकसंबन्धेन प्रतियोग्य-नधिकरणीभूतहेत्वधिकरणवृत्त्यभावप्रतियोगितासामान्ये यत्संबन्धाव-च्छिन्नत्वयद्धर्मावच्छिन्नत्वोभयाभावस्तेन संबन्धेन तद्धर्मावच्छिन्नस्य

M. Now it may be objected that in such inferences as 'time has jar because it has the dimension of time', the absence which does not exist along with its counterpositive is unestablished. This is because infinite time which is the substratum of the reason is the substratum of the universe and hence it is the substratum of counterpositives of all absences by temporal relation which is the relation of the determinant of the state of being that which is to be established. Some answer this objection as follows: the absence of jar qualified by the difference from infinite time does not occur along with its counterpositive. The reason is that although the infinite time is the substratum of jar, it is not the substratum of the jar which is qualified by difference from infinite time. This is because in infinite time there is no difference from infinite time.

In fact in the counterpositiveness in general of the absence which occurs in the substratum of the reason which is not the substratum of the counterpositive by the relation of the determinant of counterpositiveness, exists the absence of both the state of being determined by a particular characteristic and the state of being determined by a particular relation; the state of being pervader of a particular reason is to be understood as that which

मु. तद्धेतुव्यापकत्वं बोध्यम् । इत्थं च 'कालो घटवान् काल-परिमाणात्' इत्यादौ संयोगसंबन्धेन घटाभावप्रतियोगिनोऽपि घट-स्यानधिकरणे हेत्वधिकरणे महाकाले वर्तमानः स एव संयोगेन घटाभावस्तस्य प्रतियोगितायां कालिकसंबन्धावच्छिन्नत्वघटत्वा-वच्छिन्नत्वोभयाभावसत्त्वान्नाव्याप्तिः । ननु 'प्रमेयवह्निमान्धूमात्' इत्यादौ प्रमेयवह्नित्वावच्छिन्नत्वमप्रसिद्धं गुरुधर्मस्यानवच्छेदक-त्वादिति चेन्न । 'कम्बुग्रीवादिमान्नास्ति' इति प्रतीत्या कम्बुग्रीवा-दिमत्त्वावच्छिन्नप्रतियोगिताविषयीकरणेन गुरुधर्मस्याप्यवच्छेदकत्व-स्वीकारादिति संक्षेपः ।

M. is qualified by that particular characteristic by that same relation. In such inferences as 'time has jar because it (i.e. time) has the dimension of time', in infinite time which is the substratum of the reason and which is not the substratum of jar which is the counterpositive of the absence of jar by the relation of conjunction, there is the absence of jar; in the counter-positiveness of that same absence of jar by the relation of conjunction exists the twofold absence of the state of being that which is determined by the relation of temporality and of the state of being determined by jarness. Therefore the definition has no fault of too narrow application.

Now it may be objected that in such inferences as 'it has knowable fire because it has smoke', the state of being determined by knowable fireness is unestablished, because a property which is cumbersome cannot be a determinant. This cannot be admitted because a property which is cumbersome is also accepted as a determinant since the counterpositiveness which is determined by the state of having a conch-like neck etc. is the object of the knowledge in the form of the absence of the thing with conch-like neck etc. This is the summary.

दि. 'अथ वा' इत्यादिलक्षणमवतारयितुमाद्यलक्षणे दोषमाह **ननु** इति । ननु केवलान्वयित्वज्ञानकाले पक्षताघटकसंशयाभावान्नैवानुमितिः, तच्छून्यकाले तु भ्रमात्मकव्याप्तिज्ञानादनुमितिर्भवत्येवेत्यत आह **किं च** इति । **इत्यादौ** इति । आदिना संयोगेन हेतुतायां 'गुणवान् घटात्' इत्यादेः संग्रहः । ननु स्वाधिकरणावृत्तिसाध्यवदन्योन्याभावकत्वं लक्षणार्थस्तथा च नेयमव्याप्ति-रिति चेन्न । 'वह्निमान् धूमात्' इत्यादौ धूमाधिकरणे वह्निमदन्योन्याभावस्य कालिकसंबन्धेन वृत्तेरव्याप्त्यापत्तेः साध्यवत्ताग्रहविरोधितानियामकसंबन्धेना-

D. In order to introduce the definition beginning with the words 'or else' (the author) points out the defect in the first definition (with the words) **now it may be objected** (*nanu*). Now because there could be the objection that when there is the knowledge of the state of being universally affirmative, there is the absence of doubt which is a constitutive part of subjectness, there is no inferential knowledge and when there is no such knowledge inferential knowledge arises because of erroneous knowledge of invariable concomitance; (therefore the author) says **besides** (*kiṃ ca iti*). By the words **and so on** (*ityādau*) (inferences such as) 'it has quality because it has jar' where the reason (exists) by the relation of conjunction are also included. Now it may be objected that the meaning of the definition is the state of being the indicator of the mutual absence of the substratum of *sādhya* which (i.e. mutual absence) does not occur in the substratum of the reason. Therefore the definition does not suffer from the previously mentioned fault of too narrow application. This cannot be admitted. The reason is that in such inferences as 'it has fire because it has smoke', in the substratum of smoke there is the occurrence of the mutual absence of that which has fire by temporal relation, and so (the definition suffers) from the fault of too narrow application. Therefore the non-occurrence (of the mutual absence) is necessarily to be understood by the relation which determines the state of being the hindering factor for the knowledge of the state of being that which has that which is to

दि. वृत्तित्वस्यावश्यं विवक्षणीयतया 'सत्ताभाववान् जात्यभावात्' इत्यादाव-व्याप्तेः जात्यभावाधिकरणे साध्यवत्ताग्रहविरोधितानियामकसंबन्धेन समवायेन वृत्तेरप्रसिद्धेः । न च 'सत्तावान् जातेः' इत्यादौ स्वाधिकरणेत्यादिव्याप्तिज्ञानं कारणं 'सत्ताभाववान् जात्यभावात्' इत्यादौ तु साध्यवदन्येत्यादिव्याप्तिज्ञानं कारणमिति वाच्यम् । तथापि संयोगसंबन्धावच्छिन्नघटाभावे साध्ये विष-यितया हेतौ घटे लक्षणद्वयस्याप्यव्याप्तिः तत्र विषयितया हेत्वधिकरणे ज्ञाने

D. be established. But in such a case, in such inferences as 'it has the absence of existence because it has the absence of universal' (the definition would suffer) from the fault of too narrow application. This is because in the substratum of the absence of the universal, occurrence by the relation of inherence which determines the state of being hindering factor for the knowledge of the state of being that which has that which is to be established, is unestablished. Nor can it be argued that for such inferences as 'it has existence because it has universal', the knowledge of invariable concomitance in the form of (the state of being the indicator of the mutual absence of the substratum of that which is to be established which (i.e. mutual absence) does not occur in the substratum of the reason is the cause and for such inferences as, 'it has the absence of existence because it has the absence of the universal', the knowledge of invariable concomitance in the form of (the non-occurrence of the reason in the substratum which) is different from that which has that which is to be established, is the cause. However in such inferences where the absence of jar (the counterpositive of which) is determined by the relation of conjunction is that which is to be established (and) the reason is jar by the relation of the state of having object, both the definitions would suffer from the fault of too narrow application. This is because in knowledge which is the substratum of the reason, occurrence by the relation of conjunction which determines the state of being hindering factor for the knowledge of the state of being that

दि. साध्यवत्ताग्रहविरोधितानियामकसंयोगेन, तथा भूतले संयोगेन घटाधिकरणे हेतुतावच्छेदकविषयितया च, वृत्तेरप्रसिद्धेः । नन्वतिरिक्तोभयाभावे मानाभाव इत्यत आह **एकसत्त्वेऽपि** इति । इदमुपलक्षणम् । विशिष्टाभावमादायाव्याप्तिरित्यपि बोध्यम् । ननु वैशिष्ट्यव्यासज्यवृत्तिधर्मानवच्छिन्नप्रतियोगिताकत्वेनाभावविशेषणान्नाव्याप्तिरत आह **गुणवान्** इति । अत्र हेतोरेकव्यक्तितया समानाधिकरणयोरेव व्याप्तिरित्युक्तावपि न निस्तार इति भावः । 'एतद्रूपवानेतद्रसात्' इत्यादौ लक्षणसत्त्वादसंभवाभावादाह **अव्याप्तिश्च** इति । **इति वाच्यम्** इति । गुणत्वस्य द्रव्यत्वसमानाधिकरणाभाव-

D. which has that which is to be established, is unestablished. Similarly on the floor which is the substratum of the jar by the relation of conjunction, occurrence by the relation of the state of having object which is the relation of the determinant of the state of being the reason, is unestablished. Now it may be objected that there is no proof to establish a different kind of absence with two counterpositives. Therefore the author says **although one is there** (*ekasattve'pīti*). The following also is to be understood. It should be understood also that the definition would suffer from the fault of too narrow application taking qualified absence. Now it may be objected that the definition does not suffer from the fault of too narrow application because the absence is qualified in such a way that its counterpositiveness is not determined by the state of being qualified and by a characteristic which occurs simultaneously in many things; therefore the author says **it has quality** (*guṇavān iti*). Here since the reason is only one individual even if it is stated that the invariable concomitance is between two things which are co-existent, (the fault) cannot be removed. This is the idea. Since the definition is applicable in such inferences as 'it has this colour because it has this taste', there is no fault of impossibility. Hence the author says **also there is the fault of too narrow application** (*avyāptiśca iti*). **It is to be defined** (*iti vācyamiti*). The idea is that the definition does not suffer from the fault of too narrow application because qualitiness

दि. प्रतियोगितानवच्छेदकत्वान्नाव्याप्तिरिति भावः । **परम्परया** स्वाश्रय-समवायेन । तथा चोक्तपरम्परया यदवच्छेदकं तदन्यत्वस्य जातित्वे सत्त्वा-न्नाव्याप्तिरिति भावः । **तादृशधर्मावच्छिन्नाभावः** । उक्तपरम्परया रूपत्व-व्याप्यजातित्वावच्छिन्नस्य समवायेनाभावः । 'नास्ति' इत्यत्र 'पृथिव्याम्' इत्यनुषज्यते । मतान्तरमाह **साध्यादीति** । आदिना साधनादिपरिग्रहः । **व्याप्तेर्भेदात्** इति । व्याप्तिज्ञानस्य कारणताभेदादित्यर्थः । पूर्वोक्तरीत्या निर्वाहे तत्र साध्यतावच्छेदकतावच्छेदकधर्मिकप्रतियोगितावच्छेदकतानव-च्छेदकत्वप्रकारकज्ञानस्य हेतुत्वं नोचितं कारणतावच्छेदकगौरवात् ।

D. is not the determinant of the counterpositiveness of the absence which occurs in the same substratum as that of substanceness. **Indirectly** (*paramparayā*) (means) by inherence in its substratum. The idea is that in this way the definition does not suffer from the fault of too narrow application because there is difference from that which is the determinant by the already mentioned relation, in the state of being universal. **Absence of that which is determined by such a characteristic** (*tādṛśadharmāvacchinnā-bhāvaḥ*). (This means) the absence by the relation of inherence of that which is determined indirectly by the state of being universal which is pervaded by colourness. The expression 'there is not' is to be supplied with the expression 'in the earth'. (The author) mentions another opinion (with the words) **that which is to be established etc.** (*sādhyādīti*). The expression 'etc'. means that reason etc. have to be taken. **Because of the difference of invariable concomitance** (*vyāpterbhedāt iti*). Because of the difference of causality in the invariable concomitance. This is the meaning. When (the fault of too narrow application) is avoided in the way mentioned earlier, it is not proper to accept the causality of the knowledge which has as qualifier the state of being the non-determinant of the state of being the determinant of counterpositiveness existing in the determinant of the state of being the determinant of the state of being that which is to be established. This is because of the logical complexity of the

दि. न च पूर्वोक्तरीत्या 'जातिमान्' इत्येवानुमितिः स्यान्न तु 'जातिमद्वान्' इत्याकारिकेति वाच्यम् । पृथिवीत्वादिहेतुके 'जातिमान्' इत्येवानुमित्याकारो 'जातिमद्वान्' इत्याकारस्तु तद्व्यक्तित्वहेतुके इत्यदोषात् । **इत्यपि वदन्ति** इति । अनेनास्वरसः सूचितः । **शुद्धसत्ताधिकरणेति** । न च विशिष्टनिरूपिताधिकरणतायाः हेतुतावच्छेदकसंबन्धत्वे कथं तेन संबन्धेन सत्ताधिकरणं गुणः समवायस्य तथात्वे तु द्रव्यत्वे साध्ये विशिष्टसत्ताया व्यभिचारित्वात्तत्राव्याप्त्यभिधानमसङ्गतमिति वाच्यम् । साध्याभाववद्वृत्तितावच्छेदकहेतुतावच्छेदकस्यैव व्यभिचारपदार्थतया शुद्धसमवायसंबन्धस्य हेतुतावच्छेदक-

D. determinant of causality. Nor can it be objected that in the way mentioned earlier the inferential knowledge may have the form 'it has universal', and not the form 'it has that which has universal'. When the reason is earthness etc., the form of the inferential knowledge is only 'it has universal', but when the reason is the state of being that particular individual, the form of the inferential knowledge is 'it has that which has universal'. Hence there is no fault. Incongruity is indicated by the expression **some even say** (*ityapi vadanti iti*). **The substrata of pure existence** (*śuddhasattādhikaraṇeti*). It cannot be objected as follows: the relation of the determinant of the state of being the reason is the state of being substratum which is indicated by that which is qualified (i.e. qualified existence). In that case, how can a quality be a substratum of existence by that relation? If inherence is that (i.e. the relation of the determinant of the state of being reason), when the state of being substance is that which is to be established, the reason of qualified existence has the fault of deviation. Therefore the objection that there is the fault of too narrow application (for the definition) is inappropriate. The meaning of deviation is that the determinant of the state of being reason is the determinant of the occurrence in that which has the absence of that which is to be established. Therefore even though pure inherence is the relation of the determinant

दि. संबन्धत्वेऽपि विशिष्टसत्त्वस्य हेतोर्व्यभिचारित्वाभावात् **नाव्याप्तिरिति** । न च हेतुतावच्छेदकविशिष्टसत्तात्वविशिष्टसत्त्वस्य गुणे सत्त्वादेवं विवक्षणेऽपि कथमव्याप्तिपरिहार इति वाच्यम् । हेतुतावच्छेदकावच्छिन्ननिरूपिताधिकरणत्वस्य विवक्षितत्वाद्विशिष्टसत्तात्वस्य गुणनिष्ठाधिकरणतानिरूपिताधेयतानवच्छेदकतया तदवच्छिन्ननिरूपिताधिकरणत्वस्य गुणेऽभावादिति । **तथैव** तदवस्थैव । **तस्यैव वृक्षे** इति । अधिकरणभेदेनाभावभेदानभ्युपगमादिति भावः । **प्रतियोग्यधिकरणावृत्तित्वं** प्रतियोग्यधिकरणवृत्तिभिन्नत्वम् । **विवक्षितत्वात्** इति । प्रतियोगिव्यधिकरणपदेन विवक्षितत्वा-

D. of the state of being reason, there is no deviation in the reason of qualified existence and so **there is no fault of too narrow application** (*nāvyāptiriti*). Nor should it be objected that even though such is the interpretation, owing to the fact that in quality there is existence qualified by the state of being qualified existence in the form of the determinant of the state of being reason, how can the fault of too narrow application be avoided? This is because the meaning is that the state of being substratum is indicated by that which is determined by the determinant of the state of being reason. Therefore the state of being qualified existence is not the determinant of the state of being superstratum which is indicated by the state of being substratum existing in quality. Hence in quality there is the absence of the state of being substratum indicated by that which is determined by that (i.e. determinant of the state of being reason).

Same (*tathaiva*) means in the same manner. **The same (absence) exists in the tree** (*tasyaiva vṛkṣe iti*). The idea is that absence is not considered to be different because of the difference of substratum. **Non-occurrence in the substratum of the counter-positive** (*pratiyogyadhikaraṇāvṛttitvam*) (means) difference from occurrence which occurs in the substratum of the counterpositive. **Should be taken in the sense of** (*vivakṣitatvāt iti*) means that this should be understood by the expression 'not existing in the substratum of the counterpositive'. Now it may be objected that it is useless

दि. दित्यर्थः । नन्वेवं हेतुसमानाधिकरणेत्यस्य वैयर्थ्यं 'सत्तावान् जातेः' इत्यादौ सत्ताद्यभावस्य निरुक्तप्रतियोगिवैयधिकरण्याभावादव्याप्तिविरहादत आह **स्वप्रतियोग्यनधिकरणेति** । **निष्कर्षः** इति । प्रतियोगिव्यधिकरण-हेतुसमानाधिकरणाभावेत्यन्तस्य निष्कर्ष इत्यर्थः । तथा च हेतुसमानाधि-करणत्वविशेषणबलादेव तादृशप्रतियोगिव्यधिकरण्यलाभान्न तद्वैयर्थ्यमिति भावः । **सत्ताधिकरणत्वेऽपि** इति । तथा च विशिष्टसत्ताभावो न प्रतियोगि-व्यधिकरणः अभावान्तरप्रतियोगितायाश्चानवच्छेदकमेव विशिष्टसत्तात्वमित्यति-व्याप्तिरिति भावः । **न क्षतिः** नातिव्याप्तिः । एवमग्रेऽपि । ननु प्रतियोगिता

D. (to have the expression) 'occurring in the same substratum as the reason' (in the definition of invariable concomitance) because in such inferences as 'it has existence because it has universal', the absence of existence is the already mentioned absence not occurring with its counterpositive. Therefore there is no fault of too narrow application. Hence the author says **not the substratum of its counterpositive** (*svapratiyogyanadhi-karaṇeti*). **The exact position** (*niṣkarṣaḥ iti*) means the final position following from the expression ending with the word 'absence which coexists in the substratum of the reason which (i.e. absence) does not occur together with its counterpositive'. In this way it is through the force of the qualification 'occurrence in the same substratum as the reason' (the absence is understood) as not occurring in the substratum of its counterpositive. Hence that qualification (i.e. occurring in the same substratum as the reason) is not useless. This is the idea. **Although there is the state of being the substratum of existence** (*sattādhikaraṇatve'pī iti*). In this way the absence of qualified existence is not non-occurrent in the substratum of the counterpositive. The state of being qualified existence is not the determinant of the counterpositiveness of another absence. Therefore there is overextension. This is the idea. **There is no harm** (*na kṣatiḥ*) (means) there is no fault of overextension. This is the meaning hereafter also. Now it may be objected as follows: let the state of being non-substratum of its counterpositive be by

दि. वच्छेदकसंबन्धेनैव प्रतियोग्यनधिकरणत्वमुच्यतां तावतापि 'ज्ञानवान् सत्त्वात्' इत्यादावनतिप्रसङ्गादित्यत आह **इत्थं च** इति । साध्यताव-च्छेदकसंबन्धेन प्रतियोग्यनधिकरणत्वविवक्षणे चेत्यर्थः । **वह्निविरहसत्त्वेऽपि** इति । तथा च प्रतियोगितावच्छेदकसमवायेन प्रतियोगिन्यधिकरणता-दृशाभावप्रतियोगितावच्छेदकत्वाद्वह्नित्वस्याव्याप्तिः। साध्यतावच्छेदकसंबन्धा-वच्छिन्नत्वेनाग्रिमप्रतियोगिताविशेषणे तु संबन्धद्वयप्रवेशेन गौरवमिति भावः । **न क्षतिः** नाव्याप्तिः । समवायेन वह्न्यभावस्य साध्यताव-च्छेदकसंयोगेन प्रतियोग्यनधिकरणहेत्वधिकरणवृत्तित्वाभावादिति भावः ।

D. the relation of the determinant of its counterpositiveness; still there would not be overextension of definition in inferences such as 'it has knowledge because it has existence'. Therefore the author says **in this way** (*ittham ca iti*). The meaning is, not being the state of being the substratum of its counterpositive by the relation of the determinant of the state of being that which is to be established. **Although there is the absence of fire** (*vahni-virahasattve'pi iti*). In this way fireness is the determinant of the counterpositiveness of such an absence which does not exist in the substratum of its counterpositive by inherence which is the relation of the determinant of the counterpositiveness. Therefore there is the fault of too narrow application of definition. When the latter counterpositiveness is qualified by the state of being determined by the relation of the determinant of the state of being that which is to be established, two qualifications would have to be introduced (in the definition) and therefore there would be cumbersomeness. This is the idea. **No harm** (*na kṣatiḥ*) means no fault of too narrow application because of the absence of fire by the relation of inherence does not occur in the substratum of the reason which is not the substratum of the counterpositive by the relation of conjunction which is the relation of the determinant of that which is to be established. This is the idea.

दि. तत्सामान्यस्य प्रतियोगितावच्छेदकावच्छिन्नसामान्यस्य । **यत्किंचित्** इति । यत्किंचित्प्रतियोगितावच्छेदकं तदवच्छिन्नसामान्यस्य वेत्यर्थः । **पूर्वक्षणवृत्तित्वविशिष्टेति** । पूर्वक्षणवृत्तित्वविशिष्टस्य स्वस्य घटाभावादेर्योऽभावस्तदात्मकेत्यर्थः । घटाभावाद्यधिकरणेऽपि पूर्वक्षणवृत्तित्वविशिष्टघटाभावादेरभावस्योत्तरक्षणावच्छेदेन सत्त्वादिति भावः । न च पूर्वक्षणवृत्तित्वविशिष्टस्य घटाभावादेरभावः स्वाभावस्य प्रतियोगी न घटाभावादेरिति वाच्यम् । पूर्वक्षणवृत्तित्वविशिष्टस्य घटाभावादेर्योऽभावस्तदभावस्य पूर्वक्षणवृत्तित्वविशिष्टघटाभावरूपस्य घटाभावानतिरेकितया विशिष्टघटाभावप्रतियोगिनस्तस्य शुद्धघटाभावप्रतियोगित्वात् । तथा च प्रतियोगिव्यधि-

D. In general (*tat sāmānyasya*) means that which is determined by the determinant of counterpositiveness in general. **Any** (*yat-kiṃcit iti*). That which is qualified in general by any of the determinants of counterpositiveness. This is the meaning. **Qualified by occurrence in the previous moment** (*pūrvakṣaṇavṛttitva-viśiṣṭeti*) means identical with the absence of the absence itself of jar and so on which (i.e. absence of the jar) is qualified by the occurrence in the previous moment. This is because even in the substratum of the absence of jar and so on, the absence of the absence of jar which is qualified by occurrence in the previous moment exists as qualified by the later moment. This is the idea. Nor should it be argued that the absence of the absence of jar qualified by occurrence in the previous moment is the counterpositive of its absence and not of the absence of jar and so on. The absence of jar qualified by occurrence in the previous moment is the counterpositive of its absence and not of the absence of jar and so on. The absence of jar is not different from the absence of the absence of the absence of jar and so on which is qualified by occurrence in the previous moment. This is identical with the absence of jar qualified by existence in the previous moment. Therefore that which is the counterpositive of qualified absence of jar is the counterpositive of the unqualified absence of jar. In this way the absence which does not exist in the

दि. करणाभावाप्रसिद्ध्यासंभव इति भावः । **घटाभावात्मकतया** इति । अभावाधिकरणकाभावस्याधिकरणानतिरिक्तत्वादिति भावः । **इत्यादौ** इति । आदिना अभावसाध्यकसद्धेतुमात्रपरिग्रहः । **स्वरूपसंबन्ध** इति । अभावीय-विशेषणतेत्यर्थः । **पूर्वक्षणवृत्तित्वविशिष्टस्वाभावेति** । पूर्वक्षणवृत्तित्व-विशिष्टं यत्स्वं घटाभावादि तदभावात्मकेत्यर्थः । प्राचां मते द्रव्ये संयोग-सामान्याभावानङ्गीकारादाह **कपीति** । घटाभावीययत्किंचित्प्रतियोगिता-वच्छेदकघटत्वावच्छिन्नानधिकरणत्वस्य हेत्वधिकरणे संभवान्न प्रतियोगि-व्यधिकरणाभावाप्रसिद्धिनिबन्धनाव्याप्तिः संभवतीति भावः । घटत्वहेतुके

D. substratum of its counterpositive is unestablished. Hence there is the fault of impossibility. This is the idea. **Identical with the absence of jar** (*ghaṭābhāvātmakatayā iti*). An absence which has another absence as its substratum is not different from that substratum (in the form of absence). This is the idea. **And so on** (*ityādau iti*). By the expression 'and so on' all valid reasons which establish an absence are included. **The relation of self-sameness** (*svarūpasaṃbandhaḥ iti*). The qualifierness of absence. This is the meaning. **Absence of that absence which is qualified by occurrence in the previous moment** (*pūrvakṣaṇavṛttitva-viśiṣṭasvābhaveti*). The absence of the absence of that thing viz. absence of jar etc. which is qualified by existence in the previous moment is identical with it (i.e. jar). This is the meaning. According to the opinion of the old Naiyāyikas, in substance there is no general absence of conjunction. Hence the author says **monkey** (*kapīti*). The substratum of the reason is not the substratum of that which is determined by jarness which is one particular determinant of counterpositiveness of the absence of jar. Therefore (the definition) does not suffer from the fault of too narrow application because an absence not existing along with its counterpositive is not established. This is the idea. (In the inference where) jarness is the reason, the jar and so on which are the substrata of the reason cannot be non-substrata of

दि. यत्किंचित्प्रतियोगितावच्छेदकगुणसामान्याभावत्वावच्छिन्नानधिकरणत्वं हेत्वधिकरणस्य घटादेर्न संभवति उत्पत्तिकाले घटे गुणसामान्याभावसत्त्वादत आत्मपर्यन्तानुधावनम्। तृतीयविवक्षानुसारेण समाधत्ते **यादृशेति**। यादृश्याः प्रतियोगिताया अवच्छेदकावच्छिन्नानधिकरणत्वं हेतुमतस्तादृशप्रतियोगितावच्छेदकतानाश्रयत्वमित्यर्थः। **विवक्षितत्वात्** अप्रतियोगिपदेन विवक्षितत्वात्। 'कपिसंयोगाभाववानात्मत्वात्' इत्यादौ गुणसामान्याभावत्वावच्छिन्नप्रतियोगिताया एव यादृशप्रतियोगितापदेनोपादातुं शक्यतया तदनवच्छेदकत्वस्य कपिसंयोगाभावत्वे सत्त्वान्नाव्याप्तिरिति भावः। अत्र च यद्धर्मविशिष्टानधिकरणत्वं हेत्वधिकरणस्य तद्धर्मभिन्नसाध्यतावच्छेदकावच्छिन्न-

D. that which is determined by the state of being the general absence of quality which is one particular determinant of counterpositiveness because in the moment of origination the jar has general absence of quality. Therefore soulness is stated (as the reason). According to the third interpretation the (author) gives the answer with the words **of that** (*yādṛśeti*). The substratum of the reason is not the substratum of that which is determined by the determinant of a certain counterpositiveness. (The determinant of that which is to be established) is not the substratum of the state of being determinant indicated by that same counterpositiveness. **Understood** (*vivakṣitatvāt*), understood by the word 'non-counterpositive'.

In such inferences as 'it has absence of conjunction with monkey because it is a soul' the counterpositiveness which is determined by the state of being general absence of quality only can be taken by the expression 'such a counterpositiveness'; hence the state of being determinant of that counterpositiveness does not exist in the state of being absence of conjunction with monkey. Therefore there is no fault of too narrow application of the definition. This is the idea. The substratum of the reason is not the substratum of that which is qualified by a particular characteristic and the coexistence of that which is determined by the determinant of that which is to be established which is

दि. सामानाधिकरण्यस्य लघोर्निर्दुष्टस्य संभवेऽपि यथा संनिवेशे न वैयर्थ्य-मिति बोध्यम् । साध्यतावच्छेदकसंबन्धेन प्रतियोग्यनधिकरणत्वविव-क्षणेऽव्याप्तिमाशङ्कते **ननु** इति । **महाकालभेदविशिष्टघटाभावः** इति । अभावीयविशेषणताकालिकघटितसामानाधिकरण्यसंबन्धेन महाकालभेद-विशिष्टस्य घटस्याभाव इत्यर्थः । **महाकाले महाकालभेदाभावात्** इति । अभावीयविशेषणतासंबन्धेन महाकालभेदाभावादित्यर्थः । सामानाधिकरण्य-घटकीभूतविशेषणविशेष्यसंबन्धाभ्यां यत्र विशेषणविशेष्योभयसत्त्वं तत्रैव विशिष्टाधिकरणत्वोपगमादिति भावः । ननु महाकालमात्रवृत्तिविशेषणता-

D. different from that characteristic (is mentioned in the definition). Even though such faultless and logically simple (definition) is possible, still it is to be understood that there is no fault of uselessness in the definition as given.

When the non-substratum of the counterpositive (in the definition) is understood by the relation of the determinant of the state of being that which is to be established (the author) raises the possibility of the fault of too narrow application (with the words) **now it may be objected** (*nanu iti*). **The absence of jar qualified by the difference from infinite time** (*mahākāla-bhedaviśiṣṭaghaṭābhāvaḥ iti*). The absence is of the jar which is qualified by difference from infinite time by the relation of coexistence which is constituted by temporal relation in the form of the state of being qualifier of absence. This is the meaning. **Because in infinite time, there is no difference from infinite time** (*mahākāle mahākālabhedābhāvāt iti*). Because there is no mutual absence of infinite time (in infinite time) by the relation of the state of being the qualifier of absence. This is the meaning. This is because it is accepted that something is a qualified substratum only when both qualifier and qualificand exist by the relation of qualifier and qualificand which constitutes coexistence. This is the idea.

Now it may be objected that when (jar) is to be established by the relation of the state of being qualifier existing only in infinite

दि. संबन्धेन साध्यतायां महाकालान्यत्वविशिष्टघटाभावोऽपि न प्रतियोगि-व्यधिकरणस्तत्र तेन संबन्धेन महाकालान्यत्वविशिष्टघटाधिकरणाप्रसिद्धेरत आह **वस्तुतः** इति । अत्र प्रतियोगितावच्छेदकसंबन्धेन प्रतियोग्य-नधिकरणहेत्वधिकरणवृत्त्यभावीयसाध्यतावच्छेदकसंबन्धावच्छिन्नप्रतियोगिता-नवच्छेदकत्वघटितलक्षणकरणेऽपि 'कालो घटवान् कालपरिमाणात्' इत्या-दावव्याप्तिः तदवस्थैव साध्यतावच्छेदकसंबन्धावच्छिन्नतादृशप्रतियोगिताया अप्रसिद्धेरतः प्रतियोगिताधर्मिकोभयाभावपर्यन्तानुधावनम् । समवायेन वह्न्य-भावप्रतियोगितायां वह्नित्वावच्छिन्नत्वसत्त्वात् संयोगेन घटाभावप्रति-

D. time, the absence of jar which is qualified by difference from infinite time also is not non-co-existent in the substratum of its counterpositive. This is because there the substratum of the jar qualified by difference from infinite time by that relation is unestablished. Therefore the author says **in fact** (*vastutaḥ iti*). Even when it is defined that the state of being non-determinant of the counterpositiveness which is determined by the relation of the determinant of that which is to be established belongs to the absence, existing in the substratum of the reason which is not the substratum of its counterpositive by the relation of the determinant of counterpositiveness, still the fault of too narrow application (for the definition) would remain as before in such inference as 'time has jar because it (i.e. time) has dimension of time'. This is because the counterpositiveness which is determined by the relation of the determinant of that which is to be established is unestablished. Hence it is necessary to mention the absence of both the two things in the counterpositive.

In order to avoid the fault of too narrow application (for the definition) in such inferences as 'it has fire because of smoke' both the state of being determined by a particular relation and by a particular characteristic are included (in the definition) because in the counterpositiveness of the absence of fire determined by the relation of inherence, the state of being determined by fireness

दि॰ योगितायां साध्यतावच्छेदकसंयोगावच्छिन्नत्वस्य सत्त्वात् 'वह्निमान् धूमात्' इत्यादावव्याप्तिवारणाय यत्संबन्धावच्छिन्नत्वयद्धर्मावच्छिन्नत्वयोर्निवेशः । संयोगेन घटाभावप्रतियोगितायां धूमत्वावच्छिन्नत्वघटितोभयाभावात्त्वादतिव्याप्तिवारणाय 'सामान्ये' इति । **अप्रसिद्धम्** इति । तथा चाव्याप्तिरिति भावः । यदि च 'कम्बुग्रीवादिमान्नास्ति' इत्यादौ कम्बुग्रीवादिमत्प्रतियोगिताकाभाव एव विषयो न तु कम्बुग्रीवादिमत्त्वे तत्प्रतियोगितावच्छेदकत्वमपीत्युच्यते तदा यत्किंचिद्घटवत्यपि 'कम्बुग्रीवादिमान् नास्ति' इति वाक्यस्य प्रामाण्यापत्तिरिति हृदि निधाय **संक्षेपः** इति ।

D. exists and in the counterpositiveness of the absence of jar determined by the relation of conjunction, the state of being determined by the relation of conjunction which is the determinant of the state of being that which is to be established exists. In order to avoid overextension (in such inferences as 'it has smoke because it has fire') owing to the fact that there exists the absence of two things in which is included the state of being determined by smokeness in the counterpositiveness of the absence of jar by the relation of conjunction, the expression 'in general' is used.

Unestablished (*aprasiddham iti*). Therefore there is the fault of too narrow application (for the definition). This is the idea. If in such statements as 'there is the absence of a thing having a conch-like neck etc.' the object is the absence the counterpositive of which is something having a conch-like neck etc. and not the state of being the determinant of that counterpositiveness in the state of having conch-like neck etc., then it would come about that with reference to something which has jar one can validly use the sentence 'it has the absence of something which has conch-like neck' etc. Keeping this in mind (it is said) **this is the summary** (*saṃkṣepaḥ iti*).

Commentary

(p.127, ln 3 – p.128, ln 1; p.137, ln 1 – p.139, ln 2) First of all an objection is raised against the provisional definition of invariable concomitance; the objection is that the definition suffers from the fault of too narrow application. This is because when invariable concomitance is defined as the absence of the relation of the reason with anything other than that which is to be established, there would be the fault of too narrow application if the *sādhya* is something which is universally affirmative (*kevalānvayī*).[1] As for instance in such inferences as 'this is knowable because it is nameable (*idaṃ jñeyaṃ vācyatvāt*)' the *sādhya* is knowability (*jñeyatva*) and this is a universally affirmative characteristic, because knowability exists in everything, since everything is knowable at least for God. Therefore that which is different from that which has *sādhya* (*sādhyavadanya,* i.e. here, *jñeyatvavadanya)* is unestablished.

Besides take an inference such as 'it has existence because it has universal'. Here universal (*sāmānya*) is *sādhyavadanya* since according to Vaiśeṣika it has no existence by the relation of inherence. But in this universal there is no occurrence of anything by the relation of inherence which is the relation of the determinant of the state of being reason. Hence in the case of the valid inference 'it has existence because it has universal', the given definition of invariable concomitance cannot be applied. Therefore another definition of invariable concomitance is given.

Here Dinakara points out the reason why Muktāvalīkāra raises a second objection against the provisional definition of invariable concomitance. When the *sādhya* is a characteristic which is universally affirmative, there can be no doubt about its existence in anything whatever. And doubt about the existence of *sādhya* is subjectness (*pakṣatā*) according to the old Naiyāyikas. Therefore since there is no subjectness here, there cannot be any inferential knowledge either. Hence if there is no real inferential

[1] Rāmarudra defines a *kevalānvayihetu* as *bhedapratiyogitānavacchedaka.*

knowledge when the *sādhya* is universally affirmative, no objection can be raised against the provisional definition of invariable concomitance because the definition cannot be applied if the *sādhya* is universally affirmative. Therefore Muktāvalīkāra points out a further objection against the provisional definition of invariable concomitance. Such is the opinion of Dinakara.

Further, if there is absence of the knowledge that the reason is universally affirmative then inferential knowledge arises only from erroneous knowledge of invariable concomitance. Now as Parikṣīt Thampurān points out (S., p.154, ln 6) the nature of a valid reason is to produce inferential knowledge without any erroneous knowledge of invariable concomitance. This is not possible in the case of reasons which are universally affirmative.

But according to Rāmarudra, Muktāvalīkāra raises the second objection because the established theory of the Naiyāyikas is that subjectness is the absence of certainty of that which is to be established qualified by the absence of desire to establish that something (*siṣādhayiṣāvirahaviśiṣṭasiddhyabhāvaḥ pakṣatā*). And such a kind of subjectness is present even when the *sādhya* is universally affirmative. And so no objection can be raised against this. Therefore Rāmarudra points out that Muktāvalīkāra raises the second objection because of the opinion of the Mīmāṃsakas who do not admit an inference in which the *sādhya* is universally affirmative.

It should further be noted that Dinakara has a relatively long discussion on the nature of this second objection. First of all he points out that by the word *ādi* in M. text *sattāvān jāter-ityādau* inferences such as 'the mountain has quality because it has a jar (*parvato guṇavān ghaṭāt*)' and so on are included. Here conjunction is the relation of the determinant of the state of being reason. And by this relation nothing exists in the substratum of the absence of quality such as universal etc. Therefore occurrence (*vṛttitā*) by the relation of conjunction in the substratum of the absence of quality is not established. For this reason also the provisional definition of invariable concomitance suffers from the fault of too narrow application.

Now Dinakara raises an objection. The objection is that the interpretation of the provisional definition of invariable concomitance with reference to the two inferences 'it has existence because it has universal' and 'it has quality because it has jar', is not appropriate. This is because the meaning of the definition is the state of being indicator of the mutual absence of the substratum of *sādhya* which (i.e. mutual absence) does not occur in the substratum of the reason (*svādhikaraṇāvṛttisādhya-vadanyonyābhāvakatvam*)[1]. This just means that *sādhyavada-nyonyābhāva* does not exist in the substratum of the reason. Only such a reason is valid. In such inferences as 'it has existence because it has universal', the substratum of reason is only substance, quality and movement (*dravya, guṇa, karma*). All these three are also substrata of the *sādhya* i.e. existence. Hence there is no *sādhyavadanyonyābhāva* in these three. Therefore the given definition of invariable concomitance can be applied.

Such an objection cannot be admitted. This is because in such inferences as 'it has fire because it has smoke', the mutual absence of the substratum of fire exists in the substratum of smoke by relation of temporality. Therefore the definition has the fault of too narrow application. To avoid this fault we have to hold that the non-occurrence of the mutual absence in the substratum of the reason is by the relation which determines the state of being the hindering factor for the knowledge of the state of being that which has that which is to be established (*sādhya-vattāgrahavirodhitāniyāmakasaṃbandhena anyonyābhāvsya avṛtti-tvam avaśyam vivakṣaṇīyam*). In that case however in such inferences as 'it has absence of existence, because it has absence of universal (*sattābhāvavān jātyabhāvāt*)', there would be the fault of too narrow application. This is because in the substratum of the absence of the universal nothing occurs by the

[1] This compound means *yasya hetoḥ adhikaraṇe avṛttiḥ sādhyavadanyonyā-bhāvaḥ saḥ hetuḥ svādhikaraṇāvṛttisādhyavadanyonyābhāvakaḥ* i.e. *sādhya-vadanyonyābhāvaṃ nirūpayati.* In other words the particular reason in the substratum of which there is no mutual absence of that which has *sādhya* indicates (*nirūpayati*) the mutual absence of that which has *sādhya* which (absence) does not exist in the substratum of the reason.

relation of inherence which is the relation which determines the state of being the hindering factor for the knowledge of the state of being that which has that which is to be established (*sādhya-vattāgrahavirodhitāniyāmakasaṃbandha*).

Nor can it be further argued that in such inferences as 'it has existence because it has universal', the knowledge of invariable concomitance in the form *svādhikaraṇāvṛttisādhyavadanyonyā-bhāvakatva* is the cause of inferential knowledge, and in such inferences as 'it has absence of existence because it has the absence of the universal', the knowledge of invariable concomitance in the form *sādhyavadanyāvṛttitva* is the cause. This is because in that case there would be the fault of too narrow application for both definitions of invariable concomitance, in such inferences as 'knowledge has the absence of jar by the relation of conjunction because it has jar by the relation of having object (*jñānam saṃyogasaṃbandhena ghaṭābhāvavat viṣayitāsaṃbandhena ghaṭāt*)'. Here in knowledge which is the substratum of the reason by the relation of *viṣayitā*, nothing occurs by the relation of conjunction which is the *sādhya-vattāgrahavirodhitāniyāmakasaṃbandha*. Hence the definition of invariable concomitance as *svādhikaraṇāvṛttisādhyavadanyo-nyābhāvakatva* cannot be applied. When *sādhyavadanyāvṛttitva* is taken as the definition of invariable concomitance, then also there is the fault of too narrow application. This is because in this inference *sādhya* is *ghaṭābhāva* and the *sādhyavadanya* i.e. *ghaṭābhāvavadanya* is *ghaṭavadbhūtalam*. In this i.e. in *ghaṭavadbhūtalam*, nothing exists by the relation of *viṣayitā* which is the *hetutāvacchedakasaṃbandha*.

By these arguments it has been shown that the definition of invariable concomitance as *sādhyavadanyāvṛttitva* has the fault of too narrow application. Therefore the definition of invariable concomitance as accepted in the school (*siddhānta-vyāpti*) is now given. The co-occurrence of the reason with that which is to be established which is not a counterpositive of the absence that exists in that which has the reason is called invariable concomitance. This definition can be explained as

follows: take an absence which exists in that which has the reason. The *sādhya* is not the counterpositive of such an absence. The co-occurrence of the reason with such a *sādhya* is invariable concomitance. As for example in the inference 'mountain has fire because of smoke', the *sādhya* viz. fire is not the counterpositive of the absence of jar etc. which exists on the mountain which is the substratum of the reason viz. smoke. The co-occurrence of such a *sādhya* with the reason is invariable concomitance.[1]

(p.128, lns 1–7; p.139, ln 2 – p.140, ln 1) Against this definition of invariable concomitance, an objection can be raised as follows: take the case of the inference 'mountain has fire because of smoke'. Here although mountain has fire, still it has the absence of the particular instances of fire such as fire as existing in the kitchen, fire as existing in the courtyard etc. Therefore fire is the counterpositive of the absence existing in the mountain. Hence the given definition of invariable concomitance suffers from the fault of too narrow application. In order to answer this objection it cannot be argued that the fire and the smoke which coexist in the same substratum have invariable concomitance. This is because even in that case it can

[1] Here Parīkṣit Thampurān discusses what the meaning of *aikādhikaraṇyam* is. *ekam* means *abhinnam*, i.e. not different. So the substratum of that which is not different is *ekādhikaraṇa*, its *bhāva* (nature) is *aikādhikaraṇyam*. Or secondly *vṛttyasādharaṇadharmavadadhikaraṇam yasya saḥ*, that which has occurrence as the specific quality, is *ekādhikaraṇa* and its nature is *aikādhikaraṇyam*. Here the word *sādhya* means by implication *sādhyādhikaraṇam*. The meaning of the instrumental case is counterpositiveness and this is semantically connected with *bheda* in the expression *bhedābhāva* or in the second interpretation, the instrumental case in *sādhyena* means *nirūpitatvam* which is semantically connected with *vṛttitva*. In this case the word *eka* means *asādhāraṇadharmavat*. The genitive case in *yasya* means *nirūpitatva* which is semantically connected with *adhikaraṇatva*. Therefore the meaning is *sādhyādhikaraṇapratiyogika-bhedābhāvavat* or *sādhyādhikaraṇavṛttyasādhāraṇadharmavat*. The verbal knowledge arising from the compound word is *sādhyādhikaraṇābhinnādhi-karaṇavṛttitvam*, or *sādhyādhikaraṇavṛttyasādhāraṇadharmavadadhikaraṇa-vṛttitvam*. In fact, since the other parts do not have any special purpose the definition can be taken as *sādhyādhikaraṇavṛttitva* (S.,p.154, ln 20 – p.155, ln 6).

be argued that there could be the absence of two things of which one is that particular fire. This means that although there is fire in the mountain, still on the mountain there is an *ubhayābhāva* (absence of two things e.g. mountain fire and jar) the counter-positive of which is mountain fire also which is not different from fire. It cannot also be argued that there is no such thing as *ubhayābhāva* (absence of two things). This is because of our uncontradicted experience that although there is one thing, there is the absence of that thing together with another thing.

Further in the same instance of inference also there is the fault of too narrow application because of the absence of the qualified (*viśiṣṭābhāva)* i.e. even on the mountain which has fire, there is the absence of fire qualified by the state of being related to kitchen (*mahānasīyatvaviśiṣṭavahnyabhāva*).[1]

But these objections may be answered in the following way: the absence which exists on the substratum of the reason is to be understood as that absence the counterpositiveness of which is not determined by the state of being qualified and by a characteristic which occurs simultaneously in many things (*vaiśiṣṭyavyāsajjyavṛttidharmānavacchinnapratiyogitākatvenābhāva-viśeṣaṇānnāvyāptiḥ*). This just means that the absence on the substratum of the reason should not be an instance of *ubhayābhāva* or *viśiṣṭābhāva.*

Therefore another instance of a valid inference where the given definition of invariable concomitance cannot be applied, is given. Such an inference is 'earth has quality because it is a substance'. Here the earth has the quality of smell, still it does not have other qualities such as oiliness etc. Therefore the substratum of the reason, viz. substanceness, is also the substratum of the absence of the *sādhya*, viz. quality in the form of oiliness

[1] Here it may be asked what is the difference between *tattadvahnyabhāva* and *mahānasīyavahnyabhāva*, since *mahānasīyavahnyabhāva* is also an instance of *tattadvahnyabhāva*. The difference between these two *abhāvas* is that in *tattad-vahnyabhāva*, *tadvyakti* which is the counterpositive of the absence is cognized *svarūpataḥ*, i.e. its *pratiyogitāvacchedaka*, viz. *tattadvyaktitvam* is not cognized. In the case of *mahānasīyavahnyabhāva* the *pratiyogin* is *mahānasīyavahni* and the *pratiyogitāvacchedaka* is *mahānasīyatva* and *vahnitva* which are cognized.

etc. Hence there is the fault of too narrow application of the definition. Here the idea is that the reason is only one and so there is coexistence of substanceness with every instance of *sādhya* in the form of qualities. So substanceness has the invariable concomitance of quality. Therefore one cannot argue as in the case of the inference 'mountain has fire because of smoke' that the invariable concomitance is only between mountain smoke and mountain fire. Hence there is the fault of too narrow application in the case of the inference 'earth has quality because it is a substance', even if invariable concomitance is accepted only between those things which coexist on the same substratum.[1]

Because of these difficulties the given definition of invariable concomitance is made more exact as follows: invariable concomitance is the co-ocurrence of that which is determined by that which is the determinant of the state of being that which is to be established (*sādhyatāvacchedaka*) which is not the determinant of the counterpositiveness of the absence existing on the substratum of the reason (*pratiyogitānavacchedakaṃ yat sādhyatāvacchedakaṃ tadavacchinnasāmānādhikaraṇyaṃ vyāptiḥ*). Here it may be noted that *sādhyatāvacchedakāvacchinnasāmānādhikaraṇyam* means *sādhyatāvacchedakāvacchinnasya sādhyasya sāmānādhikaraṇyam.*[2]

[1] Here an objection which Parīkṣit Thampurān raises and the answer which he gives may be noted. The objection is that the plural number existing in all substances is not the counterpositive of the absence existing in the substratum of the reason. Therefore there is no too narrow application of the definition. Nor can it be argued that the notion of the addition which is the cause of that plural number cannot arise in any person. This is because *yogis* can have such a knowledge. Thampurān answers this objection poiniting out that all substances which are the material causes of that plural number do not exist at the same time. Therefore such a plural number is imaginary (S., p.155, lns 10–13).

[2] The idea here is *sādhyatāvacchedakāvacchinna* can be many different realities like *sādhya, pratiyogitā, viṣayatā* etc., i.e. *sādhya* is *sādhyatāvacchedakāvacchinna*, so also *sādhyābhāvapratiyogitā* is also *sādhyatāvacchedakāvacchinnā* etc. Here however we take only *sādhyatāvacchedakāvacchinnasādhya* which has *sāmānādhikaraṇya* with the *hetu.*

When in this way the definition is made more exact, there is also no fault of too narrow application even in the case of the inference 'earth has quality because it is a substance'. This is because qualityness is not the determinant of the counterpositiveness of the absence which exists in the substratum of substanceness *(guṇatvaṃ dravyatvādhikaraṇaniṣṭhābhāvapratiyogitāvacchedakaṃ na bhavati).*

Rāmarudra draws out the more exact implications of this definition of invariable concomitance. First of all he points out that even when the definition is made more exact in the way mentioned above, still the fault of too narrow application cannot be avoided. This is because on the mountain where there is fire there is also the absence of fire related to kitchen (*hetvadhikaraṇaparvatādau mahānasīyavahnyabhāvo'sti*). Hence the determinant of the counterpositiveness of such an absence is fireness as qualified by the state of being related with kitchen.

In order to avoid this fault, it may be argued that not being a determinant of the counterpositiveness of absence means not being the substratum of the state of being a determinant by the relation of collective extensity *(anavacchedakatva* means *avacchedakatāparyāptyanadhikaraṇatva).* The relation of the collective extensity of the state of being determinant exists in both *vahnitva* and *mahānasīyatva* (the state of being related to kitchen) together and not in any one of these individuals separately. Therefore there is no *avacchedakatā* in *vahnitva* alone by the relation of *paryāpti*. Hence *vahnitva* is not the determinant of the counterpositiveness of the absence existing on the mountain. Therefore there is no fault of too narrow application.

But this argument also cannot be admitted. This is because of the general principle that if a characteristic does not exist in one of the two things, the same characteristic cannot be said to exist in both the things together. Hence when both *mahānasīyatva* and *vahnitva* are the substrata of *avacchedakatā* by the relation of collective extensity, then each one of them is necessarily also the substratum of *avacchedakatā*.

Nor can such an argument be refuted by a counter-argument as follows: let it be that there is *avacchedakatā* in *mahānasīyatva* and *vahnitva* individually. But still *avacchedakatā* is understood as a collectively existent characteristic (*vyāsajyavṛttidharma*). Now just as one of the two things has the mutual absence of both the things[1], so also the mutual absence of that which is determined by the state of being determinant by the relation of *paryāpti* (*paryāptisaṃbandhena avacchedakatvāvacchinnabheda*) exists in *vahnitva*. This means that mutual absence of *avacchedaka* (*hetvadhikaraṇavṛttyabhāvapratiyogitāvacchedaka*) exists in one of the two things, viz. *vahnitva*. Hence the definition does not suffer from the fault of too narrow application.

But such a counter-argument is false. The reason is that in that case there would be overextension in invalid inferences such as '*mahānasīyavahnimān dhūmāt*'. This is obviously a false inference since on the mountain there is the absence of *mahānasīyavahni* though there is smoke there. But the mutual absence of both *mahānasīyatva* and *vahnitva* (*mahānasīyatva-vahnitvobhayapratiyogikānyonyābhāva*) exists in the individuals *mahānasīyatva* and *vahnitva* which are *sādhyatāvacchedakas*. Therefore the determinant of the state of being that which is to be established (*sādhyatāvacchedaka*) is not the determinant of the counterpositiveness (*pratiyogitānavacchedaka*). Hence there is overextension.

This cannot be admitted. The meaning of the definition is to be understood as follows: the determinant of the state of being determinant of that which is to be established by the relation of collective extensity (*sādhyatāvacchedakatāparyāptyavacchedaka*) is not the determinant of the collectively existing state of being determinant of the absence which exists on the substratum of the reason (*hetusamānādhikaraṇābhāva-*

[1] Here the concept of *ubhayabheda*, i.e. mutual absence of both, is to be understood carefully. Take two things *ghaṭa* and *paṭa*. In *ghaṭa* there is the mutual absence of both *ghaṭa* and *paṭa*, i.e. *ghaṭe ghaṭapaṭobhayapratiyogikānyonyābhāvaḥ vartate*. Similarly here in *vahnitva* there is *mahānasīyatvavahnitvobhaya-pratiyogikānyonyābhāva*. Therefore *vahnitva* is *pratiyogitānavacchedaka*. Hence the argument is that the definition is valid. This is the idea.

pratiyogitāvacchedakatāparyāptyanavacchedaka). It is true that in such inferences as 'it has fire because of smoke', the state of being determinant of the state of being that which is to be established (*sādhytāvacchedakatā*) existing in *vahnitva* is not determined by any characteristic. Still the determinant of the collectively existing state of being determinant of that which is to be established is the state of being that individual (*tad-vyaktitva*) existing in fireness. And this state of being that individual is not the determinant of the collectively existing state of being determinant of the counterpositiveness of the absence of *mahānasīyavahni* existing on the mountain. This is because the relation of collective extensity which exists in many things cannot be the determining relation of a characteristic which exists only in one thing; otherwise such expressions as *ākāśau* would become valid.[1]

Against this it cannot be argued that in the expression such as *ghaṭapaṭau*, the characteristic (*tadvyaktitva*) which exists only in a particular individual jar is grasped as the determinant of *dvitvaparyāpti* which exists in jar and cloth. This is because where the determinant of subjectness (*uddeśyatā-vacchedaka*) is a characteristic in only one individual, there *dvitvaparyāptyavacchedakatā* is not apprehended in the determinant of subjectness. As for example in the expression *ākāśau, ākāśatva* is not accepted as *dvitvaparyāptyavacchedaka* because *ākāśatva* exists only in *ākāśa*[2]. Here the *dvitvaparyāptyavacchedaka* is *mahānasīyatvavahnitvobhayatva*. Therefore there is no fault of too narrow application. Nor is there any overextension in such

[1] The idea here is that *ākāśatva* exists only in *ākāśa* and therefore it is an *ekamātra-vṛttidharma*. And an *ekamātravṛttidharma* cannot be accepted as existing by the relation of *dvitvaparyāpti*. Otherwise there could be the usage of *ākāśau* since *ghaṭākāśagatadvitvaparyāpti* exists also in *ākāśa*. *ghaṭākāśagatadvitva-paryāpti* is both in *ghaṭa* and *ākāśa*. Therefore *ghaṭākāśagatadvitvaparyā-ptyavacchedaka* is *ghaṭākāśobhayatva* and not *ākāśatva* alone. If *ākāśatva* alone were the *paryāptyavacchedaka* then there could be the usage *ākāśau*.

[2] Here Parīkṣit Thampurān (S., p.156, ln 3) corrects *dvitvaparyāptyanava-cchedakatvasya* as *dvitvapartyāptyavacchedakatvasya*. This correction is hard to explain and so the text as it stands is accepted.

inferences as 'mountain has fire related to kitchen because it has smoke (*parvato mahānasīyavahnimān dhūmāt*)'. This is because *sādhyatāvacchedakatāparyāptyavacchedaka* is *dvitva* existing in *mahānāsīyatva* and *vahnitva* and that *dvitva* is not different from the *dvitva* which is *pratiyogitāvacchedakatāparyāptyavacchedaka,* since there is the absence of *mahānasīyavahni* on the mountain. Hence the definition is not applied there.

Other Naiyāyikas however hold that the supposed fault of the possibility of a too narrow application in such inferences as 'there is fire because of smoke' is avoided when the counterpositiveness of the absence which exists in the substratum of the reason is understood as not determined by both the determinant of *sādhyatā* and something other than the determinant of *sādhyatā.* The counterpositiveness of *mahānasīyavahnyabhāva* is determined by *vahnitva* and *mahānasīyatva. mahānasīyatva* is different from *vahnitva.* Therefore the absence of *mahānasīyavahni* cannot be taken; only the absence of jar and so on can be taken as part of the definition of invariable concomitance.

When the reason has the fault of deviation, then there should be the absence of *sādhya* on the substratum of the reason. Then only the definition of invariable concomitance would become valid and therefore the expression *taditara* is used in the definition. Thus in false inferences such as '*mahānasīyavahnimān dhūmāt*', the counterpositiveness of the *mahānasīyavahni* is determined by *mahānasīyavahnitva* which is *sādhyatāvacchedaka.* Therefore it is not determined by *sādhyatāvacchedaka* and something other than *sādhyatāvacchedaka.* Hence the definition is valid.

The expression *sādhyatāvacchedaka* is used in order that with reference to valid reasons, there should be the counterpositiveness which is not determined by both *sādhyatāvacchedaka* and *taditara.* In other words if it is stated that the counterpositiveness of absence is determined by *taditara,* only then absence of jar cannot be taken, since here the counterpositiveness of this absence is determined by jarness which is other than (*taditara*) the determinant of that which is to be established (viz. fireness).

Now an objection may be raised as follows: even in valid inferences such as *vahnimān dhūmāt,* the absence of *tadvahnivṛttitvaviśiṣṭavahnitvavān nāsti (mahānasīyavahnivṛttitvaviśiṣṭavahnitvavān nāsti)* can be taken as *hetusamānādhikaraṇābhāva* and therefore there is the impossibility of the application of the definition in case of any valid reason. This is because the *sādhyatāvacchedaka* (i.e.*vahnitva)* is itself the *abhāvapratiyogitāvacchedaka (vahnitva*).[1]

In order to avoid this fault, it may be asserted that the state of being the determinant of the counterpositiveness of the absence (*abhāvapratiyogitāvacchedakatā*) in the definition is understood as not determined by any characteristic (*niravacchinnā*).[2] Nor can it be argued that in that case in invalid inferences such as 'it has that which has fireness because it has mountain-ness (*vahnitvavadvān parvatatvāt*)', there would be overextension. This is because here the *sādhyatāvacchedakatā* in *vahnitva* is determined by *vahnitvatva*; therefore it is not *niravcchinnā*. Therefore *sādhyābhāva* cannot be taken as *hetusamānādhikaraṇābhāva*; only *ghaṭābhāva* etc. can be taken as *hetusamānādhikaraṇābhāva* and therefore there would be the fault of overextension.

This cannot be admitted because invariable concomitance is different according to the difference of the determinant of *sādhyatā (sādhyatāvacchedakatādibhedena vyāpter bhinnatayā)*. Therefore only in the case of *niravacchinnasādhyatāvacchedaka* the *pratiyogitāvacchedakatā* is understood as not determined by

[1] Here it may be noted that in *tadvahnivṛttitvaviśiṣṭavahnitvavān nāsti*, the *abhāvapratiyogitāvacchedaka* is *vahnitva* only. *tadvahnivṛttitva* is only a qualifer to *vahnitva* and so it is only *abhāvapratiyogitāvacchedakatāvacchedaka.* In *mahānasīyavahnimān nāsti*, *mahānasīyatva* like *vahnitva* is also *abhāvapratiyogitāvacchedaka* because *mahānasīyatva* is qualifier to *vahni* (and not to *vahnitva*). This is the difference.

[2] The point of the argument here is that the *abhāvapratiyogitāvacchedaktā* in the case of *tadvahnivṛttitvaviśiṣṭavahnitvavān nasti*, is *vahnitvatvāvacchinnā* and therefore it is (*sāvcchinnā*); hence if *niravacchinnatva* is given as a qualifier to *abhāvapratiyogitāvacchedakatā*, then *tadvahnivṛttitvaviśiṣṭavahnitvavān nāsti* cannot be taken as an instance of *hetusamānādhikaraṇābhāva*.

any characteristic. Hence in the invalid inference *vahnitvavadvān parvatatvāt*, the *sādhyatāvacchedakatā* is not *niravacchinnā* and so the *abhāvapratiyogitāvacchedakatā* also cannot be *niravacchinnā*. Therefore *vahnitvavadabhāva* which is *sādhyābhāva* can be taken as *hetusamānādhikaraṇābhāva*. Hence there is no fault of overextension.

In that case it may be objected that there would be the fault of too narrow application. This is because in valid inferences such as *vahnitvavadvān dhūmāt*, one could take *tadvahnivṛttitvaviśiṣṭavahnitvavān nāsti* as *hetusamānādhikaraṇābhāva*.

This argument also cannot be admitted. The reason is that in the definition where the *sādhyatāvacchedakatā* is *sāvacchinnā*, the *pratiyogitāvacchedakatā* is not determined by both *sādhyatāvacchedakatāvacchedaka* and something other than that. Therefore there is no fault of too narrow application because the *pratiyogitāvacchedakatā* in the case of *tadvahnivṛttitvavān nāsti* is determined by both, viz. *sādhyatāvacchedakatāvacchedaka*, *i.e. vahnitvatva* and something other than that i.e. *tadvahnivṛttitva*.

But then there would be further objection in the following way: in such instances as *prameyavadvān vācyatvāt*, where *sādhyatāvacchedaka* is *prameya*, something other than *prameya* is not established and hence there would be the fault of too narrow application. But if the expression *sādhyatāvacchedakataditarobhayānavacchinnatva* is not used in this instance of inference, then also there would be the fault of too narrow application since *prameyavadghaṭābhāva* can be taken as *hetusamānādhikaraṇābhāva*.

This also cannot be admitted because in valid inferences such as '*daṇḍimān daṇḍisaṃyogāt*', *daṇḍī* is *sādhya*, *daṇḍa* is *sādhytāvacchedaka*, but in order to avoid the fault of too narrow application *daṇḍatva* is taken as *sādhyatāvacchedaka* by indirect relation (*paraṃparāsaṃbandha*). Similarly *prameyatva* is here considered as *sādhyatāvacchedaka* by indirect relation. It is only something other than *prameya* is unestablished but something other than *prameyatva* is established. Therefore there is no fault of too narrow application.

(p.128, ln 7 – p.129, ln 7; p.140, ln 1 – p.141, ln 4) Another objection is raised against the accepted definition. This objection is based on the inference 'it has that which has universal which is pervaded by colourness because it is earth (*rūpatvavyāpya-jātimadvān pṛthivītvāt*)'. In this inference the *sādhya* is *rūpatva-vyāpyajātimat*; *rūpatvavyāpyajātis* are *śuklatva, nīlatva* and so on; those which have such *rūptvavyāpyajātis* are such colours as white, blue and so on. Hence the *sādhya* is white colour or any other colour. And therefore the determinants of those which have to be established (*sādhyatāvacchedakas*) are whiteness and so on which are universals pervaded by the universal colourness (*rūpatvavyāpyajātayaḥ*). But then they can also be the determinants of the counterpositiveness of the absence which exists in blue jar and so on which are also the substrata of the reason *pṛthivītva*. In this manner the *sādhyatāvacchedaka* becomes *pratiyogitā-vacchedaka* and so there is the fault of too narrow application.

The objection is rejected because here it is considered that the *sādhyatāvacchedaka* is not *rūpatvavyāpyajāti*, i.e. *śuklatva* and so on but by indirect relation *rūpatvavyāpyajātitva* is the *sādhya-tāvacchedaka*. Here it may be noted that *rūpatvavyāpyajātitva* exists in such *rūpatvavyāpyajātis* as *śuklatva, nīlatva* and so on. Further Dinakara points out that indirect relation means *svāśrayasamavāyasaṃbandha* i.e. *rūpatvavyāpyajātitva* exists in its *āśraya* (substratum) i.e. *rūpatvavyāpyajāti* such as *śuklatva* and so on and *śuklatva* exists in *śukla* by the relation of *samavāya*. And *śukla* and so on are *sādhyas*. Now nowhere in earth there is the absence the counterpositive of which is determined by that characteristic (i.e. *rūpatvavyāpyajātitva*) by indirect relation. This is because in earth there is always some kind of colour; and this colour is always *rūpatvavyāpyajātimat*.

Rāmarudra gives the reason why Dinakara gives such an explanation. Even though *rūpatvavyāpyajātitva* by indirect relation is accepted as *sādhyatāvacchedaka*, still by direct relation the absence of that which is qualified by *rūpatvavyāpyajātitva* (viz.

śuklatva, pītatva and so on) exists in earth.[1] Therefore *sādhyatāvacchedaka* becomes *pratiyogitāvacchedaka* and so the fault of too narrow application remains. Hence Dinakara points out that *abhāvapratiyogitāvacchedaka* is by indirect relation *nīlatvatva* and so on. *jātitva* is different from *nīlatvatva* and so on and it is the *sādhyatāvacchedaka.* Therefore there is no fault of too narrow application.

The idea expressed here is the following: in the inference 'it has colour because it is earth (*rūpavān pṛthvītvāt*)' by the relation of inherence, there is in earth the absence of knowledge[2] which is qualified by colourness by the relation of the state of having object (*viṣayitā*). Therefore there is the fault of too narrow application. To avoid this fault *pratiyogitāvacchedakatā* is understood as determined by the relation of *sādhyatāvacchedakatāvacchedaka* which is inherence in the inference *rūpavān pṛthivitvāt.* The absence of the knowledge of colourness which (knowledge) is qualified by colourness by the relation of *viṣayitā,* exists in earth. But the absence of colour which is qualified by colourness by the relation of inherence which is *sādhyatāvacchedakatāvacchedakasaṃbandha* does not exist in earth. Therefore there is no fault of too narrow application. Similarly in the inference *rūpatvavyāpyajātimadvān pṛthvītvāt,* the absence of *pratiyogitāvacchedakatā* qualified by that *paraṃparāsaṃbandha* (i.e. *svāśrayasamavāyasaṃbandha*) exists in *sādhyatāvacchedaka,* viz. *rūpatva.* Therefore there is no fault of too narrow application.

[1] In non-technical language this just means that in an instance of earth such as jar which is *śukla* etc., *śuklatva* etc. do not exist directly in jar but they exist in *śukla* etc. and *śuklatva* etc. exist directly in *śukla* etc. Therefore *śuklatva* etc. exist in the earth by indirect relation (*svāśrayasamavāyasaṃbandha*). Hence we can assert that there is the absence of *śuklatva* etc. in jar by direct relation.

[2] Here again in non-technical language this means that knowledge exists by inherence only in the soul and therefore there is the absence of knowledge in earth by the relation of inherence.

Another answer to this objection is the following:[1] the nature of invariable concomitance is different according to the difference in *sādhya* etc. Therefore in the inference *rūpatva-vyāpyajātimadvān pṛthivītvāt,* the form of invariable concomitance is that the determinant of the state of being determinant of that which is to be established is not the determinant of the state of being determinant of counterpositiveness of the absence existing in the substratum of the reason (*sādhyatāvacchedakatāvacchedakaṃ hetusamānādhikaraṇābhāvapratiyogitāvacchedakatānavacchedakaṃ*). Here the *sādhyatāvacchedakatāvacchedaka* is *rūpatvavyāpyajātitva* and this is not the *abhāvapratiyogitāvacchedaktāvacchedaka* (i.e. *śuklatvatva* etc.). This is because in the earth there is no absence of that which has universal pervaded by colourness and which is determined by the characteristic of universal (*rūpatvavyāpyajātitvāvacchinnajātimān pṛthivyāṃ nāsti iti pratītyabhāvaḥ).*[2] Therefore there is no fault of too narrow application.

Dinakara gives a more precise meaning for the expression 'because of the difference of invariable concomitance (*vyāpterbhedāt*)'. According to him this expression means because of the difference in the causality of the knowledge of invariable concomitance. Rāmarudra further explains how the difference in the causality of invariable concomitance comes about. Sometimes the inferential knowledge is in the form *rūpatva-vyāpyajātimān* (i.e. *śuklatvādijātimān*); sometimes inferential knowledge is in the form *rūpatvavyāpyajātimadvān* (*śuklādi-rūpavān*). Here it may be noted that in both cases the inferential knowledge is in the form that something is white and so on in colour. But the *sādhyatāvacchedakasaṃbandhas* are different:

[1] This answer is at length treated with another example in *Dīdhiti & Gādādharī*, pp. 310–17, Cfr. also *Jāgadīśī*, pp. 210–13.

[2] This expression is to be understood as follows: *rūpatvavyāpyajātis* are *nīlatvādijātis*. *rūpatvavyāpyajātitva* is that general characteristic which is present in all *jātis* such as *nīlatva* etc. The absence, the determinant of the state of being determinant of the counterpositiveness of which is such a characteristic does not exist in earth. In non-technical language this means that there is no absence of colour in earth.

in the first form of inference it is *svāśrayasamavāyasaṃbanda* and in the second it is *samavāyasaṃbandha.* In the first form of inferential knowledge i.e. *rūpatvavyāpyajātimān, jātitva* is apprehended as *sādhyatāvacchedaka* by indirect relation[1] and so the cause of such an inferential knowledge can only be the knowledge of invariable concomitance in which *sādhyatāvacchedaka* is indirectly *pratiyogitānavacchedka.*

In the second form of inferential knowledge, i.e. *rūpatvavyāpyajātimadvān,* the *sādhyatāvacchedakatāvacchedaka* is *jātitva*[2] and for this inferential knowledge, the cause is the knowledge of invariable concomitance in the form that the *sādhyatāvacchedakatāvacchedaka* is not *pratiyogitāvacchedakatāvacchedaka.* Hence in this way when Muktāvalīkāra speaks of the difference of invariable concomitance, he really means difference in the causality of the knowledge of invariable concomitance. Therefore the expression in M. *sādhyādibhedena* means *sādhyatāvacchedakasādhanatāvacchedakabhedena.*

Dinakara further points out that one can avoid the fault of too narrow application in the way mentioned earlier, i.e. by accepting that *rūpatvavyāpyajātitva* is indirectly the *sādhyatāvacchedaka.* When this is the case, there is no need of accepting another way to avoid the fault of too narrow application by stating that the *sādhyatāvacchedakatāvacchedka* is *pratiyogitāvacchedakatānavacchedaka.* The reason is that in that case there would be cumbersomeness in the determinant of the causality of inference. This is because the cause of inferential knowledge would then be the knowledge in the form that the determinant of the state of being determinant of the state of being that which is to be established *(sādhyatāvacchedakatāvacchedaka)* is not the

[1] Here the idea is *rūpatvavyāpyajātimat* is the *sādhya* and therefore *rūpatvavyāpyajātimattvam* which is the same as *rūpatvavyāpyajāti* is *sādhyatāvacchedaka. jātitva* exists in *jāti* and so it is also considered by *paraṃparāsaṃbandha* as *sādhyatāvacchedaka.*

[2] In this inference *rūpatvavyāpyajātimadvān, rūpatvavyāpyajātimat* is the *sādhya* and so *rūpatvavyāpyajātimattva* is *sādhyatāvacchedaka* and *rūpatvavyāpyajātimattva* is the same as *rūpatvavyāpyajāti.* Therefore *rūpatvavyāpyajātitva* is *sādhyatāvacchedakatāvacchedaka.*

determinant of the state of being determinant of counterpositiveness of the absence (*pratiyogitāvacchedakatānavacchedaka*) and this is cumbersome.

Nor can it be objected that if the previous way of avoiding the fault of too narrow application is accepted, then the form of the inference would be *jātimān pṛthivītvāt* and not *jātimadvān pṛthivītvāt*. This objection cannot be admitted because if *pṛthivītva* is the reason, then it is true that the form of the inferential knowledge would be only *jātimān*. But if we take *tadvyaktitva* as the reason then the form of the inferential knowledge is *jātimadvān*. Thus there is nothing wrong in avoiding the fault of too narrow application in the way mentioned earlier. Hence to accept a cumbersome way of avoiding the fault of too narrow application is incongruous. This is shown by the expression *vadanti* (they say) in M.

(p.129, ln 7 – p.130, ln 3; p.141, ln 4 – p.142, ln 5) Now the discussion is on the nature of the substratum of the reason in the definition of invariable concomitance. The substratum of the reason should be understood as the substratum of that reason which is really qualified by the determinant of the state of being reason (*hetutāvaccedakeṇa viśiṣṭasya adhikaraṇam*). Because of this there is no fault of too narrow application in such inferences as 'it is a substance because it has existence which is qualified by the difference from that existence which exists in quality and movement (*dravyaṃ guṇakarmānyatvaviśiṣṭasattvāt*)'. Otherwise there would be the fault of too narrow application because there is no difference between qualified existence and pure existence and so substanceness is the counterpositive of the absence which exists in quality and movement which are the substrata of pure existence.

But when it is stated that the substratum of the reason (*hetvadhikaraṇa*) is the substratum of the reason qualified by the determinant of the state of being the reason (*hetutāva-cchedakaviśiṣṭasyādhikaraṇa*), then the determinant of the state of being reason (*hetutāvacchedaka*) is the state of being existence qualified by difference from that existence which exists in quality and movement (*guṇakarmānyatvaviśiṣṭasattātva*) and not

the state of being pure existence (*śuddhasttātva*). The substratum of qualified existence is only substance and not quality and movement. And in substance there is no absence of substanceness, but only of jar and so on. Therefore the counterpositive of that absence is not substanceness. Hence there is no fault of too narrow application.

Now Dinakara remarks[1] that it is not correct that Muktāvalīkāra raises the objection of too narrow application in such inferences as 'it has existence which is qualified by the difference from that existence which exists in quality and movement'. The reason for Dinakara's objection is that if the relation of the state of being substratum indicated by that which is qualified (i.e. qualified existence *viśiṣṭanirūpitādhikaraṇatā*) is accepted as the relation of the determinant of the state of being reason (*hetutāvacchedakasaṃbandha*), then by this relation quality and action are not the substrata of existence. If on the other hand inherence is accepted as the relation of the determinant of the state of being reason, then in such inferences as 'it is a substance because it has existence which is qualified by the difference from that existence which exists in quality and movement' there is deviation. This is because qualified existence and pure existence are the same and pure existence exists in quality and movement. Therefore qualified existence also exists in quality and movement. But in quality and movement there is no substanceness which is the *sādhya*. Hence there is deviation and so there is no fault of too narrow application.

Dinakara himself gives an answer to this objection. Deviation is that the determinant of the state of being reason is the determinant of the occurrence in that which has the absence of that which is to be established (*sādhyābhāvavadvṛttitāva-cchedakahetutāvacchedakasyaiva vyabhicārapadārthatā*). Therefore if inherence is accepted as the relation of the determinant of the state of being the reason, then there is no fault of deviation for the

[1] This objection raised by Dinakara seems to be taken from *Māthurīvyāpti-pañcaka*, p. 38. (*Tattvacintāmaṇi*, Vol. II, Part I).

reason *viśiṣṭasattā* because *dravyaguṇakarmānyatvaviśiṣṭasattā-tvaviśiṣṭasattā* exists only in *dravya* and not in *guṇa* and *karma*.

Against this answer, it cannot be further objected that *viśiṣṭasattā* and *śuddhasattā* are the same and so *viśiṣṭasattā* qualified by *viśiṣṭasattātva* which is the determinant of the state of being reason exists in quality also. Therefore the fault of too narrow application cannot be avoided even if it is stated that *hetvadhikaraṇa* is *hetutāvacchedakaviśiṣṭahetvadhikaraṇa*.

The answer to this objection is that the *hetutāvacchedaka-viśiṣṭādhikaraṇatva* is defined as the state of being substratum which is indicated by occurrence determined by the determinant of the state of being reason (*hetutāvacchedakāvacchinnādheyatā-nirūpitiādhikaraṇatā*). Here *hetutāvacchedka* is *viśiṣṭasattātva* and *viśiṣṭasattātvāvacchinnādhikaraṇatānirūpitādheyatā* exists only in *viśiṣṭasattā* which exists in *dravya* alone. Further *viśiṣṭasattātva* is not the determinant of the occurrence indicated by the state of being substratum which occurs in quality. Therefore the state of being substratum indicated by the occurrence which is determined by *viśiṣṭasattātva* does not exist in quality and movement. Therefore there is no fault of too narrow application.

Now Rāmarudra raises a possible objection against Dinakara's position and answers it. If *viśiṣṭanirūpitādhāratā* is accepted as *hetutāvacchedakasaṃbandha* then by this relation *sattā* exists only in *dravya*. Therefore *viśiṣṭasattā* should not be mentioned as reason but only *sattā*. Hence if in this case *viśiṣṭasattā* is taken as the reason, then there is the fault of useless qualification (*vyarthaviśeṣaṇa*).[1]

The answer to this objection is the following: according to the objection the relation between *śuddhasattā* and its

[1] *vyarthaviśeṣaṇa* will lead to the fault of *vyāpyatvāsiddhi*. This is explained in the section on fallacy: *nīladhūmatvādikam gurutayā na hetutāvacchedakam svasamānādhikaraṇavyāpyatāvacchedakadharmāntarāghaṭitasyaiva vyāpyatā-vacchedakatvāt*. M., p. 347, ln 13 – p.348, ln 2. *hetusamānādhikaranābhāva-pratiyogitāvacchedakam yat sādhyatāvacchedakaṃ tadavacchinnaṃ sāmānādhi-karaṇyāvacchedakahetutāvacchedakavattvaṃ vyāptipadārthaḥ*. Therefore *nīla-dhūmatva* is not *hetutāvacchedaka* but only *dhūmatva*.

substratum is *viśiṣṭanirūpitādhāratā*. But this is not acceptable because *śuddhasattā* and its substratum are related by the relation in the form of *śuddhasattānirūpitādhāratā* and not *viśiṣṭasattānirūpitādhāratā*. In this way there is no fault of useless qualification.

But another difficulty arises: if *viśiṣṭanirūpitādhikaraṇatā* is accepted as *hetutāvacchedakasaṃbandha,* then by stating *hetvadhikaraṇa* along with the mention of *hetutāvacchedakasaṃbandha* (i.e. *viśiṣṭanirūpitādhāratā*), the fault of too narrow application mentioned earlier can be avoided. Therefore the qualification of *hetutāvacchedakaviśiṣṭādhikaraṇa* as stated in M. is useless. This is because by the relation of *viśiṣṭanirūpitādhāratā*, *viśiṣṭasattā* exists only in substance and not in quality and movement. Hence inherence is mentioned as the *hetutāvacchedakasaṃbandha* in order to show that the qualification of *hetutāvacchedakviśiṣṭahetvadhikaraṇa* is not useless.

Now Rāmarudra points out that even if inherence is accepted as the *hetutāvacchedakasaṃbandha,* there would be no fault of deviation. This is because *sādhyābhāvavadvṛttitva* is not accepted as the nature of deviation, but deviation is the state of being substratum of the determinant of the state of being reason which is the determinant of the occurrence which is determined by the relation of the determinant of the state of being reason and which is indicated by the substratum of the absence of that which is to be established (*sādhyābhāvavannirūpitatatsaṃbandhāvacchinnādheyatāvacchedakahetutāvacchedakavattvam eva vyabhicāraḥ*). Therefore there is no fault of deviation if *viśiṣṭasattā* is accepted as the reason.

Further in the definition, the expression *hetusamānādhikaraṇa,* the substratum of the reason should be known by the relation of the determinant the state of being the reason (*hetutāvacchedakasaṃbandha*); otherwise there would be the fault of too narrow application in such inferences as 'hill has fire because it has smoke'. Here the substratum of the reason can be taken as the parts of smoke by the relation of inherence. But in them there is also the absence of fire. Therefore there is the fault of too narrow application.

When, however, *hetvadhikaraṇa* is taken by the relation of *hetutāvacchedakasaṃbandha*, then there is no fault of too narrow application, because in the example the *hetutāvacchedakasaṃbandha* is conjunction and not inherence. By the relation of conjunction smoke does not exist in its parts; by such a relation it exists only in hill and so on where there is also fire. Hence there is no fault of too narrow application.

(p.130, ln 3 – p.132, ln 4; p.142, ln 6 – p.144, ln 8) In the definition of invariable concomitance there is the expression 'the absolute absence which occurs in the same substratum of the reason (*hetusamānādhikaraṇātyantābhāva*)'. Now the discussion is on the precise meaning of this expression. First of all it should be noted that the absence should be understood as not occurring along with its counterpositive (*pratiyogivyadhikaraṇo'bhāvaḥ*).[1] This is because otherwise there would be the fault of too narrow application in such inferences as 'it has conjunction with a monkey because it is this tree'. In this inference treeness (*vṛkṣatva*) is the reason and its substratum is this tree. But in this tree though there is the conjunction of monkey on its branches, there is the absence of the conjunction of monkey on its roots. Therefore the conjunction of monkey is also the counterpositive of that absence. Hence there is the fault of too narrow application. When the absence in the substratum of the reason is taken as not occurring along with its counterpositive, then the absence of the conjunction of monkey on the roots of the tree cannot be taken. This is because this absence of monkey on the roots of the tree occurs along with its counterpositive on the same substratum, tree. Therefore there is no fault of too narrow application.

[1] Here Rāmarudra points out that the expression *pratiyogivyadhikaraṇatva* is to be taken as the qualification of the reason and not of absence. And the *pratiyogivyadhikaraṇatva* is *pratiyogyanadhikaraṇavṛttitva*. And *pratiyogyanadhikaraṇavṛttitvaviśiṣṭahetvadhikaraṇavṛttitva* is the qualification of *abhāva*. Therefore for the sake of simplicity it is stated *pratiyogyanadhikaraṇahetvadhikaraṇavṛttitva* as the qualification of *abhāva*. Rāmarudra thinks that this is the intention of Muktāvalīkāra.

Now the discussion is on the precise meaning of the expression 'not occurring in the same substratum as of the reason (*pratiyogivyadhikaraṇatva*)', i.e. *hetvadhikaraṇavṛttyabhāva* should be *pratiyogivyadhikaraṇa*. One meaning of the expression *pratiyogivyadhikaraṇatva* is *pratiyogyanadhikaraṇavṛttitva*, i.e. occurrence on something which is not the substratum of the counterpositive of the absence. But if this meaning is accepted, then there would be the same fault of too narrow application. The reason is that the absence of the conjunction of monkey in quality is the same as the absence of the conjunction of monkey on the roots of the tree since difference in absence is not accepted according to the difference in the substrata of the absence. Therefore the *sādhya* of the inference viz. conjunction of monkey becomes the counterpositive of the absence existing on the substratum of the reason. Hence there is the fault of too narrow application.

Another meaning of the expression *pratiyogivyadhikaraṇatva* is *pratiyogyadhikaraṇāvṛttitva*, i.e. non-occurrence of the absence on the substratum of the counterpositive of the same absence.[1] But when this meaning is accepted there would be the

[1] Dinakara takes the expression *pratiyogyadhikaraṇāvṛttitva* in the sense of *pratiyogyadhikaraṇavṛttibhinnatva*. The reason for this is given by Parīkṣit Thampurān (S., p.157, lns 16–17) as follows: in the opinion of Sārvabhauma there is no co-occurrence of the conjunction of monkey with the absence of the conjunction of monkey existing in quality. But there is the co-occurrence of the conjunction of monkey with the absence of conjunction of monkey existing in the tree. Therefore the absence of the co-occurrence existing in the absence of the conjunction of monkey is of non-pervasive occurrence. Hence the absence of co-occurrence with the conjunction of monkey which is of non-pervasive occurrence exists in the absence of the conjunction of monkey. Therefore even though *pratiyogivyadhikaraṇatva* in the form of *pratiyogyadhikaraṇavṛttitvābhāva* is included in the definition, the fault of too narrow application cannot be avoided. This is because *pratiyogyadhikaraṇavṛttitvābhāva* which is *avyāpyavṛtti* exists in *kapisaṃyogābhāva*. Therefore in the place of *pratiyogyadhikaraṇavṛttitvābhāva*, *pratiyogyadhikaraṇavṛttibhinnatva* in the form of mutual absence is accepted as the meaning of *pratiyogivyadhikaraṇatva* because mutual absence is of pervasive occurrence. Therefore the *kapisaṃyogābhāva* which is in quality is not different from the *kapisaṃyogābhāva* which is *pratiyogyadhikaraṇavṛtti* in substance. Therefore the *kapisaṃyogābhāva* is not different from that *kapisaṃyogābhāva* which exists in the

fault of overextension in such false inferences as 'this has conjunction because it has existence (*saṃyogī sattvāt*)'. The reason is that the absence of conjunction in quality exists also in substance. But the absence of conjunction in substance is not *pratiyogyadhikaraṇāvṛtti* but *pratiyogyadhikaraṇavṛtti,* since absence of conjunction in substance is *avyāpyavṛtti.* Therefore the absence of conjunction in quality is also *pratiyogyadhikaraṇa-vṛtti.* Hence conjunction being *sādhya,* the absence of conjunction which is the absence of *sādhya* cannot be taken as *hetvadhi-karaṇavṛttyabhāva.* So there occurs the fault of overextension.

Therefore the expression *pratiyogivyadhikaraṇatva* cannot be taken in these two meanings because of the faults mentioned. Hence the real meaning of the expression *pratiyogivyadhi-karaṇahetvadhikaraṇavṛttyabhāva* in the definition is given as *hetvadhikaraṇe pratiyogyanadhikaraṇavṛttitvaviśiṣṭābhāva,* i.e., the absence in the substratum of the reason which (absence) is qualified by the occurrence in something which is not the substratum of the counterpositive. The more precise meaning is *svapratiyogyanadhikaraṇībhūtahetvadhikaraṇavṛttyabhāva,* i.e. the absence existing in the substratum of the reason which (substratum) is not the substratum of the counterpositive of the absence. The idea is that the substratum of the reason should be different from the substratum of the counterpositive.[1] The reason for making the definition more precise in this way is given by Dinakara. If *hetvadhikaraṇavṛttitva* is not included in the definition of invariable concomitance then in such inferences as *sattāvān jāteḥ,* there would be the fault of too narrow application. This is because *sattābhāva* is also *pratiyogivyadhikaraṇābhāva* since *sattābhāva* does not exist where there is *sattā.* When the

substratum of its counterpositive. Hence the *kapisaṃyogābhāva* is not *prati-yogivyadhikaraṇa.* Therefore there is no fault of too narrow application in the opinion of Sārvabhauma also.

[1] It may be noted here that there are two theories on the nature of absence. According to some Naiyāyikas like Sārvabhauma there is no difference of absence because of the difference in substratum (*adhikaraṇabhedenāhāva-bhedābhāva*). The discussion here is based on this theory. Some other Naiyāyikas hold that there is difference of absence because of difference in substratum.

expression *hetvadhikaraṇavṛttitva* is included in the definition, *sattābhāva* cannot be taken since *sattābhāva* does not exist in the substratum of the reason *jāti* (universal). Hence there is no fault of too narrow application.

But if *pratiyogivyadhikaraṇatva* is defined as *hetvadhikaraṇe pratiyogyanadhikaraṇavṛttitvaviśiṣṭa*, then the expression *hetusamānādhikaraṇa* is useless because then *sattābhāva* cannot be taken as *pratiyogivyadhikaraṇa,* when it is defined in this way. This is the reason why M. gives a more precise meaning for the expression *pratiyogivyadhikaraṇahetusamānādhikaranābhāva* in the form of *svapratiyogyanadhikaraṇībhūtahetvadhikaraṇavṛttyabhāva.* Therefore there is no fault of useless qualification because after including the qualification of *hetusamānādhikaraṇatva*, this precise *pratiyogivaiyadhikaraṇya* is applied.[1]

The expression 'the state of not being the substratum of the counterpositive (*pratiyogyanadhikaraṇatva*)' means the state of not being the substratum of that which is determined by the determinant of counterpositiveness (*pratiyogitāvacchedakāvacchinnānadhikaraṇatva*). This means that even one instance of the counterpositive should not exist in the substratum of the reason. Such a precise meaning is given because otherwise in such false inferences as 'it has qualified existence because it has universal (*viśiṣṭasattāvān jāteḥ*)', there would be the fault of overextension. This is because there is no difference between qualified existence (*viśiṣṭasattā*) and pure existence (*śuddhasattā*). Hence the counterpositive of the absence of qualified existence is also pure existence. But there is pure existence in quality and movement. Therefore the substratum (i.e. quality

[1] Rāmarudra however thinks that *pratiyogivyadhikaraṇatva* is the qualification of the reason and not of absence as mentioned by Muktāvalīkāra. *pratiyogivyadhikaraṇatva* is *pratiyogyanadhikakaraṇavṛttitva* and *pratiyogyanadhikaraṇavṛttitvaviśiṣṭahetvadhikaranavṛttitva* is the qualification of absence. Therefore for simplicity *pratiyogyanadhikaraṇahetvadhikaraṇavṛttitva* is the qualification of absence in the definition of invariable concomitance.

But Parīkṣit Thampurān thinks that in that case the Muktāvalīkāra would have stated *hetuśca* and not *abhāvaśca*. The idea is that Rāmarudra may not be right.

and movement) of the reason, is the substratum of the counterpositive viz. pure existence. Therefore the absence of *viśiṣṭasattā* is not an absence existing in something other than the substratum of the counterpositive which (something other than the substratum) is the substratum of the reason (*pratiyogyanadhikaraṇībhūtahetvadhikaraṇavṛttyabhāva*). Therefore another absence like the absence of jar is to be taken. And here the determinant of counterpositiveness would be jarness and so on. The state of being qualified existence (*viśiṣṭasattātva)* which is the determinant of that which is to be established (*sādhyatāvacchedaka)* would be different from this (*pratiyogitāvacchedaka*). Therefore there would be the fault of overextension.

When *pratiyogivyadhikaraṇatva* is qualified by *pratiyogitāvacchedakāvacchinnānadhikaraṇatva* such a fault of overextension is avoided. This is because though there is no difference between qualified existence and pure existence, the state of being substratum indicated by the occurrence determined by *viśiṣṭasattātva (viśiṣṭasattātvāvacchinnādhyetānirūpitādhikaraṇatā*) does not exist in quality and movement. Therefore the substratum of that which is qualified by *viśiṣṭasattātva* is only substance. And *pratiyogitāvacchedakāvacchinnānadhikaraṇas* are quality and movement which are substrata of the reason.[1] Therefore *viśiṣṭasattābhāva* can be taken as *pratiyogyanadhikaraṇībhūtahetvadhikaraṇavṛttyabhāva*. And hence there is no fault of overextension.

Further, the state of not being the substratum of the counterpositive (*pratiyogyanadhikaraṇatva)* is to be understood by the relation of the determinant of the state of being that which is to be established (*sādhyatāvacchedakasaṃbandhena*). Otherwise there would be overextension in such false inferences as 'it has knowledge because it has existence (*jñānavān sattvāt*)'. This is because knowledge exists in jar and so on by the relation of the

[1] Here it should be noted that quality and movement are *pratiyogitāvacchedakāvacchinnānadhikaraṇa*. This is because only *viśiṣṭasattātva* is the *pratiyogitāvacchedaka* of *viśiṣṭasattābhāva*, although *viśiṣṭasattā* and *śuddhasattā* are one. Hence the *pratiyogitāvacchedakatāparyāptyadhikaraṇa* is only *viśiṣṭasattātva* and not *sattātva* also.

state of being object (*viṣayatāsaṃbandha*) and not by *sādhyatāvacchedakasaṃbandha* which is inherence. Therefore the absence of knowledge is not *pratiyogyanadhikaraṇahetvadhikaraṇavṛtti.* Hence some other absence should be taken. So the definition also can be applied. Therefore there is the fault of overextension.

But when it is stated that *pratiyogyanadhikaraṇatva* should be by *sādhyatāvacchedakasaṃbandha*, then there is no such fault of overextension. This is because in jar and so on there is no knowledge by *sādhyatāvacchedakasaṃbandha* which is inherence. Hence as *pratiyogyanadhikaraṇahetvadhikaraṇavṛttyabhāva*, it is possible to take *jñānābhāva*. Hence *sādhyatāvacchedaka* will be *pratiyogitāvacchedaka* and so there is no fault of overextension.

Now it may be objected that it is enough to state that the state of being non-substratum of its counterpositive be by the relation of the determinant of its counterpositiveness. The point of the objection is that the counterpositive of absence here is knowledge and it exists in the soul by the relation of inherence. Therefore *pratiyogitāvacchedakasaṃbandha* is inherence. And by this relation in jar and so on there is absence of knowledge which is *pratiyogyanadhikaraṇahetvadhikaraṇavṛtti.* Therefore this absence can be taken and its counterpositive is knowledge which is the *sādhya*. Hence there is no fault of overextension.

The answer to this objection is that in this way in such false inferences as *jñānavān sattvāt*, the fault of overextension may be avoided. But then there would be the fault of too narrow application in such valid inferences as 'there is fire because of smoke'. This is because if we take the absence of fire by the relation of inherence, then the *pratiyogitāvaccheakasaṃbandha* is inherence. The *hetvadhikaraṇa* which is mountain is not by this relation *pratiyogyadhikaraṇa* and so *pratiyogyanadhikaraṇahetvadhikaraṇavṛttyabhāva* is absence of fire by the relation of inherence. Therefore *vahnitva* is *pratiyogitāvacchedaka* and it is also *sādhyatāvacchedaka.* Hence *sādhyatāvacchedaka* is not different from *pratiyogitāvacchedaka.* Therefore there is the fault of too narrow application.

But when it is stated that *pratiyogyanadhikaraṇatva* should be by the relation of *sādhyatāvcchedka* no such fault arises. This is because here the *sādhyatāvacchedakasaṃbandha* is conjunction. By this relation the *hetvadhikaraṇa* which is the mountain is not *pratiyogyanadhikaraṇa.* Therefore we cannot take the absence of fire by the relation of inherence as *pratiyogyanadhikaraṇa-hetvadhikaraṇavṛttyabhāva* since *sādhyatāvacchedakasaṃbandha* is not inherence. Hence there is no fault of too narrow application.

Further Dinakara points out that if counterpositiveness of absence is said to be determined by *sādhyatāvacchedakasaṃbandha* then there is no fault of too narrow application in such valid inferences as 'there is fire because of smoke' by taking the absence of fire by inherence. This is because the counterpositiveness of the absence of fire by inherence is not determined by the *sādhyatāvacchedakasaṃbandha* which is conjunction. Therefore *samavāyena vahnyabhāva* cannot be taken as *pratiyogyanadhikaraṇahetvadhikaraṇavṛttyabhāva.* Therefore there is no fault of too narrow application.

But it should be noted that in this solution there is cumbersomeness. The reason is that at first *pratiyoigitāvacchedaka-saṃbandha* is used with reference to *pratiyogyanadhikaraṇa* and then *sādhyatāvacchedakasaṃbandha* is used with reference to *hetusamānādhikarṇābhāvīyapratiyogitā.* In other words in the definition of invariable concomitance *pratiyogivyadhikaraṇa-hetusamānādhikaraṇābhāva, pratiyogivyadhikaraṇa* is to be taken by *pratiyogitāvacchedakasaṃbandha* and *abhāvapratiyogitā-vacchedakasaṃbandha* will be *sādhyatāvacchedakasaṃbandha.* In this way two relations are made use of for *pratiyogitā* itself and this is cumbersome.

Now Rāmarudra raises certain problems concerning the accepted doctrine in M. that the state of not being the substratum of the counterpositive (*pratiyogyanadhikaraṇahetvadhikaraṇa-tvam*) is to be understood by the relation of the determinant of the state of being that which is to be established (*sādhyatāva-cchedakasaṃbandhena*). First of all he raises the objection that in valid inferences such as 'there is fire because of smoke' if the

sādhya, viz. fire is taken by the relation of conjunction whose adjunct is fire (*vahnipratiyogikasaṃyogena)*, then even absence of jar cannot be taken as *pratiyogyanadhikaraṇahetusamānādhikaraṇābhāva*. The reason is that by this relation the substratum of jar is unestablished; in other words jar never exists by *vahnipratiyogikasaṃyoga*; by *vahnipratiyogikasaṃyoga* only fire can exist.

In order to avoid this difficulty one cannot take *tattadvahnivyaktyabhāva,* i.e. absence of individual instances of fire, e.g. fire existing in kitchen and so on. This is because it is necessary to hold that the state of being the determinant of counterpositiveness (*pratiyogitāvacchedakatā*) should be determined by the relation of the determinant of the state of being determinant of the state of being that which is to be established (*sādhyatāvacchedakatāvacchedakasaṃbandha*). Otherwise in such valid inferences as 'it has colour because it is earth (*rūpavān pṛthvītvāt*)' there would be the fault of too narrow application. This is because there is in earth the absence of that thing, viz. knowledge which is the substratum of colourness by the relation of the state of being object (*viṣayitā*). In other words in earth there is the absence of that thing viz. knowledge which has *rūpatva* by the relation of *viṣayitā*.[1] Therefore colourness which is the *sādhyatāvacchedaka* is also *pratiyogitāvacchedaka.* Hence there is the fault of too narrow application.

Therefore when it is stated that *pratiyogitāvacchedakatā* should be determined by *sādhyatāvacchedakatāvacchedakasaṃbandha*, then *tadvyaktyabhāva* cannot be taken as *pratiyogivyadhikaraṇābhāva.* This is because the *pratiyogitāvacchedakatā* in *tadvyaktitva* is not determined by *sādhyatāvacchedakatāvacchedakasaṃbandha* which is *samavāya* but by *svarūpasaṃbandha.*[2]

[1] Here it may be noted that the substratum of *rūpatva* by the relation of *viṣayitā* is knowledge. Although the absence here is the absence of knowledge, still we do not speak of the absence of knowledge, but of the absence of *rūpatvavān*. This is because the *avyāpti* can be shown only when *rūpatva* is *abhāvapratiyogitāvacchedaka* and not when *jñānatva* is *abhāvapratiyogitāvacchedaka.*

[2] Here it may be noted that *tadvyaktitva* is not a universal or a substance etc. and so it cannot exist by *samavāyasaṃbandha*. It is an *akhaṇḍopādhi* and so it exists by *svarūpasaṃbandha.*

In order to avoid this difficulty one may propose as *pratiyogivyadhikaraṇābhāva*, the absence of that thing which is determined by the specific universal which is the determinant of the state of being produced by grass and so on (i.e. *tārṇatvāvacchinnasyābhāva*). Here the idea is that the *pratiyogitāvacchedakatā* is determined by *sādhyatāvacchedakatāsaṃbandha* which is *samavāya*. And therefore *pratiyogitāvacchedakatāvacchedakasaṃabandha* and *sādhyatāvacchedakatāvacchedakasaṃbandha* are the same.[1] And hence the definition of invariable concomitance can be applied in such valid inferences as *vahnimān dhūmāt*.

This also cannot be admitted. The reason is that even in such valid inferences as 'it has that colour because it has that taste (*tadrūpavān tadrasāt*)', the *sādhyatāvacchedakasaṃbandha* may be taken as *tadrūpapratiyogikasamavāya*. The substratum of the *sādhya* by this relation is established. Therefore *tadrūpābhāva* can be taken as *pratiyogyanadhikaraṇahetvadhikaraṇavṛttyabhāva* because in the same jar there is the absence of *tadrūpa* in the first moment of its existence. Therefore there remains the fault of too narrow application.

This argument cannot be admitted because particular kinds of relations such as *vahnipratiyogikasaṃyoga* and so on are not to be accepted. If on the contrary such relations are accepted then as *pratiyogyanadhikaraṇahetvadhikaraṇavṛttyabhāva* one can take that absence in the *sādhyatāvacchedakasaṃbandhasāmānya* (i.e. in the relation in general which is the *sādhyatāvacchedakasaṃbandha*) in which there is the absence of both *yadabhāvapratiyogitāvacchedakāvacchinnapratiyogikatva* (i.e. the state of being indicated by the adjunct of the *sādhyatāvacchedakasaṃbandha* which (adjunct) is the counterpositive of that absence) and *hetvadhikaraṇībhūtayatkiṃcidvyaktyanuyogikatva*

[1] Here the absence taken is the absence of fire produced by grass (*tāraṇatvāvacchinnapratiyogitākābhāva*). Here the *pratiyogitāvacchedakasaṃbandha* is *saṃyoga* but the *pratiyogitāvacchedakatāvacchedakasaṃbandha* is *samavāya*. And therefore the argument is that the *pratiyogitāvacchedakatāvacchedakasaṃbandha* is the same as *sādhyatāvacchedakatāvacchedakasaṃbandha*.

(i.e. the state of being indicated by any particular subjunct (of the *sādhyatāvacchedakasaṃbandha*) which (subjunct) is the substratum of the reason). Here it may be noted that in inferences such as 'mountain has fire because of smoke', the absence of jar and so on can be taken as *pratiyogyanadhikaraṇahetusamānādhikaraṇābhāva* because in the relation *vahnipratiyogikasaṃyoga* which is the *sādhyatāvacchedakasaṃbandha*, though there is the *hetvadhikaraṇībhūtayatkiṃcidvyaktyanuyogikatva*, there is no *ghaṭābhāvapratiyogikatva*. Therefore on the basis that although one is there both are not there (*ekasattve'pi dvayam nāstīti rītyā*) there is the absence of both (*ubhyābhāva*) in the *sādhyatāvacchedakasaṃbandha*.

In less technical language this means that we take as the *sādhyatāvacchedakasaṃbandhasāmānya* (here in the case of the inference 'there is fire because of smoke') *vahnipratiyogikasaṃyogasaṃbandha*. In such a relation, there is the absence of *ghaṭapratiyogikatva*. But there is *parvatānuyogikatva*. However since *ghaṭapratiyogikatva* is absent there, though there is *parvatānuyogikatva*, still there is the absence of both *ghaṭapratiyogikatva* and *parvatānuyogikatva* according to the principle *ekasattve'pi dvayaṃ nāsti.* Hence in the *sādhyatāvacchedakasaṃbandha*, i.e. *vahnipratiyogikasaṃyoga*, there is the absence of both. Therefore the absence, the *pratiyogikatva* of which is absent in the *sādhyatāvacchedakasaṃbandha*, viz. *vahnipratiyogikasaṃyoga,* is taken as the *pratiyogyanadhikaraṇahetvadhikaraṇavṛttyabhāva.* Such an absence is absence of jar because there is no *gaṭapratiyogikatva* in *vahnipratiyogikasaṃyoga*.

The word *sāmānya* is used to exclude the absence of fire as *pratiyogivyadhikaraṇābhāva*; otherwise in a particular conjunction of jar, as for instance, conjunction of jar with fire there is the absence of both. This is because though there is *vahnipratiyogikatva* there is no *hetvadhikarṇībhūtayatkiṃcidvyaktyanuyogikatva* (i.e. *parvatānuyogikatva*). Therefore the absence of fire also can be taken as *pratiyogivyadhikaraṇābhāva.* Hence there is the fault of too narrow application. When the expression

sāmānya is used that conjunction of fire can be taken where there is *vahnipratiyogikatva* e.g. conjunction of fire with mountain. Here there is also *hetvadhikarṇībhūtaparvatānuyogikatva*. Hence there is no absence of both in *vahnisaṃyoga* and so *vahnyabhāva* cannot be taken as *pratiyogivyadhikaraṇābhāva*.

The expression *yatkiṃcit* is used so that *sādhyābhāva* can be taken as *pratiyogivyadhikaraṇābhāva* in the invalid inferences such as 'there is smoke because of fire'. Hence hot iron ball can be taken as *hetvadhikaraṇa* where there is no conjunction of smoke. So in conjunction of smoke there is *dhūmapratiyogikatva* but not *hetvadhikarṇībhūtāyogolakarūpayatkiṃcidvyaktyanuyogikatva*. Hence there is the absence of both according to the principle *ekasattve'pi dvayaṃ nāsti*. Hence *dhūmābhāva* can be taken as *pratiyogivyadhikaraṇābhāva* in such invalid inferences as 'there is smoke because of fire'. Hence there is no fault of overextension.

In this way if inherence is accepted in a particular form (i.e. *vahnitvapratiyogikasamavāya* and so on), then there would be the fault of too narrow application. This is because where *vahnitva* is *sādhyatāvacchedaka* by the relation of *vahnitvapratiyogikasamavāya*, there the *pratiyogitāvacchedakatva* of the absence of jar and so on which are the *hetusamānādhikarṇābhāvas* is not determined by *sādhyatāvacchedakatāvacchedakasaṃbandha* which is *vahnitvapratiyogikasamavāya*. This is because jarness and so on do not exist by the relation of *vahnitvapratiyogikasamavāya*. Therefore *pratiyogitāvacchedakatva* by this relation is not established. And hence there is the fault of too narrow application.

In order to avoid this fault, it should not be stated that the *hetusamānādhikarṇābhāvapratiyogitāvacchedakatva* is by the relation of *sādhyatāvacchedakatāvacchedakasaṃbandha*. But it is stated only that the absence of *hetusamānādhikarṇābhāvīyapratiyogitāvacchedakatva* should be understood by the relation of selfsameness of the *avacchedakatva* which is determined by the *sādhyatāvacchedakatāvacchedakasaṃbandha*. By this particular relation (i.e. *sādhyatāvacchedakatāvacchedakasaṃbandhāvacchi-*

nnāvacchedakatvīyasvarūpasaṃbandha)[1] *pratiyogitāvacchedakatva* does not exist anywhere. Therefore there is the absence of *pratiyogitāvacchedakatā* in *vahnitva* also which is *sādhyatāvacchedaka*. Therefore there is no fault of too narrow application.

(p.132, ln 4 – p.134, ln 8; p.145, ln 1 – p.148, ln 2) Now a question is raised about the precise meaning of the words *pratiyogitāvacchedakāvacchinnānadhikaraṇa* in the expression *pratiyogitāvacchedakāvacchinnānadhikaraṇahetvadhikaraṇavṛttyabhāva*. The precise point of the question is whether as first alternative *pratiyogyanadhikaraṇatva* means *anadhikaraṇa* of any one of the *pratiyogitāvacchedakāvacchinna* (i.e. *pratiyogi*) or as second alternative *anadhikarṇa* of the *pratiyogitāvacchedakāvacchinna* in general.[2] As for instance if *ghaṭābhāvā* is taken as *pratiyogivyadhikaraṇābhāva* the *pratiyogitāvacchedakāvacchinna* could be any particular jar. Therefore the question is whether the *anadhikaraṇatva* is of any one particular jar or of jar in general (or jars). Or as third alternative the *anadhikaraṇatva* is of something which is determined by any one of the *pratiyogitāvacchedakas*. As for example if *śuklābhāva* is taken as *pratiyogivyadhikaraṇābhāva*, then, both *śuklatva* and *guṇatva* can be taken as *pratiyogitāvacchedakas* provided *śuklābhāva* is considered as *guṇābhāva*. And then the question is whether the *anadhikaraṇatva* is of something which is determined by any one of the *pratiyogitāvacchedakas* viz. *śuklatva* or *guṇatva*.

If the first alternative is accepted, then there would be the fault of too narrow application as before with reference to the valid inference 'it has conjunction with monkey because it is this tree'. This is because the conjunction with monkey not

[1] It is to be noted here that this particular relation is a *vyadhikaraṇa* relation of *pratiyogitāvacchedakatā* just as an instance of *saṃyoga* is *vyadhikaraṇa* relation of *dravyatva* (therefore *saṃyogena dravyatvam nāsti* is *kevalānvayī*). Absence of anything by such a *vyadhikkaraṇa* relation is universal positive (*kevalānvayī*).

[2] Here we speak of *anadhikaraṇa* of *pratiyogitāvacchedakāvacchinna*. The reason is that in such invalid inferences as *tadrūpavān pṛthvītvāt*, the *sādhya* is only one and therefore we cannot speak of all that which is *pratiyogitāvacchedakāvacchinna* with reference to *sādhyābhāva*.

existing in the tree is also determined by the determinant (i.e. *kapisaṃyogatva*) of counterpositiveness of the absence of conjunction with monkey. Therefore the *hetvadhikaraṇa* viz. the tree is *anadhikaraṇa* of that conjunction with monkey i.e. *vṛkṣāvṛttikapisaṃyoga*. Hence *kapisaṃyogābhāva* also is *pratiyogivyadhikaraṇābhāva*. Therefore there is the fault of too narrow application.

The idea here is that an absence which is not coexistent in *hetvadhikaraṇa* with the counterpositive is taken as *pratiyogivyadhikaraṇābhāva*. Therefore *kapisaṃyogābhāva* also is not coexistent in that tree with its counterpositive as *vṛkṣāvṛttikapisaṃyoga*, e.g. *gopuravṛttikapisaṃyoga*. So *kapisaṃyogābhāva* becomes *pratiyogivyadhikaraṇābhāva*. And so *kapisaṃyogatva is pratiyogitāvacchedaka* which is also *sādhyatāvacchedaka*. Therefore there is the fault of too narrow application.

If the second alternative is accepted then it would come about that no instance of an absence would be *pratiyogivyadhikaraṇābhāva*. This is because all instances of absence are coexistent with their counterpositives in the form of absence of its absence which (i.e. the first absence) is qualified by occurrence in the previous moment (*pūrvakṣaṇavṛttitvaviśiṣṭaghaṭābhāvasya abhāva*).

This may be explained as follows: take *ghaṭābhāva* that exists now. But *pūrvakṣaṇavṛttitvaviśiṣṭaghaṭābhāva* exists only in the previous moment and therefore its absence, viz. *pūrvakṣaṇavṛttitvaviśiṣṭaghaṭābhāvābhāva* exists everywhere except in *pūrvakṣaṇa*. Therefore *ghaṭābhāva* exists in *hetvadhikaraṇa* (mountain etc.) along with *pūrvakṣaṇavṛttitvaviśiṣṭaghaṭābhāvābhāva* which is also the *pratiyogī* of *ghaṭābhāva*.[1] Therefore

[1] The reason for this is that just as *ghaṭa* is the *pratiyogī* of *ghaṭābhāva* so also *ghaṭābhāvābhāva* is the *pratiyogī* of *ghaṭābhāva*. This is because where there is no *ghaṭa* there is *ghaṭābhāva* and therefore *ghaṭa* is *pratiyogī* of *ghaṭābhāva*. Similarly where there is no *ghaṭābhāvābhāva* there is *ghaṭābhāva* and so *ghaṭābhāvābhāva* is the *pratiyogī* of *ghaṭābhāva*. In other words where there is *ghaṭābhāva* there is neither *ghaṭa* nor *ghaṭābhāvābhāva* and therefore the *pratiyogīs* of *ghaṭābhāva* are both *ghaṭa* and *ghaṭābhāvābhāva*.

the *hetvadhikaraṇa* is not *pratiyogyanadhikaraṇa*. Hence *pratiyogyanadhikaraṇahetvadhikaraṇavṛttyabhāva* is not established.

Now Dinakara raises a possible objection and answers it. The objection is that *pūrvakṣaṇavṛttitvaviśiṣṭaghaṭābhāvābhāva* is the counterpositive of *pūrvakṣaṇavṛttitvaviśiṣṭaghaṭābhāva* and not of *ghaṭābhāva*. The answer is *pūrvakṣaṇavṛttitvaviśiṣṭaghaṭābhāvābhāvābhāva* and *pūrvakṣaṇavṛttitvaviśiṣṭaghaṭābhāva* are the same. Now *pūrvakṣaṇavṛttitvaviśiṣṭaghaṭābhāvābhāva* is the counterpositive of *pūrvakṣaṇavṛttitvaviśiṣṭaghaṭābhāvābhāvābhāva* and therefore it is the counterpositive of *pūrvakṣaṇavṛttitvaviśiṣṭaghaṭābhāva* also. Now since the qualified does not differ from the pure *pūrvakṣaṇavṛttitvaviśiṣṭaghaṭābhāva* is not different from *ghaṭābhāva*. Therefore *pūrvakṣaṇavṛttitvaviśiṣṭaghaṭābhāvābhāva* also is the counterpositive of *ghaṭābhāva*. In this way the *pratiyogivyadhikaraṇābhāva* is not established.

Now it may be argued that there is the possibility of *pratiyogivyadhikaraṇābhāva* in the following way: it is true that in such inferences as 'there is fire because of smoke', the mountain and so on are the substrata of the absence of jar and of the counterpositive of the absence of jar in the form of the absence of the absence of jar which (i.e. the first absence) is qualified by occurrence in the previous moment (*pūrvakṣaṇavṛttitvaviśiṣṭaghaṭābhāvābhāva*). However the mountain and so on are not the substrata of that counterpositive by the relation of *sādhyatāvacchedaka*. Therefore it is not proper to assert that *pratiyogivyadhikaraṇābhāva* is not established.

But *pratiyogivyadhikaraṇābhāva* can be shown to be unestablished in another way: the absence of fire existing in the absence of jar is accepted as identical with the absence of jar. Hence fire is also to be considered as the counterpositive of the absence of jar. Therefore mountain and so on which are the substrata of the reason are at the same time also the substrata of the counterpositive (viz. fire) of the absence of jar in the form of

Another way of arguing is that *ghaṭābhāvābhāva* is the same as *ghaṭa*. But some Naiyāyikas hold that *ghaṭābhāvābhāva* and *ghaṭa* are different because *abhāva* and *bhāva* are different categories.

the absence of fire. Hence absence of jar and its counterpositive in the form of fire coexist on the mountain. Therefore it is not possible to establish *pratiyogivyadhikaraṇābhāva*. Dinakara states that the argument is based on the assumption that an absence which has another absence as its substratum is not different from that substratum in the form of absence.

But this theory may be rejected for the following reason as Rāmarudra points out: if such a theory is accepted then in a place where there is the absence of jar and there itself there is also the presence of fire, then one should have the notion of the absence of fire. Similarly in a place where there is the absence of fire and there itself there is the presence of jar, one should have the notion of the absence of jar. This is impossible. Therefore absence of jar should be considered as different from the absence of fire. Hence it is not valid to assert that *pratiyogivyadhikaraṇābhāva* is not established.

If in this way it is accepted that the absence of fire existing in the absence of jar is different from the absence of jar, then another difficulty arises: in such inferences as 'it has absence of smoke because it has the absence of fire', there is the fault of too narrow application. The reason is that here the *sādhyatāvacchedakasaṃbandha* is *svarūpasaṃbandha* and by this relation the substratum of the reason is the substratum of the counterpositive of absence of jar in the form of *pūrvakṣaṇavṛttitvaviśiṣṭaghaṭābhāvābhāva*. In this way the *pratiyogivyadhikaraṇābhāva* remains unestablished.

If the third alternative that *pratiyogyanadhikaraṇatva* means the *anadhikaraṇatva* of something which is determined by any one of the *pratiyogitāvacchedakas*, the fault of too narrow application mentioned in the previous position can be avoided. This is because the substratum of the reason is not the substratum of that which is determined by jarness which is one particular determinant of counterpositiveness of the absence of jar. The idea here is that *ghaṭābhāva* has two *pratiyogitāvacchedakas* viz. *ghaṭatva* and *pūrvakṣaṇavṛttitvaviśiṣṭaghaṭābhāvābhāvatva*. Hence although in mountain and so on there is *pūrvakṣaṇavṛttitvaviśiṣṭaghaṭābhāvābhāvatvāvacchhinnapūrva-*

kṣaṇavṛttitvaviśiṣṭaghaṭābhāvābhāva, still there is absence of *ghaṭa* which is determined by one *pratiyogitāvacchedaka* viz. *ghaṭatva*. In this way *pratiyogivyadhikaraṇābhāva* is established.

But then another difficulty arises: there would be the fault of too narrow application in such inferences as 'it has absence of conjunction with monkey because it is a soul'. This is because of the following reason: the absence of *sādhya* which is the absence of the absence of conjunction with monkey existing in the soul is identical with conjunction with monkey. And conjunction with monkey is a quality. Therefore the determinant of the counterpositiveness of *kapisaṃyogābhāvābhāva* i.e. *sādhyābhāva* is *guṇasāmānyābhāvatva* also just as it is also *kapisaṃyogābhāvatva.* And the soul which is the substratum of the reason is not the substratum of *guṇasāmānyābhāva* which is qualified by *guṇasāmānyābhāvatva*. Hence *kapisaṃyogābhāvābhāva* which is the *sādhyābhāva* is *pratiyogivyadhikaraṇābhāva*. Therefore there is the fault of too narrow application.

Here it may be noted that the fault of too narrow application exists also in such inferences as *saṃyogābhāvavān ātmatvāt;* but in the opinion of old Naiyāyikas, the absence of conjunction in general does not exist in substance. Hence Muktāvalīkāra takes *kapisaṃyogābhāvavān ātmatvāt* as the example for the inference in which there is the fault of too narrow application.

Further it may be noted that if instead of the inference *kapisaṃyogābhāvavān ātmatvāt* the inference *kapisaṃyogābhāvavān ghaṭatvāt* is taken, then there would be no fault of too narrow application. This is because at the moment of origin, there is *guṇasāmānyābhāva* in jar. Hence the substratum of the reason, i.e. jar is not the non-substratum of *guṇasāmānyābhāva* which is qualified by one of the *pratiyogitāvacchedakas,* i.e. *guṇasāmānyābhāvatva.* Therefore *kapisaṃyogābhāvābhāva* cannot be *pratiyogivyadhikaraṇābhāva*. Hence there is no fault of too narrow application.

From all these it follows that the words *pratiyogitāvacchedakāvacchinnānadhikaraṇa* in the expression *pratiyogitāvacchedakāvcchinahetvadhikaraṇavṛttyabhāva* should not be

taken in any of the three senses discussed above. But the term *apratiyogi* in the whole definition of invariable concomitance should be understood in the following way: the substratum of the reason is not the substratum of that which is determined by the determinant of a particular counterpositiveness of the absence. And the *sādhyatāvacchedaka* is not the determinant of that counterpositiveness. Hence there is no fault of too narrow application in the inference *kapisaṃyogābhāvavān ātmatvāt* because by the expression *yādṛśapratiyogitā, guṇasāmānyābhāvatvāvacchinnapratiyogitā* can be taken. The determinant of this counterpositiveness is *guṇasāmānyābhāvatva* and this is not *sādhyatāvacchedaka* which is *kapisaṃyogābhāvatva.* Similarly in the inference *vahnimān dhūmāt, ghaṭatvāvacchinnapratiyogitā* can be taken as *yādṛśapratiyogitā.* The determinant of this counterpositiveness is *ghaṭatva* and this is not the *sādhyatāvacchedaka* which is *vahnitva.*

Here Dinakara points out that a simpler definition of invariable concomitance is also possible. The substratum of the reason is not the substratum of that which is qualified by a certain characteristic; the coexistence of the reason with that which is determined by *sādhyatāvacchedaka* which is different from that particular characteristic is invariable concomitance. This definition also has no faults; still this does not mean that the elaborate definition given earlier is useless.

Now Rāmarudra raises an objection against this position in the following way: there would be cumbersomeness in the definition since mutual absence of infinite number of *pratiyogitāvacchedakas* will have to be understood by the expression *pratiyogitāvacchedaka* because of the use of the expressions *yat* and *tat.* This objection is to be rejected because a logically complex property is not accepted as the determinant of counterpositiveness just as *kaṃbugrīvādimattva* is not accepted as the *pratiyogitāvacchedaka* of the absence of *kaṃbugrīvādimān.* Therefore the mutual absence of that which is determined by a logically complex property as for example *kaṃbugrīvādimattva* is not established. Therefore we will have to accept *pāribhā-*

ṣikāvacchedaka.[1] Hence there is cumbersomeness in both definitions. Therefore both definitions can be accepted.

(p.135, ln 1 – p.136, ln 5; p.148, ln 2 – p.150, ln 4) A final objection to the definition is as follows: even if *pratiyogyanadhikaraṇatva* is accepted by the *sādhyatāvacchedakasaṃbandha* as mentioned earlier, there would be the fault of too narrow application in such inferences as 'time has jar because it (time) has the dimension of time'. The reason is that with reference to this inference the absence which does not exist along with its counterpositive is unestablished. This is because infinite time which is the substratum of the reason is the substratum of the counterpositive of all absences by temporal relation which is the *sādhyatāvacchedakasaṃbandha*. The reason is that infinite time is the substratum of the universe of all things.

Certain Naiyāyikas answer this objection in the following way: the absence of jar qualified by the difference from infinite time should be here taken as *pratiyogivyadhikaraṇābhāva*. The reason is that although infinite time is the substratum of jar, it is not the substratum of the jar which is qualified by difference from infinite time. This means that in *mahākāla* there is no *mahākālabheda*. Therefore there cannot be also *mahākālabhedaviśiṣṭaghaṭa;* this is because here the *viśeṣaṇa* is absent and therefore the *viśiṣṭa* is also absent.

Here a question may arise: by what relation *mahākālabheda* exists in jar which is the counterpositive of the absence in the form of *mahākālabhedaviśiṣṭaghaṭābhāva*? Dinakara gives the answer that jar is qualified by the relation of *abhāvīyaviśeṣaṇatāghaṭitasāmānādhikaraṇya*. This means that *mahākālabheda* exists in *bhūtala* and so on by the relation of *abhāvīyaviśeṣaṇatā* and in *bhūtala* and so on *ghaṭa* exists. Hence there is *sāmānādhikaraṇya* between *mahākālabheda* and *ghaṭa* since both exist in the same substratum of *bhūtala* and so on.

[1] *pāribhāṣikāvacchedaka* is not a *dharma* like usual *avacchedakas* but it is an *avacchedaka* taken from the nature of the definition itself. Here such a *pāribhāṣikāvacchedaka* is *hetusamānādhikaraṇābhāvīyapratiyogitāsamānavṛttikam avacchedakam.*

Therefore in jar there is *mahākālabheda* by the relation of *abhāvīyaviśeṣaṇatāghaṭitasāmānādhikaraṇya.*

Here it may also be noted that as Rāmarudra points out, *abhāvīyaviśeṣaṇatā* is to be understood as *daiśikaviśeṣaṇatā.* Such an interpretation of *abhāvīyaviśeṣaṇatā* is given because *kālikaviśeṣaṇatāsaṃbandha* is also *abhāvīyaviśeṣaṇatāsaṃbandha.*[1] And by *kālikaviśeṣaṇatāsaṃbandha, mahākālabheda* exists in *mahākāla* also and jar exists in *mahākāla* by *kālikaviśeṣaṇatāsaṃbandha.* Hence *mahākāla* which is the substratum of the reason is the substratum of jar also. Therefore *mahākālabhedaviśiṣṭaghaṭābhāva* cannot be *pratiyogivyadhikaraṇābhāva.* When *abhāvīyaviśeṣaṇatā* is interpreted as *daiśikaviśeṣaṇatā* then *mahākālabhedaviśiṣṭaghaṭābhāva* can be taken as *pratiyogivyadhikaraṇābhāva.* This is because *mahākālabheda* does not exist in *mahākāla* by the relation of *daiśikaviśeṣaṇatā.*[2]

Now Rāmarudra raises a further question: by the relation of *daiśikaviśeṣaṇatā*, *mahākālabheda* does not exist in *mahākāla* but *mahākālabhedaviśiṣṭaghaṭa* can exist in *mahākāla* by *kālikasaṃbandha* since *mahākāla* is the substratum of all things. Therefore *mahākālabhedaviśiṣṭaghaṭābhāva* is not *pratiyogivyadhikaraṇa.*

According to Rāmarudra, Dinakara answers this objection as follows: something can be considered as the substratum of a qualified thing only if the qualifier and the qualificand coexist in the substratum by their respective relations. As for example *ghaṭābhāvaviśiṣṭapaṭaḥ,* does not exist on the floor if *ghaṭābhāva* does not exist on the floor by *daiśikaviśeṣaṇatā (svarūpa) saṃbandha,* even though *paṭa* exists on the floor by *saṃyogasaṃbandha.* Only when *ghaṭābhāva* exists on the floor by

[1] Here the idea is that *abhāvīyaviśeṣaṇatā* can be of two kinds, *daiśikaviśeṣaṇatā* and *kālikaviśeṣaṇatā.* As for example just as in the case of *bhūtale ghaṭaḥ, ghaṭapratiyogikasaṃbandha* is *saṃyoga* so also in *bhūtale ghaṭo nāsti, ghaṭābhāvapratiyogikasaṃabandha* is *daiśikaviśeṣaṇatā* and in *kāle ghaṭo nāsti* the *abhāvapratiyogikasaṃabandha* is *kālikaviśeṣaṇatā.*

[2] *daiśikaviśeṣaṇatā* seems to be identical with *svarūpasaṃbandha* as can be inferred from the *jāgadīśī pankti: yāvanto bhāvāḥ daiśikaviśeṣaṇatayobhayavṛttayaḥ. Jāgadīśī,* p. 102, ln 3.

daiśikaviśeṣaṇatāsaṃbandha and *paṭa* also exists on the floor by *saṃyogasaṃbandha* we can assert that there is *ghaṭābhāva-viśiṣṭapaṭa* on the floor.

Similarly only when *ghaṭa* exists in *mahākāla* by *kālika-saṃbandha* and when *mahākālabheda* exists in *mahākāla* by *daiśikaviśeṣaṇatāsaṃbandha*, we can state that there is *mahā-kālabhedaviśiṣṭaghaṭa* in *mahākāla*. But this is impossible since by *daiśikaviśeṣaṇatāsaṃbandha*, *mahākālabheda* cannot exist in *mahākāla*. Therefore *mahākālabhedaviśiṣṭaghaṭābhāva* can be taken as an example of *pratiyogivyadhikaraṇābhāva*.

But it may be further objected as follows: in the inference *kālo ghaṭavān kālaparimāṇāt* if the *sādhya* is mentioned by *mahākālamātravṛttiviśeṣaṇatāsaṃbandha*[1] then *mahākālānya-tvaviśiṣṭaghaṭābhāva* also cannot be *pratiyogivyadhikaraṇā-bhāva*. This is because by this relation *mahākālānyatvaviśiṣṭa-ghaṭa* does not exist anywhere except in *mahākāla* because by this relation of *mahākālavṛttiviśeṣaṇatā*, *ghaṭa* can exist only in *mahakāla*; but there is no *mahākālabheda* in *mahākāla*. Therefore the substratum of *mahākālānyatvaviśiṣṭaghaṭa* by this relation is not established. Hence *mahākālānyatvaviśiṣṭaghaṭābhāva* is not *pratiyogivyadhikaraṇābhāva*. Hence the fault of too narrow application remains.

Now Rāmarudra points out that in the inference *kālo ghaṭavān kālaparimāṇāt*, if *sādhyatāvacchedakasaṃbandha* is accepted as *mahākālamātravṛttiviśeṣaṇatāsaṃbandha*, then *gaganābhāva* can be taken as *pratiyogivyadhikaraṇābhāva*. This is because *pratiyogivyadhikaraṇatva* has been taken earlier in the form of an *ubhayābhāva*, i.e. as *sādhyatāvacchedakasaṃ-bandhasāmānye yadabhāvapratiyogitāvacchedakāvacchinnaprati-yogikatvahetvadhikaraṇībhūtayatkiṃcidvyaktyanuyogikatvo-bhayābhāva*. In *mahākālamātravṛttiviśeṣaṇatā*, though there is *mahakālānuyogikatva*, there is no *gaganapratiyogikatva*. Therefore there is the absence of both. In this way *gaganābhāva* is established as *pratiyogivyadhikaraṇābhāva*.

[1] *viśeṣaṇatāsaṃbandha* is a kind of *svarūpasaṃbandha*.

This is not correct because *gagana* also exists in *mahakāla* by the relation of *kālikaviśeṣaṇatā*. Otherwise *gagana* would not be the cause of sound. This is because in the definition of causality *pūrvavṛttitva* has necessarily to be included. Hence in the *kālikasaṃbandha* there is *gaganapratiyogikatva* and *mahākālānuyogikatva*. Therefore there is no absence of both of these. Hence *gaganābhāva* also is not *pratiyogivyadhikaraṇābhāva*. Here it should be noted that though it is stated that *gagana* is *avṛtti*, here *avṛttitva* means *avṛttitva* by a relation other than *kālikasaṃbandha*. In this way what is stated in M. that *kāla* is the substratum of all things can also be considered as correct.

A further objection is raised against this position as follows: the definition in which *ubhayābhāva* is included is purposeless because one can take the absence of jar by the relation of inherence if *pratiyogivyadhikaraṇa* is taken by *pratiyogitāvacchedakasaṃbandha* instead of *sādhyatāvacchedakasaṃbandha*. The reason is that in order to avoid the fault of too narrow application which arises because if *samavāyena vahnyabhāva* is taken we will have to mention necessarily the *pratiyogitā* in the definition as determined by *sādhyatāvacchedakasaṃbandha*. The *pratiyogitā* of *samavāyena ghaṭābhāva* is not determined by *sādhyatāvacchedakasaṃbandha* which is *saṃyoga*. Therefore *samavāyena ghaṭābhāva* cannot be taken as *pratiyogivyadhikaraṇābhāva*.

For these reasons M. gives a more developed definition of invariable concomitance as follows: in the counterpositiveness in general of the absence which occurs in the substratum of the reason which is not the substratum of the counterpositive by the relation of the determinant of counterpositiveness exists the absence of both the state of being determined by a particular characteristic (*sādhyatāvacchedakadharma*) and the state of being determined by a particular relation (*sādhyatāvacchedakasaṃbandha*). The state of being pervader of a particular reason is that which is qualified by that particular characteristic by that same relation.

This definition of invariable concomitance can be explained by taking the inference *kālo ghaṭavān kālaparimāṇāt* as example. Here we take *saṃyogena ghaṭābhāva* as *hetusamānādhikaraṇābhāva.* In this example, the *pratiyogitā* which is in the *pratiyogin*, viz. jar there is *ghaṭatvāvacchinnatva* (i.e. *sādhyatāvacchedakadharmāvacchinnatva*) but not *kālikasaṃbandhāvacchinnatva* (i.e. *sādhyatāvacchedakasaṃbandhāvacchinnatva*). Therefore in the *pratiyogitā* there is the absence of both (*ubhayābhāva*) *ghaṭatvāvacchinnatva* and *kālikasaṃbandhāvacchinnatva* by the principle *ekasattve'pi dvayaṃ nāsti.* Therefore by the relation of *sādhyatāvacchedaka* (here in the example, *kālikasaṃbandha*) *ghaṭatvāvacchinnaghaṭa* (i.e. *sādhyatāvacchedakadharmāvacchinna*) is the pervader of *kālaparimāṇa,* which is the reason. Hence there is no fault of too narrow application.

Now the question is why *ubhayābhāva* (i.e. *yatsaṃbandhāvacchinnatvayaddharmāvacchinnatvobhayābhāva*) is used in the definition of invariable concomitance? In the inference, *vahnimān dhūmāt,* if *yaddharmāvacchinnatva* alone is used in the definition of invariable concomitance, *samavāyena vahnyabhāva* can be taken as *hetvadhikaraṇavṛttyabhāva.* In the counterpositiveness of this absence there is no absence of *yaddharmāvacchinnatva* (i.e. *vahnitvarūpasādhyatāvacchedakadharmāvacchinnatva).* Therefore there is the fault of too narrow application. If on the contrary *saṃyogena ghaṭābhāva* is taken as the *hetvadhikaraṇavṛttyabhāva*, then in the counterpositiveness of this absence there is no absence of *yatsaṃbandhāvacchinnatva* (i.e., *saṃyogarūpasādhyatāvacchedakasaṃbandhāvacchinnatva*). Therefore there is the fault of too narrow application. Hence *ubhayābhāva* is used to avoid the fault of too narrow application as explained earlier.

In false inferences such as *dhūmavān vahneḥ* one can take also *ghaṭābhāva* as *hetvadhikaraṇavṛttyabhāva.* In the counterpositiveness of this absence there is *yatsaṃbandhavacchinnatva* but no *yaddharmāvacchinnatva* and therefore there is *ubhayābhāva* of *yatsaṃbandhāvacchinnatva* and *yaddharmāvacchinnatva.* Therefore there is the fault of too narrow

application. In order to avoid this fault, the word *sāmānya* in the expression *pratiyogitāsāmānya* is used. Then *hetvadhikaraṇa-vṛttyabhāva* is also *dhūmābhāva*. And in the *pratiyogitā* of this *abhāva* there is both *yatsaṃbandhāvacchinnatva* and *yad-dharmāvacchinnatva*. Hence there is no absence of both. Therefore the given definition of invariable concomitance cannot be applied and hence there is no fault of overextension.

(p.136, lns 5–9; p.150, lns 4–8) A further objection may be raised as follows: in such inferences as 'it has knowable fire because it has smoke (*prameyavahnimān dhūmāt*)' the state of being determined by knowable fireness (*prameyavahnitvā-vacchinnatva*) is unestablished because a property which is cumbersome cannot be a determinant of counterpositiveness. The idea here is that in the given definition of invariable concomitance the *ubhayābhāva* of *yatsaṃbandhāvacchinnatva* and *yaddharmā-vacchinnatva* is used. Here the *sādhyatāvacchedaka* is *prameya-vahnitva* and it cannot be an *abhāvapratiyogitāvacchedaka* since it is a cumbersome property. Therefore there is the fault of too narrow application.

This objection cannot be admitted because a property which is cumbersome is also accepted as *pratiyogitāvacchedaka*. This is because *kaṃbugrīvādimattvāvacchinnatva* is also the object of the notion *kaṃbgrīvādimān nāsti*.

Dinakara explains further this answer: if it is asserted that *kaṃbugrīvādimatpratiyogikābhāva* only is understood and not *kaṃbugrīvādimatpratiyogitāvacchedakatva* i.e. *kaṃbugrīvādi-mattva* as *abhāvapratiyogitāvacchedaka* by the statement *kaṃbu-grīvādimān nāsti*, then it would come about that the statement *kambugūvādimān nāsti* made with reference to the substratum which has any one jar, would become valid.[1] But it is not

[1] The reasoning here is the following: when it is asserted *bhūtale ghaṭo nāsti* the meaning is *ghaṭatvāvacchinnapratiyogitākābhāvo'sti*, i.e. there is the absence of all jars. If *ghaṭatvāvacchinnatva* is not also the object of knowledge then the statement *ghaṭo nāsti* is valid even when there is one *ghaṭa*. This is because even though one *ghaṭa* is present any other *ghaṭa* is absent. In the same way if *kaṃbugrīvādimattvāvacchinnatva* is also not the object of knowledge

accepted as valid by anybody. Therefore *gurudharma* is also accepted as *abhāvapratiyogitāvaccheaka.*

Here Rāmarudra enters into a detailed discussion whether a *gurudharma* can be accepted as *pratiyoigitāvacchedaka-dharma.* First of all a possible objection is raised as follows: the knowledge in the form *kaṃbugrīvādimān nāsti* has as object *kaṃbugrīvādimattva* also as *pratiyogitāvacchedaka.* But this *avacchedakatva* in such an *avacchedaka* is not in the form of *svarūpasaṃbandha* (i.e. the relation of selfsameness) but in the form of *anatiriktavṛttitva,* (i.e. occurrence in something which is not different from *pratiyogī*). Such *anatiriktavṛttitva* is not to be understood as *pratiyogitāvacchedakaśūnyāvṛttitva,* i.e. as non-occurrence in the substratum of the absence of the determinant of counterpositiveness. If *anatiriktavṛttitva* is understood as *pratiyogitāvacchedakaśūnyāvṛttitva,* then there would come about the knowledge that quality has no existence. This is because in quality there is the absence of qualified existence (*viśiṣṭasattā*). Further where there is no *viśiṣṭasattātva,* there is no *satttātva* also because there is no difference between *viśiṣṭasattā* and *śuddhasattā.* Now *viśiṣṭasattābhāvīyaprati-yogitāvacchedaka* is *viśiṣṭasattātva.* But if *pratiyogitāvacchedaka* is defined as *pratiyogitāvacchedakaśūnyāvṛttitva,* then *sattātva* also would be *avacchedaka* of *viśiṣṭasattābhāvīyapratiyogitā.* This is because *sattātva* exists only in *sattā* and therefore it does not exist in the substratum of the absence of *viśiṣṭasttātva.* For example there is the absence of *viśiṣṭasattātva* in jar and so on but there is no *sattātva* there. Therefore *sattātva* is *pratiyogitā-vacchedakaśūnyāvṛtti.* Hence *sattātva* also would be *viśiṣṭa-sattābhāvapratiyogitāvacchedaka.* Therefore there would be the knowledge that in *guṇa* there is no *sattā,* because there is the absence of *viśiṣṭasattā* in *guṇa.*

But *anatiriktavṛttitva* is *svāvacchinnavyāpakatāvacchedaka-pratiyogitāvacchedakatva,* i.e. the state of being the determinant of the counterpositiveness which (i.e. determinant) is the

the statement *kaṃbugrīvādimān nāsti* would be valid even if there is one *kaṃbugrīvādimān.*

determinant of the state of being the pervader determined by itself. This may be explained as follows: take *ghaṭatva* as *anatiriktavṛttirūpāvacchedaka* of *ghaṭābhāvīyapratiyogitā* and that is also *ghaṭatvāvācchinnavyāpakatāvacchedaka,* i.e. *ghaṭatvāvacchinnavyāpakatā* is in *ghaṭa* and so *vyāpakatāvacchedaka* is also *ghaṭatva*. And this *ghaṭatva* is *ghaṭābhāvīyapratiyogitāvacchedaka*. In this sense *kaṃbugrīvādimattva* also is *pratiyogitāvacchedaka* because it is also *ghaṭatvāvacchinnavyāpakatāvacchedaka*. Therefore *gurudharma* also can be considered as *pratiyogitāvacchedaka*.

Further if this definition of *avacchedaka* is accepted then it is not possible to have the knowledge that there is no *sattā* in *guṇa*. This is because *viśiṣṭasattātva* is not the *avacchedaka* of *sattābhāvīyapratiyogitā* because *viśiṣṭasattātva* is not *sattātvāvacchinnavyāpakatāvacchedaka*. This means that wherever there is *sattā*, it is not the case that there is *viśiṣṭasattā* also because *sattā* exists in *guṇa* and *karma*, but there is no *viśiṣṭasattā* in them but only in *dravya*. Therefore there is no knowledge in the form that there is no *sattā* in quality. Nor is there any knowledge in the form *kaṃbugrīvādimān nāsti* where there is jar. This is because the *pratiyogitāvacchedaka* of the absence existing in the substratum of jar is not the determinant of the state of being the pervader (*vyāpakatāvacchedaka*) qualified by *kaṃbugrīvādimattva*.

Nor can it be said that *kaṃbugrīvādimattvāvacchinnavyāpakatāvacchedakatva* is *kaṃbugrīvādimattvāvacchinnasamānādhikaraṇābhāvapratiyogitānavacchedakatva*. This is because if it is so, then there would be the fault of *aprasiddhi* as stated earlier. Such a characteristic viz. *kaṃbugrīvādimattvāvacchinnasamānādhikaraṇābhāvapratiyogitānavacchedakatvatva* cannot be considered as the *pratiyogitāvacchedaka* of *kaṃbugrīvādimattvāvacchinnasamānādhikaraṇābhāvīyapratiyogitāvacchedakatvābhāvīyapratiyogitā*. This is because *kaṃbugrīvādimattvāvacchinnasamānādhikaraṇābhāvīyapratiyogitāvacchedakatvatva* is more cumbersome than *ghaṭasamānādhikaraṇābhāvīyapratiyogitāvacchedakatvatva*. Therefore *kaṃbugrīvādimattvāvacchinnasamānādhikaraṇābhāvapratiyogitāvacchedakatvatvāvacchinnā-

bhāva is not established. Therefore the *pratiyogitāvacchedakatva* cannot be defined as *svāvacchinnavyāpakatāvacchedakapratiyogitāvacchedakatva*. But *svāvacchinnavyāpakatāvacchedaka* is taken in the form of *kaṃbugrīvādimattvāvacchinnasamānādhikaraṇābhāvapratiyogitāvacchedakabhedakūṭaviśiṣṭa*. And such an *avacchedakatva* is established since no cumbersome property is included in it.

In less technical language this may be explained as follows: in *kaṃbugrīvādimattvāvacchinnavyāpakatāvacchedaktva*, *vyāpakatā* means *kaṃbugrīvādimattvāvacchinnasamānādhikaraṇābhāvapratiyogitva*. Therefore *vyāpakatāvacchedakatva* means *tadavcchinnasmānādhikaraṇābhāvapratiyogitānavacchedakatva*. *anavacchedakatva* here means absence of *avacchedakatva* i.e. *tadavcchinnasmānādhikaraṇābhāvapratiyogitāvacchedakatvābhāva*. The counterpositiveness of this absence is determined by *kaṃbugrīvādimattvāvacchinnavanniṣṭhābhāvapratiyogitāvacchedakatvatva*. That is a cumbersome property in comparison with *ghaṭasamānādhikaraṇābhāvapratiyogitāvacchedakatvatva*. Therefore the aforesaid *avacchedakatva* is not determined by this cumbersome property as *kaṃbugrīvādimattvāvacchinnavanniṣṭhābhāvapratiyogitāvacchedakatvatva*. Therefore the absence of that *avacchedakatā* is not established. Hence the *vyāpakatāghaṭitāvacchedakatva* is not possible. Therefore we take the collection of the individual differences of particular *avacchedakatās* of the absence of the *pratiyogitā* which exist in the substratum of that which is determined by *kaṃbugrīvādimattva* as *vyāpakatāvacchedakatva*. And this is not an unestablished property.

All these arguments cannot be admitted. There is *svarūpasaṃbandharūpāvacchedakatva* in *gurudharma* also. The reason is that when there is the knowledge *ghaṭo nāsti* (there is no jar) *ghaṭatva* (jarness) is also grasped as having *svarūpasaṃbandharūpāvacchedakatā*. This is because the meaning of *nañ* is absence and to this absence jar is connected by the relation of *ghaṭatvāvacchinnapratiyogitākatva* (the state of being the indicator of the counterpositiveness determined by jarness). Therefore the *avacchedakatā* in *ghaṭatva* is accepted in the form of the relation

of selfsameness (*svarūpasaṃbandha*). Hence the knowledge *ghaṭo nāsti* is the evidence for accepting *ghaṭatva* as the *pratiyogitāvacchedaka*. Similarly the knowledge that *kaṃbugrīvādimān nāsti* is the evidence for accepting *kaṃbugrīvādimattva* as having *pratiyogitāvacchedakatā* in the form of *svarūpasaṃbandha*. This is because if *svāvacchinnavyāpakatāvacchedakatva* as *pratiyogitāvacchedakatva* does not become the object in the knowledge *kaṃbugrīvādimān nāsti* then this *avacchedakatva* existing in *kaṃbugrīvādimattva* cannot be the object of knowledge *kaṃbugrīvādimān nāsti*. Therefore just as in the instance of knowledge *ghaṭo nāsti*, in the instance of knowledge *kaṃbugrīvādimān nāsti* also *kaṃbugrīvādimattva* is to be accepted as *avacchedaka* in the form of *svarūpasaṃbandha*. Therefore by the force of that knowledge (i.e. *kaṃbugrīvādimān nāsti*) *svarūpasaṃbandharūpāvacchedakatā* is to be accepted in cumbersome property also.

Now an objection may be raised as follows: the *avacchedakatā* in a cumbersome property cannot be accepted in the form of the relation of selfsameness. Therefore in the knowledge *kaṃbugrīvādimān nāsti*, the counterpositive of the absence is *kaṃbugrīvādimān* and it is connected with absence by the relation of *svāvacchinnavyāpakatāvacchedakāvacchinnapratiyogitā*. In such instances of knowledge as *ghaṭo nāsti*, the counterpositive of the absence is jar and it is connected with absence by the relation of *ghṭatvāvacchinnapratiyogitā* because of simplicity.

Such an objection cannot be accepted because in two instances of knowledge which have the same object, we cannot admit different kinds of relations as objects. The two instances of knowledge *ghaṭo nāsti*, and *kaṃbugrīvādimān nāsti* have the same object i.e. jar, though expressed in different words. Therefore it is not proper that the first instance of knowledge has an object *ghaṭatvāvacchinnapratiyogitāsaṃbandha*, i.e. *pratiyogyaṃśe prakārībhūtadharmāvacchinnapratiyogitāsaṃbandha*, i.e. a relation in the form of counterpositiveness determined by the characteristic which is the qualifier of the counterpositive. As for example in the instance of the knowledge, *ghaṭo nāsti*,

ghaṭa is the counterpositive of the absence and *ghaṭatva* is *pratiyogyaṃśe prakārībhūtadharma,* i.e. the characteristic which is the qualifier of the counterpositive. This *ghaṭatva* is the determinant of counterpositiveness. And such a counterpositiveness is the relation between *ghaṭa* and its absence.

The second instance of knowledge *kaṃbugrīvādimān nāsti* has as object *pratiyogyaṃśe prakārībhūtadharmāvacchinna-vyāpakatāvacchedakadharmāvacchinnapratiyogitāsaṃbandha,* i.e., a relation in the form of counterpositiveness which is determined by the characteristic which is the determinant of the state of being the pervader which is determined by the characteristic which is the qualifier of the counterpositive. As for example in the instance of knowledge *kaṃbugrīvādimān nāsti, kambugūvādimān* is the counterpositive and *kaṃbugrīvādimattva* is the *pratiyogyaṃśe prakārībhūtadharma.* And *tādṛśa-dharmāvacchinnavyāpakatāvaccehedaka* is *kaṃbugrīvādimattva.* The relation between *kaṃbugrīvādimān* and its absence is that of counterpositiveness which is determined by the *vyāpakatāva-cchedakadharma,* i.e. *kaṃbugrīvādimattva.*

Thus in the two instances of knowledge having the same object viz. jar, two different relations (i.e. the relation between the absence and its counterpositive) become object. This is cumbersome. Therefore in both instances of knowledge only the relation in the form *pratiyogyaṃśe prakārībhūtadharmāva-cchinnapratiyogitā* should be accepted. From this it follows that there is no argument to show that a cumbersome property cannot be the determinant of counterpositiveness. Hence according to the evidence arising from the instance of knowledge itself the state of being determinant of counterpositiveness should be accepted in *gurudharma* also.

A further objection may be raised as follows: with reference to the definition of invariable concomitance in which *ubbhayā-bhāva* is used (i.e. *pratiyogyanadhikaraṇībhūtahetvadhikaraṇa-vṛttyabhāvapratiyogitāsāmānye yatsambandhāvacchinnatvaya-ddharmāvacchinnatvobhayābhāva...),* the fault of too narrow application in such inferences as *premeyavahnimān dhūmāt,* as

pointed out in M. is not valid. This is because a cumbersome property cannot be the determinant of that which is to be established. This objection is also to be rejected because *avacchedakatā* in the form of *svarūpasaṃbandha* is not accepted by the old Naiyāyikas with reference to cumbersome properties. But *sādhyatāvacchedakatā* in the form of a particular instance of *viṣayatā* is accepted in cumbersome properties also.

Text 4
Subjectness

का. सिषाधयिषया शून्या सिद्धिर्यत्र न तिष्ठति।
स पक्षस्तत्र वृत्तित्वज्ञानादनुमितिर्भवेत्॥ ७० ॥

मु. पक्षवृत्तित्वमित्यत्र पक्षत्वं किं तदाह **सिषाधयिषया** इति। सिषाधयिषाविरहविशिष्टसिद्ध्यभावः पक्षता, तद्वान् पक्ष इत्यर्थः। सिषाधयिषामात्रं न पक्षता, विनापि सिषाधयिषां घनगर्जितेन मेघानुमानात्। अत एव साध्यसंदेहोऽपि न पक्षता, विनापि साध्यसंदेहं तदनुमानात्। सिद्धौ सत्यामपि सिषाधयिषासत्त्वेऽनुमिति भंवत्येव।

K. Where the certainty (of that which is to be established) without the absence of the desire to establish the same does not exist, that is subject. By means of the knowledge of the existence (of the reason) in it, there arises inferential knowledge. (*Kārikā* 70)

M. With reference to (the expression) 'occurrence in the subject' (used to define consideration the question arises) what is subjectness? The answer is given with the words **the desire to establish** (*siṣādhayiṣeti*). Subjectness is the absence of the certainty (of that which is to be established) qualified by the absence of the desire to establish the same; that which has this (i.e. subjectness) is the subject. This is the meaning.

Only the desire to establish (that which is to be established) is not the subjectness because even without the desire (to establish that which is be established) there is the inference of clouds from the roar of thunder. Therefore the doubt of that which is to be established also is not subjectness because inference arises even without the doubt of that (i.e. cloud) which is to be established. There is indeed inferential knowledge when there is the certainty (of that which is to be established) if there is the desire to establish the same. Therefore the state of being qualified

मु. अतः सिषाधयिषाविरहविशिष्टत्वं सिद्धौ विशेषणम्। तथा च यत्र सिद्धिर्नास्ति तत्र सिषाधयिषायां सत्यामसत्यामपि पक्षता। यत्र सिषाधयिषास्ति तत्र सिद्धौ सत्यामसत्यामपि पक्षता। यत्र सिद्धिरस्ति सिषाधयिषा च नास्ति तत्र न पक्षता, सिषाधयिषाविरहविशिष्टसिद्धेः सत्त्वात्। ननु यत्र परामर्शानन्तरं सिद्धिः ततः सिषाधयिषा तत्र सिषाधयिषाकाले परामर्शनाशान्नानुमितिः, यत्र सिद्धिपरामर्शसिषाधयिषाः क्रमेण भवन्ति तत्र सिषाधयिषाकाले सिद्धेर्नाशात्प्रतिबन्धकाभावादेवानुमितिः, यत्र सिषाधयिषासिद्धिपरामर्शास्तत्र परामर्शकाले सिषाधयिषैव नास्ति, एवमन्यत्रापि।

M. by the absence of the desire to establish is qualifier to the certainty (of that which is to be established). Therefore where there is no certainty (of that which is to be established) there is subjectness whether there is the presence or absence of the desire to establish (that which is to be established). Where there is the desire to establish there is subjectness whether there is the presence or the absence of certainty. Where there is the certainty but there is no desire to establish (that which is to be established) there is no subjectness because there is the certainty qualified by the absence of the desire to establish (that which is to be established).

It may be objected: where after consideration there is the certainty (of that which is to be established) and then there is the desire to establish, at the time of the desire to establish because of the destruction of consideration there is no inferential knowledge. Where there arise one after another, the certainty of that which is to be established, consideration and desire to establish, there at the moment of the desire to establish since there is the destruction of certainty, inferential knowledge arises because of the absence of the hindering factor. Where there are the desire to establish, certainty and consideration, there at the moment of consideration, there is no desire at all to establish. The same will be the case in other instances also.

मु. सिद्धिकाले परामर्शकाले च न सिषाधयिषा, योग्यविभुविशेष-गुणानां यौगपद्यनिषेधात्, तत्कथं सिषाधयिषाविरहविशिष्टत्वं सिद्धेर्विशेषणमिति चेन्न । यत्र 'वह्निव्याप्यधूमवान् पर्वतो वह्निमान्' इति प्रत्यक्षं स्मरणं वा ततः सिषाधयिषा तत्र पक्षतासंपत्तये तद्विशेषणस्यावश्यकत्वात् । इदं तु बोध्यम् । यादृशयादृशसिषाधयिषासत्त्वे सिद्धिसत्त्वे यल्लिङ्गकानुमितिस्तादृशतादृशसिषाधयिषाविरहविशिष्टसिद्ध्यभावस्तल्लिङ्गकानुमितौ पक्षता । तेन सिद्धिपरामर्शसत्त्वे 'यत्किंचित् ज्ञानं जायताम्' इतीच्छायामपि नानुमितिः । 'वह्निव्यप्यधूमवान् पर्वतो वह्निमान्' इति प्रत्यक्षसत्त्वे 'प्रत्यक्षातिरिक्तं ज्ञानं जायताम्' इतीच्छायां तु भवत्येव । एवं

M. At the moment of certainty and at the moment of consideration there is no desire to establish because perceptible special qualities of omnipresent substances do not exist simultaneously. Therefore how can the state of being qualified by the absence of the desire to establish be a qualifier of certainty?

This cannot be admitted; where there is the perception or recollection in the form 'the mountain which has smoke which is pervaded by fire has fire' and then there is the desire to establish, there in order to obtain subjectness that qualification is necessary.

This is to be understood: by the existence of which types of desires to establish, when there is certainty, inferential knowledge arises from which reason, for that instance of inferential knowledge, the absence of the certainty which is qualified by the absence of those kinds of desires to establish is the subjectness. Therefore when there are certainty and consideration, there is no inferential knowledge even if there is the desire in the form that there may be some instance of knowledge. When there is the perceptual knowledge in the form 'the mountain having smoke pervaded by fire has fire,' if there is the desire that there may be an instance of knowledge different from perception, there

मु. धूमपरामर्शसत्त्वे 'आलोकेन वह्निमनुमिनुयाम्' इतीच्छायामपि नानुमितिः। सिषाधयिषाविरहकाले यादृशसिद्धिसत्त्वे नानुमिति-स्तादृशी सिद्धिर्विशिष्यैव तत्तदनुमितिप्रतिबन्धिका वक्तव्या। तेन 'पर्वतस्तेजस्वी' 'पाषाणमयो वह्निमान्' इति ज्ञानसत्त्वेऽप्यनुमितेर्न विरोधः। परं तु पक्षतावच्छेदकसामानाधिकरण्येन साध्यसिद्धावपि तदवच्छेदेनानुमितेर्दर्शनात् पक्षतावच्छेदकावच्छेदेनानुमितिं प्रति पक्षतावच्छेदकावच्छेदेन साध्यसिद्धिरेव प्रतिबन्धिका, पक्षताव-च्छेदकसामानाधिकरण्येनानुमितिं प्रति तु सिद्धिमात्रं विरोधि। इदं तु बोध्यम्। यत्र 'अयं पुरुषो न वा' इति संशयानन्तरं 'पुरुषत्व-

M. would indeed arise (inferential knowledge). Similarly when there is the consideration of smoke and the desire to establish fire by (the reason of) light, there would be no inferential knowledge.

When there is the absence of desire to establish and when there is a particular instance of certainty, there is no inferential knowledge; such a certainty in particular should be considered as the hindering factor for that particular instance of inferential knowledge. Therefore when there is the knowledge that mountain has light and that which has stones has fire, there is no hindrance for inferential knowledge (in the form mountain has fire). However even when there is certainty of that which is to be established as qualified by the co-occurrence with the determinant of subjectness there is inferential knowledge in that which is qualified by that determinant (i.e. determinant of subjectness). Therefore the hindering factor for the inferential knowledge in that which is determined by the determinant of subjectness is only the certainty of that which is to be established in that which is determined by the determinant of subjectness. But the hindering factor for the inferential knowledge qualified by co-occurrence with the determinant of subjectness is just certainty (in any form). This should indeed be understood: after the doubt if this is a man or not, there is the knowledge this has hands etc. which are pervaded by the state of being man, if there is no desire for

मु. व्याप्यकरादिमानयम्' इति ज्ञानं तत्रासत्यामनुमित्सायां पुरुषस्य प्रत्यक्षं भवति न त्वनुमितिः, अतोऽनुमित्साविरहविशिष्टप्रत्यक्षसामग्री कामिनीजिज्ञासादिवत्स्वातन्त्र्येण प्रतिबन्धिका। एवं परामर्शानन्तरं विना प्रत्यक्षेच्छां पक्षादेः प्रत्यक्षानुत्पत्तेः प्रत्यक्षेच्छाविरहविशिष्टानुमितिसामग्रीभिन्नविषयकप्रत्यक्षे प्रतिबन्धिकेति संक्षेपः।

दि. मूले पक्षतानिरूपणे सङ्गतेरप्रदर्शनात् तां प्रदर्शयति **पक्षवृत्तित्वमित्यत्र** इति। तथा च प्रकृतस्य परामर्शस्य घटकतया पक्षधर्मत्वमपि प्रकृतं तदुपपादकत्वरूपोपोद्घातसङ्गत्या पक्षतानिरूपणम्। व्याप्तिनिरूपितैककार्यकारित्वमेव सङ्गतिरिति बोध्यम्। मूले पक्षतालक्षणस्य स्पष्टतयानुक्तेः पक्षता-

M. inferential knowledge there arises perceptual knowledge of man and not inferential knowledge. Therefore the causal complex of perceptual knowledge which is qualified by the absence of the desire to establish is considered to be hindering factor independently just as the desire to know a young woman. Similarly even after consideration without the desire for perceptual knowledge, the perception of the subject etc. does not arise and therefore the causal complex of inferential knowledge qualified by the absence of perceptual knowledge is hindering factor for the perception which has a different object. This is the summary.

D. While discussing subjectness in the basic text (viz.K.), since Relevance was not indicated, (the author) shows it with the words **with reference to (the expression) occurrence in the subject** (*pakṣavṛttitvamityatra*). In this way the state of being attribute of the subject also is a present topic since it is a constituent part of consideration which is the present topic. Discussion on subjectness (is begun) as that which explains it (i.e. the state of being attribute of the subject) by Relevance in the form of Introduction. Relevance is to be understood as the production of the same effect indicated by invariable concomitance. Since the definition of subjectness is not mentioned clearly in the basic text (the author) giving independently the definition of

दि. लक्षणं स्वातन्त्र्येण प्रदर्शयन् मूलार्थमाह **सिषाधयिषाविरहेति** । घनगर्जितेन मेघानुमितिस्थलेऽव्याप्त्यापत्त्या सिषाधयिषामात्रस्य पक्षतात्वं निषेधति **सिषाधयिषामात्रं न पक्षता** इति । **मेघानुमानात्** मेघानुमितेः । **अत एव** वक्ष्यमाणदूषणादेव । सिषाधयिषाविरहरूपविशेषणस्य प्रयोजनमाह **सिद्धौ सत्याम्** इति । **अत** इति । तत्रानुमितिनिर्वाहकपक्षतासिद्ध्यर्थमिति भावः । **तत्र सिषाधयिषायां सत्यामसत्यामपि** इति । सत्यामुभयाभावप्रयुक्तस्यासत्यां विशेष्याभावमात्रप्रयुक्तस्योक्तविशिष्टाभावस्य सत्त्वादिति भावः । **सिद्धौ सत्यामसत्यां च** इति । सत्यां विशेषणा-

D. subjectness explains the meaning of the basic text with the words **the absence of the desire to establish** (*siṣādhayiṣāviraheti*).

With the words **only the desire to establish is not subjectness** (*siṣādhayiṣāmātram na pakṣateti*) (the author) denies that subjectness is only the desire to establish because of the fault of too narrow application in such instances as the inferential knowledge of clouds from the roar of thunder. **Inference of clouds** (*meghānumānāt*) means inferential knowledge of clouds. **Therefore** (*ata eva),* because of the fault which will be pointed out later. By the expression **when there is the certainty (of that which is to be established)** (*siddhau satyām iti*) (the author) points out the purpose of the qualification in the form, the absence of desire to establish. **Therefore** (*ata iti*), in order to establish the subjectness which is the cause of inferential knowledge. This is the idea. **Whether there is the presence or absence of the desire to establish** (*siṣādhayiṣāyāṃ satyām asatyām iti*). In the case of the presence of the desire to establish there is the absence of the qualified brought about by the absence of both (i.e. absence of the absence of desire and absence of certainty); in the case of the absence of desire to establish, there is the absence of the qualified brought about by the absence of qualificand (i.e. certainty). **Whether there is the presence or the absence of certainty** (*siddhau satyām asatyām ca iti)*. In the case of the presence of certainty there is the absence of the qualified brought about only by the absence of the qualifier (i.e. the absence of the desire to establish); in the

दि. भावमात्रप्रयुक्तस्यासत्त्वां तूभयाभावप्रयुक्तस्य विशिष्टाभावस्य सत्त्वादिति भावः । **सिद्धेः सत्त्वात्** इति । सिद्धेः सत्त्वेन तदभावरूपपक्षताया अभावादिति भावः । सिषाधयिषाविरहवैशिष्ट्यं च सिद्धावेककालाव-च्छेदेनैकात्मवृत्तित्वम् । तेन सिषाधयिषाकालीनसिद्धेः कालिकसंबन्धेन सिषाधयिषाविरहविशिष्टत्वसत्त्वेऽपि न क्षतिः । परामर्शरूपकारणसत्त्वे सिद्धिरूपविरोधिसत्त्वे यद्यनुमित्सा स्यात्तदा तस्याः उत्तेजकत्वं वाच्यं न चैतत्संभवतीत्याशङ्कते **ननु यत्र** इति । **परामर्शानन्तरं** परामर्शद्वितीय-क्षणे । **ततः** सिद्ध्युत्पत्तिद्वितीयक्षणे । **क्रमेण** अव्यवधानेन । **एवमन्य-त्रापि** इति । यत्र परामर्शसिषाधयिषासिद्धयः क्रमेण भवन्ति, एवं सिद्धि-

D. case of the absence of certainty there is the absence of the qualified brought about by the absence of both (i.e. the absence of the desire to establish and certainty). This is the idea. **Because there is the certainty** (*siddheḥ sattvāt*). Since there is certainty, there is the absence of subjectness in the form of the absence of certainty. This is the idea. The manner in which the absence of the desire to establish is a qualifier to certainty is to be understood as the existence (of both) in the same soul at the same time. Therefore there is no harm even though the certainty at the time of the desire to establish is qualified by the absence of the desire to establish by the relation of temporality. When there is the cause in the form of consideration and when there is the hindering factor in the form of certainty, if there is the desire to establish then that desire should be said as stimulating factor and this is not possible and so the objection is raised with the words **it may be objected** (*nanu yatreti*).

After consideration (*parāmarśānantaram*) means in the second moment after consideration. **Then** (*tataḥ*) means in the second moment after the origin of certainty. **One after the other** (*krameṇa*) i.e. without interval. **The same will be the case in other instances also** (*evam anyatrāpī īti*). The meaning is when consideration, desire to establish and certainty arise one after the other; similarly (where) certainty, desire to establish and consideration (arise one after the other); similarly (where) desire

दि. सिषाधयिषापरामर्शाः, एवं सिषाधयिषापरामर्शसिद्धयश्च तत्रेत्यर्थः । **सिद्धिकाले परामर्शकाले च** इति । सिद्धिपरामर्शोभयक्षण इत्यर्थः । **कथम्** इति । किमर्थमित्यर्थः। **इति प्रत्यक्षम्** इति । अनुमितीष्टसाधनताविषयकमिति शेषः । प्रत्यक्षोत्पत्तेः पूर्वमनुमितीष्टसाधनताधीस्वीकारे इच्छासामग्र्या प्रतिबन्धात् प्रत्यक्षमेव न स्यात् । **यादृशयादृशेति** । 'घटानुमितिर्जायताम्' इतीच्छासत्त्वेऽपि 'पर्वतो वह्निमान्' इति सिद्ध्यसत्त्वे 'वह्निमान्' इत्यनुमित्युत्पत्तेः 'पर्वतो वह्निमान्' इति सिद्धिसत्त्वेऽपि तदिच्छाबलात्तादृशानुमित्यापत्तिरत उक्तं **सिद्धिसत्त्वे** इति । इदं चोत्तेजकेच्छाव्यक्तेः परिचायकं रूपम् । उत्तेजकत्वं तु तत्तद्व्यक्तित्वेनैवेति बोध्यम् । **तेन**

D. to establish, consideration and certainty (arise one after the other). **At the moment of certainty and at the moment of consideration** (*siddhikāle parāmarśakāle ca iti*). At both moments of certainty and consideration. This is the meaning. **How can** (*katham iti*). For what purpose? This is the meaning. **There is the perception** (*iti pratyakṣam iti*), the object of which is the state of being the means existing in the inferential knowledge for (accomplishing) the desired thing. This is the rest (of the sentence). Before the origin of the perception, if the knowledge of the state of being the means existing in the inferential knowledge for (accomplishing) the desired thing is accepted, because of the hindering factor in the form of the causal complex of the desire, there would be no perception at all. **Of which types ...** (*yādṛśayādṛśeti*). Even when there is the desire in the form 'let inferential knowledge of jar arise' and when there is the absence of certainty in the form 'the mountain has fire' since inferential knowledge in the form 'it has fire' arises, even when there is the certainty in the form 'mountain has fire', by the force of the desire (for the inferential knowledge of jar) there would come about such an inferential knowledge (that 'mountain has fire'). Therefore it is mentioned **when there is certainty** (*siddhisattve iti*). This is to be understood as indicative of the individual instance of desire which is the stimulating factor. It is to be understood that the state of being stimulating factor is in the capacity of being an individual only. **Therefore** (*tena*) means

दि. तत्तदिच्छाया उत्तेजकत्वेन । 'यत्किंचित् ज्ञानम्' इति अस्य 'एतदुत्तरकालीनम्' इत्यादिः । अन्यथा यत्किंचित् ज्ञानस्य सर्वदा सिद्धत्वेन तद्रूपेणेच्छाविरहात् । **नानुमितिः** इति । नानुमित्यापत्तिरित्यर्थः । तदिच्छायास्तद्व्यक्तित्वेनोत्तेजकत्वानभ्युपगमादिति भावः । न च 'यत्किंचित् ज्ञानं जायताम्' इत्येतादृशेच्छाकाले सिद्धिसत्वेऽप्यनुमितिर्भवत्येवेति वाच्यम्। अनुमितिसामग्रीसत्त्वे आत्मादिविषयकयत्किंचिन्मानसादिसामग्रीसत्त्वनियमेन यत्किंचिन्मानसाद्युत्पत्त्यैव तादृशेच्छाविषयसिद्धेः तत्रानुमित्युत्पत्ताविष्टापत्त्यसंभवात् । नन्वनुमितित्वप्रकारकेच्छात्वेनानुगतरूपेणैवोत्तेजकत्वं वाच्यं तावतैव 'यत्किंचित् ज्ञानं जायताम्' इतीच्छावारणसंभवान्न तु तत्तद्व्यक्ति-

D. when each individual instance of desire is the stimulating factor. (The expression) pertaining to a subsequent time after this (is to be added) before (the expression) 'some instance of knowledge'. Otherwise since there is always some instance of knowledge there would not be desire in that form (i.e. let there be some instance of knowledge). **No inferential knowledge** (*nānumitiḥ iti*) means no possibility of inferential knowledge. The meaning is that that particular instance of desire is not accepted as the stimulating factor in the capacity of being that particular desire. It may be objected that at the time of the desire in the form 'let there be some instance of knowledge' even if there is certainty, inferential knowledge would indeed arise. When there is the causal complex of inferential knowledge, there would necessarily be the causal complex of a particular instance of mental perception whose object is self etc.; therefore by the origin of some instance of mental perception, the purpose of such a desire is fulfilled; hence the objection that inferential knowledge would arise cannot be taken as an acceptable objection. Nor can it be further objected that the state of being stimulating factor is to be understood as having a consecutive characteristic in the form of the state of being desire, the qualifier of which is the state of being inferential knowledge. In this way the desire in the form 'let there be some instance of knowledge' can be avoided. Therefore the state of being stimulating factor should not be understood as qualified by the state of being that individual

दि. त्वेनोत्तेजकत्वं कल्प्यं गौरवादित्यत आह **वह्निव्याप्येति** । 'प्रत्यक्षातिरिक्तं ज्ञानम्' इत्यस्य 'शाब्दसामग्र्यसत्त्वे' इत्यादिः । शाब्दसामग्रीसत्त्वे शाब्दबोधेनैवेच्छाविषयसिद्धिसंभवात् । 'भवत्येव' इति 'अनुमितिः' इत्यनेन संबध्यते । तथा चानुमितित्वप्रकारकेच्छात्वेनोत्तेजकत्वे तत्रानुमितिर्न स्यादिति भावः । तल्लिङ्गकत्वप्रवेशस्य फलमाह **एवम्** इत्यादिना । **नानुमितिः** इति । इच्छायास्तत्तद्व्यक्तित्वेनोत्तेजकतया तदिच्छाव्यक्तेरनुत्तेजकत्वादिति भावः। इदं तु बोध्यम् । 'पर्वते वह्न्यनुमितिर्जायताम्' इत्याद्यनुगतेच्छानां पर्वतत्वा-

D. (desire) because there is cumbersomeness. Therefore (the author) says **pervaded by fire** (*vahnivyāpyeti*). Before (the expression) 'knowledge different from perception (*pratyakṣātiriktam jñānam*)' (the expression) 'absence of causal complex of verbal knowledge (*śābdasāmagryasattve*)' (should be added). The reason is that when there is the causal complex of verbal knowledge, the object of desire would be accomplished by means of verbal knowledge itself. (The expression) 'would indeed arise (*bhavatyeva*)' is connected (with the expression) 'inferential knowledge (*anumiti*)' (which is understood). Therefore when the state of being stimulating factor is understood (as determined) by the state of being desire, the qualifier of which is the state of being inferential knowledge, in such a place there would be no inferential knowledge. This is the idea. (The author) points out the purpose of including (the expression) 'the state of being produced by that reason' with the words **similarly etc.** (*evamityādinā*). **No inferential knowledge** (*nānumitiriti*). An instance of desire, in as far as it is that individual desire, is to be understood as the stimulating factor and therefore the desire (to establish fire by the reason of light) is not a stimulating factor. This is the idea.

This indeed is to be understood. The instances of desires such as 'let there be inferential knowledge of fire in the mountain' have a consecutive character; they are stimulating factors having the consecutive form of the state of being desire the object of which is inferential knowledge. (These desires) have the qualifierness

दि. वच्छिन्नोद्देश्यकत्वप्रकारतानिरूपितवह्निविधेयकत्वप्रकारताशाल्यनुमिति-गोचरेच्छात्वेनानुगतरूपेणैवोत्तेजकत्वं, 'प्रत्यक्षातिरिक्तं ज्ञानं जायताम्' इत्याद्यननुगतेच्छानां तु तत्तद्व्यक्तित्वेन, न तु सकलेच्छानां तत्तद्व्यक्तित्वेन, गौरवादिति । सिषाधयिषाकाले 'पर्वतो वह्निमान्' इति सिद्धिसत्त्वेऽपि 'पर्वतो वह्निमान्' इत्यनुमित्युत्पत्तेः तादृशसिद्धेर्न तादृशानुमितिप्रतिबन्धकत्वं स्यादत उक्तं **सिषाधयिषाविरहकाले** इति । **विशिष्य** इति । 'पर्वतो वह्निमान्' इत्याद्यनुमितौ पर्वतत्वाद्यवच्छिन्नविशेष्यतानिरूपितवह्नित्वाद्यव-

D. existing in the state of being indicator of the predicateness existing in fire; such a qualifierness is indicated by the qualifierness existing in the state of being indicator of the subjectness which is determined by mountainness.[1] And in the case of desires such as 'let there be knowledge other than perception' which (desires) do not have consecutive characteristics (are stimulating factors) in as far as they are particular individual desires; not all desires are stimulating factors, in as far as they are individual desires because of cumbersomeness. When there is the desire to establish (fire) even though there is the certainty that the mountain has fire, inferential knowledge in the form 'mountain has fire' arises. Therefore such a certainty is not a hindering factor for that particular knowledge. Therefore (the expression) 'at the time of the absence of desire to establish' (is used in the definition of subjectness). **In particular** (*viśiṣyaiva*). In the case of the inferential knowledge 'mountain has fire' the hindering factor is to be considered as the certainty in which the qualifierness

[1] This is the translation of the highly technical sentence, '*parvatatvāvacchinnoddeśyakatvaprakāratānirūpitavahnividheyakatvaprakāratāśālyanumiti-gocarecchātvam*. This is the actual consecutive character (*anugatadharma*) of the two desires. These desires have the form *parvato vahnimān ityanumiti jāyatām* and *parvate vahnih ityanumitirjāyatām*. But these forms of desires have inferential knowledge as object. These instances of inferential knowledge have two characteristics: one is *parvatoddeśyakatva* and the other is *vahnividheyakatva*. Therefore these two characteristics are qualifiers (*prākāra*) of the desire. Further each of these two characteristics posesses different instances of qualifierness (*prakāratā*). And these *prakāratās* are related by the relation of *parasparanirūpyanirūpakabhāva*.

दि. च्छिन्नप्रकारताशालिनिश्चयत्वेन प्रतिबन्धकता वक्तव्येत्यर्थः । तत्प्रयोजनमाह **तेन** इति । 'सिद्धिरेव' इत्येवकारेण सामानाधिकरण्येन सिद्धिव्यवच्छेदः। **सामानाधिकरण्येनानुमितिं प्रति तु** इति । सामानाधिकरण्यमात्रेणानुमितिं प्रतीत्यर्थः । अन्यथावच्छेदकावच्छेदेनानुमितेरपि सामानाधिकरण्यावगाहितया तद्व्यवच्छेदाप्रतीतेः । **सिद्धिमात्रम्** इति । पक्षविशेष्यकसाध्यप्रकारकनिश्चयत्वेन विरोधित्वमित्यर्थः । उपाध्यायास्तु सिषाधयिषाविरहविशिष्टसिद्धिप्रत्यक्षसामग्र्योरन्यतरस्याभावः पक्षता । तेन सिद्धिकाले समानविषयकप्रत्यक्षसामग्रीकालेऽपि च नानुमित्यापत्तिरित्याहुस्तद्दूषयितुं प्रत्यक्षसामग्र्यभावस्य पक्षताकुक्ष्यप्रवेशे प्रत्यक्षसामग्रीकाले कथं नानुमितिरित्युत्कटशिष्यजिज्ञासानुत्पादार्थं प्रथमतः स्वसिद्धान्तमाह

D. is determined by fireness which (qualifierness) is indicated by the qualificandness determined by mountainness. (The author) points out its purpose with the word **therefore** (*tena*). By means of the word 'only' in the expression 'only certainty' there (occurs) the exclusion of certainty qualified by co-occurrence. **But for the inferential knowledge qualified by co-occurrence** (*sāmānādhikaraṇyenānumitiṃ prati iti*) means only for the inferential knowledge qualified by co-occurrence. Otherwise it would not be possible to exclude inferential knowledge qualified by co-occurrence since it is included in the inferential knowledge qualified by the determinant of subjectness. **Just certainty** (*siddhimātramiti*). The meaning is that the certainty in which that which is to be established is the qualifier and the subject is the qualificand.

According to Upādhyāya subjectness is the absence either of the causal complex of perception or of the certainty qualified by the absence of the desire to establish. Therefore he says that there is no possibility of inferential knowledge when there is the causal complex for the perception of the same object or when there is certainty (of the same). In order to reject this opinion and to avoid the intense desire of the pupil to know the reason why inferential knowledge does not arise if the absence of the causal complex of perception is not included in the definition

दि. इदं तु बोध्यम् इत्यादिना । **भवति** इति । संशयोत्तरप्रत्यक्षं प्रति हेतुभूतस्य विशेषदर्शनस्य सत्त्वादिति भावः । एतादृशप्रत्यक्षसामग्रीविशेषपर्यन्तानुधावनं च तद्विषयेऽनुमितिसामग्रीसंपत्तिदर्शनार्थं अन्यथा स्वातन्त्र्येणानुमितिसामग्रीप्रदर्शनेन प्रयासापत्तेः । **स्वातन्त्र्येण** इति । पक्षताकुक्ष्यप्रविष्टत्वेनेत्यर्थः । शाब्दसिद्धौ सत्यां 'अशाब्दज्ञानं जायताम्' इतीच्छायामनुमितेरुत्पादात्सिद्धावनुमितिगोचरेच्छात्वेन तादृशेच्छाकाले प्रत्यक्षसामग्रीकालेऽनुमित्यनुत्पादेन सामग्र्यामनुमितित्वप्रकारकेच्छात्वेनोत्तेजकत्वस्यावश्यकतया एकरूपेणोत्तेजकत्वासंभवात् । एवमुभयत्र सिषाध-

D. of subjectness, the author explains first of all his own doctrine with the words **This should indeed be understood** (*idam tu bodhyamityādinā*). (Perceptual knowledge) arises (*pratyakṣam*) (*bhavati iti*). The idea is that because there is the perception of the particular characteristic which is the cause of perceptual knowledge after a doubt (perceptual knowledge arises). In order to show the special causal complex of inferential knowledge of that object, (the author) presents such a specific causal complex of perception; otherwise he will have to make the additional effort to establish independently the causal complex of inferential knowledge. **Independently** (*svātantryeṇa iti*). Without being included in the definition of subjectness. This is the meaning. When there is the certainty in the form of verbal knowledge, if there is a desire in the form 'let there be an instance of knowledge other than verbal knowledge' then inferential knowledge arises. Therefore when there is the certainty, the stimulating factor is necessarily in the form of the desire the object of which is inferential knowledge. When there is such a desire (i.e. desire for an instance of knowledge other than verbal knowledge) and when there is the causal complex of perception inferential knowledge does not arise. Therefore when there is the causal complex of perception, the stimulating factor (for inferential knowledge) is the desire the qualifier of which is the state of being inferential knowledge. Hence the state of being stimulating factor cannot be determined by one consecutive characteristic. Further in both places (viz. certainty and the causal complex of perception)

दि. यिषाविरहस्य नैकसंबन्धेन विशेषणत्वं सिद्धौ समवायघटितसामानाधिकरण्येन चक्षुःसंयोगादिरूपसामग्र्यां तु स्वाश्रयचक्षुःसंयुक्तमनःप्रतियोगिकविजातीयसंयोगघटितसामानाधिकरण्येनेत्येकरूपेण तयोः प्रतिबन्धकत्वासंभवादित्याशय इति दिक् । नन्वनुमितिं प्रति प्रत्यक्षसामग्र्याः स्वातन्त्र्येण प्रतिबन्धकत्वे भिन्नविषयेऽपि प्रत्यक्षसामग्रीकालेऽनुमित्यनुपपत्तिः । मन्मते तु अनुमानातिरिक्तप्रकृतसाध्यसाधकमानत्वेन पक्षताकुक्षौ तस्याः प्रवेशेनोक्तापत्त्यनवकाशादत आह **एवम्** इति । **अनुमितिसामग्रीप्रतिबन्धिका** इति । तथा च भिन्नविषयकानुमिति सामग्र्यभावघटितप्रत्यक्षसामग्र्यास्तत्राभावान्न पूर्वोक्तस्थलेऽनुमित्यनुपपत्तिरिति भावः ।

D. the absence of the desire to establish is not a qualifier by the same relation. For certainty it is a qualifier by the relation of co-occurrence consisting of inherence. For the causal complex in the form of the conjunction of eyes and so on, it is qualifier by the relation of co-occurrence consisting of a particular form of conjunction the adjunct of which is mind which is connected with eyes which are the substratum of the conjunction of the eyes. Therefore the idea is that there would not be hindrance of both in the same form. This is the direction. Now it may be objected that if the causal complex of perception is an independent hindering factor, then when there is the causal complex of perception the object of which is different (from the object of inferential knowledge), inferential knowledge would not arise. In my opinion since it (the causal complex of perceptual knowledge) is included in the definition of subjectness in the form of the means of establishing the desired *sādhya* which (i.e. the means) is different from inference there would not be the possibility of undesired consequence which was mentioned. Therefore (the author) says **similarly** (*evam iti*). **The causal complex of inferential knowledge (is) hindering factor** (*anumiti-sāmagrīpratibandhiketi*). In this way, since there is the absence of the causal complex of perception in which the absence of the causal complex of inferential knowledge the object of which is different from the object of perceptual knowledge is a constituent

दि. यद्वानुमितिसामग्रीप्रतिबन्धिका अनुमितिसामग्र्येव प्रतिबन्धिका न तु भिन्ने विषये प्रत्यक्षसामग्र्यनुमितौ प्रतिबन्धिकेत्यर्थः । तथा च प्रत्यक्षसामग्र्याः समानविषयकानुमितिं प्रत्येव प्रतिबन्धकतया न पूर्वोक्तानुमित्यनुपपत्तिरिति भावः ।

D. part there would be no inappropriateness for inferential knowledge to arise in the place mentioned. This is the idea. Or else the expression 'causal complex of inferential knowledge is a hindering factor' means the causal complex of inferential knowledge alone is hindering factor. And it is not the case that the causal complex of perception is hindering factor for the inferential knowledge in which the object is different (from the object of perceptual knowledge). This is the meaning. In this way the causal complex of perceptual knowledge is a hindering factor only for inferential knowledge having the same object. Hence there is no possibility of the objection that inferential knowledge would not arise as mentioned earlier. This is the idea.

Commentary

(p.201, ln 3 – p.202, ln 5; p.205, ln 6 – p.207, ln 5) In K., Relevance for the discussion of subjectness after the discussion on invariable concomitance has not been shown; therefore the authors first of all point out the Relevance of discussing subjectness. Dinakara explicitly states that the *saṅgati* (Relevance) is *upodghāta* (Introduction) which is defined as that which explains the topic under discussion (*prakṛtopapādakatvam upodghātaḥ*). This is because subjectness is a constituent part of consideration (*parāmarśa*) which is the present topic of discussion. Therefore subjectness is also the present topic of discussion and so it is discussed by the Relevance of Introduction (*upodghāta*) since it explains consideration. But this is the Relevance between the discussions on consideration and subjectness. The Relevance between discussion on invariable concomitance and subjectness is *ekakāryakāritva,* i.e. the state of being the cause of one effect since both invariable concomitance and subjectness produce the effect in the form of inferential knowledge.

An objection may be raised here as follows: although *pakṣatā* is a direct cause of inferential knowledge, invariable concomitance is not such a cause; only knowledge of invariable concomitance is a direct cause of inferential knowledge. Therefore *pakṣatā* and *vyāpti* are not causes of the same effect and therefore there is no Relevance in the form of *ekakāryakāritva* in the discussion on *pakṣatā* after the discussion on *vyāpti*. This objection is answered by pointing out that *ekakāryakāritva* means that which brings about one effect (i.e. *ekakāryaprayojakatva*). This is something common to both cause and determinant of causeness. Therefore although *pakṣatā* is the direct cause of inferential knowledge and invariable concomitance is not a direct cause of inferential knowledge, still invariable concomitance is the determinant of causeness since it is the object of the knowledge of invariable concomitance which is a direct cause of inferential knowledge.[1]

In a similar manner the Relevance for the discussion on fallacious reasons after the discussion of valid reason is in the form of *ekakāryakāritva* as shown by the author of *Dīdhiti*. This is because inferential knowledge arises because of consideration of the reasons proposed by the one who starts the discussions and the knowledge that the reasons advanced by the opponent are fallacious is useful in order to remove hindering factors against inferential knowledge.

In fact there is Relevance in the form of Introduction (*upodghāta*) also for treating *pakṣatā* after *vyāpti*. This is because Relevance indicated *(nirūpita)* by a certain thing is the object of the knowledge which is the cause of the desire to know the reason for mentioning that thing after the mentioning of another thing. Therefore the desire to know what is *pakṣatā* may arise since it is a part of *pakṣavṛttitva* which is also the object of the same consideration just as invariable concomitance. This is the reason why Gadādhara points out that Introduction (*upodghāta*) is the Relevance when Dīdhitikāra discusses the definition of

[1] When *vyāptijñānam* is *kāraṇam*, *vyāpti* is *kāraṇatāvacchedakam* since *vyāpti* exists in *vyāptijñāna* by the relation of *viṣayitā*. Further this instance of knowledge in the form of *vyāptijñāna* is the cause of inferential knowledge as the knowledge of invariable concomitance (*vyāptijñānatvena*).

inference after the discussion on subjectness while establishing the causality of consideration for inferential knowledge.

K. defines subject as follows: where the certainty of that which is to be established without the absence of the desire to establish the same does not exist, that is subject. This means that the subject is that on which there does not exist the certainty of that which is to be established without the absence of the desire to establish the same. But this is only a definition of subject but not of subjectness. Although the definition of subjectness can be derived from the definition of subject, still for the sake of clarity Muktāvalīkāra defines what subjectness is. Subjectnes is the absence of the certainty of that which is to be established qualified by the absence of the desire to establish the same (*siṣādhayiṣāvirahaviśiṣṭasiddhyabhāvaḥ pakṣatā*).

Only the desire to establish that which is to be established is not subjectness. This is because even without the desire to establish that which is to be established there is the possibility of the inference of the cloud from the roar of thunder. Therefore subjectness is defined as the absence of the certainty of that which is to be established qualified by the absence of the desire to establish the same.

Now an objection may be raised: there is the certainty qualified by the absence of the desire to establish the *sādhya* in the self by the relation of inherence. And the absence of that certainty exists in the subject (*pakṣa*). Therefore, even when there is the certainty without the desire to establish the *sādhya*, inferential knowledge should arise. This is not possible because the certainty exists in the subject also by the relation of qualificandness. This just means that the certainty that the mountain has fire exists in the self by the relation of inherence; but at the same time this same certainty exists in the mountain by the relation of qualificandness.[1]

[1] An instance of knowledge exists in the self by the relation of inherence, but at the same time it exists in the object of the knowledge by the relation of *viṣayatā*. Thus for instance in the certain knowledge 'mountain has fire', certainty exists in the mountain by the relation of *viṣayatā* in the form of *viśeṣyatā* and in the fire this certainty exists by the relation of *viṣayatā* in the form of *prakāratā*.

Further according to the old Naiyāyikas doubt of *sādhya* is what constitutes *pakṣatā*.[1] This opinion is rejected because even without the doubt of *sādhya* inferential knowledge arises as in the case of the inferential knowledge of cloud from the roar of thunder. If there is desire to establish the *sādhya* inferential knowledge of it arises even though there is certainty of *sādhya*, although certainty in itself is a hindrance for inferential knowledge. Therefore the absence of the desire to establish is given as a qualification to certainty. Hence even though there is certainty, inferential knowledge arises because there is subjectness in the form of *siṣādhayiṣāvirahaviśiṣṭa-siddhyabhāva*. When there is the desire to establish the *sādhya*, the certainty is not qualified by the absence of the desire to establish *sādhya*. Therefore there is the absence of certainty which is qualified by the absence of the desire to establish the *sādhya*.

Further when there is no certainty of the *sādhya* whether there is the desire to establish the *sādhya* or not there is subjectness. When there is the desire to establish the *sādhya*, there is the absence of both qualifier and qualificand. The qualifier is the absence of the desire to establish the *sādhya* and such a qualifier does not exist when there is the desire to establish. Hence there is the absence of the qualifier. The qualificand is the certainty which is absent. Hence since both the qualifier and the qualified are absent that which is qualified viz. *siṣādhayiṣāvirahaviśiṣṭa-siddhi* is absent and so there is subjectness. When there is the absence of certainty, there is the absence of the qualificand, and so there is the absence of the qualified viz. certainty. So even if there is no desire to establish the *sādhya*, there is subjectness.

Where there is the desire to establish the *sādhya* whether there is the certainty of the *sādhya* or not there is subjectness. When there is the certainty and the desire to establish the *sādhya*, there is the absence of the qualifier (i.e. the absence of the desire to establish) and therefore there is the absence of that which is qualified and so there is subjectness. When there is the desire to establish and the absence of certainty, there is the absence of the

[1] *tatra nānupalabdhe na nirṇite'rthe nyāyaḥ pravartate, kim tarhi, saṃśayite-'rthe, Nyāyabhāṣya* on *Nyāyasūtra,* 1.1.1.p.35, ln 4.

qualificand, viz. certainty. Hence there is the absence of that which is qualified. Therefore there is subjectness.

Further, where there is the certainty but there is no desire to establish the *sādhya* there is no subjectness. This is because there is the certainty qualified by the absence of desire to establish the *sādhya*. Hence subjectness is only *siṣādhayiṣāvirahaviśiṣṭasiddhyabhāva*. It should be noted that the absence of the desire to establish the *sādhya* and the certainty of the *sādhya* should exist at the same time in the same soul; otherwise it will not be a hindering factor. The reason is that the certainty at the time of the desire to establish the *sādhya* is qualified by the absence of the desire to establish the *sādhya* by the relation of temporality. But when it is stated that the absence of the desire to establish the *sādhya* and the certainty of the *sādhya* should exist at the same time in the same soul, then there is no absence of the desire to establish the *sādhya*; therefore there arises inferential knowledge.[1]

[1] Here Parīkṣit Thampurān (S., pp. 160–1) raises objections to this position and answers them. First of all he points out that even when there is the desire to establish the *sādhya*, there is the absence of the desire to establish the *sādhya* in jar at the same time and in the soul in the previous moment. Therefore the absence of the desire to establish the *sādhya* qualifies the certainty by being at the same time (in jar) and in the soul (in the previous moment). Hence there would not be inferential knowledge. In order to avoid this it is stated that the occurrence of the absence of desire to establish the *sādhya* as existing in the soul is determined by the same time at which certainty exists. Even then it may be objected that there is the absence of *siṣādhayiṣā* in the soul as limited by jar. (It may be noted here that according to Nyāya *ātma* is *vibhu* and so although there is *siṣādhayiṣā* in the soul as limited by body still there is the absence of *siṣādhayiṣā* in the soul as limited by jar and so on. In other words the special qualities of the soul are *avyāpyavṛtti*). Hence the difficulty remains, i.e. inferential knowledge cannot arise. This objection cannot be admitted. This is because *vaiśiṣṭyam* (i.e. *siṣādhayiṣāvirahasya vaiśiṣṭyam*) is *tadadhikaraṇavṛttitvam*. Therefore the *adhikaraṇatā* of *siṣādhayiṣāviraha* is in *ātman*, but this *adhikaraṇatā* is the indicator (*nirūpaka*) of *adhikaraṇatāvacchedakatā* existing in jar which is a particular place. But this is excluded because *vaiśiṣṭyaghaṭakādhikarṇatā* is known as *anirūpakam* of the *avacchedakatā* existing in jar (*vaiśiṣṭyaghaṭakasiṣādhayiṣāvirahādhikaraṇatāyāṃ deśaniṣṭhāvacchedakatvānirūpakatvasya niveśāt*).

Now it may be further objected that the *adhikaraṇatā* of *siṣādhayiṣāviraha* is in the soul and this *adhikaraṇatā* is determined by the body which is a particular place. Therefore the given answer is not appropriate. This

(p.202, ln 5 – p.203, ln 5; p.207, ln 5 – p.208, ln 5) Now it may be objected as follows: consideration (*parāmarśa*) is the cause of inferential knowledge. And the hindering factor for the same (i.e. inferential knowledge) is certainty. Therefore if there arises inferential knowledge when there is both consideration and hindering factor in the form of certainty, then *siṣādhayiṣā* can be accepted as stimulating factor (*uttejaka*). But this is not possible. This is because of the following reasons: first of all, where there is certainty after consideration and then there is the desire to establish, there will not be any inferential knowledge because at the time of the desire to establish, consideration is destroyed.[1] And so owing to the absence of consideration which is the cause of inferential knowledge there will be no inferential knowledge.

Further, when the certainty of the *sādhya*, consideration and the desire to establish arise one after another at the moment of the desire to establish, there is also the destruction of certainty. Hence inferential knowledge arises because of the absence of the hindering factor. When there arise desire to establish *sādhya,* certainty and consideration one after another, at the moment of consideration desire to establish is destroyed and so because of the absence of the stimulating factor and the presence of the hindering factor no inferential knowledge arises. In the same manner when consideration, desire to establish and certainty occur one after another, at the moment of certainty consideration is destroyed and so there is no inferential knowledge because of the absence of the cause. Similarly when certainty, desire to establish and consideration arise in this order, at the moment of consideration certainty is destroyed and so there is inferential knowledge because of the absence of the

objection is also rejected because there is no basis to argue that the body is the determinant of *adhikaraṇatā* of *siṣādhayiṣāviraha*. Otherwise everything will be the determinant of *siṣādhayiṣāvirahādhikaraṇatā*. (The reason is that when there is no *siṣādhayiṣā* in the soul, the absence of *siṣādhayiṣā* exists everywhere). Therefore it is better to accept *siṣādhayiṣāvirahādhikaraṇatā* as *niravacchinnā*.

[1] This is because of the Nyāya principle that the perceptible special qualities of omnipresent realities are destroyed by any of the special qualities which arise immediately after that particular quality (*yogyavibhuviśeṣaguṇānām svottara-vṛttiviśeṣaguṇanāśyatvam*).

hindering factor. Again when desire to establish, consideration and certainty occur one after another, at the moment of certainty there is the destruction of the desire to establish and so because of the absence of the stimulating factor and the presence of the hindering factor there is no inferential knowledge. Further desire to establish cannot arise at the same time as certainty and consideration since the special qualities of omnipresent substances do not exist simultaneously.[1] Because of these reasons the absence of the desire to establish cannot be a qualifier of certainty.

This objection is rejected because of the following reasons: when there is perception in the form 'the mountain which has smoke that is pervaded by fire has fire' and then there is the desire to establish the *sādhya*, then there would be inferential knowledge. Here consideration in the form of perception is at the same time as certainty. Hence there is the hindering factor in the form of certainty. Still inferential knowledge arises because of *siṣādhayiṣā*, the stimulating factor. And in this instance subjectness can only be absence of certainty which is qualified by the absence of the desire to establish *sādhya* (*siṣādhayiṣāvirahaviśiṣṭasiddhyabhāva*). Here though there is *siddhi*, there is no *siṣādhayiṣāvirahaviśiṣṭasiddhi* and hence there is *pakṣatā*.

Now D. points out that the perception in question should have also as object *anumitīṣṭasādhanatā*, i.e. inferential knowledge as the means of obtaining that which is desired. The reason is that after the perceptual knowledge in the form 'the mountain which has smoke that is pervaded by fire has fire', there is no desire for inferential knowledge (*anumitsā*) because there is no

[1] But here Parīkṣit Thampurān points out (S., p.161, lns 2 & 17) that if *siṣādhayiṣā* arises in between *siddhi* and *parāmarśa*, then *siṣādhayiṣā* exists at the moment of certainty and at the moment of consideration. Hence the objection raised in M. is not valid. Therefore D. has explained the expression *siddhikāle parāmarśakāle ca* as *siddhiparāmarśobhayakṣaṇe*; i.e. at the moment when both *siddhi* and *parāmarśa* exist together, there does not arise *siṣādhayiṣā*. Hence the M. text *siddhikāle parāmarśakāle ca na siṣādhayiṣā* is to be understood in the sense of *siddhikāle parāmarśakāle na ca siṣādhayiṣā*. The idea is that if the text is taken as it stands in M. then the moments of *siddhi* and *parāmarśa* can be different; but if *ca* is placed after *na* as Thampurān suggests then the moment of *siddhi* and *paramarśa* are the same. In this interpretation, the meaning of *ca* is *avadhāraṇa*, i.e. certainty.

knowledge of *iṣṭasādhanatā*, i.e. the means of obtaining that which is desired. This is because of the general rule that the *iṣṭasādhanatājñāna* is the cause of the desire for the means (*upāyecchā*). And if the *iṣṭasādhanatājñāna* is accepted before the perception, then perception itself will not arise since the causal complex of desire for inferential knowledge will hinder perception and produce desire for inferential knowledge. If however *iṣṭasādhanatājñāna* is accepted as arising after perception then at the moment of desire to establish, the perception that the mountain which has smoke that is pervaded by fire has fire will be destroyed since it is in the third moment after the *iṣṭasādhanatājñāna*. Therefore in the absence of consideration in the form of perceptual knowledge, there would not arise any inferential knowledge. Hence the perception mentioned should have *anumitīṣṭasādhanatā* also as object i.e. its form should be: *vahnivyapyadhūmavān parvato vahnimān anumitīṣṭasādhanaṃ ca.*

M. mentions *vahnivyāpyadhūmavān parvato vahnimāniti pratyakṣaṃ smaraṇaṃ vā.* Here a question arises why the author mentions *smaraṇam* also. The reason for this is given by Parīkṣit Thampurān (S., p.161, lns 10&11). The perception *vahni-vyāpyadhūmavān parvato vahnimān* is an external perception produced by the conjunction of the eyes and so on. Such a causal complex of perception cannot produce the perceptual knowledge of *iṣṭasādhanatā*. Therefore consideration in the form of perception cannot have *iṣṭasādhanatā* also as its object. Therefore M. mentions also recollection.[1]

(p.203, ln 5 – p.204, ln 9; p.208, ln 5 – p.212, ln 6) M. now gives the final definition of subjectness as follows: by the existence of which types of desires to establish the *sādhya* when there is the existence of certainty, inferential knowledge arises from which reason for that instance of inferential knowledge, the absence of the certainty which is qualified by the absence of

[1] Parīkṣit Thampurān here makes a further remark: in M. *siṣādhayiṣā* is placed after *pratyakṣaṃ smaraṇaṃ vā.* Here a question is raised why *siṣādhyiṣā* is not placed before *pratyakṣam.* Thampurān answers that this is because if *pratyakṣam* is placed after *siṣādhyiṣā*, then after this perception another perception having the same object can arise since the *anumitsā* is not a hindrance for the perception of the same object. (S., p.161, lns 12–13).

those kinds of desires to establish is subjectness. What is intended by this definition of subjectness may be made clear with the help of an example. When there is certainty in the form of consideration as in the instance *vahnivyāpyadhūmavān parvato vahnimān*, then there should be *siṣādhayiṣā* in order that inferential knowledge may arise. Such a *siṣādhayiṣā* can be in many forms as *anumitir jāyatām, pratyakṣātiriktam jñānaṃ jāyatām* etc. This is the purpose of including the expression 'which types of desires (*yādṛśayādṛśasiṣādhayiṣā*)' in the definition. The form of the inferential knowledge that arises from this consideration is *parvato vahnimān*. Subjectness for such an instance of inferential knowledge is the absence of certainty which is qualified by the absence of those kinds of desires to establish the *sādhya*.

In the definition of subjectness the purpose of the expression 'when there is certainty (*siddhisattve*)' is to be explained as follows: when there is the desire for the inferential knowledge of jar if there is no certainty that the mountain has fire, then inferential knowledge that the mountain has fire arises. Hence when there is the certainty that the mountain has fire, if there is the same desire for inferential knowledge of jar, then the inferential knowledge 'mountain has fire' should arise. But this does not happen. This is because such a desire is not a stimulating factor in the presence of such a certainty. Therefore the expression 'when there is certainty (*siddhisattve*)' is used in the definition. And the expression *yādṛśayādṛśasiṣādhayiṣāsattve siddhisattve* is to be understood as indicating all particular instances of desires to establish the *sādhya*.

Only individual desires to establish *sādhya* in as far as they are such individual desires are the stimulating factors. Hence the state of being such an individual (*tadvyaktitvam*) only is the determinant of the state of being stimulating factor (*uttejakatāvacchedakam*) and therefore in the definition of subjectness as given in M. the section till the end of the word *anumiti* is not included as a determinant. Since such an individual desire to establish the *sādhya* is the stimulating factor when certainty and consideration are present even if after these there is the desire for some kind of knowledge, no inferential knowledge arises.

Here R. raises an objection. It is not possible for the desire for some kind of knowledge to arise after the knowledge

in the form of consideration and certainty. The reason is that consideration and certainty are instances of some kinds of knowledge and so after these there cannot be again desire for some kinds of knowledge. This is because when something is already obtained, there is no desire for it again (*siddhe vastuni icchānutpatteḥ*). It cannot be further argued that although something is obtained, if there is no knowledge that it is obtained, then there could be desire for that something again. Therefore even though there are some instances of knowledge in the form of consideration and certainty still there is no knowledge that such instances of knowledge have occurred. Hence there could be desire for such instances of knowledge.

This cannot be admitted. Even though there is the absence of the knowledge that some instances of knowledge have arisen, there is no desire for the knowledge that has arisen. Therefore only in cases other than instances of knowledge, the knowledge that something is obtained is the hindering factor for the desire for that something. In the case of knowledge, the fact that knowledge has arisen is itself the hindering factor for the desire for that instance of knowledge. This is the reason why various authors assert that there is no desire for a thing which has been obtained.

A further objection is raised. It was stated that no inferential knowledge arises when there are consideration certainty and then desire for some instance of knowledge. But according to the opponent, this is not true; inferential knowledge does arise even in that case. This objection is rejected because when the causal complex of inferential knowledge is present, there is invariably the causal complex of mental perception of soul etc. Therefore the desire for some instance of knowledge is fulfilled. Therefore there will not be any possibility of inferential knowledge.

It may be noted that in the answer to the objection, the presence of the causal complex of inferential knowledge is mentioned. The reason is that without the presence of the causal complex for inferential knowledge, even the objection that inferential knowledge arises cannot be raised. When the causal complex of inferential knowledge is present, since there is consideration etc. there is the causal complex of the mental perception. This is because conjunction of the mind with the

soul (*ātmamanasaṃyoga*) is the causal complex of mental perception and this is necessarily present when consideration takes place since it is an instance of knowledge. Therefore if the desire is only for some kind of knowledge as the objector stated then this desire is fulfilled by the occurrence of the mental perception of the soul itself. Therefore inferential knowledge does not take place.[1] Hence only that desire which will not be fulfilled except by the occurrence of inferential knowledge is the stimulating factor.

Nor can it be argued that the stimulating factor is the desire where the qualifier is *anumititva* (state of being inferential knowledge). Hence the determinant of *uttejakatva* (the state of being stimulating factor) in the desire is *anumititvaprakārake-cchātva* (the state of being desire in which the qualifier is *anu-mititva*). This is the consecutive characteristic of the stimulating factor. Therefore it is simpler to consider *anumititvaprakāra-kecchā* as stimulating factor rather than individual desires in the capacity of their being individual desires (*tattadvyaktitvena*) as stimulating factor because in that case there would be many *tadvyaktitvas*. This is cumbersome.

However when there is the perceptual knowledge that 'the mountain having smoke pervaded by fire has fire', if there is a desire for an instance of knowledge which is different from perception, inferential knowledge would arise. But according to Rāmarudra a question may be raised here: after the perceptual knowledge in the form that 'the mountain having smoke pervaded by fire has fire', if there is a desire for an instance of knowledge which is different from perception, inferential knowledge will not arise. This is because such a desire can be fulfilled by the verbal knowledge of the same object, i.e. fire.

Dinakara answers this question pointing out that in the M. text before the expression *pratyakṣātiriktaṃ jñānam*, the expression *śābdasāmgryasattve* (i.e. when there is the absence of the causal complex of verbal knowledge) should be added. Therefore the full meaning of the statement is as follows: when there is the

[1] It may be noted here that *bhinnaviṣayakapratyakṣaṃ prati anumitisāmagrī pratibandhikā.* Therefore when there is the causal complex of inferential knowledge of fire etc. the mental perception of the soul does not arise.

perceptual knowledge that 'the mountain having smoke pervaded by fire has fire', when there is the absence of the causal complex of verbal knowledge, if there is a desire for an instance of knowledge which is different from perception, inferential knowledge would certainly arise. The idea here is that if the stimulating factor is accepted only as *anumititvaprakāra-kecchā*, then there would be no inferential knowledge since here the stimulating factor is *pratyakṣātiriktaṃ vahnijñānaṃ jāyatām*.[1]

Now the purpose of the expression *talliṅgaka*, by that particular reason, in the definition of *pakṣatā* is shown. When there is consideration the object of which is smoke, even if there is a desire for inferential knowledge of fire by the reason of light, inferential knowledge will not arise. This is because an instance of desire in as far as it is that individual desire is to be understood as the stimulating factor and not any other desire. This means that a particular desire should actually produce inferential knowledge; only such a particular desire is accepted as the stimulating factor. Therefore the desire to establish fire by the reason of light does not actually produce inferential knowledge and so it cannot be considered as a stimulating factor when

[1] Here Parīkṣit Thampurān makes very pertinent observations (S., p.161, lns 16–17). First of all he refers to the opinion of certain Naiyāyikas (i.e. Srīrāya Narasiṃha, author of *Prabhā*, commentary to M.; Cfr. *Prābhā*, p.500, lns 5ff) that at the time of consideration in the form of perception or at the time of desire, there cannot be the presence of causal complex of verbal knowledge which includes the meaning of words and so on. This is because two instances of the special qualities of the soul do not arise at the same time (*yogyavibhu-viśeṣaguṇānāṃ yaugapadyaniṣedhāt*). Hence this addition of the expression *śābdasāmagryasattve* is not necessary. This question is answered by pointing out that earlier M. stated *yatra vahnivyāpyadhūmavān parvato vahnimān iti pratyakṣaṃ smaraṇaṃ vā*. Hence here too *pratyakṣam* indicates also *smaraṇam*. Therefore when the consideration is in the form of recollection, the causal complex of verbal knowledge also may be there. This is because this recollection is the recollection of the meanings of the words which (i.e. recollection) is the causal complex of verbal knowledge. Therefore it is necessary to add the expression *śābdasāmagryasattve* also in the statement. Nor can it be further objected that here the desire in the form, *pratyakṣātiriktaṃ jñānaṃ jāyatām* is not a stimulating factor for inferential knowledge since by the recollection of fire such a desire is fulfilled and hence there will be no inferential knowledge. This is because such a desire is not a stimulating factor for recollection. Or else the word *śābda* in the expression *śābdasāmagrī* indicates knowledge other than perception and inferential knowledge.

there is consideration the object of which is smoke. The state of not being the stimulating factor (*anuttejakatva*) means not being the counterpositive of the absence which is the determinant of the state of being hindering factor of inferential knowledge (*pratibandhakatānirūpitāvacchedakatāvadabhāvāpratiyogitvam anuttejakatvam*).[1]

The conclusion of these discussions is given by Dinakara in his own way. According to him instances of desires such as 'let there be inferential knowledge of fire in mountain' have a consecutive character. This means that *anumitigocarecchātva* is the consecutive character in these desires here. Therefore one can include all such desires as stimulating factors. Such desires as 'let there be knowledge other than perception' have no consecutive character. They are stimulating factors in their individual capacity. Hence not all individual desires are stimulating factors in their individual capacity because of cumbersomeness. In short, not every desire is to be taken as *uttejaka* in as far as it is *tadvyakti (tadvyaktitvena)*. Only such desires as *pratyakṣātiriktam jñānaṃ jāyatām* etc. are *tadvyaktitvena uttejakas*. But desires like *parvate vahnyanumitir jāyatām*, *dhūmena vahnyanumitir jāyatām* etc. are *uttejakas* having a consecutive characteristic in the form of *anumitigocarecchātva*.

Here Rāmarudra enters into a detailed discussion why *anumitgocarecchātva* is taken as the consecutive characteristic as the determinant of *uttejakatā* by Dinakara and not *anumititvāvacchinnaviṣayakecchātva*.[2] This is because if the latter is taken

[1] This means that *siṣādhayiṣāvirahaviśiṣṭasiddhi* is *pratibandhaka*. Therefore the *pratibandhakatāvacchedakatā* is in *siṣādhayiṣāviraha* (i.e. *abhāva*). The counterpositive of this absence is *siṣādhayiṣā* and therefore this *siṣādhayiṣā* is *uttejaka*. But in the case of *ālokena vahnyanumitīcchā*, such an *icchā* is not the stimulating factor, because the *pratibandhkatāvacchedakībhūtābhāva* is not the *abhāva* of this *siṣādhayiṣā*. In other words when there is *dhūmaliṅgakaparāmarśa* only *dhūmenānumitīcchā* is the stimulating factor, not any other desire.

[2] Here in R. the text was *anumititvāvacchinnavidheyaka* and this is changed into *anumititvāvacchinnaviṣayaka* by Parīkṣit Thampurān, because in *anumitigocarecchā*, i.e. *anumitir me jāyatām*, *anumitī* is *viśeṣya* (*uddeśya*) and *anumititva* is *vidheya* (*prakāra*); therefore *anumitiva* is not *vidheyatāvacchedaka*, but *anumititva is vidheya* and *anumiti* is *uddeśya* and therefore a general statement is made that *anumititvāvacchinnaviṣayaka* since *anumiti* is *uddeśya* of desire and therefore it is *viṣaya* of *icchā* as *uddeśya*.

as the consecutive characteristic, *anumititva* also becomes the object of desire and so such a desire as *parvatoddeśyakavahnividheyakajñānaṃ me jāyatām* cannot be included as *uttejaka* as an instance of *anumitigocarecchā*. The reason is that in the desire in the form *parvatoddeśyakavahnividheyakajñānaṃ me jāyatām, anumititva* is not the determinant of *viṣayatā* but only *jñānatva*. Therefore Dinakara rejected *anumititvācchinnaviṣayakecchātva* as the consecutive characteristic. But when *anumitigocarecchātva* is taken as the consecutive characteristic, then the instance of desire in the form *parvatoddeśyakavahnividheyakajñānaṃ me jāyatām* is included as an instance of *anumitigocarecchā* because this knowledge (*parvatoddeśyakavahnividheyakajñāna*) can also be an instance of inferential knowledge. Therefore Dinakara takes *anumitigocarecchātva* as the consecutive characteristic.

But an objection is raised by the Pūrvapakṣin against this position: if the instance of desire mentioned above is taken as a stimulating factor, then when there is the certainty of the *sādhya* and where there is also the causal complex of perception, inferential knowledge should arise, since there is the stimulating factor in the form of the desire mentioned. Actually inferential knowledge does not arise here because when there is the causal complex of perception, perception takes place and in this way *parvatoddeśyakavahnividheyakajñānecchā* is fulfilled. But if such a desire is taken as *uttejaka*, then *anumiti* should arise. This is the objection. The answer is that such a desire is not fulfilled by perception because in the case of perception, there is neither *uddeśya* nor *vidheya* and so in the perceptual knowledge there is no *uddeśyavidheyabhāva*. Hence *parvatoddeśyakavahnividheyakajñāna* cannot be an instance of perception. Hence in this instance inferential knowledge does arise.

A further objection may be raised as follows: in that case the inclusion of *anumitigocaratva* in the expression *parvatatvāvacchinnoddeśyakatvaprakāratānirūpitavahnividheykatvaprakāratāśālyanumitigocarecchātvam* which is taken as the consecutive character as the determinant of *uttejakatva* is without any purpose. The reason is that the consecutive character of the desire mentioned earlier exists in the desire the object of which is only inferential knowledge. This objection is rejected because it is necessary to avoid the possibility of inferential knowledge

when there is the erroneous desire in the form *parvatoddeśyaka-vahnividheykapratyakṣaṃ jāyatām.*[1]

A further objection may be raised as follows: in verbal knowledge *uddeśyavidheyabhāva* is accepted. Therefore when there is the causal complex of verbal knowledge and certainty of *sādhya,* by the desire *parvatoddeśyakavahnividheyakajñānaṃ jāyatām* there would be inferential knowledge if such a desire is accepted as stimulating factor. But in fact the desire in the form *parvtoddeśyakavahnividheyakajñānaṃ jāyatām* is fulfilled by the verbal knowledge in the form *parvato vhnimān* and so in reality inferential knowledge cannot arise. The answer to this objection is that in the verbal knowledge in the form *parvato vahnimān*, the qualifier is *vahnimat* and this is related to *parvata* by the relation of *abheda* (non-difference). Hence in this instance of verbal knowledge there is only *parvatatvāvacchinnoddeśyatānirūpitavahnimattvāvacchinnavidheyatā* and so there is no *parvatatvāvacchinnoddeśyatānirūpitavahnitvāvacchinnavidheyatā* which exists only in inferential knowledge the desire of which is *uttejaka.*[2] Therefore in this instance verbal knowledge does not arise but inferential knowledge arises.

Still a further objection may be raised: when an inference is made in the form *parvato vahnimān*, which is understood in such a way that *vahnimat* is the *sādhya* which is related to *parvata* by the relation of *abheda* and when there is the causal complex of verbal knowledge in the form *parvato vahnimān* and when there is the certainty of *sādhya* verbal knowledge arises. But in the present instance, there could be inferential knowledge in the form *parvato vahnimān* (where *vahnimat* is understood as

[1] Just as there can be erroneous knowledge, there can also be erroneous desire. In the present instance even though it is impossible to have *parvatoddeśyaka-vahnividheyakapratyakṣa*, still it is possible to have a desire for such a perception. This is called erroneous desire (*visaṃvādīcchā*).

[2] If *parvatoddeśyakavahnividheyakajñānam* is inferential knowledge the *vidheyatā* is *vahnitvāvacchinna* whereas if it is verbal knowledge then it is *vahnimattvāvacchinna*. The reason is that verbal knowledge arises by *saṃsargamaryādā* and when the words have same case endings the relation between their meanings is *abheda* (Cfr. *Vyutpattivāda,* p.4. - *abhedaś ca prātipadikārthe svasamānavibhaktikena svāvyavahitapūrvavartinā ca padenopasthāpitasyaiva saṃsargamaryādayā bhāsate*).

vidheyaka) by the desire *parvatatvāvacchinnoddeśyakavahnimattvāvacchinnavidheyakajñānaṃ jāyatām.*

This objection is also rejected because even if in verbal knowledge *uddeśya* and *vidheya* are accepted, still here in these particular instances, such desires (*parvatatvāvacchinnoddeśyatānirūpitavahnimattvāvacchinnavidheyatāśālijñānaṃ jāyatām itīcchā*) are accepted as stimulating factors in their individual capacities (*tadvyaktitvena*). And the *anumitigocarecchātva* mentioned earlier is not the determinant of the state of being stimulating factor and so this desire is not included in the expression *anumitigocarecchātvāvacchinna.* Although there is cumbersomeness in accepting desires in their individual capacities as stimulating factors, still this is not improper because there is no determinant of the state of being stimulating factor which is simpler.

In fact there is no *uddeśyavidheyabhāva* in verbal knowledge. Only in inferential knowledge it is necessary to accept *uddeśyavidheyabhāva.* If *uddeśyavidheyabhāva* is not accepted in inferential knowledge there could be the usage such as *parvatam anuminomi*, when one intends to infer fire in the mountain, i.e. when one intends to have the inferential knowledge *parvato vahnimān.* This is because if *vidheyatā* is not accepted in inferential knowledge, then *viṣayatā* is the meaning of the accusative case in the statement *parvate vahnim anuminomi.* But here *parvata* is also the object of inferential knowledge, i.e. in *parvata* also there is the *viṣayatā* of inferential knowledge. Hence just as the accusative case is used after *vahni* in order to express *viṣayatā* so also the accusative case can be used after the word *parvata* in order to express *viṣayatā.* In this way there would be the usage of *parvatam anuminomi.* But such a usage is not accepted by anybody.

Therefore in the case of inferential knowledge, the accusative case should be taken as meaning *vidheyatā,* though in other instances *viṣayatā* is the meaning of the accusative case. When the accusative case in the expression *vahnim* is used along with the verb *anuminomi* referring to inferential knowledge, then it means *vidheyatā.* Further when the locative case in the expression *parvate* is used along with the verb *anuminomi* referring

to inferential knowledge, then it means *uddeśyatā*. In this way such a usage as *parvatam anuminomi* is avoided.

A further objection is that *prakāritā* is the meaning of the accusative case in the expression *vahnim* in the statement *parvate vahnim anuminomi*. Hence the usage *parvatam anuminomi* can be avoided because in the inferential knowledge *parvato vahnimān*, *parvata* is *uddeśya* and *vahni* is *prakāra* and so there is no *prakāratā* in *parvata*. Hence such a usage as *parvatam anuminomi* is not possible.

This argument also cannot be admitted because in that case there could be such a usage as *parvatatvam anuminomi* because there is *prakāratā* in *parvatatva* also just as in *vahni*. This is the reason why Gādādhara says that the meaning of the accusative case used with a root meaning inferential knowledge is *vidheyatā* or *vidheyitā*. When the accusative case is used along with a root meaning verbal knowledge, then it means *viṣayitā*. This is because the usage *parvatam śṛṇomi*, meaning I have verbal knowledge of mountain is acceptable.[1] The meaning of the locative case used with a root having a sense other than inferential knowledge is *viśeṣyatā*. If such is the case there could be the usage *parvate parvatam śṛṇomi*. This is because the meaning of the accusative case in verbal knowledge is *viṣayatā* and in the expression *parvatam* there is *viṣayatā* in the form of *viśeṣyatā*. In this way *viṣayatā* is the meaning of both the locative and accusative cases. Hence there could be the usage *parvate parvatam śṛṇomi*.

This also cannot be accepted because the meaning of the accusative case is *prakāritā* which is determined by any relation other than non-difference when it is used along with a word having locative case. Since it is explicitly stated that the *prakāritā* should be determined by a relation other than non-difference, such a usage as *parvate vahnimantam śṛṇomi* where the *prakāritā* in *vahnimat* is determined by the relation of non-

[1] *viśeṣyatā* and *prakārata* are only in *savikalpakapratyakṣa*, *anumiti* and *śābdabodha*. But the *viśeṣyatā* and *prakāratā* in *anumiti* are called *uddeśyatā* and *vidheyatā*.

difference is not valid,[1] when the verbal knowledge is in the form *parvato vahnimān*.

A further objection may be raised as follows: when there is the consideration the object of which is smoke, there could be inferential knowledge if there is the desire of inferential knowledge as *parvato vahnimān* from the reason light, because this desire also has as object inferential knowledge where there is *vahnividheyakatva* and *parvatoddeśyakatva*. Nor can it be argued that the inferential knowledge which is the object of desire should not have as *prakāra* the state of being produced by any reason (*kiṃcilliṅgakatva* = *kiṃcilliṅgajanyatva*) and hence such a possibility of inferential knowledge would be avoided. This is because in that case there would not be inferential knowledge even when there is the desire of inferential knowledge *parvato vahnimān* from the reason of smoke, i.e. where *dhūmaliṅgakatva* is *prakāra* in the inferential knowledge, which is the object of desire.

A further argument may be as follows: for the inferential knowledge which arises from a particular reason, the desire of inferential knowledge which is not brought about by a reason other than that particular reason should be the stimulating factor: thus *dhūmaliṅgakatvaprakārakecchā* is included and *ālokaliṅgakatvaprakārakecchā* is excluded as stimulating factors. This argument also cannot be accepted. The reason is that in that case, there cannot be inferential knowledge in the form *parvato vahnimān* from the reason of smoke when there is the desire the object of which is two instances of inferential knowledge which are brought about by two different reasons smoke and light.

These arguments cannot be accepted. The desire which is the stimulating factor is to be understood in the following way: for the inferential knowledge which arises from a reason qualified by a particular characteristic, the desire for inferential knowledge which has the qualificandness in the inferential knowledge which is indicated by qualifierness which exists in

[1] Here the question is what exactly is the *anuvyavasāya* after the verbal knowledge *parvato vahnimān*. The only valid form of *anuvyavasāya* is *parvate vahnim śṛṇomi* and not *parvate parvatam śṛṇomi* or *parvate vahnimantaṃ śṛṇomi*.

the state of having fire as predicate and which is not indicated by qualifierness existing in the state of being produced by the reason which is qualified by a characteristic which is different from that particular characteristic, is the stimulating factor. Thus for instance we can include as stimulating factors all the three types of desires as *parvate vahnyanumitir jāyatām, parvate dhūmena vahniynumitirjāyatām* and *parvate dhūmaliṅgaka alokaliṅgakānumitiśca jāyatām.*

When the stimulating factor is a conjunct desire (*samūhālaṃbanecchā*) in a form such as *parvate dhūmaliṅgaka ālokaliṅgakānumitiśca jāyatām*, there are two instances of qualificandness in the inferential knowledge which is the object of the desire. One qualificand is indicated by the qualifierness existing in the state of being produced by the reason of smoke (*dhūmaliṅgakatvaprakāratā*) and the other is indicated by the qualifierness existing in the state of being produced by light (*ālokaliṅgakatvaprakāratā*). This is because in a conjunct knowledge there is the difference in qualificandness arising from difference in qualifierness. The reason for this is that otherwise there would be no difference between the definite conjunct knowledge in the form 'tree has conjunction with monkey' and 'absence of conjunction with monkey' and the doubt in the form 'whether the tree has conjunction with monkey or not'.

The difference between definite conjunct knowledge and doubt is that in the former where the qualificandness is qualified by only one characteristic, there are two instances of qualificandness, one is indicated by one *prakāratā*, the other is indicated by the other *prakāratā*. But in the case of doubt there is only one qualificandness indicated by two instances of qualifierness.

In this way the inferential knowledge that arises only from smoke is the effect of the cause, viz. subjectness in the form of the absence of certainty which is qualified by the absence of desire mentioned earlier (i.e. *niruktavahnividheyakatvaprakāratānirūpitatadharmānyadharmāvacchinnaliṅgakatvaprakārakatvānirūpitānumitiniṣṭhaviśeṣyatāśālīcchā*). The reason for mentioning that inferential knowledge arises only from smoke is that when there is the desire for inferential knowledge, in the form of a *viśiṣṭavaiśiṣṭyāvgāhīcchā* (i.e. *dhūmaliṅgakatvaviśiṣṭā-*

lokaliṅgānumitirjāyatām) inferential knowledge arises by two instances of consideration with two different reasons, viz. smoke and light and hence there would be deviation. This is because there is no absence of certainty which is qualified by the absence of desire mentioned earlier.

Or else *kiṃcitliṅgakāprakārakatvam* should be given as a qualifier of the stimulating factor in the form of desire. In that case there is no need of mentioning *dhūmamātraliṅgakatva* in the inferential knowledge even though the *dhūmaliṅgaka* desire is not included in the stimulating factor. This desire is considered as a separate stimulating factor and so the exclusion of this desire in the desire mentioned earlier is not a fault.

The hindering factor for inferential knowledge should be understood as follows: when there is a particular instance of the absence of desire to establish the *sādhya* and when there is a particular instance of certainty, there is no inferential knowledge; such a certainty in particular should be considered as the hindering factor for that particular instance of inferential knowledge. This means that when there is the desire to establish although there is the certainty that the mountain has fire, there arises the inferential knowledge in the form mountain has fire. Therefore such a certainty of the *sādhya* is not hindering factor for such an inference. Therefore Muktāvalīkāra states that the hindering factor is only such a certainty which is qualified by the absence of the desire to establish the *sādhya*.

This means that the instances of knowledge which prevent and which are prevented should have the same qualificand and the same qualifier. Hence when there is the certainty that the mountain has light there is no difficulty for inferential knowledge in the form mountain has fire to arise. Similarly when there is the certainty that that which has stones, has fire, there is no impossibility for the inferential knowledge, in the form mountain has fire to arise.

Further the certainty of the *sādhya* which is the hindering factor for inferential knowledge should be more precisely understood as follows: even if there is certainty of the *sādhya* in one subject, there can be inferential knowledge of the *sādhya* in all instances of the subject. Therefore the hindering factor for inferential knowledge in all instances of subject is the certainty

of the *sādhya* in all instances of the subject. But for inferential knowledge of the *sādhya* in any one of the subjects the hindering factor is the certainty of the *sādhya* in all the subjects or in that particular subject.

(p.204, ln 9 – p.205, ln 5; p.212, ln 6 – p.215, ln 4) According to Yajñapati Upādhyāya subjectness is the absence of either of the causal complex of perception or of the certainty qualified by the absence of the desire to establish. This means that according to him subjectness is one of the two following instances of absence. Sometimes subjectness is the absence of the causal complex of perception. Therefore when there is the certainty of the *sādhya* and the desire to establish it, if there is the causal complex of perception of the same object, inferential knowledge does not arise because there is no subjectness in the form of the absence of the causal complex of perception. And sometimes subjectness is the absence of the certainty qualified by the absence of the desire to establish the *sādhya*. Therefore when there is certainty and the absence of desire to establish there is no inferential knowledge because of the absence of subjectness in the form of the absence of certainty qualified by the absence of the desire to establish.

But such an opinion of Upādhyāya is rejected by Muktāvalīkāra. The reason is that the causal complex of the perception of the same object as in the inferential knowledge is an independent hindrance for inferential knowledge. Therefore the absence of the causal complex of the same does not constitute subjectness.

As for example after the doubt if this is a man or not, there is the knowledge this has hands etc. which are pervaded by the state of being man. Then if there is no desire for inferential knowledge there would arise perceptual knowledge. Therefore the causal complex of perceptual knowledge which has the same object as the inferential knowledge is an independent hindrance for the inferential knowledge when there is no desire for inferential knowledge. The reason for this is that after the doubt if this is a man or not when there is the knowledge that this has hands etc. which are pervaded by the state of being man, there is the causal complex of inferential knowledge in the form of consideration. Therefore there should arise normally inferential knowledge. But if there is no desire for inferential knowledge

this does not take place because of the presence of the causal complex of perceptual knowledge of the same object. Hence the causal complex of the perception of the same object should be considered as an independent hindrance for the inferential knowledge of the same object.[1]

Dinakara explains what it means here to be an independent hindrance for the inferential knowledge. The idea is that the causal complex of perception of the object which is the same as in the inferential knowledge is not a part of the definition of subjectness.

Further Dinakara points out that the stimulating factor cannot be in one form; technically this may be expressed as follows: the state of being stimulating factor cannot be determined by one consecutive characteristic. This is because when there is the certainty in the form of verbal knowledge,[2] if there is a desire in the form let there be an instance of knowledge other than verbal knowledge, then inferential knowledge arises. Hence here the stimulating factor is necessarily in the form of the desire the object of which is inferential knowledge.

Now when there is the desire for an instance of knowledge other than verbal knowledge and when there is the causal complex of perception inferential knowledge does not arise, but perception does arise. Therefore when there is the causal

[1] Here Parīkṣit Thampurān points out that (S., p.162, lns 14 & 17) the word *pratyakṣa* in the expression *pratyakṣasāmagrī* should be understood as indicative of *śābda* also. Hence the *anugama* for the *pratibandhaka* will be *anumānātiriktaprakṛtasādhyasādhakamānatvam*. The reason for this is that *gurutva* etc. cannot be objects of perceptual knowledge. Therefore when they are the *sādhya*, the absence of the same is unestablished. Hence subjectness cannot be defined as *siṣādhyiṣāvirahaviśiṣṭasiddhipratykaṣasāmagriyanyatrābhāva*. This objection is rejected when *pratykṣa* is taken as indicative of *śābda* also because we can have the verbal knowledge (*śābda*) of *gurutva*, though we do not have its direct perception.

[2] The verbal knowledge in question arises from the sentence *saḥ* (i.e. *vahnimat parvataḥ*) and in the verbal knowledge arising from this sentence *parvata* is *viśeṣya* and *vahni* is *prakāra*. Therefore such a knowledge is hindrance for the inferential knowledge *parvato vahnimān*. But the verbal knowledge arising from the sentence *parvato vahnimān* has *parvata* as *viśeṣya* and *vahnimat* as *prakāra* by the relation of *abheda* and so it is not a hindering factor for the inferential knowledge *parvato vahnimān*. Cfr. also the principle *nipātātirikta-nāmarthyoḥ bhedasaṃbandhenānvayasya avyuttpannatvāt*.

complex of perception the stimulating factor for inferential knowledge is *anumititvaprakārakecchā* i.e. the desire the qualifier of which is the state of being inferential knowledge.[1]

Further it should be noted that the absence of desire is not a qualifier to *sādhyasiddhi* and *pratyakṣasāmagrī* by the same kind of relation. In *sādhyasiddhi* it (i.e. *siṣādhyiṣāviraha*) is qualifier by *samavāyaghaṭitasāmānadhikaraṇya*, i.e. co-occurrence consisting of inherence. This means that both *siddhi* and *siṣādhyiṣā* exist in the same soul by the relation of inherence. Therefore the absence of *siṣādhyiṣā* is by the relation of inherence. For *pratyakṣasāmagrī* which is the conjunction of the eyes etc., the absence of desire is qualifier by the relation of *svāśrayacakṣussaṃyuktamanaḥpratiyogikavijātīyasaṃyogaghaṭitasāmānādhikaraṇya*, i.e. co-occurrence consisting of conjunction the adjunct of which is mind which is connected with eyes which are the substratum of the conjunction of the eye. This means *pratyakṣasāmgrī* exists in the soul because of its special kind of conjunction with mind which is related with the conjunction of the eyes. And the absence *siṣādhayiṣā* by the relation of inherence exists in the soul where the causal complex of perception also exists by the special relation which is already mentioned. Therefore the certainty of the *sādhya* and the causal complex of perception are not hindrances to inferential knowledge in the same form.

Rāmarudra has given the reason why Dinakara pointed out that the stimulating factors cannot be in one form. If the causal complex of perception is included in the definition of subjectness, then there would be simplicity because there would be only one hindering factor for inferential knowledge. But Dinakara points out that the causal complex of perception cannot be included in the definition of subjectness. The reason is that hindrances have different forms and they have no consecutive characteristic.

[1] Here Rāmarudra points out that if only *anumititvaprakārakecchā* is accepted as the stimulating factor, then there would not be inferential knowledge when there is the causal complex of perception and the desire in the form *pratyakṣātiriktam jñānam jāyatām*. Therefore such a desire also should be considered as stimulating factor.

Now it may be objected that if the causal complex of perception is accepted as an independent hindering factor for inferential knowledge, then there should not be inferential knowledge the object of which is other than the object of perceptual knowledge when there is the causal complex of perceptual knowledge. In the opinion of Upādhyāya such an objection cannot be raised because the causal complex of perception is also included in the definition of subjectness with the expression *anumānātiriktasādhakamānatvam*, i.e. cause of certainty which is different from inferential knowledge. To answer this objection it is pointed out in M. that after consideration without desire for perceptual knowledge, there is no perceptual knowledge of subject etc., although there is the causal complex of perceptual knowledge of subject etc. in the form of the conjunction of the eyes and so on. Therefore the causal complex of inferential knowledge which is qualified by the absence of the desire for perception is a hindrance for perception of the object which is not the object of inferential knowledge. Hence because there is the absence of causal complex of perception in which the absence of the causal complex of inferential knowledge the object of which is different from the object of perceptual knowledge is a constituent part there would be no difficulty for inferential knowledge to arise when there is the causal complex of perception of a different object. This means that at the time of *pratyakṣasāmagrī*, there is *bhinnaviṣayakānumitisāmagrī* and so inferential knowledge arises.

It may be further objected as follows: it was already stated that the causal complex of perception along with the absence of the causal complex of inferential knowledge in which the object is different from the perceptual knowledge is a hindering factor for inferential knowledge. Similarly the causal complex of inferential knowledge along with the absence of the causal complex of perceptual knowledge, the object of which is different from the object of inferential knowledge is a hindering factor for perceptual knowledge. Therefore when there are both causal complexes, i.e. the causal complex of perception and the causal complex of inferential knowledge of different objects there should not arise inferential knowledge. But actually inferential knowledge arises. However such an inferential

knowledge cannot be avoided because the causal complex of inferential knowledge of a different object along with the absence of the causal complex of perception of a different object does not exist. Therefore Dinakara gives another opinion with the word *yadvā*.

According to this opinion, the causal complex of inferential knowledge only is a hindering factor. This means that for inferential knowledge the causal complex of perception of a different object is not a hindering factor. Therefore the causal complex of perception is a hindering factor for the inferential knowledge in which the object is the same as the object of the perceptual knowledge.[1] This is the brief description of subjectness.

The implication of the statement that this is a brief description of subjectness is explained by Parīkṣit Thampurān as follows: it may be objected that the subjectness in the form *siṣādhayiṣā-*

[1] Here Parīkṣit Thampurān raises the question of what exactly is the meaning of *samānaviṣayakatvam* (S., p.163 , lns 17ff). *samānaviṣayakatvam* in inferential knowledge is not *pratyakṣasamānaviṣayakatvam*, i.e. having the same object as perceptual knowledge. This is because in that case the causal complex of perception of the mountain would be the hindering factor for the inferential knowledge in the form *parvato vahnimān* since the *parvata* is the object of both perceptual and inferential knowledge. Further *samānaviṣayakatvam* i.e. not *pratyakṣaviṣayatāśūnyāviṣayakatvam* i.e. not having the object which is not the object of perception. This is because when there is the causal complex of perception either in the form of a *samūhālambanā* such as *parvato pāṣāṇamayaḥ mahānaso vahnimān* or in the form of perception having the form *vahnimatviśeṣyakaparvatatvaprakāraka*, there will not be inferential knowledge in mountain. The reason is that which is not the object of perception is also not the object of inferential knowledge since in both instances of knowledge the objects are both *parvata* and *vahni*.

Both these instances of *pratyakṣasamānaviṣayakatvam* cannot be admitted. Therefore *samānaviṣayakatvam* is interpreted as *pratyakṣīyaviśeṣyatāvacchedakāvacchinnoddeśyatānirūpitatadīyaprakāratāvacchedakāvacchinnavidheyatākatvam*. This means that the way in which the qualificand and the qualifier are related should be the same in the instances of perceptual and inferential knowledge. Thus in the example *parvato vahnimān* the qualificand *parvata* is related to the qualifier *vahni* whether it is perceptul knowledge or inferential knowledge. This is not the case in the instance of *parvataḥ pāṣāṇamayaḥ mahānāso vahnimān cā* since the qualificand *parvata* is not related to the qualifier *vahni*, but it is related to the qualifier *pāṣāṇamayatva* and therefore there is no *samānaviṣayakatvam* between this instance of *samūhalambanapratyakṣa* and inferential knowledge in the form *parvato vahnimān*.

virahaviśiṣṭasiddhyabhāva is not a cause of inferential knowledge in general. But subjectness in the form of *siṣādhayiṣā* is a cause only for a particular form of inferential knowledge coming after certainty. This is because when there is only *siddhi* without *siṣādhayiṣā*, inferential knowledge does not arise. But when there is *siddhi* with *siṣādhayiṣā* inferential knowledge arises. Therefore *siṣādhayiṣā* is accepted as *subjectness* in this case.

Such an objection is rejected because there is no consecutive character in *siṣādhayiṣā*. The reason is that *siṣādhayiṣā* can have different forms such as *pratyakṣādyatiriktaṃ vahnijñānaṃ jāyatām, vahnibhinnānyavidheyakānumitir jayatām, anumitir jāyatām* etc. Therefore there would be many causes for inference. In the definition of subjectness which we have discussed at length, there is consecutive character in the form of *siṣādhayiṣābhāvakūṭa*, i.e. all instances of the absences of *siṣādhayiṣā*. Hence subjectness is the cause for inferential knowledge in the only one form of *siṣādhayiṣāvirahaviśiṣṭasiddhyabhāva* and hence there is simplicity.

Text 5

Definition of Fallaciousness and Division of Fallacies

का. अनैकान्तो विरुद्धश्चाप्यसिद्धः प्रतिपक्षितः।
कालात्ययापदिष्टश्च हेत्वाभासाश्च पञ्चधा॥ ७१॥

मु. हेतुप्रसङ्गाद्धेत्वाभासान्विभजते अनैकान्तः इत्यादि। तल्लक्षणं तु यद्विषयकत्वेन ज्ञानस्यानुमितिविरोधित्वं तत्त्वम्। तथा हि व्यभिचारादिविषयकत्वेन ज्ञानस्यानुमितिविरोधित्वात्ते दोषाः। यद्विषयकत्वं च यादृशविशिष्टविषयकत्वम्। तेन बाधभ्रमस्यानुमितिविरोधित्वेऽपि न क्षतिः। तत्र विशिष्टस्याप्रसिद्धत्वान्न हेतुदोषः। नच 'वह्न्यभावव्याप्यपाषाणमयत्ववान्' इति परामर्शकाले वह्निव्याप्यधूमस्याभासत्वं न स्यात् तत्र विशिष्टस्याप्रसिद्धत्वादिति वाच्यम्।

K. Fallacious reasons are of five kinds: Deviant, Opposite, Unestablished, that which has a Counterthesis and Contradictory. (*Kārikā* 71)

M. In connection with the discussion on reason (the author) divides the fallacious reasons with the words **Deviant etc.** (*anaikānta ityādi*). The definition of a fallacy is the state of having that object the knowledge of which (i.e. knowledge) prevents inferential knowledge. As for example the knowledge which has as object deviation and so on opposes inferential knowledge. Therefore they are fallacies. The state of having that object means the state of having the object qualified by a certain type of characteristic. Therefore there is no harm even though the erroneous knowledge of contradiction prevents inferential knowledge. Since the qualified object is unestablished there, there is no fallacy of the reason. Nor can it be argued that at the time of consideration in the form that that which has stones is pervaded by the absence of fire, smoke which is pervaded by fire would not be a fallacious reason because the qualified object is not established.

मु. इष्टापत्तेः । अन्यथा बाधस्यानित्यदोषत्वापत्तेः । तस्मात्तत्र भ्रमादनुमितिप्रतिबन्धमात्रं हेतुस्तु न दुष्टः । इत्थं च साध्याभाव-वद्वृत्तिहेत्वादिकं दोषः तद्वत्त्वं च हेतौ येन केनापि संबन्धेनेति नव्याः। परे तु यद्विषयकत्वेन ज्ञानस्यानुमितिविरोधित्वं तद्वत्त्वं हेत्वाभासत्वं सत्प्रतिपक्षे विरोधिव्याप्त्यादिकमेव तथा तद्वत्त्वं च हेतोर्ज्ञानरूपसं-बन्धेन । न चैवं 'वह्निमान् धूमात्' इत्यादौ पक्षे बाधभ्रमस्य साध्या-भावविषयकत्वेनानुमितिविरोधित्वात् ज्ञानरूपसंबन्धेन तद्वत्त्वस्यापि सत्त्वात् सद्धेतोरपि बाधितत्वापत्तिरिति वाच्यम् । तत्र ज्ञानस्य संबन्धत्वाकल्पनात् । अत्र सत्प्रतिपक्षित इति व्यवहारेण तत्कल्पनात्

M. This objection is acceptable. Otherwise Contradiction would be a non-permanent fallacy. Therefore it would only prevent inferential knowledge because of erroneous knowledge; but the reason is not fallacious. In this way fallacy is the reason etc. which exist in that which has the absence of *sādhya*. And the reason has it (fallacy) by any relation whatever. This is the opinion of the modern Naiyāyikas.

Others however hold that the state of being fallacious reason is the state of being the substratum of that particular thing (i.e. fallacy) which is the object of that instance of knowledge which has the state of being opposed to inferential knowledge. In the case of Counterthesis the opposing invariable concomitance is fallacy; it exists in reason by the relation of knowledge. Nor can it be objected that in the case of the inference 'it has fire because it has smoke', the erroneous knowledge of contradiction in the subject has as object the absence of *sādhya* and so it opposes inferential knowledge. Therefore it (Contradiction) exists (in the reason) by the relation of knowledge. Hence a valid reason also would become contradictory. (The reason for rejecting this opinion is that) there knowledge is not accepted as relation. Here in the case of Counterthesis, there is the usage that it has a Counterthesis and hence knowledge is considered as relation; but there in that case there is the absence of the usage that it is

मु. तत्र बाधित इति व्यवहाराभावादित्याहुः । अनुमितिविरोधित्वं चानुमितितत्करणान्यतरविरोधित्वं तेन व्यभिचारिणि नाव्याप्तिः । दोषज्ञानं च यद्धेतुविषयकं तद्धेतुकानुमितौ प्रतिबन्धकं तेनैकहेतौ व्यभिचारज्ञाने हेत्वन्तरेणानुमित्युत्पत्तेः तदभावाद्यनवगाहित्वाच्च व्यभिचारज्ञानस्यानुमितिविरोधित्वाभावेऽपि न क्षतिरिति संक्षेपः । यादृशसाध्यपक्षहेतौ यावन्तो दोषास्तावदन्यान्यत्वं तत्र हेत्वाभासत्वम् । पञ्चत्वकथनं तत्संभवस्थलाभिप्रायेण ।

दि. हेत्वाभासान् इति । विजयलक्षणैककार्यकारित्वमत्र सङ्गतिर्बोध्या । ननु लक्षणात्मकसाधारणधर्मज्ञानं विना विशेषे जिज्ञासानुदयाद्विभागो

M. contradictory. The state of being preventer of inferential knowledge means either the state of being preventer of inferential knowledge or the state of being preventer of the instrumental cause of inferential knowledge. Therefore there is no fault of too narrow application in a deviant reason. The knowledge of a fallacy the object of which is a particular reason is a preventer of the inferential knowledge brought about by the same reason. Therefore even if there is knowledge of deviation in one reason there could arise inferential knowledge by means of another reason; and because the absence of that (i.e. *sādhya)* is not the object of the knowledge of deviation, even if the knowledge of deviation does not prevent inferential knowledge, there is no harm. This is the summary. The state of being a fallacy is the state of being different from that which is different from all fallacies that exist in a particular reason as connected with subject and that which is to be established. It is mentioned that the fallacies are five in number in order to show the places where they can occur.

D. Fallacious reasons (*hetvābhāsān* iti). Here Relevance is to be understood as bringing about one effect in the form of victory. Now it may be objected that without the knowledge of the common characteristic in the form of definition, there would not be any

दि. निष्प्रयोजक इत्यतो लक्षणमाह **तल्लक्षणं तु** इति । हेत्वाभासलक्षणं त्वित्यर्थः । लक्ष्ये लक्षणं ग्राहयति **तथा हि** इति । **ते** व्यभिचारादयः । ननु 'यद्विषयकत्वेन' इत्यत्र तृतीयार्थोऽवच्छेदकत्वं तथा च 'वह्निमान् धूमात्' इत्यत्र वह्न्यभावेऽतिव्याप्तिः पर्वतविशेष्यकवह्न्यभावप्रकारकनिर्णयत्वेन वह्न्यनुमितिं प्रति प्रतिबन्धकत्वेन वह्न्यभावविषयकत्वस्य प्रतिबन्धकतावच्छेदककोटिप्रविष्टत्वात् । न च स्वरूपसंबन्धरूपावच्छेदकतापर्याप्त्यधिकरणत्वमनतिरिक्तवृत्तित्वं वावच्छेदकत्वं तृतीयार्थः । वह्न्यभावविषयकत्वस्यावच्छेदककोटिप्रविष्टत्वेऽपि अवच्छेदकतापर्याप्त्यनधिकरणत्वात् अति-

D. desire to know the individual and so classification is useless. Therefore (the author) gives the definition of fallacy with the words **its definition** (*tallakṣaṇam*). The definition of fallacy; this is the meaning. (The author) applies the definition to that which is defined with the words, **as for example** (*tathāhīti*). **They** (*te*) means deviation etc. Now it may be objected as follows: the meaning of the instrumental case in the expression *yadviṣayakatvena* is the state of being determinant. Thus there would be overextension in the absence of fire when the inference is 'there is fire because of smoke'. This is because the definite knowledge in which mountain is the qualificand and absence of fire is the qualifier prevents the inferential knowledge of fire and so the state of having absence of fire as the object of knowledge is a part of the state of being determinant of the state of being preventer.

It cannot be objected that the meaning of the instrumental case is the state of being determinant either in the form of the state of being the substratum of collective extensity of the state of being determinant in the form of relation of selfsameness or the occurrence in something which is not different from itself (i.e. *pratibandhaka*). Therefore there is no overextension because though the state of having absence of fire as the object is a part of the state of being determinant, still it has not the state of being substratum of collective extensity of the state of being

दि. रिक्तवृत्तित्वाच्च नातिव्याप्तिरिति वाच्यम् । पर्याप्तिनिवेशेऽसंभवापत्तेः अप्रामाण्यज्ञानानास्कन्दितत्वस्याधिकस्य प्रतिबन्धकतावच्छेदककोटिप्रविष्टत्वात् अनतिरिक्तवृत्तित्वरूपावच्छेदकत्वनिवेशे 'ह्रदो वह्निमान् धूमात्' इत्यादौ वह्न्यभावविशिष्टह्रदादावव्याप्त्यापत्तेः प्रतिबन्धकत्वाभाववति ह्रद इत्येतादृशज्ञाने वह्न्यभावविशिष्टह्रदविषयकत्वस्य सत्त्वात् विशिष्टह्रदस्य ह्रदानतिरेकादत आह **यद्विषयकत्वं च** इति । एतद्विवक्षणप्रयोजनमाह **तेन** इति । **बाधभ्रमस्य** बाधभ्रमसाधारणस्य पर्वतविशेष्यकवह्न्यभावप्रकारकनिश्चय-

D. determinant and also because it has occurrence in something different from itself (i.e. *pratibandhaka*). (These arguments cannot be admitted) because if the relation of collective extensity is introduced then there would be the fault of impossibility. The reason is that something more in the form of the state of being not affected with the knowledge of invalidity also is a part of the determinant of the state of being preventer and also because of the fault of too narrow application in the lake which has the absence of fire in such inferences as 'the lake has fire because of smoke', if the state of being determinant as occurrence on something which is not different from itself, is introduced. The reason is that in the instance of knowledge the object of which is lake and in which there is the absence of the state of being hindering factor, there is the state of having the object in the form the lake qualified by the absence of fire, because the qualified lake is not different from just lake. Therefore the author says **the state of having object** (*yadviṣayakatvam ceti*). The author mentions the purpose of this interpretation with the words **therefore** (*tena*). **Erroneous knowledge of Contradiction** (*bādha-bhramasya*) means the state of being definite knowledge in which the absence of fire is the qualifier and mountain is the qualificand and which (the state of being definite knowledge) is common to erroneous knowledge of Contradiction.

दि. त्वादेरित्यर्थः । **अनुमितिविरोधित्वेऽपि** अनुमितिविरोधितावच्छेदकत्वेऽपि । **न क्षतिः** न वह्न्यभावादावतिव्याप्तिः । इतरथा वह्न्यभावविषयकत्वस्य पर्वतविशेष्यकवह्न्यभावप्रकारकत्वरूपानुमितिप्रतिबन्धकतावच्छेदककोटिप्रविष्टत्वात्तत्रातिव्याप्तिः स्यादिति भावः । 'यादृशविशिष्टे'ति विवक्षिते तु तत्र नातिव्याप्तिरित्याह **तत्र** इत्यादिना । न च वह्न्यभावविशिष्टपर्वतस्याप्रसिद्धत्वेऽपि यादृशविशिष्टपदेन वह्न्यभावत्वविशिष्टंवह्न्यभावमुपादाय तत्रातिव्याप्तिरिति वाच्यम् । 'यादृशविशिष्टे' ति विवक्षणेऽनतिरिक्तवृत्तित्वस्यैवावच्छेदकत्वस्य लक्षणे निवेशनीयतया वह्न्यभावविषयक-

D. Even though (the erroneous knowledge of Contradiction) prevents inferential knowledge (*anumitivirodhitve'pi*) means even though (the state of being definite knowledge is) the determinant of the state of being preventer of inferential knowledge. **There is no harm** (*na kṣatiḥ*) means there is no overextension in the absence of fire etc. Otherwise there would be overextension because the state of having absence of fire as the object is included as a part of the determinant of the state of being preventer of inferential knowledge, in the form of the state of having the absence of fire as the qualifier and the state of having mountain as qualificand. This is the idea. When it is interpreted as the object qualified by a certain type of characteristic there would be no fault of overextension . (The author) expresses this by the words **there etc.** (*tatretyādinā*). Nor can it be argued that even though mountain qualified by the absence of fire is unestablished, still there would be overextension if one takes the expression 'the object qualified by a certain characteristic' in the sense of the absence of fire as qualified by the state of being absence of fire. If the interpretation (of the expression the state of having that object is) the state of having the object qualified by a certain type of characteristic, then since it is necessary to introduce in the definition, the state of being determinant in the form of occurrence in something which is not different from the

दि. त्वस्य प्रतिबन्धकत्वाभाववति वह्न्यभाव इति ज्ञाने वृत्तेस्तत्रातिव्याप्तेर-भावात्। न चैवं पूर्वोक्तरीत्या वह्न्यभावविशिष्टह्रदादावव्याप्तिरिति वाच्यम्। यादृशविशिष्टविषयकत्वेनेत्यस्य यद्रूपावच्छिन्नविषयकत्वेनेत्यर्थकत्वात्तत्व-मित्यस्य च तद्वत्त्वमित्यर्थकत्वात् ह्रद इति ज्ञाने च वह्न्यभावावच्छिन्न-विषयकत्वाभावात्। अथात्रानतिरिक्तवृत्तित्वरूपस्यावच्छेदकत्वस्य विव-क्षणेऽनुमितिप्रतिबन्धकत्वाभाववति 'ह्रदो वह्निमान्न वा' इति संशये 'वह्न्यभाववान् ह्रदो वह्निमान्' इत्याहार्यनिश्चयेऽप्रामाण्यज्ञानास्कन्दित-तादृशनिश्चये च वह्न्यभावविशिष्टह्रदविषयकत्वस्य सत्त्वादसंभव इति चेन्न।

D. substratum of that thing, the state of having fire as object occurs in the instance of the knowledge of the absence of fire where there is the absence of the state of being preventer. Therefore there is no overextension. Nor can it be objected that as mentioned earlier, there would be the fault of too narrow application in the lake qualified by the absence of fire. This is because the expression the state of having the object qualified by a certain type of characteristic means the state of having the object which is determined by a certain characteristic. The state of being that means the state of having that characteristic. And in the instance of knowledge the object of which is lake, the state of having the object is not determined by the absence of fire.

Now it may be objected further that when the state of being determinant is interpreted as occurrence in something which is not different from itself (i.e. *pratibandhaka*) there would be the state of having the lake qualified by the absence of fire as the object in the instances of knowledge which are not hindering factors for inferential knowledge such as doubt whether the lake has fire or not, the definite knowledge brought about by desire when there is contradiction in the form lake which has absence of fire has fire and such a definite knowledge which is affected by the knowledge of invalidity. And so there would be impossibility (of the definition).

दि. ज्ञानस्येत्यत्र ज्ञानपदस्यानाहार्याप्रामाण्यज्ञानानास्कन्दितनिश्चयपरतया तादृशनिश्चयनिष्ठं यादृशविशिष्टविषयकत्वमनुमितिप्रतिबन्धकतानतिरिक्त-वृत्तितत्त्वमित्यर्थलाभादिति दिक्। सत्प्रतिपक्षस्यानित्यदोषत्ववादी शङ्कते **न च** इति। **विशिष्टस्याप्रसिद्धत्वात्** इति। पाषाणमयत्वे वह्न्यभाव-व्याप्यत्वाभावादिति भावः। **इष्टापत्तेः** इति। तथा च सद्धेतूनां प्रति-परमर्शेऽपि न दुष्टत्वमिति भावः। **अन्यथा** प्रतिबन्धकीभूतभ्रमविषयस्यापि दोषत्वे। **अनित्यदोषत्वापत्तेः** इति। पक्षे साध्याभावभ्रमदशायां सद्धे-तावपि दोषवत्त्वापत्तेरित्यर्थः। **इत्थं च** यादृशविशिष्टविषयकत्वेन ज्ञानस्य

D. This cannot be admitted because in the expression 'of the knowledge' the word 'knowledge' means definite knowledge which is not affected by knowledge of invalidity and which is not an instance of knowledge brought about by desire when there is contradiction. Hence the state of having something as object which is qualified by a certain type of characteristic existing in such a certainty does not occur in something which is other than the hindering factor. The state of being that is the meaning (of the definition). This is the direction.

Now one who holds that the fallacy of Counterthesis is not permanent argues (with the words) **nor can it be objected** (*na ca iti*). **Because the qualified object is not established** (*viśiṣṭa-syāprasiddhatvāditi*) means because there is the absence of the state of being pervaded by the absence of fire in the state of being that which has stones. **This objection is acceptable** (*iṣṭāpatteriti*). In this way even when there is a counter consideration valid reasons are not fallacious. **Otherwise** (*anyathā*) means if the object of the erroneous cognition which is a hindering factor, has the characteristic of being a fallacy. **Would be a non-permanent fallacy** (*anityadoṣatvāpatteriti*). When there is the erroneous knowledge of the absence of *sādhya* in the subject, even valid reason would be fallacious. This is the meaning. **In this way** (*ittham ca*) means the knowledge having an object qualified by a certain type of characteristic is the hindering

दि. प्रतिबन्धकत्वं तादृशविशिष्टस्य दोषत्वे च । **हेत्वादिकम्** इति । आदिना साध्याभावविशिष्टपक्षपरिग्रहः । यादृशविशिष्टपदेन व्यभिचारत्वादिविशिष्टं व्यभिचारादिकमादाय लक्षणं न संभवति व्यभिचारविषयकत्वस्य प्रतिबन्धकताशून्ये व्यभिचार इति ज्ञाने वृत्तित्वेनातिरिक्तवृत्तित्वात् किं तु व्यभिचारादिविशिष्टं हेत्वादिकमादायैवेति व्यभिचारादिविशिष्टं हेत्वादिकमेव दोष इति भावः । ननु व्यभिचारादिविशिष्टस्य हेतोर्दोषत्वे तद्वत्त्वस्य हेतावभावाद्धेतौ दुष्टत्वव्यवहारो न स्यात् । न च तादात्म्येन तद्वत्त्वं विवक्षणीयमिति वाच्यम् । तथा सति वह्न्यभावविशिष्टह्रदादेः तादात्म्येन धूमेऽभावेन ह्रदपक्षके धूमस्य दुष्टत्वं न स्यादत आह **तद्वत्त्वं च** इति ।

D. factor; that which is qualified by that same particular characteristic is fallacy. By the words etc. in the expression 'reason etc. (*hetvādikam*)' the subject which is qualified by the absence of *sādhya* is to be taken. If the expression 'qualified by a certain type of characteristic' means Deviation qualified by the state of being Deviation, then the definition cannot be applied because the state of having Deviation as object exists in the instance of the knowledge of Deviation which is not a hindering factor and so it exists in something other than itself (i.e. hindering factor). But one has to take reason and so on which are qualified by Deviation and so on (in order to apply the definition of Deviation). In this way fallacy is reason and so on which are qualified by Deviation and so on. This is the idea.

Now it may be objected that if fallacy is taken as the reason qualified by Deviation and so on, then the reason would not have that and so it would not be possible to assert that a particular reason is fallacious. Nor can it be argued that it has that (i.e. reason has reason) by the relation of identity. This is because if it is so, in the smoke there would be the absence of lake etc. qualified by the absence of fire and so on by the relation of identity and hence when the inference has lake as subject smoke would not be a fallacious reason. Therefore (the author) says **and the reason has it** (*tadvattvaṃ ca iti*).

दि. न च वह्निव्यभिचारविशिष्टद्रव्यत्वस्य धूमेऽपि सत्त्वादतिव्याप्तिरिति वाच्यम् । यादृशविशिष्टविषयकज्ञानत्वेन यद्धेतुकानुमितिप्रतिबन्धकत्वं तादृशविशिष्टाश्रयतद्धेतोरेव दुष्टत्वादिति । सत्प्रतिपक्षादेरनित्यदोषत्ववादिनां मतमाह **परे तु** इति । ननु वह्न्यभावादिव्याप्तेर्यत्पदेनोपादातुं शक्यत्वेऽपि तस्या धूमावृत्तितया न धूमस्य दुष्टत्वं स्यादत आह **तद्वत्त्वं च** इति । **ज्ञानेति** । एकज्ञानविषयत्वेन तद्वत्त्वमित्यर्थः । **तद्वत्त्वस्य** साध्याभाववत्त्वस्य । **तत्र** बाधभ्रमकालीनधूमादिसद्धेतावित्यर्थः । **अत्र** प्रतिपरामर्शकालीने धूमादिसद्धेतौ । **तत्कल्पनात्** ज्ञानस्य संबन्धत्वकल्पनात् ।

D. Nor can it be argued that substanceness which is qualified by the Deviation of fire exists also in smoke and so there is the fault of overextension. This is because when an instance of knowledge having something which is qualified by a particular characteristic is the hindering factor of inferential knowledge from a particular reason, then that reason having that something which is qualified by that characteristic is fallacious reason. (The author) discusses the opinion of those who hold that the fallacy of Counterthesis is non-permanent (with the words) **others however** (*pare tviti*). It may be objected that though by the word 'which' (*yat*) the invariable concomitance of absence of fire can be taken, still it does not exist in smoke and so smoke will not be a fallacious reason. Therefore (the author) says **the state of having that** (*tadvattvaṃ ceti*). **Knowledge** (*jñāneti*); it has that because it is the object of the same knowledge. This is the meaning. **The state of having that** (*tadvattvasya*) means the state of having the absence of *sādhya*. **There** (*tatra*) means in the valid reason of smoke etc. which is at the same time of erroneous knowledge of contradiction. **Here** (*atra*) means in the valid reasons such as smoke etc. which extist at the same time as counter consideration. **It is considered** (*tatkalpanāt*) means because knowledge is considered as a relation.

दि. ननु सद्धेतावपि बाधित इति व्यवहारेण संबन्धत्वकल्पनं ज्ञानस्य भविष्यतीत्यत आह **तत्र** इति । बाधभ्रमकालीने सद्धेतावित्यर्थः । प्रत्युतायं न बाधितः पुरुषस्तु भ्रान्त इत्येवव्यवहारादिति भावः । तादृशव्यवहाराव्यवहारयोः स्वानुभवमात्रसाक्षिकत्वम् **आहुः** इत्यस्वरसबीजम् । यथाश्रुतविरोधित्वत्यागे बीजमाह **तेन** इत्यादिना । ननु तद्धेतुकतत्साध्यकानुमितिं प्रति तद्धेतौ तत्साध्यव्यभिचारग्रहाभावो हेतुर्वाच्यस्तत्राह **तदभावेति** । **न क्षतिः** नाव्याप्तिः । नन्वत्र लक्षणेऽवच्छेदकत्वं न स्वरूपसंबन्धविशेषः पूर्वोक्तदोषादित्यनतिरिक्तवृत्तित्वमेव निवेशनीयं तथा च 'धूमवान् वह्नेः'

D. Now it may be objected that even about valid reasons there could be usage that it is contradicted and so knowledge can be considered as a relation and therefore (the author) says **there** (*tatreti*) which means at the time of the erroneous knowledge of Contradiction about valid reason. This is because it (the valid reason) on the contrary is not contradicted, but the usage is only that the person has erroneous knowledge. By the expression 'they say' incongruity is indicated because usage and non-usage have basis only in one's own experience. (The author) points out the reason for abandoning the idea of the state of being preventer (of inferential knowledge) as accepted in the original text M. with the word, **therefore** (*tenetyādinā*). Now it may be objected that for an instance of inferential knowledge with a particular *sādhya* produced by a particular reason the absence of the knowledge of Deviation of the same *sādhya* in the same reason should be understood as the cause; therefore (the author) says **the absence of that** (i.e. *sādhya*) (*tadabhāveti*). **No harm** (*na kṣatiḥ*) means no fault of too narrow application. Now it may be objected that in the definition of fallacy the state of being determinant is not in the form of a particular instance of the relation of selfsameness because of the fault which was mentioned earlier. Therefore it should be understood as occurrence in the thing which is not different from itself (hindering factor). Therefore in such inferences as 'it has smoke because it has fire'

दि. इत्यादौ प्रमेयत्वविशिष्टव्यभिचारेऽतिव्याप्तिस्तद्विषयकत्वस्य प्रतिबन्धकतानतिरिक्तवृत्तित्वादत आह **संक्षेपः** इति । प्रकृतानुमितिप्रतिबन्धकतावच्छेदकान्तराघटितत्वेनानुमितिविरोधितावच्छेदकं विशेषणीयं प्रमेयत्वविशिष्टव्यभिचारश्च प्रकृतानुमितिप्रतिबन्धकतावच्छेदकीभूतो यो व्यभिचारस्तद्घटित एवेति न तत्रातिप्रसङ्ग इति दिक् । नन्वत्रानुमितितत्करण ज्ञानान्यतरप्रतिबन्धकत्वमन्यतरनिष्ठप्रतिबध्यतानिरूपकत्वघटितं यदि तदा 'पर्वतो वह्निमान् धूमात्' इत्यादै वह्न्यभावविशिष्टह्रदस्यापि दोषताप्रसङ्गः तस्य

D. and so on, there would be overextension in the Deviation qualified by the state of being the object of valid knowledge because the state of having this as its object does not occur in something which is other than the hindering factor. Therefore the author says **this is the summary** (*saṃkṣepa iti*). The determinant of the state of being preventer of inferential knowledge should be understood as not constituted by another determinant of the state of being preventer of the inferential knowledge which is the object of the present discussion. And the Deviation which is qualified by the state of being the object of valid knowledge is indeed constituted by the Deviation which is the determinant of the state of being preventer of the inferential knowledge which is the object of present discussion. Therefore there is no overextension. This is the direction.

Now it may be objected that the state of being preventer of either inferential knowledge or its instrumental cause is constituted by the state of being indicator of the state of being prevented existing in one of the two (i.e. inferential knowledge or the instrumental cause of inferential knowledge). If this is accepted then with reference to such inferences as mountain has fire because of smoke etc. the lake qualified by the absence of fire would be a fallacy. This is because it is the determinant of the state of being preventer indicated by the state of being prevented existing in the present conjunct inferential knowledge

दि. 'पर्वतो वह्निमान्' 'ह्रदो वह्निमान्' इति समूहालम्बनात्मकप्रकृतानुमितिनिष्ठप्रतिबध्यतानिरूपितप्रतिबन्धकतावच्छेदकत्वात् । यदि च तादृशान्यतरत्वावच्छिन्नप्रतिबध्यतानिरूपकत्वघटितं तदा तादृशान्यतरत्वस्य कस्यचित्प्रतिबध्यतानवच्छेदकतयासंभवः तादृशान्यतरत्वव्यापकप्रतिबध्यतानिवेशे च व्यभिचारादौ बाधादौ चाव्याप्तिः व्यभिचारादेरनुमित्यविरोधितया बाधादेश्च व्याप्तिज्ञानाविरोधितया तत्प्रतिबध्यतायास्तथाविधान्यतरत्वाव्यापकत्वात् । किं च तद्धर्मावच्छिन्नपक्षकतद्धर्मावच्छिन्नसाध्यकतद्धर्मावच्छिन्नहेतुकानुमितितत्करणज्ञानान्यतरविरोधित्वं लक्षणे निवेशनीयं अन्यथा 'पर्वतो वह्निमान् धूमात्' इत्यादौ पर्वतादेः काञ्चनमयत्वाभावो हेत्वाभासः

D. in the form the mountain has fire and the lake has fire. If that (i.e. the state of being preventer) is constituted by the state of being indicator of the state of being prevented which is determined by the state of being one of them, then there would be impossibility of definition because this type of the state of being one of them is not the determinant of any type of the state of being prevented.

If it is stated that the state of being prevented is the pervader of such a state of being one of the two, then there would be the fault of too narrow application with reference to Deviation etc. and Contradiction etc. This is because Deviation etc. do not prevent inferential knowledge, and Contradiction etc. do not prevent the knowledge of invariable concomitance and so the state of being prevented (existing) in these two is not the pervader of such a state of being one of the two. Besides it is necessary to include in the definition (of fallacy) the state of being preventer of inferential knowledge arising from a reason determined by a particular characteristic and having *sādhya* determined by a particular characteristic and having a subject determined by a particular characteristic or the instrumental cause of such an inferential knowledge; otherwise in such inferences as mountain has fire because of smoke the absence of the state of being golden in mountain and so on would be a

दि. स्यात् । एवं च 'निर्वह्निः पर्वतो वह्निमान् धूमात्' इत्यादौ न कोऽपि हेत्वाभासः स्यात् तादृशानुमितेरप्रसिद्धेरत आह **यादृशसाध्येति** । **संभ-वेति** । 'वायुर्गन्धवान् स्नेहात्' इत्यादौ सर्वहेत्वाभाससंभव इति भावः ।

D. fallacy. In this way in such inferences as mountain which has no fire has fire because of smoke, there would not be any kind of fallacy since such inferential knowledge is unestablished. Therefore (the author) says **a particular kind of** ***sādhya*** (*yādṛśa-sādhya*) **Can occur** (*saṃbhava*). In such inferences as air has smell because it is oily there can be all the five fallacies.

Commentary

(p.241, lns 3–7; p.243, ln 8 – p.245, ln 6) After discussion on invariable concomitance and subjectness, the authors deal with the fallacies. The Relevance (*saṅgati*) for treating these are both Connection (*prasaṅga*) and Having the same effect (*ekakāryakāritva*). According to M. there is Relevance in the form of Connection because after treating the nature of a valid reason as having invariable concomitance (*vyāpti*) and the state of having the reason in the subject (*pakṣadharmatā*), one naturally remembers those reasons which do not have these characteristics. They are the fallacious reasons. Hence they are taken up for discussion.

According to D. there is also Relevance in the form of 'Having the same effect'.[1] This is because the knowledge of both the valid reasons and the fallacious reasons is helpful to bring victory to the defender in a debate. One gains victory by establishing the validity of one's own reason and the invalidity of the reasons advanced by the opponents. Therefore the

[1]Here there is a slight difference in the text of M. followed by Dinakara; he omits the expression *hetuprasaṅgāt*. And this may be the reason why Dinakara does not mention *prasaṅgasangati*. Another reason why Dinakara does not mention *prasaṅgasaṅgati* is that prior to the discussion on fallacious reasons, there is no treatment of valid reasons as such. In M. before the section on fallacious reason *pakṣatā* is treated. And some Naiyāyikas do not accept *pakṣatā* as a distinguishing feature of valid reasons; hence there is no *prasaṅga-saṅgati* in treating fallacies.

knowledge of both valid and invalid reasons bring about the same effect in the form of victory. Besides victory, according to Rāmarudra they also produce the same effect in the form of the definite knowledge of the nature of definition of inferential knowledge. For these reasons the discussion on fallacious reasons is now relevant.

In the *kārikā*, the author enumerates the five fallacious reasons: Deviant, Opposite, Unestablished, That which has a counterthesis, and Contradictory. But he does not give a general definition of fallacious reason. And without the knowledge of general definition there does not arise the desire to know the individuals included in this definition and so classification would be useless. Therefore Muktāvalīkāra furnishes the general definition of fallacious reason. A fallacy is the state of having something as the object of knowledge which prevents inferential knowledge (*yadviṣayakatvena jñānasya anumitivirodhitvam tattvam*). Thus knowledge of Deviation etc. prevents inferential knowledge and so they are fallacies.

Rāmarudra first of all points out that this is the definition of fallacy and not of fallacious reasons. This is because in D. the expression *hetvābhāsāḥ* is taken as a *ṣaṣṭhītatpuruṣa* compound meaning *hetorābhāsāḥ*, i.e. defects of the reason. Although the definition of fallacious reasons ought to have been mentioned because false reasons are classified, still once one knows the defects it is possible to know what a fallacious reason is since a fallacious reason has always a defect. In K. the compound *hetvābhāsāḥ* is taken as meaning *hetuvadābhāsante iti hetvābhāsāḥ*, i.e. those which appear as reasons, viz. fallacious reasons.

Thus the definition of fallacy as given in M. is *yadviṣayakatvena jñānasya anumitivirodhitvam tattvam*. Now an objection may be raised against this definition as follows: here the meaning of the instrumental case in the expression *yadviṣayakatvena* is the state of being determinant.[1] As for example the

[1] Here, Parīkṣit Thampurān (S., p.164, lns 8–11) points out that *vaiśiṣṭyam* is rejected as the meaning of the instrumental case because the conjunct knowledge *parvato vahnyabhāvavān bhūtalaṃ ca ghaṭavad* is the hindering factor for the

inferential knowledge *hrado vahnimān* is prevented by the knowledge *hrado vahnyabhāvavān*; hence *vahnyabhāvavadd-hradaviṣayakatva* is the determinant of the state of being preventer of inferential knowledge (*anumitipratibandhakatāvacchedaka*). Accordingly with reference to such inferences as 'there is fire because of smoke' there would be overextension in the absence of fire. This is because even the erroneous definite knowledge of the absence of fire on the mountain is also a hindering factor for the inferential knowledge of fire on the mountain. Hence the state of having object in the form of the absence of fire (*vahnya-bhāvaviṣayakatva)* can also be considered as the determinant of the state of being preventer of inferential knowledge. Therefore valid reason also would become fallacious.

To avoid this fault one cannot argue that the state of being determinant should be defined as follows: it is either in the form of the state of being the substratum of collective extensity of the state of being determinant in the form of the relation of selfsameness (*svarūpasaṃbandharūpāvacchedakatāparyāptya-dhikaraṇatvam*) or in the form of occurrence in something which is not different from its (i.e. *pratibandhakatā*) substratum (*anati-riktavṛttitvam*). Since *vahnyabhāvavatparvataviṣayakatva* is the determinant of *pratibandhakatā*, *vahnyabhāvaviṣayakatva* is indeed a part of *pratibandhakatāvacchedaka*. But the *avacche-dakatāparyāpti* is in *vahnyabhāvavatparvataviṣayakatva* and so *vahnyabhāvaviṣayakatva* does not have the *avacchedaktāpa-ryāpti* since it is only a part of *vahnyabhāvavatparvataviṣaya-katva*. Further *vahnyabhāvaviṣayakatva* exists in that knowledge

inferential knowledge *parvato vahnimān*. And so there would be the fault of overextension in *ghaṭavadbhūtala* because this also is the object of conjunct knowledge. Therefore in order to avoid this overextension *avacchedakatva* is taken as the meaning of the istrumental case. But *ghaṭavadbhūtalaviṣaya-katva* is not the determinant of the state of being perventer since *ghaṭavad-bhūtalaviṣayakatvam* exists also in the simple cognition *ghaṭavadbhūtalam*. And such a cognition does not prevent the inferential knowledge *parvato vahnimān*. And so when *avacchedakatā* is taken as the meaning of the instrumental case, then there would not be any overextension as mentioned earlier. Such a meaning of the instrumental case is also supported by the *Vārttika 'prakṛtyādibhyo upasaṃkhyānam'* on P.S. 2.3.18.

where *pratibandhakatā* does not exist, for example *vahnyabhāvaviṣayakatva* exists in the knowledge of mere *vahnyabhāva*. But this knowledge is not a hindering factor for the inferential knowledge *parvato vahnimān*. Therefore it is *atiriktavṛtti*. Hence there is no overextension .

But this cannot be admitted. This is because of the following difficulties: if in the definition of fallacy the relation of collective extensity is introduced, there would be the fault of impossibility because in the instance of the false inference *hrado vahnimān dhūmāt* there is the fallacy of Contradiction (*bādha*) in *vahnyabhāvavaddhrada*. But mere *vahnyabhāvavaddhradaviṣayakatva* has no *avacchedakatāparyāpti*. This is because *avacchedakatāparyāpti* exists in *vahnyabhāvavaddhradaviṣayakatva* as the definite knowledge not affected by the knowledge of invalidity and by the knowledge by desire when there is contradiction (*aprāmāṇyajñānānāskanditatvānāhāryatvaniścayatvāntharbhāvenaivācchedakatāparyātptiḥ*). Further it cannot be argued as Rāmarudra points out that the *vahnybhāvavaddhradaviṣayakatva* qualified by these three elements is understood as the substratum of collective extensity of the state of being determinant of the state of being hindering factor and so there is no fault of impossibility. This is because if *anāhāryatvāprāmāṇyajñānāskanditatvaniścayatvaviśiṣṭavahnyabhāvaviśiṣṭahradaviṣayakatva* is taken by the relation of *paryāpti* as the determinant of the state of being hindering factor, then the erroneous knowledge of fire arising from the mistaken notion of *guñjā* seeds as fire would not be a hindering factor for the inferential knowledge, lake has no fire because such a knowledge of fire is not *viśiṣṭaviṣayaka* knowledge, i.e. *guñjā* seed is not *vahnitvaviśiṣṭa*.

The situation envisaged is the following: *guñjā* seed is mistaken as fire and because *guñjā* seed is present in the lake one wrongly thinks that there is fire in the lake. Such a mistaken notion of fire in the lake is also a hindrance for the inferential knowledge lake has no fire. But this knowledge is not a *viśiṣṭaviṣayaka* knowledge because *guñjā* seed is not qualified (*viśiṣṭa*) by *vahnitva*. Therefore such a mistaken notion of fire in the lake

would not be hindrance for the inferential knowledge, lake has no fire; but such a mistaken notion of fire is also actually a hindrance. Hence *viśiṣṭaviṣayakatva* cannot be taken as the determinant of the state of being hindering factor for inferential knowledge.

Therefore the definite knowledge which has the state of having object and related with each of the three elements mentioned earlier (i.e. *anāhāryatva, aprāmāṇyajñānāskanditatva* and *niścayatva*) by *nirūpyanirūpakabhāva* only should be taken as hindering factor (i.e *anāhāryatvanirūpitāprāmāṇyajñānānā-skanditatvanirūpitaniścayatva*). This is because the *viśiṣṭaviṣa-yakatvādisamudāya* does not exist wherever there is the state of being hindering factor as in the example of knowledge of *guñjā* seed as fire. Therefore there is no collective extensity of the state of being determinant of the state of being hindering factor in the *viśiṣṭaviṣayakasamudāya.*

It may be further argued that with respect to a fallacy the *viśiṣṭaviṣayatā* as *viṣayatā* belonging to a valid knowledge is taken as *nirūpyanirūpakabhāvāpannaviśiṣṭaviṣayatā* and hence the *viṣayatā* in the erroneous knowledge of the *guñjā* seed as fire is not such a *viśiṣṭaviṣayatā.* So there would be no fault of impossibility. This is because such a *viśiṣṭaviṣayatā* has the collective extensity of the *avacchedakatā* of *pratibandhakatā.* And in this way the erroneous knowledge of fire arising from the mistaken notion of *guñjā* seed as fire although prevents inferential knowledge, the object of such an erroneous knowledge is not considered as a fallacy.

Such an argument also cannot be admitted. This is because if something does not exist in one thing, it does not exist also in the collection which includes that one thing. In such inferences as there is fire in the lake, mere *vahnyabhāvaviṣayakatva* is a part of *vahnyabhāvavaddhradaviṣayakatva*. And if *pratiban-dhakatāvacchedakatā* does not exist in *vahnyabhāvaviṣayaktva* which is a part of *vahnyabhāvavaddhradaviṣayaktva* then *anu-mitipratibandhakatāvacchedakatāparyāpti* does not exist in *vahnya-*

bhāvavaddhradaviṣayakatva. Therefore there is the fault of impossibility in *vahnyabhāvavaddhrada*.[1]

Because of these reasons *avacchedakatā* is accepted in the form of *anatiriktavṛttitva* and *anatiritavṛttitva* means non-occurrence in any thing where there is no *pratibandhakatā*. But *vahnyabhāvaviśiṣṭaviṣayakatva* exists also in the instance of the knowledge of mere *vahnyabhāva* which does not hinder the inferential knowledge *parvato vahnimān*. Therefore *vahnyabhāvaprakārakatva* is not *anatiriktavṛtti;* hence there is no overextension in *vahnyabhāva.*

But this also is not acceptable. The reason is that in such inferences as the lake has fire because of smoke, there would be the fault of too narrow application in the lake qualified by the absence of fire (*vahnyabhāvaviśiṣṭahrada*). This is because *vahnyabhāvaviśiṣṭahradaviṣayakatva* exists in the instance of knowledge of mere lake.[2] And such a knowledge of the mere lake is no hindering factor for the knowledge *hrado vahnimān.* Therefore *vahnyabhāvaviśiṣṭahradaviṣayakatva* is not *pratibandhakatāvacchedaka* since it is not *anatiriktavṛtti.*

(p.241, ln 7 – p.242, ln 2; p.245, ln 7 – p.248, ln 3) This is the reason why Muktāvalīkāra has interpreted the expression *yadviṣayakatva* as *yādṛśaviśiṣṭaviṣayakatva*. Therefore even though the erroneous knowledge of contradiction prevents

[1] The concept of *paryāptyavacchedakatāparyāpti* may be explained as follows: *dvitvam* exists by *paryāpti* relation in both *ghaṭa* and *paṭa* together. But *ghaṭaparyāptadvitvam* exists in *ghaṭa* only and it is one individual thing because it is not *vyāsajyavṛtti*. Only *vyāsajyavṛttidharma* exists by *paryāpti* relation and so *ghaṭaparyāptadvitvam* has no *paryāpti* relation. Similarly *ghaṭatvaparyāptāvacchedakatā* is not *vyāsjyavṛtti* and so it has no *paryāpti* relation.

In the same manner *vahnyabhāvavaddhṛdaviṣayakatvaparyāptāvacchedakatā* is also *avyāsajyavṛtti* and so it has no *paryāpti* relation. The idea is that *anumitipratibandhatāvacchedakatā* is *vyāsajyavṛtti* existing in *vahnyabhāvaviṣayakatva* and *hradaviṣayakatva*. But *vahnyabhāvavaddhradaviṣayakatvaparyāptāvacchedakatā* exists only in *vahnyabhāvavaddhradaviṣayakatva* and so it is not *vyāsajyavṛtti*. Hence it has no *paryāpti* relation.

[2] Here it should be noted that the qualified lake is not different from mere lake because of the principle that the qualified does not differ from the simple (*viśiṣṭam śuddhāt nātiricyate*).

inferential knowledge, the mountain qualified by the absence of fire is not established. Therefore *vahnyabhāvaviśiṣṭaparvata-viṣayakatva* in this instance cannot be taken as *pratibandhakatā-vacchedaka* and so there would not be any fault of overextension in *vahnyabhāva* etc.

Still it may be objected that there could be overextension in the absence of fire in the following way: one can take by the expression *yādṛśaviśiṣṭa*, the absence of fire qualified by the state of being the absence of fire. But this cannot be admitted because if the expression *yadviṣayakatva* is interpreted as *yādṛśaviśiṣṭaviṣaykatva*, the *pratibandhakatāvacchedaka* here is to be understood as *anatiriktavṛttitva* because of the reasons already discussed. But *vahnyabhāvaviśiṣṭaviṣayakatva* exists in the knowledge of mere *vahnyabhāva* which is not a hindering factor and so it is *atiriktavṛtti*. Hence *vahnyabhāvaviśiṣṭa-viṣayakatva* cannot be taken as *pratibandhakatāvacchedaka*. Therefore there is no overextension .

It may be further argued that in the way explained earlier, there would be the fault of too narrow application in lake which is qualified by the absence of fire, because *vahnyabhāvaviśiṣṭa-viṣayakatva* exists in the knowledge of mere lake since mere lake does not differ from lake qualified by the absence of fire.

This argument also cannot be admitted. The reason is that *yādṛśaviśiṣṭaviṣaykatva* means *yadrūpāvacchinnaviṣayakatva*[1] and *tattvam* in the definition means *tadvattvam*. Then there would not be too narrow application because if *vahnyabhāva-vaddhradatva* is taken by the word *yadrūpa*, then in the knowledge of mere lake, there would not be *vahnyabhāva-vaddhradatvāvavacchinnaviṣayakatva* because there is no *vahnya-bhāvāvacchinnaviṣayakatva* in the knowledge *hrada* i.e. the knowledge of *hrada* has only *hradatvāvacchinnaviṣayakatva* and not also *vahnyabhāvācchinnaviṣayaktva*. Only the knowledge

[1] In the present example *vahnyabhāvavaddhradatva* would be the *yadrūpa* which is present in all instances of *vahnyabhāvavaddhrada*. It should be noted here that both *vahnyabhāva* and *hradatva* are taken by the word *yadrūpa*. Therefore *tadvattvam* means *vahnyabhāvavaddhradatvavattvam*.

vahnyabhāvavaddhrada has *hradatvāvacchinnaviṣayatā* and *vahnyabhāvāvacchinnaviṣayatā*. Further Rāmarudra has pointed out the reason for interpreting *tattvam* as *tadvattvam*. *Tat* in the example would be *vahnyabhāvavaddhradatva* which is not a fallacy. Therefore *tattva* is *vahnyabhāvavaddhradatvattva* and it exists only in *vahnyabhāvavaddhradatva* and it does not exist in *vahnyabhāvavaddhrada* which is the fallacy. But when it is said *tadvattva*, it means *vahnyabhāvahradatvavān* which is the same as *vahnyabhāvavaddhrada* and this is a fallacy.

Now it may be objected that by the word *yadrūpa*, *vahnyabhāvavaddhradatva* is to be understood and this is *vahnyabhāvaviśiṣṭahradatva* by the relation of *sāmānadhikaraṇya*, i.e. *hradatva* exists in *hrada* and *vahnyabhāva* also exists in *hrada*. This is because the suffix after a *karmadharaya* compound denotes the *sāmānādhikarṇya* of the two *padārthatāvacchedakas* as mentioned by *Dīdhitikāra*[1]. But such *vahnyabhāvavaddhradatvāvacchinnaviṣayitā* (*vahnyabhāvaviśiṣṭaviṣayitā*) does not exist in the knowledge which is the hindering factor viz. *hrado vahnyabhāvavān*. This is because in the knowledge in the form *hrado vahnyabhāvavān, vahnyabhāva* is not a qualifier to *hradatva* by *sāmānādhikaraṇya* relation but it is a qualifier to *hrada* by *svarūpasaṃbandha*. In order to answer this objection Dinakara mentions *vahnyabhāvāvacchinnaviṣayakatva* also as *pratibandhakatāvacchedaka*. In this way both *vahnyabhāva* and *hradatva* should be taken by the expression *yadrūpa* as the determinants of the *viṣayatā* of the knowledge that prevents inferential knowledge and not *vahnyabhāvaviśiṣṭahradatva* as mentioned earlier. And such a *viṣayatā* determined by *vahnyabhāva* and *hradatva* exists in the hindering knowledge *hrado vahnyabhāvàvān*. Therefore there would not be the fault of impossibility which was mentioned earlier. Further in the

[1] As for instance in the *karmadhāraya* compound *nīlaghaṭa* identity (*tādātmya*) between *nīlapadārtha* and *ghaṭapadārtha* is conveyed. The *padārthatāvacchedakas* are *nīlatva* and *ghaṭatva* and they exist in *nīlaghaṭa*. Here it should be noted that though *nīlatva* exists in *nīla*, here *nīla* means *nīlapadārtha* which is identical with *ghaṭa*. Hence it is stated that *nīlatva* and *ghaṭatva* exist in *nīlaghaṭa*. Therefore they have *sāmānādhikaraṇyasaṃbandha* between them.

instance of knowledge *vahnyabhāvaviśiṣṭahradatvavān* also there is *viṣayatā* determined only by *vahnyabhāvavaddhradatva*. However this knowledge is not a hindering factor for the knowledge *hrado vahnimān*. Hence there would be the fault of impossibility. But when both *vahnyabhāva* and *hradatva* are taken by the expression *yadrūpa* then in the knowledge *vahnyabhāvaviśiṣṭa-hradatvavān*, there does not exist the *viṣayatā* as determined by *vahnyabhāva* and *hradatva* but *viṣayatā in hradatva* is *vahnya-bhāvāvacchinna*. Therefore there is no fault of impossibility.

In the knowledge in the form of mere *hrada*, there is *hrada-tvāvacchinnaviṣayatā*, but not *vahnyabhāvāvacchinnaviṣayatā*. Therefore in the knowledge in the form of mere *hrada*, there is no *viṣayatā* determined by both *vahnyabhāva* and *hradatva*. In order to show this Dinakara mentioned *vahnyabhāvāvacchinna-viṣayakatvābhāva*. Therefore *vahnyabhāva* alone should not be taken by the expression *yadrūpa*. If we take *vahnyabhāva* only by the word *yadrūpa*, then it would be impossible to apply the definition because *vahnyabhāvāvacchinnaviṣayatā* exists in the knowledge of mere *vahnyabhāvavān*. But when *vahnyabhāva* and *hradatva* are taken by the term *yadrūpa* then it would be possible to apply the definition because *kevalavahnyabhāvā-vacchinnaviṣayatā* exists in the knowledge of *vahnyabhāvavān* which is not the hindering factor for the inferential knowledge *hrado vahnimān* because *vahnyabhāvāvacchinnaviṣayatā* exists in the knowledge of mere *vahnyabhāvavān*. But *vahnyabhāva-hradatvobhayāvacchinnaviṣayatā* exists only in the knowledge *vahnyabhāvavān hradaḥ* and this is the hindering factor for the knowledge *hrado vahnimān*.

A further objection may be raised as follows: *vahnyabhāva-hradatvobhayāvacchinnaviṣayitvam* means *vahnyabhāvaniṣṭha-prakāratānirūpitahradatvaniṣṭhaprakāratānirūpitaviśeṣyatā-nirūpakatvam*. But this exists in the instances of knowledge *vahnyabhāvavān hradatvavāṃśca* and *vahnyabhāvavān hrada-tvavān*. The first is an instance of knowledge where two things are apprehended in one place (*ekatra dvyayam iti rītyā*). Here *vahnyabhāva* and *hradatva* are apprehended in *hrada*. In the

second instance of knowledge *vahnyabhāvavān* is *viśeṣya* (therefore the *viśeṣyatā* is *vahnyabhāvāvacchinna)* and *hradatva* is *prakāra.* But these two instances of knowledge are not hindering factors for the inferential knowledge *hrado vahnimān.* Hence this *viṣayitā,* i.e. *vahnyabhāvaviśiṣṭahradaviṣayitā* (i.e. *vahnyabhāva-niṣṭhaprakaratānirūpitahradatvaniṣṭhaprakāratanirūpitahrada-niṣṭhaviśeṣyatānirūpitaviṣayitā)* is *atiriktavṛtti* and so it cannot be taken as *yadrūpāvacchinnaviṣayitā.* Hence there would be the fault of impossibility (*asaṃbhva*) for the definition of fallacy.

Some Naiyāyikas answer this difficulty as follows: that which is *yadrūpāvacchinnaprakāratānirūpitayadrūpāvacchinna-viśeṣyatānirūpakatvam* which is *anumitipratibandhakatāna-tiriktavṛtti, tadrūpāvacchinnaviśiṣṭatadrūpāvacchinna* is fallacy. This is to be explained as follows: in the instance of the inferential knowledge of *hrado vahnimān* the fallacy is *vahnya-bhāvavaddhrada*; here the first *yadrūpa* means *vahnyabhāvatva* and the second *yadrūpa* means *hradatva*. Therefore *vahnya-bhāvatvāvacchinnaprakaratānirūpitahradatvaniṣṭhaprakāratā-nirūpitaviśeṣyatānirūpakatvam* is in the knowledge of *vahnya-bhāvavān hradaḥ* which is the hindering factor for the knowledge *hrado vahnimān*, and such a *nirūpakatvam* does not exist in the instances of knowledge *vahnyabhāvavān hradatvavāṃśca* and *vahnyabhāvavān hradatvavān.* This is because *vahnyabhāva-tvāvacchinnaprakāratānirūpitahradatvāvacchinnaviśeṣyatānirū-pakatva* does not exist in these two instances of knowledge because the *nirūpyanirūpakabhāva* between *hradatvāvacchi-nnaviśeṣyatā* and *vahnyabhāvatvāvacchinnaprakaratā* is not apprehended there. In the first instance of knowledge, i.e. *vahnyābhāvavān hradatvavāṃśca, hradatva* is not apprehended as *viśeṣyatāvacchedaka* but it is apprehended as *prakāra* and also in the second instance of knowledge, i.e. *vahnyabhāvavān hradatvavān, hradatva* is apprehended as *prakāra* and not as *viśeṣyatāvacchedaka.* Therefore only in the instance of knowledge *hrado vahnyabhāvavān* there is *vahnyabhāvatvāvacchinna-prakāratānirūpita hradatvāvacchinnaviśeṣyatānirūpakatvam* because in this instance of knowledge only, *hradatva* is

apprehended as *viśeṣyatāvacchedaka*. Therefore such *nirūpakatvam* is *pratibandhakatānatiriktavṛtti*. Hence *vahnyabhāvatvācchinnaviśiṣṭahradatvāvacchinna* (i.e. *vahnyabhāvavaddhrada*) is fallacy.

This answer is not acceptable because there would be the fault of too narrow application in the Contradiction in the form *ghaṭo dravyam* when one wants to have the inferential knowledge in the form *ghaṭo na dravyam*. Here the *prakāratā* in the instance of the knowledge *ghaṭo dravyam* is in *dravyatva* but such a *prakāratā* is not determined by any characteristic since *dravyatva* is a universal which is apprehended without any further characteristic (unlike in the knowledge *vahnyabhāvavān hradaḥ* where the *prakāratā* in *vahnyabhāva* is determined by *vahnyabhāvatva*). Therefore *dravyatvaniṣṭhaprakāratā* cannot be taken by the expression *yadrūpāvacchinnaprakāratā*.

According to some other Naiyāyikas by the expression *yadrūpa*, *hradatva* which is the *avacchedaka* of *vahnyabhāvadharmitā* is to be taken. But *dharmitāvacchedakahradatvāvacchinnatva* in the *viṣayitā* means *dharmitāvacchedakatānirūpitaviṣayitānirūpakatāvacchedakatākatva*. Therefore the *viṣayitānirūpakatāvacchedakatā* of the knowledge *hrado vahnyabhāvavān* is indicated by *vahnyabhāvadharmitāvacchedakatā*. This is because just as according to some Naiyāyikas there is difference between *prakāratā* and *viśeṣyatā* existing in one thing belonging to one instance of knowledge and so they accept *nirūpyanirūpakabhāva* between such a *prakāratā* and *viśeṣyatā*, so also it is held that there is *nirūpyanirūpakabhāva* between *dharmitāvacchedakatā* and *viṣayitānirūpakatāvacchedakatā*. Therefore only the knowledge *hrado vahnyabhāvavān* which is *hradatvāvacchinnaviśeṣyaka* and *vahnyabhāvaprakāraka* has *vahnyabhāvadharmitāvacchedakatāpannahradatvāvacchinnaviṣayakatva*. The instances of knowledge *vahnyabhāvavān hradatvavāṃśca* and *vahnyabhāvavān hradatvavān* have no *vahnyabhāvadharmitāvacchedakatāpannahradatvāvacchinna-*

viṣayakatva. Therefore there would not be the fault of impossibility mentioned earlier.[1]

According to some others the instance of knowledge *vahnyabhāvavān hradatvavāṃśca* where both *vahnyabhāva* and *hradatva* are qualifiers is to be taken as an instance of conjunct knowledge (*samūhālaṃbana*). Therefore in this instance of knowledge there are two qualificands (*viśeṣyas*) as there are two qualifiers (*prakāras*).[2] Hence in the instance of knowledge, *vahnyabhāvavān hradatvavāṃśca*, we do not have only one *viśeṣyatā* but we have two *viśeṣyatās* and so there is no *vahnyabhāvaniṣṭhaprakāratānirūpitahradatvaniṣṭhaprakāratānirūpakatva*. Therefore this instance of knowledge cannot be taken as *vahnyabhāvahradatvobhayaprakāratānirūpitaviśeṣyatānirūpaka*. Therefore taking this knowledge there would be no fault of impossibility.

In order to avoid the fault of impossibility because of the second instance of knowledge (i.e. *vahnyabhāvavān hradatvavān*) by the expression *yadrūpāvacchinnaviṣayatā*, it is pointed out that the *yadrūpāvacchinnaviṣayatā* should be qualified by *prakṛtyanumityanirūpitapratibandhakatānavacchedakatva*. Therefore though in this knowledge *ubhayaprakaratānirūpitaviśeṣyatā* exists there is no *prakṛtyanumityanirūpitapratibandhakatānavacchedakatva*. This is because *prakṛtānumiti* is *hrado*

[1] Here Parīkṣit Thampurān (S., p.165, lns 2–4) points out the incongruity implied by the expression *vadanti*. According to many authors there is *avacchedyāvacchedakabhāva* between *dharmitāvacchedakatā* and *viṣayitānirūpakatāvacchedakatā* both of which exist in *hradatva*. Therefore they reject *nirūpyanirūpakabhāva* between the two. Besides in the case of the inferential knowledge *ghaṭo'vṛtti* mere *ghaṭavān* is *bādha*. So the knowledge *avyapakaviṣayatāśūnyaghaṭavān* is hindering factor. In this knowledge nothing is apprehended as *dharmitāvacchedaka*. So there is no *dharmitāvacchedakatāpannayadrūpāvacchinnaviṣayakatva*. Hence there would be the fault of too narrow application.

[2] This is because it is accepted that in an instance of *samūhālaṃbanajñāna*, as for example *ghaṭapaṭau, ghaṭa* and *paṭa* are the *viśeṣyas* and *ghaṭatva* and *paṭatva* are the respective *prakāras*. Cfr. *nānāprakātānirūpitam nānāmukhyaviśeṣyatāśālijñānam samūhālaṃbanajñānam,* from *vyutpattivāda* by Gādādhara as quoted in *Nyāyakośa* under *samūhālambanaṃ.*

vahnimān, tādṛśānumityanirūpitapratibandhakatā exists in the instance of knowledge *vahnyabhāvavān na hradaḥ* which is the hindering factor for *vahnyabhāvavān hradatvavān* (i.e. *vahnyabhāvavān hradaḥ*). Therefore *yadrūpāvacchinnaviṣayatā* in this knowledge has *pratibandhakatāvacchedakatā* (i.e. there is no *prakṛtyanumityanirūpitapratibandhakatānavacchedakatva*). Therefore by the expression *yadrūpaviṣayatā*, the *viṣayatā* of this knowledge cannot be taken. Hence there would be no fault of impossibility.

This also cannot be admitted. This is because *vahnyabhāvavaddhradaviṣayatā* is also *prakṛtyanumityanirūpitapratibandhakatāvacchedikā*. This is because in the expression *prakṛtyanumityanirūpitapratibandhakatānavacchedakatva* we can take the *pratibandhakatā* in the knowledge *hrado vahnyabhāvavān*. Therefore there is impossibility. It should be noted here that the knowledge *vahnyabhāvavān hradaḥ* prevents both *hrado vahnimān* and *hrado na vahnyabhāvavān*.[1] Therefore the *pratibadhyatā* in the inferential knowledge, (i.e. *hrado vahnimān*) is different from the *pratibadhyatā* in the knowledge *hrado na vahnyabhāvavān*. Therefore the *pratibandhakatā* in the knowledge *hrado vahnyabhāvavān* is *anumitiniṣṭhapratibadhyatānirūpitapratibandhakatā*. This *pratibandhakatā* is different from the *pratibandhakatā* which is indicated by the *pratibadhyatā* in the knowledge *hrado na vahnyabhāvavān*.

Now a further objection is raised and the answer to this objection will provide also the answer to the main objection of impossibility raised at the beginning of this discussion. In the instance of knowledge *jātimān vahnyabhāvavān* also there is *yadrūpāvacchinnaviṣayitā*, i.e. *vahnyabhāvahradatvāvacchinnaviṣayitā*. But this instance of knowledge *jātimān vahnyabhāvavān* is not a hindering factor for the inferential knowledge *hrado*

[1] Here it should be noted that the instance of knowledge *hrado vahnimān* is not the same as the instance of knowledge *hrado na vahnyabhāvavān*. This is because the *viṣayatā* in the first instance of knowledge is determined by *saṃyogasaṃbandha* and *vahnitvāvacchinna*. But the *viṣayatā* in the second instance of knowledge is *svarūpasamhandhāvacchinna* and *abhāvatvāvacchinna*.

vahnimān. Therefore *vahnyabhāvahradatvāvacchinnaviṣayitā* becomes *pratibandhakatātiriktavṛtti*. Hence *vahnyabhāvavaddhradatvāvacchinnaviṣayitā* cannot be taken by the expression *yadrūpāvacchinnaviṣayitā* and so there would be the fault of impossibility.

In order to avoid this fault, *yadrūpāvacchinnaviṣayitā* should be understood as belonging to the knowledge which has no *avyāpakaviṣayitā* of *yadrūpāvacchinnaviṣayitā*. *avyāpakaviṣayitāśūnyajñānīyatva* means *yadrūpāvacchinnaviṣayakatvasamānādhikaraṇābhāvapratiyogitāvacchedakam yadyadrūpāvacchinnaviṣayitātvam tattadrūpāvacchinnaviṣayitāśūnyajñānīyatvam*. In the knowledge *jātimān vahnyābhāvavān, hradatvajāti* is apprehended as having *jātitva* as qualifier. Therefore *jātitvaviṣayitā* is *yadrūpāvacchinnaviṣayitvāvyāpakaviṣayitā* because wherever there is *yadrūpāvacchinnaviṣayitā*, i.e. *vahnyabhāvavadhradatvāvacchinnaviṣayitā* there is no *jātitvaviṣayitā*. This is because *vahnyabhāvatvāvacchinnaviṣayitā* is in the knowledge of mere *vahnyabhāvavān hradaḥ* and here there is no *jātitvaviṣayitā*. But on the other hand in the instance of knowledge *jātimān vahnyabhāvavān* there is *jātitvaviṣayitā*. Therefore the knowledge *jātimān vahnyābhāvavān* cannot be taken as hindering factor. Hence in this way the definition of fallacy will be that the *yadrūpāvacchinnaviṣayitā* belonging to the knowledge which has no *avyāpakaviṣayitā* of *yadrūpāvacchinnaviṣayitā* has the *avacchedakatā* of *pratibandhakatā* in the form of *svarūpasaṃbandha*; therefore *tadrūpāvacchinnā* is fallacy. Hence there is no need of mentioning *pratibandhakatāvacchedakatā* as *anatiriktavṛtti*. This is because taking *vahnyabhāvaviṣayitā* of the knowledge in mere *vahnyābhāvavān* there would not be overextension in *vahnyābhāva*. The reason is that *vahnyābhāvaviṣayitā* belonging to the knowledge in mere *vahnyābhāva* has no *hradatvāvacchinnaviṣayitā*. Therefore it is *avyāpaka* of *vahnybhāvahradatvobhayāvacchinnaviṣayitā*, i.e. wherever there is *vahnyabhāvaviṣayitā*, there is no *vahnyabhāvahradatvāvacchinnaviṣayita*. Therefore there would not be the fault of overextension .

This argument cannot be admitted. This is because still there would be overextension in *saṃyogatvaviśiṣṭa* which is the object of erroneous knowledge of Contradiction in the form *saṃyogaḥ saṃyogavān*. It should be noted that the inference here is *saṃyogaḥ saṃyogābhāvavān*. The hindering factor for this knowledge can only be the knowledge in the form *saṃyogaḥ saṃyogavān*; and this is actually an instance of erroneous knowledge of Contradiction (*bādhabhrama*).

The overextension here occurs in the following way: all instances of *saṃyogatvāvacchinnaviṣayitā* are *saṃyogatvaviśiṣṭaviṣayatvavyāpaka*, i.e. wherever there is *saṃyogatvaviśiṣṭaviṣayitā* there is *saṃyogatvāvacchinnaviṣayitā*. Therefore *saṃyogatvāvacchinnaviṣayitā* cannot be the *avyāpakaviṣayitā* of *saṃyogatvaviśiṣṭaviṣayitā*. The *avyāpakaviṣayitā* will be *ghaṭatvādyavacchinnaviṣayitā*. The knowledge which has no such *avyāpakaviṣayitā* is the knowledge of *saṃyogaḥ saṃyogavān*. And *saṃyogatvaviśiṣṭaviṣayitā* exists in this knowledge. Therefore it will be *avyāpakaviṣayitāśūnyajñānam*. The *pratibandhakatāvacchedakatā* of this knowledge exists in *saṃyogatvaviśiṣṭaviṣayitā*. Therefore *yadrūpāvacchinnaviṣayatā* in the erroneous knowledge of contradiction *saṃyogaḥ saṃyogavān* is *saṃyogatvaviśiṣṭaviṣayitā*. This is because *saṃyogavatsaṃyogatvāvacchinnaviṣayitā* cannot be taken as *yadrūpāvacchinnaviṣayatā* because *saṃyogavatsaṃyogaḥ* is unestablished. Hence there would be overextension in *saṃyogatvaviśiṣṭa*.

It cannot be further argued as follows: wherever there is *saṃyogatvaviśiṣṭaviṣayitā* there is no *saṃyogāvacchinnaviṣayitā*. Therefore *saṃyogāvacchinnaviṣayitā* is *saṃyogatvaviśiṣṭaviṣayitvāvyāpakaviṣayitā* and such *saṃyogāvacchinnaviṣayitā* exists in the knowledge *saṃyogaḥ saṃyogavān*. Here *saṃyogavān* cannot be the object of the knowledge *saṃyogaḥ saṃyogavān* because such an object, i.e. *saṃyogavān* is unestablished. But *saṃyoga* is the determinant of the *saṃyoganiṣṭhaviṣayitānirūpakatā*, though *saṃyoga* does not exist in *saṃyoga;* this is because *saṃyoga* is *vyadhikaraṇāvacchedaka*

of *saṃyoganiṣṭhaviṣayitānirūpakatā.*[1] In this way the instance of knowledge *saṃyogaḥ saṃyogavān* is not bereft of *avyāpakaviṣayitā* of *saṃyogatvaviśiṣṭaviṣayitā.* Therefore *saṃyogatvaviśiṣṭaviṣayitā* existing in this knowledge cannot be taken as *yadrūpāvacchinnaviṣayitā.* Hence there is no overextension.

This cannot be admitted because even in the erroneous knowledge *saṃyogaḥ saṃyogavān, saṃyogāvacchinnaviṣayitā* does not exist. Here *saṃyoganiṣṭhaprakāratā* determined by *saṃyogatva* is apprehended. *saṃyoga* is not taken as *viśeṣyatāvacchedaka.* Therefore *viṣayitānirūpakatā* of the knowledge is not determined by *saṃyoga*; so this knowledge is *avyāpakaviṣayitāśūnyajñāna* and *yadrūpāvacchinnaviṣayitā,* i.e. *saṃyogatvaviśiṣṭaviṣayitā* belonging to that knowledge can be taken as *yadrūpāvacchinnaviṣayitā.* Therefore the above mentioned overextension remains.

Similarly in the instance of knowledge *abhāvavān vahnyabhāvavān* in which *hradatva* is perceived as *abhāva*[2], the *viṣayitā* which is determined by both *vahnybhāva* and *hradatva* exists. There that *viṣayitātva* which is determined by the particular characteristics such as *ghaṭatva* and so on is the determinant of the counterpositiveness of absence. This absence exists in the instance of knowledge *abhāvavān vahnyabhāvavān* where the *viṣayitā* determined by the already mentioned two things viz. *hradatva* and *vahnyabhāva* exists. But the *abhāvatvāvacchinnaviṣayitātva* is not *vahnyabhāvahradatvāvacchinnaviṣayitāsamānādhikaraṇābhāvapratiyogitāvacchedaka.* Therefore the knowledge *abhāvavān vahnyabhāvavān* is *tadrūpāvacchinnaviṣayitāśūnyajñāna.* And this is not a hindering factor for the knowledge *hrado vahnimān.* So *yadrūpāvacchinnaviṣayitā* i.e.

[1] The idea here may be made clear with the help of an example: when there is *paṭatvena ghaṭaviṣayakajñānam,* the *viṣayatā* in *ghaṭa* is also *paṭatvāvacchinnā*; but obviously *paṭa* does not exist in *ghaṭa.* Therefore, *paṭatva* is *vyadhikaraṇāvacchedaka* of *ghaṭanisṭaviṣayatā.* Similarly, in *saṃyoganiṣṭaviṣayatā,* it is possible to take *saṃyoga* as *vyadhikaraṇāvacchedaka* since *saṃyoga* cannot exist in *saṃyoga.*

[2] The idea here is that *hradatva* is erroneously perceived as *abhāva* just as sometimes a rope is perceived as a snake.

vahnybhāvahradatvobhayāvacchinnaviṣayitā is not *pratibandhakatāvacchedaka*. Therefore there is the fault of impossibility.

This also cannot be admitted. The knowledge which hinders the inferential knowledge should be qualified as follows: such an instance of knowledge which hinders inferential knowledge should be bereft of the *viṣayitā* which is determined by a certain particular characteristic (e.g. *ghaṭatva*) and a certain particular relation (e.g. *saṃyoga*). But the *viṣayatā* in *abhāvavān vahnyabhāvavān* which is determined by the particular characteristic, i.e. *abhāvatva*, and a particular relation, i.e. *samavāya,* is the counterpositive of the absence which exists in the substratum of *yadrūpāvacchinnaviṣayitā,* i.e. the *viṣayitā* in *vahnyabhāvavān hradaḥ*. Here *abhāvatvāvacchinnasamavāyasaṃbandhāvacchinnaviṣayitā* which is *avyāpakaviṣayitā* of *yadrūpāvacchinnaviṣayitā* (i.e. *vahnyabhāvahradatvobhayāvacchinnaviṣayitā*) exists in the knowledge *abhāvavān vahnyabhāvavān*; and so this knowledge cannot be taken as *avyapakaviṣayitāśūnyajñānam*. Therefore there is no fault of impossibility.

In less technical language, this just means that in the knowledge *abhāvavān vahnyabhāvavān* if by *abhāva hradatva* is taken, then there is *samavāyasaṃbandhāvacchinnābhāvatvāvacchinnaviṣayita*. This is *avyāpakaviṣayitā* of *vahnyabhāvahradatvobhayāvacchinnaviṣayitā* because wherever there is *vahnyabhāvahradatvobhayāvacchinnaviṣayitā,* there is no *samavāyasaṃbandhāvacchinnābhāvatvāvacchinnaviṣayitā.* And the reason for this is that *vahnyabhāvahradatvobhayāvacchinnaviṣayitā* is *svarūpasaṃbandhāvacchinnā.* Therefore the knowledge *abhāvavān vahnyabhāvavān* is not bereft of *avyāpakaviṣayitā.* Hence there is no fault of impossibility.

Even then let us take the case where the *hrada* and so on are *pakṣa* in the capacity of *tadvyakti* in the knowledge *abāvavān vahnyabhāvavān*. Here the *tadvyaktitva* is taken by the expression *abhāva*. Now the knowledge *abhāvavān vahnyabhāvavān* is also *avyāpakaviṣayitāśūnya*. The reason is that *tadvyaktitva* is known by *svarūpasaṃbandha*. The idea here is that the *abhāvatvāvacchinnaviṣayitā* (*tadvyaktitvaviṣayatā*) is *svarūpasaṃ-*

bandhāvacchinnā in *abhāvavān vahnyabhāvavān*. Therefore *abhāvatvāvacchinnatadvyaktitvaviṣayitā* is not *avyāpakaviṣayitā* of *vahnyabhāvatadvyaktitvo(hradatvo)bhayavacchinnaviṣayitā*. Hence the knowledge *abhāvavān vahnyabhāvavān* is bereft of *avyāpakaviṣayitā*. But this is not a hindering factor for the inferential knowledge *hrado vahnimān*. Therefore, there is the fault of impossibility.

This argument also cannot be admitted. This is because *tadvyaktitva* is not a *jāti* and therefore it does not become an object of knowledge by itself; but it should be understood that *tadvyaktitva* which is the *pakṣatāvacchedaka* is grasped as *tadvyaktītarāvṛtti*. And in the instance of knowledge *abhāvavān vahnyabhāvavān, tadvyaktitva* is apprehended as *abhāva* and not as *tadvyaktītarāvṛtti*. Hence *yadrūpāvacchinnaviṣayitā* (*tadvyaktītarāvṛttiviṣayitā*) does not exist in the knowledge *abhāvavān vahnyabhāvavān*. Therefore there would not be the fault of impossibility.

If however because of the fear of the fault of infinite regress,[1] it is accepted that even though *tadvyaktitva* is not a universal, still it becomes the object of knowledge by itself, then the fault of impossibility cannot be avoided. In order to avoid this, the definition of fallacy is given in another way: *yadrūpāvacchinnaviṣayitā* (i.e. *avyāpakaviṣayitā*, e.g. *jātitvaviṣayitā*) is qualified by *yadrūpāvacchinnaviṣayitā* (e.g. *vahnyabhāvahradatvobhayāvacchinnaviṣayitā*) by the relations of *svanirūpitaviṣayitānirūpitatva* and *svabhinnatva*. This *viṣayitātva* (e.g. *jātitvaviṣayitātva*) is the determinant of the counterpositiveness of the absence co-existing with *yadrūpāvacchinnaviṣayitā* (i.e. *vahnyabhāvahradatvobhayāvacchinna viṣayitā*). That *yadrūpāvacchinnaviṣayitā* (i.e. *jātitvaviṣayitā*) belongs to the knowledge

[1] Here the fear of infinite regress occurs because of the principle *jātyakhaṇḍopādhyatiriktapadārthānām kiṃciddharmaprakārakatvaniyamaḥ*. Therefore if *tadvyaktitva* which is neither a *jāti* nor an *akhaṇḍopādhi* becomes the object of knowledge as qualified by *tadvyaktitvatva*, then *tadvyaktitvatva* will become the object of knowledge as qualified by *tadvyaktitvatvatva* etc. Thus there would be infinite regress.

which is not bereft of *avyāpakaviṣayatā*. Therefore taking this knowledge, there would not be the fault of impossibility.

Similarly the *abhāvatvāvacchinnaviṣayitā* in the knowledge *abhāvavān vahnyabhāvavān* is qualified by *yadrūpāvacchinna-viṣayitā* (i.e. *vahnyabhāvahradatvobhayāvacchinnaviṣayitā*) by the relations of *svavirūpitaviṣayitānirūpitatva* and *svabhinnatva*. The *abhāvatvāvacchinnaviṣayitā* is indicated by *vahnyabhāva-hradatvobhayāvacchinnaviṣayitānirūpitaviṣeṣyatā* and it is also different from *vahnyabhāvahradatvobhayāvacchinnaviṣayitā*. But the *abhāvatvāvacchinnaviṣayitātva* is the determinant of the counterpositiveness of the absence which exists in the substratum of *yadrūpāvacchinnaviṣayitā* (i.e. *vahnyabhāvahradatvobhayā-vacchinnaviṣayitā*). Such *abhāvatvāvacchinnaviṣayitā* which is qualified by *vahnyabhāvahradatvobhayāvacchinnaviṣayitā* by the relations of *svanirūpitaviṣayitānirūpitatva* and *svabhinnatva* exists in the knowledge *abhāvavān vahnyabhāvavān*. Therefore that knowledge is not bereft of *abhāvatvāvacchinnaviṣayitā* (i.e. *avyāpakaviṣayitā*). So the *viṣayitā* belonging to this knowledge cannot be taken as *yadrūpāvacchinnaviṣayitā*. Therefore taking this knowledge there would not be any fault of impossibility.

Now the question is why *svabhinnatvam* is considered as the relation between the first *yadrūpāvacchinnaviṣayatā* (i.e. *vahnyabhāvatvāvacchinnaprakāratā* in the instance of knowledge *hrado vahnyabhāvavān*) and the second *yadrūpāvacchinnaviṣa-yatā* (i.e. *abhāvatvāvacchinnaviṣayatā* in the instance of knowledge *abhāvavān vahnyabhāvavān*). The answer is that in the instance of knowledge *hrado vahnyabhāvavān* there is *yadrūpāvacchi-nnaviṣayatāviśiṣṭayadrūpāvacchinnaviṣayatā*. The first *yadrūpā-vacchinnaviṣayatā* is *vahnyabhāvatvāvacchinnaprakāratanirū-pitaviśeṣyatā*. This *viśeṣyatā* qualifies *vahnyabhāvatvāvacchinna-prakāratā* which is the second *yadrūpāvacchinnaviṣayatā*. But this second *viṣayatātva* is not the determinant of the counter-positiveness of the absence existing in the substratum of *vahnya-bhāvahradatvāvacchinnaviṣayatā*. Therefore *yadrūpāvacchinna-viṣayatātva* existing in *vahnyabhāvatvāvacchinnaprakāratā* cannot be *yadrūpāvacchinnaviṣayatāsamānādhikaraṇābhāvapratiyogitā-*

vacchedaka. Therefore by the expression *yadrūpāvacchinna-viṣayatā*, *vahnyabhāvatvahradatvobhayāvacchinnaviṣayatā* cannot be taken. Hence there will be the fault of impossibility in *vahnya-bhāvavaddhṛda*. When *svabhinnatva* is introduced as the relation the *vahnyabhāvatvāvacchinnaprakāratā* cannot be qualified by the same *vahnyabhāvatvāvacchinnaprakāratā*. Therefore the second *yadrūpāvacchinnaviṣayatā* in the form of *vahnyabhāva-tvāvacchinnaprakāratā* will not be qualified by the first *yadrū-pāvacchinnaprakāratā* which is in the form of *vahnyabhāvatvā-vacchinnaprakāratā* because there is no difference between these two *prakāratās*.

If such is the case the introduction of *avacchedakatva* in the form of *anatiriktavṛttitva* would be useless. This is because taking the erroneous knowledge *saṃyogaḥ saṃyogavān* there would not be overextension in *saṃyogatvaviśiṣṭa*. Here the first *yadrūpāvacchinnaviṣayatā* is *saṃyogatvāvacchinnaprakāratā*. This *prakāratā* qualifies *saṃyogatvāvacchinnaviśeṣyatā* because there is *svanirūpitaviṣayatānirūpitatva*. There is also *saṃyoga-tvāvacchinnaprakāratānirūpita saṃyoganiṣṭhaviṣayatā*. This *viṣayatā* indicates *saṃyogatvāvacchinnaviśeṣyatā*. So there is *svanirūpitaviṣayatānirūpitatva*. And this *saṃyogatvāvacchinna-viśeṣyatā* is different from *saṃyogatvāvacchinnaprakāratā*. So there is *svabhinnatva* also. This *saṃyogatvāvacchinnaviśe-ṣyatā* is *avyāpakaviṣayatā* of *saṃyogatvāvacchinnaprakāratā*. And this *viśeṣyatā* exists in the knowledge *saṃyogaḥ saṃyo-gavān*. Therefore *saṃyogaḥ saṃyogavān* is not *avyāpaka-viṣayatāśūnyajñānam*. Therefore taking this erroneous knowledge there would not be overextension. Hence introducing *anatirikta-vṛttitva* is not necessary.

These arguments cannot be admitted. This is because if *anatiriktavṛttitva* is not introduced there would be overextension in the *pāṣāṇamayaparvata*. This instance of knowledge *pāṣāṇa-mayo vahnyabhāvavān pāṣāṇamayaśca parvataḥ* is a hindering factor for the inferential knowledge *parvato vahnimān*. Therefore the *pāṣāṇamayaparvatatvāvacchinnaviṣayatā* exists in the instance of knowledge *pāṣāṇamayo vahnyabhāvavān pāṣāṇamayaśca*

parvataḥ. Taking this *viṣayatā* by the expression *yadrūpāvacchinnaviṣayatā* there would be overextension in *pāṣāṇamayaparvata*. When *pratibandhakatāvacchedakatā* is introduced as *anatiriktavṛttitva*, there would not be any such overextension. This is because the *pāṣāṇamayaparvatatvāvacchinnaviṣayatā* exists only in the instance of knowledge *pāṣāṇamayaḥ parvataḥ*. This is no hindering factor for the inferential knowledge *parvato vahnimān*. Therefore *pāṣāṇamayaparvatatvāvacchinnaviṣayatā* is *atiriktavṛtti* of *anumitipratibandhakatā*. Therefore there is no *avacchedakatva* in the form of *anatiriktavṛttitva* and hence there is no overextenison.

In the definition of fallacy as given by Muktāvalīkāra, the expression *jñānasya* is to be understood as *niścayasya*. And the meaning of the genitive case here is occurrence (*niṣṭhatvam*, i.e. *vṛttitvam*). Therefore although *vahnyabhāvavaddhradaviṣayakatvam* exists in the instances of knowledge (such as doubt etc.) which are not hindering factors for inferential knowledge, still the *yadviṣayakatva* which is qualified by *niścayavṛttitva* does not exist in any instance of knowledge which is not a hindering factor for inferential knowledge. Therefore there is no fault of impossibility. This is the idea.

Now it may be objected as follows: *niścayavṛttitvaviśiṣṭavahnyabhāvavaddhradaviṣayakatva* exists in the hindering knowledge. But this exists also in other instances of knowledge which are not hindering factors. This is because of the principle, that that which is qualified is not different from that which is not qualified i.e. pure qualificand (*viśiṣṭam śuddhāt nātiricyate*). Therefore here the qualificand *vahnyabhāvavaddhradaviṣayakatva* exists also in such non-hindering instances of knowledge as doubt and so on. Hence the qualificand viz. *vahnyabhāvavaddhradaviṣayakatva* which is qualified by *tādṛśaniścayavṛttitva* exists also in the instances of knowledge which are not hindering factors. Therefore *niścayavṛttitvaviśiṣṭaviṣayakatva* cannot be *pratibandhakatāvacchedaka* and hence the definition cannot be applied.

Against this it cannot be argued as follows: *niścayavṛttitva-viśiṣṭaviṣayakatvam (viṣayatātvam)* is to be understood as *anu-mitipratibandhakatāśūnyanirūpitādheyatānavacchedaka*. This means that *anumitipratibandhakatāśūnya* are such instances of knowledge as doubt and so on. *tannirūpitādheyatā* is in the *viṣayatā* belonging to that particular instance of knowledge which is not a hindering factor. The *viśiṣṭaviṣayatātvam* (= *yadrūpāvacchinnaniścayavṛttitvaviśiṣṭaviṣayatātvam*) is not the *avacchedaka* of such *ādheyatā*.

These arguments cannot be admitted. It may be possible to argue as follows: *niścayavṛttitvaviśiṣṭaviṣayitāttvam* means both *niścayavṛttitvavaiśiṣṭyam* and *viṣayitātvam*. Each one of them separately is the determinant of the occurrence in the *viṣayitā* indicated by the instances of knowledge which are not hindering factors of inferential knowledge. Therefore *niścayavṛttitva-viśiṣṭaviṣayatātva* is not *ādheyatānavacchedaka*. In this way the definition cannot be applied. However in the definition, *anati-riktavṛttitva* means *svavyāpkatatkatvam*. And therefore the definition of fallacy would be: *tādṛśaniścayavṛttitvaviśiṣṭa-yadrūpāvacchinnaviṣayitāvyāpakam anumitipratibandhakatvam tadrūpāvacchinno doṣaḥ*. In this definition *vyāpakatā* is constituted by *viśiṣṭādhikaraṇatā* and therefore *niścayavṛttitva-viśiṣṭaviṣayitā* has its *viśiṣṭādhikaraṇatā* only in the instance of knowledge which is the hindering factor for inferential knowledge. Therefore the *pratibandhakatā* is the *vyāpaka* of that *niścayavṛttitvaviśiṣṭaviṣayitā*. And the *tadrūpam* means *vahnyabhāvavaddhradatva* the substratum of which is the fallacy.

This definition may be formulated in another way also: *anu-mitipratibandhakatāśūnyāvṛttitādṛśaniścayavṛttitvaviśiṣṭayadrū-pāvacchinnaviṣayitātvāvacchinnādhikaraṇatā tadrūpavān doṣaḥ*. Here though *niścayavṛttitvaviśiṣṭaviṣayitā* is not different from *śuddhaviṣayitā* still the *viśiṣṭādhikaraṇatā* does not exist in the instance of knowledge such as doubt and so on. Therefore *tādṛśaniścayavṛttitvaviśiṣṭaviṣayitātvāvacchinnādhikaraṇatā* does not exist in the instances of knowledge which are not hindering factors. Therefore there is no fault of impossibility.

The following also is to be understood: in the instance of inferential knowledge *hrado vahnimān* there would be over-extension in *vahnyabhāvavajjalavadvṛttijalavaddhrada*. The knowledge of *vahnyabhāvavajjalavadvṛttijalavaddhrada* is hindering factor for the inferential knowledge *hrado vahnimān*. This knowledge is an instance of a qualified knowledge since its form is *jalavān vahnyabhāvavān jalavāṃśca hradaḥ* where the knowledge *jalavān hradaḥ* is qualified by the knowledge *jalavān vahnyabhāvavān*. Though this instance of knowledge is a hindering factor for the inferential knowledge *hrado vahnimān* still it is not included in *bādha*.[1] It may be noted here that the instance of knowledge *jalavān vahnyabhāvān jalavāṃśca hradaḥ* is a hindering factor because of its part *jalavān vahnyabhāvavān* which is the *avacchedakadharma* of *pratibandhakatā*. Therefore *vahnyabhāvavajjalavadvṛttijalavaddhradaviṣayitā* is *pratibandhakatāvacchedakaviṣayitā*. Hence *vahnyabhāvavajjalavadvṛttijalavaddhradatva*, which is the *yadrūpa*, exists in *vahnyābhāvajjalavadvṛttijalavaddhrada* and hence there is the overextension mentioned already.

Nor can it be argued that *vahnyabhāvavajjalavadvṛttijalavaddhradaḥ* should be included in *bādha* because it is different from *satpratipakṣa* and because *vahnyabhāvavajjalavadvṛttijalavadviṣayitā* is the determinant of *pratibandhakatā* which prevents the knowledge of *sādhya* in *pakṣa*. The reason is that it is the accepted principle that the *vyāpya* of a particular *hetvābhāsa* is included in that particular *hetvābhāsa*; and it is not the case that the *avacchedaka* of a particular *hetvābhāsa* is also included in that *hetvābhāsa*. Therefore according to the Naiyāyikas the *pratibandhakatā* caused by the knowledge of *pratibandhakatāvacchedakadharma* is not included in the definition of *hetvābhāsa*. Nor can it be argued that the *prati-*

[1] The reason why *vahnyabhāvavadjalavadvṛttijalavaddhrada* is not included in *bādha* is that the accepted definition of *bādha* is *pakṣe sādhyābhāvaḥ* or *sādhyabhāvavān pakṣaḥ*. And this definition cannot be applied to *vahnyabhāvavadjalavadvṛttijalavaddhradaḥ*. In other words *vahnyabhāvavadjalavadvṛttijalavaddhradaḥ* is not the *lakṣya* of the definition of fallacy.

bandhakatā in the definition of fallacy should be qualified by *jñānavaiśiṣṭyānavacchinnatva*. The *pratibandhakatā* in the knowledge *jalavān vahnyabhāvavān jalavāṃśca hradaḥ* is determined by *jñānavaiśiṣṭya* since the instance of knowledge *jalavān hradaḥ* is qualified by the instance of knowledge *jalavān vahnyabhāvavān*. Therefore *jñānavaiśiṣṭyānavacchinnatva* does not exist in *pratibandhakatā*, and hence there is no overextension[1]

[1] Here Parīkṣit Thampurān makes the following observations: (S., p.165, ln 20 ff.) *jñānavaiśiṣṭyam* means *ekakālāvacchedenaikātmavṛttitvarūpam sāmānādhikaraṇyam*. This means that one instance of knowledge qualifies another instance of knowledge if both instances of knowledge exist in the same soul at the same time. Therefore when it is stated that the *pratibandhakatā* should be *jñānavaiṣiṭyānavacchinnā*, it means that the *pratibandhakatā* should not be indicated by the *avacchedakatā* which is determined by the relation of *sāmānādhikaraṇya* and which exists in the knowledge *jalavān vahnyabhāvavān*. Here it should be noted that the *pratibandhakatā* actually exists in the instance of knowledge *jalavān hradaḥ* in as far as it is qualified by the instance of knowledge *jalavān vahnyabhāvavān*. And the expression 'it is qualified' means that the instance of knowledge *jalavān vahnyabhāvavān* exists in the instance of knowledge *jalavān hradaḥ* by the relation of *sāmānādhikaraṇya* since both instances of knowledge exist in the same soul at the same time.

Here it may be objected why in order to avoid the overextension it is stated *jñānavaiśiṣṭyaṇavacchinnatvam?* The reason for this is the following: take the instance of the inferential knowledge *jñānam aṅkuraviśeṣaviṣayakatvābhāvavat*. Here the *bādha* is *aṅkuraviśeṣaviṣayakatvaviśiṣṭajñānam* and the *bādhajñānam*, is accepted as an instance of valid knowledge. Here the subject (*pakṣa*) of the inference is in the form of an instance of knowledge. This instance of knowledge qualifies the knowledge of *bādha*; i.e. this instance of knowledge is in the knowledge of *bādha* by the relation of *viṣayitā*. Therefore *pratibandhakatā* in this *bādhajñāna*, i.e. *aṅkuraviśeṣaviṣayakatvaviśiṣṭajñānam* which is in the form of an instance of certain knowledge determined by the first instance of knowledge, viz. *aṅkuraviśeṣaviṣayakatvaviśiṣṭajñānam*. Hence the *pratibandhakatā* in the *bādhajñāna* is not *jñānānavacchinna*. Therefore there would be the fault of too narrow application.

When however the *vaiśiṣṭya* in the expression *jñānavaiśiṣṭya* is taken in the form of *sāmānādhikaraṇya* then such a *vaiśiṣṭya* in the given instance is not the determinant of *pratibandhakatā* existing in *bādhajñāna* since such a *pratibandhakatā* is not determined by *jñānavaiśiṣṭya*. Therefore the *pratibandhakatā* in *bādhajñāna* already mentioned is *jñānavaiśiṣṭyānavacchinna*. Therefore there is no fault of too narrow application.

This argument also cannot be accepted. The reason is that for the inference *hrado vahnimān jalāt*, the fallacy of Counterthesis is in the form *jalavyāpako vahnyabhāvo jalavān hradaḥ*. The knowledge of this *satpratipakṣa* is a hindering factor as an instance of *jñānaviśiṣṭajñāna* in the form of *jalavyāpako vahnyabhāvo jalavān hradaḥ*. Therefore there is no *jñānavaiśiṣṭyānavacchinnapratibandhakatā* in the knowledge of Counterthesis. Hence there is the fault of too narrow application.

In order to avoid this fault of too narrow application, it cannot be argued in the following way: here the *satpratipakṣa* is not accepted in that form in which *vyāpakasamānādhikaraṇavyāpti* is made use of but only in the form where the *sādhyavadavṛttimatpakṣa* is apprehended as *satpratipakṣa* where the

But a further objection may be made against this answer: take the instance of an inferential knowledge where the subject is an instance of *sāmānādhikaraṇyasambandhena jñānaviśiṣṭajñānam*, as for example *ghaṭaviśiṣṭapaṭajñānam* existing in a soul. *aṅkurviśeṣaviṣayakatvābhāva* is taken as the *sādhya*. Here the *pratibandhakatā* in the *bādhajñāna* which is in the form of *sāmānādhikaraṇyena jñānaviśiṣṭajñānam ankuraviśeṣaviṣayakatvavat* is determined by *jñānavaiśiṣṭya*. Hence *jñānavaiśiṣṭyānavacchinnāpratibandhakatā* is not there and therefore there is the fault of too narrow application.

In another way it would seem that it is enough to state *jñānānavacchinnatva* when the *pratibandhakatā* is understood as indicated by the *avacchedakatā* in the form of *viṣayitā* and the *jñānavaiśiṣṭya* is not the determinant of *pratibandhakatā* as an object. This way is more precisely explained by Manthiṭa Kunjunni Nambutiri in the *tippani* to S. in the following manner: *jñānavaiśiṣṭyānavacchinnatvam* means the absence of both *jñānavaiśiṣṭyāniṣṭhāvacchedakatākatva* and *viṣayitāsambandhāvacchinnāvacchedakatvānirūpakatvam*. Though in the *pratibandhakatā* there is *jñānavaiśiṣṭyaniṣṭhāvacchedatakatvam* (since the *jñānaviśiṣṭajñānam* is the *pakṣa*) still there is no *viṣayitāsambandhāvacchinnāvacchedakatvānirūpakatvam*. Hence there is *ubhayābhāva* in *pratibandhakatā*.

In fact all the direct or indirect qualifications of the instance of knowledge which is the hindering factor are also accepted as the determinants of *pratibandhakatā*, therefore when the *pratibandhaka* is mentioned as *aprāmāṇyajñānāskandita*, then *aprāmāṇyajñāna* also is considered as the determinant of *pratibandhakatā*. Therefore the *pratibandhakatā* which is not determined by an instance of knowledge is not established. Hence the qualification of *jñānānavavcchinnatvam* cannot be used in order to avoid this overextension. Therefore the qualification of *jñānavaiśiṣṭyānavacchinnatvam* is given to *pratibandhakatā* in order to avoid the overextension.

pūrvapakṣavyāpti is used.[1] This is because if the *satpratipakṣa* is used with the help of *vyāpakasamānādhikaraṇavyāpti*, then there would be overextension in *jalavyāpakavahnyabhāva-kālīnajalavaddhrada* which has also as object *jalavyāpaka-vahnyabhāvavān* and *jalavān hradaḥ*. But this is not considered a fallacy. Therefore *satpratipakṣa* is used only with the help of *pūrvapakṣavyāpti* where there is only one instance of knowledge, viz. *vahnimadavṛttijalavaddhrada*.

But this argument also cannot be accepted. This is because in that case there would be the fault of too narrow application in the fallacy of Opposition (*virodha*). This is because for the inferential knowledge *hrado vahnimān jalāt*, *vahnivyāpakī-bhūtābhāvapratiyogijala* is Opposition (*virodha*). The knowledge of this Opposition is the hindering factor in the form *vahni-vyāpakībhūtābhāvapratiyogī jalam* and *jalavān hradaḥ* or *hrada-vṛttivahnivyapakībhūtābhāvapratiyogī jalam*. Therefore the *prati-bandhakatā* in this knowledge is *jñānāvaiśiṣṭyāvacchinna* and not *jñānāvaiśiṣṭyānavacchinna*. Hence the fault of too narrow application.

Nor can it be argued that if *virodhī* is accepted in the form *vahnivyāpakībhūtābhāvapratiyogī jalam*, then *tadviṣayakatva* is *pratibandhakatātiriktavṛtti* because *tadviṣayakatva* (i.e. *vahni-vyāpakībhūtābhāvapratiyogijalaviṣayakatva*) exists in the knowledge of mere *vahnivyāpakībhūtābhāvapratiyogijalam*. And

[1] When *vyāpakasamānādhikaraṇavyāpti* is used the *satpratipakṣa* would be *jalavyāpakavahnyabhāvavadvṛtti jalavadhṛdaḥ*. The knowledge of this *satprati-pakṣa* is hindering factor in the form: *jalavyāpako vahnyabhāvaḥ jalavān hradaḥ* which is an instance of *jñānaviśiṣṭajñānam*. But if this instance of knowledge as the knowledge of *satpratipakṣa* in which *vyāpakasamānā-dhikaraṇavyāpti* is made use of then *jalavyāpakavahnyabhāvakālīnajalavadd-hradaḥ* would also be an instance of *satpratipakṣa* because this knowledge is also a combination of two instances of knowledge: *jalavyāpakovahnyabhāvaḥ* and *jalavān hradaḥ*, i.e. *sādhyabhāvavyāpyahetumatpakṣa* (which is the definition of *satpratipakṣa*). But when *pūrvapakṣavyāpti* is made use of in the definition of *satpratipakṣa, jalavyāpaka vahnyabhāvakālīna jalavaddhradaḥ* will not be a *satpratipakṣa*, because in this instance *vahnimadavṛttijalavadd-hradaḥ* would be *satpratipakṣa*. And this knowledge is not an instance of *jñā-navisiṣṭajñāna*.

this is not a hindering factor for the inferential knowledge *hrado vahnimān* since this *jala* is not known as existing in *hrada*. If in order to avoid this fault of too narrow application of the general definition of fallacy, *pakṣavṛttitvaviśiṣṭavahnivyāpakībhūtā-bhāvapratiyogijala* is accepted as *virodha,* then for the inference *parvato vahnimān jalāt, vahnivyāpakībhūtābhāvapratiyogijalam* cannot be the fallacy of *virodha*. This is because there is no *pakṣavṛttitva* (i.e. *parvatavṛttitva*, i.e. *parvatavṛttitvaviśiṣṭa-jalam*). Therefore the final definition of fallacy is the following: in all instances of certainty of things qualified by a particular characteristic, there (in the certainty) is the absence of both *anumityapratibandhakatva* and *pakṣadharmatāgrahakālīnatva*, those things that are determined by that particular characteristic are fallacy. In this way *vahnivyāpakībhūtābhāvapratiyogijalam* is the fallacy of Opposition in the inference *parvato vahnimān jalāt* because the *yadrūpāvacchinnaniścaya* is in the form *vahni-vyāpakībhūtābhāvapratiyogijalam*. This knowledge is hindering factor for inferential knowledge; therefore there is no *anumitya-pratibandhakatva* and *pakṣadharmatāgrahakālīnatva*. Therefore there is absence of both. *tadrūpāvacchinna* means *vahnivyāpakī-bhūtābhāvapratiyogijalatvāvacchinnajalam* is fallacy. Therefore there would be no fault of too narrow application in *parvato vahnimān jalāt* where *vahnivyāpakībhūtābhāvapratiyogijalam* would be fallacy.

These arguments also cannot be admitted: in order to avoid the overextension in *vahnyabhāvavajjalavadvṛttijalavadd-hradaḥ*, it is stated that the hindering factor in the form of an instance of certain knowledge should be qualified by the absence of *viṣayatā* which is determined by a certain characteristic and which is not the determinant of *prakṛtānumitipratibandhakatā*. The certain knowledge *vahnyabhāvajjalavadvṛttijalavaddhradaḥ* has *viṣayatā* which is determined by *vṛttitvatva* (i.e. *ādheya-tātva*). That *viṣayatā* is not the determinant of *prakṛtānumiti-pratibandhakatā*. When the knowledge *jalavān vahnyabhāvan jalavāṃśca hradaḥ* is taken as the hindering factor then the *vṛttitvaviṣayatā* which is apprehended in the instance of

knowledge *vahnyabhāvadjalavadvṛttijalavaddhradaḥ* is not the *pratibandhakatāvacchedaka* because this *vṛttitvaviṣayatā* is not apprehended in the instance of knowledge *jalavān vahnyabhāvān jalavāṃśca hradaḥ.* But there is no absence of *pratibandhakatānavacchedakaviṣayatā* (i.e. *vṛttitvaviṣayatā*) in the instance of knowledge *vahnyabhāvajjalavadvṛttijalavaddhradaḥ.* Therefore taking this instance of knowledge there would not be the fault of overextension .

It may be noted here that the certainty in the form *hrado vahnyabhāvavān*[1] has *prakṛtānumitipratibandhakatānavacchedakahradatvaniṣṭhaprakāratānirūpitaniravacchinnaviśeṣyatā.* Therefore there is no absence of *prakṛtanumitipratibandhakatānavacchedakaviṣayatā* since there is *niravacchinnaviśeṣyatā.* Hence there would be the fault of too narrow application in *vahnyabhāvavaddhradaḥ* which is the fallacy of Contradiction. When *kiṃcidavacchinnatva* is used as qualifier of *viṣayatā*, then there would not be the fault of too narrow application because *viśeṣyatā* in *anumitipratibandhakatānavacchedakahradatvaprakāratānirūpitahradaniṣṭhaviśeṣyatā* is not determined by any characteristic. Therefore that *viṣayatā* is not *kiṃcidavacchinna.* Hence there is the absence of *kiṃcidavacchinnaviṣayatā.* And so there is no fault of too narrow application.

Still there could be overextension in one part of contradiction viz. in *vahnyabhāva* or *hrada*. The idea here is that the form of the knowledge is indeed *vahnyabhāvavān hradaḥ*, but actually its object is only one part either *hradaḥ* or *vahnyabhāvaḥ*. And the instance of knowledge having only one part as its object is mistakenly given the form *hrado vahnyabhāvavān*. This knowledge is *prakṛtānumitipratibandhakatānavacchedakakiṃcidavacchinnatvaviṣayatāśūnyam.* i.e. this certainty is bereft of the state of having object which is determined by some characteristic which is not the determinant of the state of being hindering factor for a particular inferential knowledge. And now *hradatvāvacchinna-*

[1] Here it should be noted that in *hrado vahnyabhāvavān* there is *hradatvaniṣṭhaprakaratānirūpitaniravacchinnaviśeṣyatā* but in *vahnyabhāvavān hradaḥ* there is *vahnyabhāvaniṣṭaprakāratānirūpitahradatvāvacchinnaviśeṣyatā.*

viṣayatā or *vahnyabhāvatvāvacchinnaviṣayatā* could be taken as *yadrūpāvacchinnaviṣayatā* and so there could be overextension in *ekadeśa*, i.e. in either *hrada* or *vahnyabhāva*.

This overextension is avoided by inserting *yadrūpāvacchinnaviṣayitvāghaṭakaviṣayitāśūnyatvam* in the certain knowledge which hinders inferential knowledge i.e. this certain knowledge should be bereft of the state of having object which is not the constituent part of the state of being the object which is determined by that particular characteristic. The instance of knowledge in which the object is one part i.e. either *vahnyabhāva* or *hrada* and the form of which is *hrado vahnyabhāvavān* is not established as *yadrūpāvacchinnaviṣayatvāghaṭakaviṣayatāśūnya*. This is because the *yadrūpāvacchinnaviṣayatā* is *vahnyabhāvaddhradatvāvacchinnaviṣayatā*. The *aghaṭakaviṣayatā* of this *vahnyabhāvaddhradatvāvacchinnaviṣayatā* is either *hradatvāvacchinnaviṣayatā* or *vahnyabhāvatvāvacchinnaviṣayatā*. The *hradaviṣayatā* or *vahnyabhāvaviṣayatā* is *aghaṭakaviṣayatā* of *vahnyabhāvaddhradatvāvacchinnaviṣayatā* because *hradaviṣayatā* or *vahnyabhāvaviṣayatā* is the determinant of the counterpositiveness of the mutual absence existing in the substratum of that *vahnyabhāvaddhradatvāvacchinnaviṣayatā*. It means that the instance of knowledge *vahnyabhāvavān hradaḥ* is different from the knowledge of mere *vahnyabhāva* or mere *hrada*. Therefore the *hradaviṣayatā* or *vahnyabhāvaviṣayatā* is *aghaṭakaviṣayatā*. This *ekadeśaviṣayatā* exists in the knowledge *hrado vahnyabhāvavān* in which only the *ekadeśa* is the real object. Therefore this *niścaya* is not *yadrūpāvacchinnaviśayatāghaṭakaviṣayatāśūnya*. Hence there is no overextension in *ekadeśa*.

In this way there is no need to mention *avyāpakaviṣayatāśūnyajñāna* to avoid the fault of impossibility of the definition of *hetvābhāṣa* taking the knowledge *jātimān vahnyabhāvavān* where *jāti* is *hradatva* and where *jātitva* is also apprehended. This is because the *jātitvaviṣayitā* in this knowledge *jātimān vahnyabhāvavān* is not the *pratibandhakatāvacchedakaviṣayitā* because *jātitvaviṣayitā* exists in the knowledge which is not the hindering factor. Therefore *jātitvaviṣayitā* is *pratibandhakatā-*

navacchedakaviṣayitā and the knowledge is not bereft of *pratibandhakatānavacchedakaviṣayitā*. Hence taking the instance of knowledge of *jātimān vahnyabhāvavān*, there is no impossibility.[1]

Further in this way from the manner in which Dinakara has used the expression *vahnyabhāvāvacchinnaviṣayakatvābhāvāt* it is possible to take both *vahnyabhāva* and *hradatva* by the word *yadrūpa*. Even in this case there is no difficulty. This is because the two instances of knowledge which are considered as not hindering factors, viz. *vahnyabhāvavadvṛttijalavaddhrada* and *jalavyāpakavahnyabhāvakālinajalavaddhrada* can be avoided by the expression *prakṛtānumitipratibandhakatānavacchedakakiṃcidavacchinnaviṣayatāśūnyatva*.

Similarly there is also further simplicity. This is because the overextension in the *prameyatvaviśiṣṭavyabhicāra* was avoided by using the expression *viśiṣṭāntarāghaṭitatva* in the definition of fallacy. This overextension is also avoided by the same expression *prakṛtānumitipratibandhakatānavacchedakakiṃcidavacchinnaviṣayitāśūnyam*. Here *prameyatvaviṣayitā* is *prakṛtānumitipratibandhakatānavacchedakaviṣayitā*. That *viṣa-*

[1] Parīkṣit Thampurān however does not agree with this opinion (S., p.166, lns 20ff). According to him in the case of the inference *hrado vahnimān* if by the expression *yadrūpa*, both *vahnyabhāva* and *hradatva* are taken, then in the instance of knowledge *jātimān vahnyabhāvavān* also the *yadrūpāvacchinnaviṣayitā* exists. Therefore the mutual absence which exists in the instance of knowledge *jātimān vahnyabhāvavān* is *tadvyaktimadbhedaḥ*, i.e. *doṣajñānīyaviṣayitārūpatadvyāktimadbhedaḥ*. And in the instance of knowledge *hrado vahnyabhāvavān*, there is no absence of *viṣayatā* existing in the instances of knowledge *vahnyabhāva* and *hraḍatva*. And these instances of *viṣayatā* are the determinants of the counterpositiveness of the mutual absence of *tadvyaktimān*. Therefore there would be the fault of too narrow application. In order to avoid this, it is necessary to add *avyāpkaviṣayitāśūnyatva* where the already mentioned *yadrūpāvacchinnaviṣayitātva* is included. In this way the mutual absence of *tadvyaktimān* is not *viṣayitātvāvacchinnāvacchedakatākapratiyogitākabhedaḥ*, but it would be *yadrūpāvacchinnaviṣayatāvān bhedaḥ*. That *bheda* does not exist in the instance of knowledge *jātimān vahnyabhāvavān*. Therefore *yadrūpāvacchinnaviṣayatā* is not the *pratiyogitāvacchedakaviṣayatā*; but it will be some other *viṣayatā*. That *viṣayatāśūnyatvam* exists in *hrado vahnyabhāvān*. And therefore there is no fault of too narrow application.

yitāśūnyatva does not exist in the instance of knowledge of *prameyatvaviśiṣṭavyabhicāra*. Therefore there is no overextension.[1]

In this way there is no fault if *svarūpasaṃbandharūpāvacchedakatva* is introduced in the definition of fallacy. In such a case there is no harm in dropping the *avacchedakatva* in the form of *anatiriktavṛttitva*. Still there is more simplicity since expressions like *anāhāryatva* etc. need not be used. The reason is that the *viṣayitā* of *āhāryajñāna* is not *pratibandhakatāvacchedakaviṣayitā*. Hence *pratibandhakatānavacchedakaviṣayitāśūnyatva* does not exist in *āhāryajñāna* and so there would not be the fault of impossibility by taking *āhāryajñāna*.

But even then there would be overextension in *pāṣāṇamayatvaviśiṣṭaparvata* (S., p.167, lns 5ff). This is because for the inferential knowledge *parvato vahnimān, pāṣāṇamayo vahnyabhāvavān pāṣāṇamayaśca parvataḥ* is hindering factor. Therefore *pāṣāṇamayatvaviśiṣṭaparvataviṣayitā* is *pratibandhakatāvacchedakayadrūpāvacchinnaviṣayitā*. Therefore there is overextension in *pāṣāṇamayatvaviśiṣṭaparvata*.

In order to avoid this overextension, it is stated that the overextension in *vahnyabhāvāvajjalavadvṛttijalavaddhrada*, the *pratibandhakatānavacchedakakiṃcidavacchinnaviṣayitāśūnyajñānaviṣayitva* is to be given as a qualifier to *yadrūpāvacchinnaviṣayitā*. Then there would not be overextension in *pāṣāṇamayatvaviśiṣṭaparvata*. This is because *pāṣāṇamayatvaviśiṣṭapar-*

[1] Here Parīkṣit Thampurān points out a possible objection and answers it. (S., p.167, lns 1ff.). In the case of the inferential knowledge *hrado vahnimān* there could be overextension in *vahnyabhāvavaddhradavat*. This is because *vahnyabhāvavadhradavadviṣayatā* is *niravacchinnaviṣayitā* since what *hradavān* is, is not explicitly mentioned. Therefore *kimcidavacchinnaviṣayatā* does not exist in this knowledge; hence *kimcidavacchinnaviṣayatāśūnyatvam* exists there. In order to avoid this overextension *viśiṣṭāntarāghaṭitatva* is necessarily to be added in the definition of fallacy. This objection cannot be accepted because in the instance of knowledge *vahnyabhāvaddhradavān, vahnyabhāvahradatvāvacchinnaprakāratā* which is not the determinant of the state of being hindering factor exists. Therefore *kimcidavacchinnaviṣayatāśūnyatva* does not exist in the instance of knowledge *vahnyabhāvavaddhradavān*. Therefore there is no fault of overextension. In this way the expression *viśiṣṭāntarāghaṭitatva* need not be added.

vata which is *yadrūpāvacchinna* has not that *viṣayitā* of that knowledge which is *prakṛtānumitipratibandhakatānavacchedakaviṣayitāśūnya*. The reason is that *pāṣāṇamayo vahnyabhāvavān pāṣāṇamayaśca parvataḥ* has the *pratibandhakatānavacchedakaviṣayitā*.[1] Therefore the knowledge *pāṣāṇamayo vanhyabhāvavān pāṣāṇamayaśca parvataḥ* has no absence of *prakṛtānumitipratibandhakatānavacchedakaviṣayitā*. Taking *jātimān vahnyabhāvavān* (where *jāti* is taken as *hradatva*), the *jātitvaviṣayitā* though it is *pratibandhakatānavacchedakaviṣayitā*, still it is not *kiṃcidavacchinnaviṣayitā* since *jātitvaviṣayitā* is *niravacchinnaviṣayitā*. Hence there is the absence of *kiṃcidavacchinnaviṣayitā* in the knowledge *jātimān vahnyabhāvavān*; therefore there is the impossibility of the application of the definition of fallacy. In order to avoid this impossibility the *avyāpakaviṣayitāśūnyatvaviśiṣṭaniścayavṛttiyadrūpāvacchinnaviṣayitātvam* should be added in the definition of fallacy and so the finally accepted definition of fallacy is *yadrūpāvacchinnaviṣayitvāvyāpakaviṣayitāśūnyaniścayavṛttiyadrūpāvacchinnaviṣayitātvam prakṛtānumitipratibandhakatānavacchedakakiṃcidavacchinnaviṣayatāśūnyajñānaviṣayatve sati prakṛtānumitipratibandhakatāvacchedakam yadrūpam tadvattvam*. Hence there is no overextension even in a part of the definition of fallacy. This is the idea of the author.

Some other Naiyāyikas hold the following opinion: in order to avoid the overextension in *pāṣāṇamayatvaviśiṣṭaparvata*, the fallacy should be defined as follows: *yādṛśaviśiṣṭaviṣayakaniścayaviśiṣṭayādṛśaviśiṣṭaviṣayakaniścayatvam prakṛtānumitipratibandhakatānatiriktavṛttijñānavaiśiṣṭyānavacchinnapratibandhakatānavacchedakatādṛśaviśiṣṭaviṣayatādvayaśūnyapra-*

[1] Here it should be noted why *paṣāṇāmayatvaviśiṣṭaparvataviṣayatā* is not *pratibandhakatāvacchedakaviṣayatā*. The reason is that the *pāṣāṇamayatvaviśiṣṭaparvataviṣayatā* exists in the instance of knowledge *pāṣāṇamayaḥ parvataḥ*. This knowledge is not a hindering factor for the inferential knowledge *parvato vahnimān*. Therefore *pāṣāṇamayatvaviśiṣṭaparvataviṣayatā* is *pratibandhakatānavacchedakaviṣayatā*.. Here the *pratibandhakatāvacchedakaviṣayatā* is in the instance of *viśiṣṭajñāna* in the form *vahnyabhāvaviśiṣṭapāṣāṇamayatvavadvṛtti pāṣāṇamayatvaviśiṣṭaparvataviṣayatā*.

tītiviṣayaḥ tādṛśaviśiṣṭaḥ hetvābhāsaḥ. Such a definition cannot be applied to *pāṣāṇamayatvaviśiṣṭaparvataḥ.* Here by the expression *yādṛśaviśiṣṭaviṣaykaniścaya* is taken as *pāṣāṇamayo vahnyabhāvavān.* Therefore by the expression *yādrśaviśiṣṭaviṣayakaniścaya viśiṣṭayādṛśaviśiṣṭaviṣaykaniścayatvam* is understood *pāṣāṇamayo vahnyabhāvavān pāṣāṇamayaśca parvataḥ iti niścayatvam.* That *niścaya* is the hindering factor for the inferential knowledge *parvato vahnimān.* Therefore that *niścayatva* is *pratibandhakatānatiriktavṛtti.* It means where there is that *niścayatva*, there is that *pratibandhakatā.* Then both the *viśiṣṭaviṣayatās*, viz. *vahnyabhāvavatpāṣāṇamayaviṣayatā* and *pāṣāṇamayatvaviśiṣṭaparvataviṣayatā* are *jñānavaiśiṣṭyānavacchinnapratibandhakatānavacchedakaviṣayatā* because in this knowledge (*pāṣāṇamayo vahnyabhāvavān pāṣāṇamayaśca parvataḥ*) the *pratibandhakatā* is *jñānavaiśiṣṭyāvacchinna.* Therefore these *viṣayatās* are *jñānavaiśiṣṭyānavacchinnapratibandhakatānavacchedakaviṣayatās, tādṛśaviṣayatādvayaśūnyajñānam* is not *pāṣāṇamayo vahnyahāvavān pāṣāṇamayaśca parvataḥ.* The *viṣayatādvayaśūnyapratīti* will be any other knowledge. The object of that knowledge is not *pāṣāṇamayatvaviśiṣṭaparvata.* Therefore there is no overextension in *pāṣāṇamayatvaviśiṣṭaparvataḥ.* It should be noted here that in the *viśiṣṭaviṣayatā* in the definition *jñānavaiśiṣṭyānavacchinnapratibandhakatānavacchedakam* should be given as a qualifier. If this qualifier is omitted from this definition, then there would be impossibility in *vahnybhāvavaddhradaḥ* which is the *bādha.* This is because by the expression *yādṛśaviśiṣṭaviṣaykaniścayaviśiṣṭayādrśaviśiṣṭaviṣayakaniścaya* is to be understood *vahnyabhāvaviṣayakaniścayaviśiṣṭavahnyabhāvavaddhradaḥ iti niścayaḥ.* This *niścayaḥ* also is hindering factor for the inferential knowledge *hrado vahnimān.* Therefore this *niścayatva* is *anumitipratibandhakatānatiriktavṛtti.* But in *vahnyabhāvaddhradaḥ* there is no *viśiṣṭadvayaviṣayatāśūnyapratītiviṣayatva* since both *vahnyabhāvaviṣayatā* and *vahnyabhāvavaddhradaviṣayatā* are present in the *bādhajñānam* in the form *vahnyabhāvavān hradaḥ.* When this qualification is used then the *viṣayatādvayam* is not *jñānavaiśiṣṭyavachinnaprati-*

bandhakatānavacchedaka because the knowledge *vahnyabhāvaniścayaviśiṣṭavahnyabhāvavaddhradaḥ* is not hindering factor in the form *jñānaviśiṣṭajñānam*. Therefore *jñānavaiśiṣṭyānavacchinnapratibandhakatānavacchedakaviṣayatādvayaśūnyapratītiviṣayatva* exists in *vahnyabhāvavad hradaḥ* which is the *bādha*. Therefore there is no fault of impossibility for the definition of fallacy.

(p.241, ln 9 – p.242, ln 3; p.248, ln 3 – p.250, ln 3) Now we discuss an objection in M. which is raised by those who hold that the Counterthesis is a fallacy even when there is erroneous knowledge (of *vyāpti* and *pakṣadharmatā* of the *pratihetu*).[1] According to them here in the instance of the inferential knowledge *parvato vahnimān dhūmāt* there is the fallacy of *satpratipakṣa* if there is the erroneous knowledge that *vahnyābhāvavyāpyapāṣāṇamayatvavān parvataḥ*. But this would not be possible if *yadviṣayakatva* is interpreted as *yādṛśaviśiṣṭaviṣaykatva* because *vahnyabhāvavyāptiviśiṣṭapāṣāṇamayatva* is unestablished since there is no *vyāpti* of *vahnyabhāva* in *pāṣāṇamayatva*.

This objection is answered by pointing out that in such instances there is no fallacy of Counterthesis. This is because there is no valid knowledge of *vyāpti* and *pakṣadharmatā* of the *pratihetu*. If the fallacy of Counterthesis is accepted even when there is erroneous knowledge of the *vyāpti* and *pakṣadharmatā* of *pratihetu*, then there would be the fallacy of Contradiction (*bādha*) even when there is the erroneous knowledge of the absence of *sādhya*, i.e. *bādha* should also be an *anityadoṣa*. Hence in the instance of the inferential knowledge *parvato vahnimān dhūmāt*, when there is erroneous knowledge of *vyāpti* and *pakṣadharmatā* of the *pratihetu* there is no fallacy of Counterthesis. Here because of erroneous cognition of the *vyāpti* and *pakṣadharmatā* of the *pratihetu* inferential knowledge in the

[1] There are two opinions among the Naiyāyikas about the nature of *satpratipakṣa*. According to some *satpratipakṣa* is *anitya*, i.e. there is *satpratipakṣa* even when there is the erroneous knowledge of the absence of *vyāpti* and *pakṣadharmatā* of the *hetu*. According to others *satpratipakṣa* is *nitya*, i.e. there is *satpratipakṣa* only when the *hetu* is fallacious.

form *parvato vahnimān* is prevented, but the reason in itself is not fallacious. Otherwise i.e. if the fallacy of Counterthesis is admitted even when there is the erroneous cognition of the *vyāpti* and *pakṣadharmatā* of the *pratihetu*, then even valid reasons would become fallacious when there is the erroneous knowledge of the absence of *sādhya*.

Hence fallacy is to be accepted in the following way: when an instance of knowledge having a particular object which is qualified by a particular characteristic prevents inferential knowledge, that which is characterized by that particular characteristic is fallacy. In this way fallacy is reason and so on which exist in that which has the absence of *sādhya*. By the expression 'and so on' we should take also the subject which is qualified by the absence of *sādhya*.

The real meaning of the statement : *sādhyābhāvavadvṛtti-hetvādikam doṣaḥ* is to be understood as follows: the definition of fallacy cannot be applied by taking Deviation qualified by the state of being Deviation by the expression *yādṛśaviśiṣṭa*. This is because the state of having object in the form of Deviation (*vyabhicāraviṣayakatva*) exists in the instance of knowledge of just Deviation which is not a hindering factor. Therefore it exists where the state of being hindering factor does not exist. But the reason which is fallacious is the reason which is qualified by Deviation. In this way the definition of fallacy does not suffer from any fault of impossibility.

Now a question arises: if fallacy is the reason itself having Deviation and so on, then such kind of fallacy cannot exist in the reason, since reason cannot be said to exist in reason itself. As an answer to this question it cannot be stated that the fallacy considered as the reason itself having Deviation and so on exists in the reason by the relation of identity. This is because if such an answer is accepted, in the instance of inferential knowledge, the lake has fire because of smoke, smoke would not be a fallacious reason because the Contradiction in the form of the lake having the absence of fire (*vahnyabhāvavaddhrada*) does not exist in the reason i.e. in smoke by the relation of identity. Therefore M. states that fallacy considered as the reason itself

having Deviation and so on exists in the reason by any kind of relation. This means that the former exists in the latter by the relation which is actually apprehended there.[1] This is the view of modern logicians.

A further objection may be raised as follows: there is the fault of overextension for this definition of fallacy because this definition can be applied even in the case of valid inferences such as 'mountain has fire because of smoke'. The reason is that smoke has substanceness which is qualified by Deviation of fire. This objection is rejected since the meaning of the definition is that that instance of knowledge the object of which is that which is qualified by a particular characteristic which prevents an instance of inferential knowledge produced by a particular reason, that particular reason which has that which is qualified by that characteristic as substratum is fallacious reason. Therefore the knowledge *vahnyabhāvavadvṛttidravyatvam*, i.e. substanceness which exists in that which has the absence of fire is not hindering factor for the inferential knowledge produced by smoke. Therefore though smoke has substanceness there is no usage that smoke is a fallacious reason. And hence there would be no overextension.

(p.242, ln 4 – p.243, ln 1; p.250, ln 3 – p.251, ln 4) Other Naiyāyikas hold that *satpratipakṣa* is an *anityadoṣa*, i.e. Counterthesis is a fallacy even when there is an erroneous knowledge of the contradictory invariable concomitance. And according to them fallacy is defined as follows: *yadviṣayaka-tvena jñānasya anumitivirodhitvam tadvattvam hetvābhāsatvam*

[1] Here *Kiraṇāvali* (p.259, lns 13ff.) remarks that in all cases of fallacious reason the relation in question is *svaviṣayakajñānaviṣayaprakṛtahetutā-vacchedakavattvasambandha*, i.e.*svam* is *doṣaḥ*, (e.g. *vahnyabhāvaddhṛadaḥ*) *svaviṣayakajñānam* is *vahnyabhāvaddhṛadaḥ dhūmśca iti jñānam*, *prakṛta-hetutāvacchedakam* is *dhūmatva* which exists in *dhūma*. Therefore by this relation of *svaviṣayakajñānaviṣayaprakṛtahetutāvacchedakavattvasambandha* the fallacy of Contradiction exists in smoke. When the reason is mentioned as having a heavy property (e.g. *nīladhūma, kambugrīvādimān*) or when the reason is unestablished (e.g. *kāñcanamayadhūma*) then the relation is *svaviṣayakajñānīyaviśeṣyatvam* i.e. *svam* is *doṣaḥ*, i.e. *nīladhumaḥ, svaviṣa-yakajñānam* is *nīladhūmaviṣayakajñānam*, so here in *dhūma* there is *viśeṣyatā*.

i.e. a fallacy (here considered as a fallacious reason according to the derivation *hetuvad ābhāsante hetvābhāsāḥ*) is that (viz. Deviation and so on) which is the object of an instance of knowledge that prevents inferential knowledge.

In the case of *satpratipakṣa* the opposite invariable concomitance and so on are defects (*doṣah*). And the fallacious reason has these defects by the relation in the form of knowledge. This means that when there is the fault of Counterthesis there is the knowledge of opposite invariable concomitance. This invariable concomitance exists in the reason of the establishing inference by the relation of knowledge. As for example, someone argues *śabdo nityaḥ śrāvaṇatvāt*. So in *śrāvaṇatva* which is the reason in the establishing inference the knowledge of the invariable concomitance of the state of being non-eternity (*anityatvavyāpti*) exists by the relation of knowledge. This is because when the opponent states *śabdo 'nityaḥ kṛtakatvāt*, the knowledge of *anityatvavyāpti* arises also for the defender of the syllogism. And in this way in the reason of the establishing inference the invariable concomitance of the counter-reason exists by the relation of knowledge.

Now a possible objection may be raised: in such valid inferences as 'it has fire because it has smoke', there could sometimes arise erroneous knowledge of Contradiction in the subject in the form that there is the absence of fire in the mountain. This could be hindrance for inferential knowledge because the object of such a knowledge is the absence of *sādhya*. And that Contradiction also exists in the valid reason by the relation of knowledge, i.e. by being the object of one instance of knowledge (viz. *parvato vahnyabhāvavān dhūmavāṃśca*). In this way valid reason also can become invalid because of the fault of Contradiction.

This objection is rejected because knowledge in the form of *ekajñānaviṣayatva*, i.e. the state of being the object of one instance of knowledge, is not accepted as a relation because there is no proof for the acceptance of such a relation. This is due to the fact that there is no usage in ordinary discourse that a valid reason has the fault of Contradiction but the usage is that

the person who thinks like this has made a mistake. In the case of Counterthesis there is indeed usage that the reason has the fault of Counterthesis when there is the erroneous knowledge of the opposite invariable concomitance.

This opinion of the old Naiyāyikas does not seem to be correct because it is based only on one's own opinion. Further the fallacy of Counterthesis is pervaded by the fallacy of Contradiction, i.e. wherever there is the fallacy of counterthesis, there is the fallacy of Contradiction. Hence when there is the absence of that which pervades, there should also be the absence of that which is pervaded. Therefore when Contradiction is absent, Counterthesis also should be absent. Hence when there is the erroneous knowledge of opposite invariable concomitance, there is no fault of Counterthesis but only the erroneous knowledge of the opposite invariable concomitance hinders inferential knowledge. This is the incongruity in the position of the old Naiyāyikas and such an incongruity is indicated by the expression *āhuh* in M.

(p.243, ln 1–5; p.251, ln 4 – p.254, ln 1) The expression *anumitivirodhitvam,* the state of being opposed to inferential knowledge, is to be interpreted as *anumititatkāraṇānyataravirodhitvam*, the state of being opposed to inferential knowledge or to the instrumental cause of inferential knowledge. This just means that the knowledge of fallacy either directly prevents inferential knowledge or the instrumental cause of inferential knowledge. Therefore there is no fault of too narrow application with reference to the fallacy of Deviation, though the knowledge of Deviation does not prevent inferential knowledge directly but prevents only the knowledge of invariable concomitance which is the instrumental cause of inferential knowledge. The knowledge of fallacy is with reference to a particular reason. Such a knowledge of fallacy hinders the inferential knowledge produced by that reason. Therefore when there is the knowledge of Deviation about one reason, inferential knowledge can arise from another reason.

Now it is accepted that with reference to an instance of inferential knowledge having a particular *sādhya* and reason, the

absence of the knowledge of the deviation of that particular *sādhya* in that particular reason is the cause. This is not the case here because the knowledge of Deviation has no absence of *sādhya* as its object. Therefore it is not a hindering factor for the inferential knowledge. Hence the absence of the knowledge of Deviation cannot be a cause of inferential knowledge in the capacity of being the absence of hindering factor.

But when the expression *anumitivirodhitva* is interpreted as *anumititiatkaraṇānyataravirodhitva*, then the absence of the knowledge of Deviation will be a cause of inferential knowledge in the capacity of being the absence of hindering factor for the cause of inferential knowledge, viz. the knowledge of invariable concomitance.

Here Ramarudra raises a further objection as follows: that an inferential knowledge arises from a particular reason means that it arises after the consideration of that particular reason. Therefore when there is a consideration with two different reasons and after this there is the knowledge of Deviation in one reason, the inferential knowledge that arises is produced by that consideration. Therefore the absence of *vyabhicārajñānābhāva* which is stated as the cause of this inferential knowledge does not exist there and therefore there is deviation of cause and effect relation.

As for instance when fire is established on the mountain by the two reasons, smoke and the state of having stones (*pāṣāṇamayatva*), after the consideration with the two reasons (viz. *vahnivyāpyadhūmavān vahnivyāpyapāṣāṇamayatvavāṁśca parvataḥ*) there arises the knowledge of Deviation in one reason, viz. the state of having stones (*pāṣāṇamayatva*). (The form of the knowledge of Deviation is *vahnybhāvavadvṛttipāṣāṇamayatvam*). But even after this there is the inferential knowledge 'the mountain has fire'. And since this instance of inferential knowledge occurs after the consideration it is to be taken as produced by the consideration of both reasons. But since there is the knowledge of Deviation with reference to one reason (*pāṣāṇamayatva*), there is no absence of the knowledge of Deviation which was mentioned as the cause of inferential

knowledge. In this way there is deviation with reference to cause and effect relationship.

The answer to this objection is the following: that an inferential knowledge is produced by a particular reason e.g. *dhūma,* means that it should be different from the inferential knowledge which is qualified by the knowledge of Deviation with reference to a particular reason, eg. *pāṣāṇamayatva,* by the relation of the state of coming immediately after that i.e. knowledge of Deviation.[1] The inferential knowledge mentioned earlier is different from the inferential knowledge which is qualified by the knowledge of Deviation with reference to a particular reason, eg. *pāṣāṇamayatva,* by the relation of the state of coming immediately after that. This is because such an inferential knowledge arises by the reason *dhūma*. Therefore this inferential knowledge is not qualified by the knowledge of Deviation with reference to the particular reason (*dhūma*) by the relation of the state of coming immediately after that. Therefore this inferential knowledge is different from the inferential knowledge which is qualified by the knowledge of Deviation with reference to a particular reason (*pāṣāṇamayatva*). Hence this inferential knowledge cannot be said to be qualified by the knowledge of Deviation with reference to the reason smoke. And so there is no deviation of cause and effect relation.

[1] Here the inferential knowledge *parvato vahnimān* is qualified by the knowledge of Deviation with reference to a particular reason of *pāṣāṇamayatva* by the relation of the state of coming immediately after that (*avyavahitottara-vasaṃbandhena taddhetudharmikavyabhicārajñānaviśiṣṭānumiti*). This means that the qualifier of such an inferential knowledge is *taddhetudharmikavyabhi-ārajñānam*, here such a *vyabhicārajñānam* is *vahnyabhāvavadṛttipāṣāṇa-ayatvam*. And this qualification is in the inferential knowledge *parvato vahnimān* by the relation of *avyavahitottaratvam.* But the inferential knowledge *parvato vahnimān dhūmāt* is not qualified by the knowledge of Deviation with reference to the particular reason of smoke by the relation of the state of coming immediately after that knowledge of Deviation. This means that we have no knowledge of *dhūma* as *vahnyabhāvavadvṛtti*. Therefore this inferential knowledge is not qualified by the knowledge of Deviation in the reason which produces that inferential knowledge. Hence there is no harm.

However a further difficulty may be raised as follows: the given definition of fallacy is *yādṛśaviśiṣṭaviṣayakatvam prakṛtānumitipratibandhakatāvacchedakam tattvam*, i.e. the state of having a particular thing as object qualified by a particular characteristic is the determinant of the state of being hindering factor for the inferential knowledge. The state of being that particular characteristic is (the state of being) fallacy. Here the determinant of the state of being hindering factor is the state of having a particular thing as object qualified by a particular characteristic (*yādṛśaviśiṣṭaviṣayakatva*). Here the state of being the determinant of the state of being hindering factor is not in the form of relation of selfsameness (*svarūpasaṃbandha*). But it is in the form of the state of being existent in the thing which is not different from the substratum of that thing (*anatirikta-vṛttitvam*). This is because otherwise there would be such faults as overextension in the absence of fire with reference to the inference there is fire because of smoke as explained earlier.

But when the state of being determinant of the state of being hindering factor is understood in the form of the state of being existent in the thing which is not different from the substratum of that thing then there would be overextension in Deviation qualified by knowability (*prameyatvaviśiṣṭavyabhi-cāra*). The reason is that the state of having as object Deviation qualified by knowability is existent in the thing which is not different from the substratum of the state of being hindering factor for inferential knowledge. The idea here is that though the knowledge of *prameyatvaviśiṣṭvyabhicāra* hinders inferential knowledge it is not considered as a fallacy. Hence there is overextension. Therefore another definition of fallacy is given which will avoid this fault of overextension.

The determinant of the state of being hindering factor for an instance of inferential knowledge should be understood as qualified by the state of being not constituted by any other determinant of the state of being hindering factor for the same instance of inferential knowledge. In less technical language this means that the determinant of the state of being hindering factor (of an instance of inferential knowledge) should not

include another determinant of the same. The Deviation qualified by knowability (*prameyatvaviśiṣṭavyabhicāra*) includes also Deviation (*vyabhicāra*) which is also a determinant of the state of being hindering factor. Therefore Deviation qualified by knowability (*prameyatvaviśiṣṭavyabhicāra*) cannot be taken by the expression the state of having a particular thing as object qualified by a particular characteristic (*yādṛśaviśiṣṭaviṣayakatva*). And in this way Deviation qualified by knowability (*prameyatvaviśiṣṭavyabhicāratva*) cannot be taken as the determinant of the state of being hindering factor for inferential knowledge.

Rāmarudra here first of all notes that in D. Deviation (*vyabhicāra*) is taken as the determinant of the state of being hindering factor. But in M. the state of having a particular thing as object qualified by a particular characteristic (*yādṛśaviśiṣṭaviṣayakatva*) is accepted as the determinant of the state of being hindering factor for inferential knowledge. Therefore there seems to be a contradiction between D. and M. Hence R. points out that Deviation (*vyabhicāra*) is the determinant of the state of being hindering factor in the capacity of being the object of the knowledge of Deviation (*viṣayavidhayā*).[1]

In this way according to R. the definition of fallacy would be the following: the state of having the object qualified by a particular characteristic is the determinant of the state of being hindering factor for inferential knowledge when it (*yadviṣayakatva*) is not constituted by another qualified thing which does not exist where the state of being hindering factor for inferential knowledge exists. That which has such a state of having the object is fallacy. In the case of *prameyatvaviśiṣṭavyabhicāra*

[1] Here the way in which *vyabhicāra* becomes the determinant of *pratibandhakatā* may be noted. Let us take as example the following *pratibadhyapratibandhakabhāva, ghaṭābhāvajñānam prati ghaṭajñānam pratibandhakam.* So the *pratibandhakatā* in *ghaṭajñāna* is determined by *ghaṭa* also in the capacity of its being the object of *ghaṭajñāna* though it is determined also by *ghaṭajñānatva* and *ghaṭaviṣayakatva*. Similarly *vyabhicārajñāna* is *pratibandhaka* for *anumiti*. And so *vyabhicāra* is also the determinant of *pratibandhakatā* in the capacity of being the object of *vyabhicārajñāna,* though *vyabhicārajñānatva* and *vyabhicārajñānaviṣayakatva* are also the determinants of *pratibandhakatā.*

which is the *viśiṣṭa*, the *viśiṣṭāntara* is *vyabhicāra* which *viṣayavidhayā* is *pratibandhakatāvacchedaka* as explained earlier. So *prameyatvaviśiṣṭavyabhicāra* is constituted by *vyabhicāra* which is the *viśiṣṭāntara*. Therefore there is no *viśiṣṭāntārāghaṭitatva* in *prameyatvaviśiṣṭavyabhicāra*. So by the expression *yādṛśaviśiṣṭaviṣayakatva* we cannot take *prameyatvaviśiṣṭavyabhicāraviṣayakatva*. Therefore there is no fault of overextension.

tadaghaṭitatva, the state of being not constituted by that, means *tadaviṣayakapratītiviṣayatva*, the state of being the object of knowledge which does not have that thing as object. A particular thing cannot be the object of knowledge which does not have the same thing as object. Therefore if the expression *antara* is not used then there would be impossibility of the application of the definition. This is because Deviation and so on do not have the state of being the object of knowledge which does not have Deviation and so on as object (i.e. *vyabhicārāviṣayakapratītiviṣayatva* does not exist in *vyabhicāra*).

The meaning of *antara* is not *svabhinna*, different from itself. This is because *prameyatvaviśiṣṭavyabhicāra* i.e. Deviation qualified by knowability is not different from just Deviation. And so the overextension will remain. Therefore *svabhinna* is taken in the sense of *svāviṣayakapratītiviṣayatva*, the state of being the object of knowledge which does not have that thing itself as object.

Now an objection may be raised as follows: take the inference, *prameyatvam avṛtti prameyatvāt*, i.e. knowability is non-occurrent because it is knowability. Here Deviation will be in the form *avṛttitvābhāvavadvṛttiprameyatva*, i.e. knowability is occurrent in that which has the absence of non-occurrence. Such a fallacy of Deviation includes also Contradiction which is in the form of *vṛttiprameyatva*, i.e. knowability is occurrent. Therefore the definition would suffer from the fault of too narrow application since it does not apply to Deviation itself.

The answer to this objection is that the expression *viśiṣṭāntaraviṣayakatvānavacchinnatva* should be taken as qualifier of *anumitipratibandhakatā* and it is not the case that the expression

viśiṣṭāntarāghaṭitatva is a qualifier of *doṣa* as mentioned earlier. This means that the state of being hindering factor (*pratibandhakatā*) for inferential knowledge which exists in the knowledge of Deviation which prevents the knowledge of invariable concomitance is not determined by the state of having as object another qualified thing (i.e. Contradiction) because the *pratibandhakatā* which exists in the knowledge of Deviation is not determined by the state of having Contradiction as object. Therefore the state of being hindering factor existing in the knowledge of Deviation is different from the state of being hindering factor existing in the knowledge of Contradiction. Although here Contradiction is also the object of the knowledge of Deviation, still the state of being hindering factor in this knowledge of Deviation is indicated by the knowledge of invariable concomitance and not by inferential knowledge. Therefore the state of being hindering factor in the knowledge of Deviation is not determined by the state of having Contradiction as object (*bādhajñānaviṣayatva*). In less technical language this means that the knowledge of Deviation does not prevent inferential knowledge directly but only indirectly by preventing the knowledge of invariable concomitance as explained earlier; but the knowledge of Contradiction prevents inferential knowledge directly. And therefore there is no fault of too narrow application.

According to some others however in order to avoid this fault of too narrow application in Deviation the expression, the state of being not constituted by another qualified thing which is not of the same class as itself (here Deviation) (*svasajātīya-viśiṣṭāntarāghaṭitatva*) should be a qualifier of fallacy (*doṣa*). Therefore Deviation is not constituted by a qualified thing of the same class, though it is constituted by Contradiction, since Contradiction is not of the class of Deviation since class here is understood as that which distinguishes (e.g. *bādhatva, vyabhicāratva* etc.) various fallacies. Therefore there is no fault of too narrow application.

This cannot be admitted: the reason is that the state of belonging to the same class (*svasajātīyatva*) should be understood in the form of a characteristic that distinguishes one fallacy from

another fallacy. This characteristic should be *viśiṣṭāntarāghaṭitatvāghaṭitabādhatva etc.* i.e. the state of being Contradiction which is not constituted by that which is not constituted by another qualified thing. As for example, the fallacy of *bādha* is not constituted by that thing e.g *vyabhicāra* etc. which are not constituted by another *vyabhicāra* etc. This just means that *bādha* and so on should not be constituted by Deviation and so on.

If *svasajātīyatva* is not accepted in this way, then there would be overextension in *vyabhicāraviśiṣṭameyatva*. This is because in *vyabhicāraviśiṣṭameyatva* there is no characteristic which distinguishes fallacies. Therefore *vyabhicāraviśiṣṭameyatva* cannot be taken by the expression *sva*. Hence *svasajātīyaviśiṣṭāntarāghaṭita* will be *meyatvaviśiṣṭavyabhicāra* and so on. Other than these is *vyabhicāraviśiṣṭameyatva* which is also *anumitipratibandhakatāvacchedaka*. Therefore there would be overextension in *vyabhicāraviśiṣṭameyatva*.[1] When the expression *sajātīya* means *viśiṣṭānatrāghaṭitatvāghaṭita* there is no overextension in *vyabhicāraviśiṣṭameyatva* because *vyabhicāraviśiṣṭameyatva* is constituted by that, i.e. *vyabhicāra* which is not constituted by any other *viśiṣṭa* e.g. *vyabhicāra, bādha* etc.

But then it would come about that Contradiction would be of the same class as Deviation. This is because *viśiṣṭāntarāghaṭitatvāghaṭitaviśiṣṭāntara* is *bādha* and that will be in Deviation including also Contradiction (i.e. *bādhaviśiṣṭavyabhicāra* as in *prameyatvam avṛtti prameyatvāt*). Therefore there would again be the fault of too narrow application in Deviation.

If by the word *sva*, *anuyogi* (i.e. *vyabhicārādi*) is taken, then *svasajātīyaviśiṣṭāntarāghaṭitatvam* means *svasajātīyatvam yat*

[1] The idea here is that *vyabhicāraviśiṣṭameyatva* is not constituted by *svasajātīyaviśiṣṭāntara*. This is because *vyabhicāraviśiṣṭameyatva* does not have any characteristic which distinguishes fallacy. But *meyatvaviśiṣṭavyabhicāra* is constituted by *vyabhicāra* i.e. it is constituted by that *viśiṣṭāntaravyabhicāra* which has that characteristic which distinguishes fallacy viz. *vyabhicāratva*. But this characteristic exists also in *prameyatvaviśiṣṭavyabhicāra*. So *prameyatvaviśiṣṭavyabhicāra* is *vyabhicārasajātīya*, but *vyabhicāraviśiṣṭameyatva* is not *vyabhicārasajātīya*. Therefore *sajātīyaviśiṣṭāntarāghaṭitatva* exists in *vyabhicāraviśiṣṭameyatva*. Hence there is overextension in *vyabhicāraviśiṣṭameyatva*.

viśiṣṭāntaram tadaviṣayakapratītiviṣayatvam, then there would not be the fault of too narrow application because by the expression *sva, vyabhicāra* is taken. Then *svasajātīyaviśiṣṭāntara* would be *vyabhicāra. tadaviṣayakapratīti* is *bādhaviṣayakapratīti.* And *bādhaviṣayakapratītiviśayakatva* exists also in *bādhaghaṭita-vyabhicāra*. In this way *svasajātīyaviśiṣṭāntarāghaṭitatva* exists in *badhaghaṭitavyabhicāra* and so there is no fault of too narrow application. And the expression denoting the qualificand, viz. *yādṛśaviśiṣṭaviṣaykatvam anumitipratibandhakatāvacchedakam* (i.e. *tathāvidham*) need not be given. In jar and so on there is no *svasajātīyatva* and so there would be no fault of overextension . And *sajātīya* is to be understood as the full characteristic which distinguishes one fallacy from another fallacy. In *meyatvaviśiṣṭa-vyabhicāra*, there is also *śuddhavyabhicāratva* and therefore *meyatvaviśiṣṭavyabhicāra* is *svasajātīya* of *śuddhavyabhicāra*. But in *vyabhicāraviśiṣṭameyatva* there is no *vyabhicāratva* and so there is no *sajātīyatva* between *vyabhicāraviśiṣṭameyatva* and *vyabhicāra*. Therefore there is no fault of overextension in *meyatva-viśiṣṭavyabhicāra*. There is no fault in such an argument except that it is opposed to the primary text, viz. *Dinakarī*.[1] Here it should be noted that no body holds that *prameyatvaviśiṣṭa-vyabhicāra* is a logical fallacy though the knowledge of *prame-yatvaviśiṣṭavyabhicāra* prevents inferential knowledge. And in order to avoid the overextension of the definition of fallacy in *prameyatvaviśiṣṭavyabhicāra*, the expression *viśiṣṭāntarāghaṭi-tatvam* is added in the definition of fallacy.

Still a further objection may be made: even when the expression *viśiṣṭāntarāghaṭitatva* is added in the definition of fallacy, it is difficult to avoid the usage that *prameyatva-viśiṣṭavyabhicāra* is a fallacy. This is because *viśiṣṭāntarā-ghaṭitaśuddhavyabhicāratva* exists also in *prameyatvaviśiṣṭa-*

[1] Here the actual *Dinakarī* text which is referred to is *prakṛtānumitiprati-bandhakatāvacchedakāntarāghaṭatvenānumitivirodhitāvacchedakam viśeṣa-ṇīyam*. (p.328, ln 1). This is based on *Dīdhiti, sāmānyanirukti*, p.1591.

vyabhicāra.[1] And in this way *prameyatvaviśiṣṭavyabhicāra* also would be a fallacy. This objection is answered in the following way: when the expression *viśiṣṭāntarāghaṭitatva* is introduced in the definition of fallacy, *uddeśyatāvacchedakadharma* should be understood in that form (i.e. *viśiṣṭāntarāghaṭitatvāghaṭita-vyabhicāratva*).[2] Therefore *meyatvaviśiṣṭavyabhicāratva* is not *viśiṣṭāntarāghaṭitoddeśyatāvacchedaka*. Hence there is no usage that *prameyatvaviśiṣṭavyabhicāra* is a fallacy.[3]

[1] *vyabhicāratva* exists in *vyabhicāra* and this *vyabhicāratva* exists also in *prameyatvaviśiṣṭavyabhicāra*, just as *ghaṭatva* exists in *ghaṭa* and the same *ghaṭatva* exists also in *nīlaghaṭa.*

[2] Parīkṣit Thampurān (S., p.168, ln 9) describes the *uddeśyatāvacchedakadharma* more precisely and so he points out that such a *dharma* actually is *viśiṣṭāntarāghaṭitatvaghaṭitapratibandhakatānatiriktavṛttiviṣayitānirūpakatāvacchedakam.* (i.e. *vyabhicāratvam*).

[3] Here Parīkṣit Thampurān (S., p.168. lns 12ff.) raises an objection and answers it in the following way: it is stated that *uddeśyatāvacchedakadharma* is *viśiṣṭāntarāghaṭitatvaghaṭitavyabhicāratva.* And if it is accepted that *uddeśyatāvacchedaka* and *vidheyatāvacchedaka* are the same, then the statement that *prameyatvaviśiṣṭavyabhicāro na doṣaḥ* would be invalid. This is because here *vidheyatāvacchedaka* is *doṣatva* which is actually *vyabhicāratva* and this is present in *prameyatvaviśiṣṭavyabhicāra.* Therefore it is not possible to make a valid statement that *prameyatvaviśiṣṭavyabhicāro na doṣaḥ.*

The answer to this objection is that here the expression *doṣa* is given by implication the meaning *doṣapadārthatāvacchedaka* and the expression *prameyatvaviśiṣṭavyabhicāra* is given by implication the meaning *prameyatvaviśiṣṭavyabhicāratva.* In this way the meaning of the whole sentence is that *prameyatvaviśiṣṭavyabhicāratva* is not *doṣapadārthatāvacchedaka.* And this is a valid statement since we do not accept *prameyatvaviśiṣṭavyabhicāratva* as *doṣapadārthāvacchedaka.*

It may be objected further as follows: if *doṣapadārthatāvacchedaka* is *vyabhicāratva* then *vyabhicāratva* exists also in *prameyatvaviśiṣṭavyabhicāra* since *prameyatvaviśiṣṭavyabicāra* is not different from *vyabhicāra.* Hence there is no mutual absence of *doṣapadārthatāvacchedaka* in *prameyatvaviśiṣṭavyabhicāratva* or in both *prameyatva* and *vyabhicāratva* together.

The answer to this objection is that in that case the meaning of *doṣa* is to be understood as *viśiṣṭāntaraviṣayitvāvyāpakasvāvacchinnaviṣayitāvyāpakapratibandhakatākadharmavān.* This means that *doṣa* is that which has that characteristic which is indicated by the state of being hindering factor which is the pervader of the state of having object which is qualified by that characteristic itself and which is not the pervader of the state of having object

Now another objection is raised: it was stated earlier that the state of being opposed to inferential knowledge (*anumiti-virodhitva*) should be understood as the state of being opposed to either inferential knowledge or the instrument of inferential knowledge (*anumititatkaraṇānyataravirodhitva*), otherwise there would be the fault of too narrow application in Deviation and so on. This is because the knowledge of Deviation does not prevent

which is another qualified thing. In this way the rule that there is no difference between *uddeśyatāvacchedaka* and *vidheyatāvacchedaka* is also kept. If the difference between *uddeśyatāvacchedaka* and *vidheyatāvacchedaka* is accepted, then in the *viṣayitā* which is indicated by one particular characteristic there is no state of being indicated by the state of being indicated by the state of being indicator which is determined by another characteristic (*ekadharmāvacchinna-viṣayitāyām aparadharmāvacchinnanirūpakatākatvāsaṃbhavāt*). Therefore the *pratibandhakatā* which is the pervader of the *viṣayitā* which is determined by *prameyatvaviśiṣṭavyabhicāratva* is not non-pervader of *viśiṣṭāntaraviṣayitā*. This is because the *pratibandhakatā* which is in the knowledge *prameyatva-viśiṣṭavyabhicāra* is *doṣaḥ*.

Where the negative particle *na* is used in statements such as *prame-yatvaviśiṣṭavyabhicāro na doṣaḥ, vahniḥ na doṣaḥ* etc., the mutual absence is apprehended as relation, i.e. *prameyatvaviśiṣṭavyabhicāratva* and *śuddha-vahnitva* etc. are apprehended by the relation *svāvacchinnanirūpakatākabheda* in *doṣaviṣayitā* where *sva* is *prameyatvaviśiṣṭavyabhicāratva, vahnitva* etc. Therefore there is no difficulty in making such statements as *prameyatva-viśiṣṭvyabhicāro na doṣaḥ, vahniḥ na doṣaḥ* etc.

But then another difficulty arises: with reference to such valid reasons as *parvato vahnimān dhūmāt* we cannot make a statement *vahnyabhāvo na doṣaḥ* bcause the *doṣapadārtha* as defined, viz. *viśiṣṭāntaraviṣayitvāvyāpaka-svāvacchinnaviṣayitāvyāpakapratibandhatākakadharmavān* is unestablished. Therefore the meaning of the word *vahnyabhāva* is by implication *tatta-ddharmāvacchinnaviṣayakatvaviśiṣṭaniścaya* (where *taddharma* is *vahnya-bhāvatva* and so on) and *doṣapadārtha* means *prakṛtānumitipratibandhaka-tāvān*. And the negative particle denotes *anyonyābhāva* and therefore there is no harm.

According to some others both *prameyatva* and *vyabhicāratva* are the meanings of the expression *prameyatvaviśiṣṭavyabhicāra*. And the *doṣa-padārthatāvacchedaka* is different from both *prameyatva* and *vyabhicāratva* together. And since such an *ubhayabheda* is present the sentence *prameyatva-viśiṣṭavyabhicāro na doṣaḥ* is valid.

According to some others the sentence *prameyatvaviśiṣṭavyabhicāro doṣaḥ* is valid and the sentence *prameyatvaviśiṣṭavyabhicāro na doṣaḥ* is invalid. Therefore many speak of overextension in *vyabhicāravṛttimeyatva*.

inferential knowledge, but prevents only the knowledge of invariable concomitance which is the instrumental cause of inferential knowledge. Now it is objected that the state of being preventer of either inferential knowledge or its instrumental cause is only the state of being indicator of the state of being prevented existing in one of the two (i.e. inferential knowledge or the instrumental cause of inferential knowledge). But if this is accepted, even with reference to such valid inferences as 'mountain has fire because of smoke', the lake qualified by fire can be considered as fallacy. The reason is that in the case of an instance of conjunct inferential knowledge in the form 'mountain has fire' and 'lake has fire' the determinant of the state of being hindering factor would be the lake qualified by the absence of fire.

In order to avoid this fault of overextension in *vahyabhāvavaddhradaḥ*, the definition of fallacy is given as consisting of the state of being preventer (*pratibandhakatā*) indicated by the state of being prevented (*pratibadhyatā*) which is determined by the state of being one or the other (i.e. by the inferential knowledge or the instrument of inferential knowledge). But then there would be the fault of impossibility. This is because the state of being one or the other (*anyataratva*) cannot be the determinant of the state of being prevented. The reason is that the knowledge of Contradiction prevents only inferential knowledge and the knowledge of Deviation prevents only the knowledge of invariable concomitance. Therefore the determinant of the state of being prevented which is indicated by the state of being preventer existing in the knowledge of Contradiction (*bādhajñānaniṣṭhapratibandhakatānirūpitapratibadhyatāvacchedakam*) is the state of being inferential knowledge (*anumititva*). And the determinant of the state of being prevented which is indicated by the state of being preventer existing in the knowledge of Deviation (*vyabhicārajñānaniṣṭhapratibandhakatānirūpitapratibadhyatāvacchedaka*) is the state of being the knowledge of invariable concomitance (*vyāptjñānatva*). In this way the state of being one or the other (*anyataratva*) cannot be considered as the determinant of any one of the instances of the state of being prevented. Therefore when the state of being prevented (*prati-*

badhyatā) exists in the knowledge of invariable concomitance, the state of being one or the other (*anyataratva*) exists in inferential knowledge also. Therefore it is (*pratibadhyatātiriktavṛtti*). Hence it is not the determinant of the state of being prevented existing in the knowledge of invariable concomitance. Similarly when the state of being prevented exists in the inferential knowledge, the state of being one or the other exists in the knowledge of invariable concomitance also. Therefore it is *atiriktavṛtti*. Hence it is not the determinant of the state of being prevented existing in either inferential knowledge or knowledge of invariable concomitance.

In order to avoid this fault of impossibility it is stated that the definition of fallacy includes also the state of being prevented as the pervader of the state of being one of the two (viz. inferential knowledge and knowledge of invariable concomitance). In this way the overextension mentioned earlier in the lake qualified by absence of fire (*vahnyabhāvaddhrada*) when there is a conjunct inference in the form 'mountain has fire' and 'lake has fire' is also avoided. This is because the state of being one or the other (*anyataratva*) exists also in instances of inferential knowledge which are not conjunct, and there, there does not exist the state of being prevented indicated by the state of being preventer existing in the knowledge 'lake has absence of fire'.

But in that case another difficulty arises. There would be the fault of too narrow application with reference to Deviation and Contradiction. This is because the knowledge of deviation is not hindering factor for inferential knowledge and the knowledge of Contradiction is not hindering factor for the knowledge of invariable concomitance. Therefore the *pratibadhyatā* existing in each one of them is not the pervader of the state of being one of the two.

Therefore the main objection mentioned by Dinakara that there would be overextension in lake qualified by absence of fire remains. Hence Rāmarudra points out here that this over-extension can be avoided in the following way. The definition of fallacy should be as follows: it is the state of being hindering factor indicated by the state of being hindered which is determined by a certain characteristic which is pervaded by the

state of being one or the other. Such a state of being hindering factor is the pervader of the state of having object determined by a particular characteristic. Fallacy is that which is qualified by that characteristic (*tādṛśānyataratvavyāpyayatkiṃciddharmāvacchinnapratibadhyatānirūpitapratibandhakatāyadrūpāvacchinnaviśayitāvyāpikā tadrūpāvacchinno doṣaḥ*).

By this the overextension in the lake qualified by the absence of fire is avoided; this is because the state of being hindering factor indicated by the state of being hindered which is determined by a certain characteristic which is pervaded by the state of being one or the other (*anyatratvavyāpya yatkiṃcitdharmāvacchinnapratibadhyatānirūpitapratibandhakatā*), is not the pervader of the state of having object determined by that characteristic. The reason is that the state of being hindering factor exists in the erroneous knowledge 'mountain has fire' but there is no state of having object determined by the state of being lake which is qualified by the absence of fire.

Similarly the fault of too narrow application in Deviation and Contradiction also can be avoided. This is because the state of being inferential knowledge is one characteristic which is pervaded by the state of being one or the other. The state of being prevented determined by that particular characteristic (*yatkiṃcitdharmāvacchinna* i.e. *anumititva*) exists in inferential knowledge. The state of being preventer (*pratibandhakatā*) which is indicated by that (i.e. *anumitiniṣṭhapratibadhyatā*) exists in the knowledge of Contradiction which is the pervader of the state of having object determined by a particular characteristic (i.e. *vahnyabhāvavaddhradatva*). Hence the lake qualified by the absence of fire is fallacy.

In the case of Deviation the characteristic which is pervaded by the state of being one or the other is the state of being the knowledge of invariable concomitance. The state of being hindering factor which is indicated by the state of being hindered which is determined by that (viz. the state of being the knowledge of invariable concomitance) exists in the knowledge of Deviation. This state of being hindering factor is the pervader of the state of having object determined by that particular

characteristic, viz. the state of being Deviation (*yadrūpāvacchinna-viṣayitāvyāpakapratibandhakatā; yadrūpam = vyabhicāratvam*). Hence deviation qualified by the state of being Deviation is fallacy. Therefore there is no fault of too narrow application in Deviation.

In fact the expression inferential knowledge (*anumiti*) in the definition of fallacy is to be understood as conjunctive inferential knowledge (*samūhalambanānumiti*) in the form that the subject has *sādhya* and also the reason which is pervaded by *sādhya* (*pakṣaḥ sādhyavān, sādhyavyāpyahetumāṃśca*). Then there would be no fault of too narrow application either in Deviation or in Contradiction. This is because the knowledge of both prevents such a conjunctive inferential knowledge.

In order to avoid the overextension in lake qualified by the absence of fire in the case of the conjunctive inferential knowledge 'the mountain has fire and the lake also has fire' (*parvato vahnimān hradaśca tathā*) the state of being pervader of the state of being inferential knowledge (*anumititvavyāpakatva*) should be added in the definition of fallacy. The state of being inferential knowledge existing also in the non-conjunctive inferential knowledge 'mountain has fire' does not have the state of being prevented by the knowledge 'lake has the absence of fire'. In simple language it just means that the knowledge 'lake has absence of fire' does not prevent the inferential knowledge 'mountain has fire'. Hence there is no overextension in the lake which has the absence of fire.

In the statement the subject has *sādhya* and also the reason which is pervaded by *sādhya* (*pakṣaḥ sādhyavān sādhyavyāpyahetumāṃśca*) the expression pervaded (*vyāpya*) is to be understood as that which has invariable concomitance (*vyāptimān*). But invariable concomitance is of two kinds: affirmative (*anvayavyāpti*) and negative (*vyatirekavyāpti*). If one type of invariable concomitance i.e. either affirmative or negative invariable concomitance is here used, then there would be the fault of too narrow application either in the fallacy of common Deviation (*sādhāraṇa*) or in the fallacy of inconclusive Deviation (*anupasamhārin*). This is because the knowledge of common

Deviation does not prevent the knowledge of negative invariable concomitance and the knowledge of inconclusive Deviation does not prevent the knowledge of affirmative invariable concomitance. Hence the expression invariable concomitance should be understood as including both kinds of invariable concomitance, viz. affirmative and negative. In this way it has been shown that the definition is free from all faults.

Still according to Dinakara another difficulty can arise. This is because in the definition of fallacy it is necessary to include the state of being preventer of inferential knowledge arising from a reason determined by a particular characteristic and having a *sādhya* determined by a particular characteristic and having a subject determined by a particular characteristic or the instrumental cause of such an inferential knowledge. The reason is that otherwise in such inference as the mountain has fire because of smoke, the absence of the state of being golden (*kāñcanamayatvābhāva*) in mountain and so on would be a fallacy. This is because the inferential knowledge 'mountain has fire because of smoke' is free from all fallacies. When however the expressions determined by a particular characteristic etc. are not used, then in the definition of fallacy by the expression inferential knowledge, inferential knowledge in the form 'the golden mountain has fire' can be taken. Such an inferential knowledge is prevented by the knowledge that the mountain has the absence of the state of being golden. Hence mountain qualified by the absence of the state of being golden becomes a fallacy for the valid inferential knowledge 'mountain has fire because of smoke'. In this way valid reasons also become invalid.

However through the use of the expression 'determined by a particular characteristic' the fallacy of the absence of the state of being golden can be removed with reference to the valid inference 'mountain has fire'. But then there would be the fault of too narrow application in the instance of inferential knowledge 'mountain which has the absence of fire has fire'. Such an inferential knowledge has the fault of unestablished subject (*āśrayāsiddhi*) because mountain is accepted as having fire. Therefore such a knowledge cannot be taken by the expression

'inferential knowledge' in the definition of fallacy. Hence the definition of fallacy in which the expression 'determined by a particular characteristic' is used cannot be applied in the case of the present fallacy of unestablished subject with reference to the knowledge 'mountain which has the absence of fire has fire'. This is because such an inferential knowledge in the form 'the mountain which has the absence of fire has fire' is unestablished. In non technical language the idea here is the following: suppose someone has by his own desire the knowledge (*āhāryajñāna*) that 'mountain which has absence of fire has fire', how can we show that such a knowledge is invalid? Obviously such a knowledge is wrong but the definition of fallacy as given does not apply to the fault of the absence of the subject (*asrayā-siddhi*) because such an inferential knowledge is unestablished. And if the definition of fallacy does not apply here, then it would become valid inference.

(p.243, lns 6–7; p.254, lns 1–3) For these reasons the Muktāvalīkāra gives another definition of fallacy. Fallacy is the state of being different from that which is different from all possible fallacies in the particular reason. This means that a fallacy is different from that which is different from fallacies (*doṣānyānyatvam*). This is explained by Rāmarudra as follows: suppose someone takes the instance of the knowledge 'mountain which has the absence of fire, has fire'. Here the determinant of the state of being subject is absence of fire, the determinant of the state of being *sādhya* is fireness and the determinant of the state of being reason is smokeness. Actually this is not an instance of inferential knowledge. But someone makes use of it in a syllogism. Here according to the Naiyāyikas there is the fallacy of the absence of subject (*āśrayāsiddhi*) in the form mountain qualified by absence of fire. There is also the fault of Contradiction (*bādha*) since it is presumed that mountain has fire. The state of being different from that which is different from such faults is the general definition of fallacy. Therefore even though the instance of inferential knowledge 'mountain which has the absence of fire has fire' is unestablished, there is no harm, i.e. there is no fault of too narrow application. The

meaning is that even though one asserts that the mountain which has the absence fire has fire, there is the fault of Contradiction etc., still someone uses this in a syllogism because of his desire of inferential knowledge in this form i.e. he has the desire that there be inferential knowledge in the form that the mountain which has the absence of fire has fire. Here there are many faults like absence of subject, etc. Contradiction is one of such faults (*anyatama*).[1]

But still another difficulty arises: with reference to such an inference as that which is knowable has ether (*prameyam gaganavat*), that which is knowable has absence of ether (*gaganābhāvavat prameya*) is the fallacy of Contradiction. Here the state of being one of them (*anyatamatva*) in the definition of fallacy means the state of being different from that which is different from that (i.e. fallacy) (*tadanyānyatva*). In the case of that which is knowable has the absence of ether (*gaganā-bhāvavat prameyam*), that which is different (*anya*) from that which is knowable which has the absence of ether is not established, since everything is knowable. Therefore the given definition of fallacy cannot be applied here and hence the definition suffers from the fault of too narrow application.

By the expression one of them (*anyatama*) if the different individual characteristics in the fallacies are taken (*doṣadharmāḥ*) then in such instances of inferential knowledge where the determinant of the state of being subject (*pakṣatāvacchedaka*) is knowable (*prameyam*) as for instance in the inferential knowledge, jar which has a knowable thing has ether (*prameyavadghaṭaḥ gaganavān*), there is Contradiction in the form, jar which has a knowable thing has absence of ether (*prameyavadghaṭaḥ gaganā-bhāvavān*). Here the determinant of the state of being subject is

[1] *anyatamatva* more precisely is *bhedatrayāvacchinnapratiyogitākabheda-vattvam*; for example *ghaṭapaṭakaṭānyatamatvam* is *bhedatrayam pustakādiṣu tādṛśaghaṭabhedapaṭabhedakaṭabheda bhedatrayāvacchinnapratiyogitākabhedaḥ ghaṭe, paṭe, kaṭe ca*. Similarly *anyataratva* means *bhedadvayāvacchinnaprati-yogitakabhedavattva*. For example *ghaṭapaṭānyatara* means *ghaṭabhedaḥ paṭa-bhedaḥ iti bhedadvayam pustakādiṣu, tādṛśapustakādibhedaḥ ghate paṭe ca*. This is *anyataratva*.

knowable thing (*prameya*); a characteristic different from knowable thing is not established. Therefore the definition of fallacy suffers from the fault of too narrow application. And besides in the case of the fallacy of Contradiction, even mere lake would be a fallacy. This is because mere lake is different from that which is different from lakeness while being different from absence of fire (*vahnyabhāvabinnatve sati hradatvabhinno yaḥ*).

These faults may be avoided. Fallacy is a thing which is determined by the characteristic which is the substratum of collective extensity of the state of being determinant of the state of being indicator of the state of having object which is one of the states of having object determined by which certain things are considered as fallacies (*yadyaddharmāvacchinne doṣavyavahāraḥ tattadavacchinnaviṣayitānyatamaviṣayitānirūpakatāvacchedakatāparyāptyadhikaraṇadharmāvacchinno doṣaḥ*). Where in a particular instance there is only one fault, there also the expression 'one of them (*anyatama*)' can be used in the definition of fallacy, on the basis of differences of qualifier and qualificand and the differences in fallacy and that which is pervaded by fallacy. As for example the golden mountain has fire because of smoke, the fault of the absence of the determinant of subjectness (*āśrayāsiddhi*) can be in two forms: the mountain has the absence of the state of being gold (*parvate kāñcanamayatvābhāvaḥ*) and the mountain is the substratum of the absence of the state of being gold (*kāñcanamayatvābhāvavān parvataḥ*). In the first mountain is qualifier and the absence of the state of being gold is the qualificand. In the second the absence of the state of being gold is the qualifier and *parvata* is the qualificand. Besides fallacy and that which is pervaded by fallacy can also be taken as fallacy as for example the mountain which is pervaded by the absence of the state of being golden (*kāñcānamayatvābhāvavyāpyavān parvataḥ*). Therefore the expression *viśiṣṭāntarāghatitatva* should not be added, since Deviation qualified by knowability is not considered as fallacy by authoritative persons.

However in many places there are only two or three fallacies. Therefore how can there be a fivefold division of fallacy?

Hence the possibility of the five fallacies coming together is shown by Dinakara in an example: air has smell because it is oily. Here there are all the five fallacies, it has Deviation because oiliness exists also where there is no smell, it has Contradiction because air has no smell, it has *svarūpāssiddhi*, because there is absence of oiliness in air, it has Counterthesis because there could be a counter-reason to show that air has no smell; it has Opposition because there is Opposition between oiliness and smell since the oiliness is the quality of water only and smell is the quality of earth only according to the Vaiśeṣikas. Thus taking the possibility of various fallacies in a particular instance, they are divided into five.

Text 6
Fallacy of Deviant Reason and its Divisions

का. आद्यः साधारणस्तु स्यादसाधारणकोऽपरः ।
तथैवानुपसंहारी त्रिधानैकान्तिको भवेत् ॥ ७२ ॥

मु. एवं च साधारणाद्यन्यतमत्वमनैकान्तिकत्वम् । साधारणः साध्यवदन्यवृत्तिः, तेन च व्याप्तिज्ञानप्रतिबन्धः क्रियते । असाधारणः साध्यासमानाधिकरणो हेतुः, तेन साध्यसामानाधिकरण्यग्रहः प्रतिबध्यते । अन्ये तु सपक्षावृत्तिरसाधारणः, सपक्षश्च निश्चितसाध्यवान् इत्थं च 'शब्दोऽनित्यः शब्दत्वात्' इत्यादौ यदा पक्षे साध्यनिश्चयस्तदा नासाधारण्यम्, तत्र हेतोर्निश्चयादिति वदन्ति । अनुपसंहारी

K. The first may be Common, the other is Uncommon; likewise there is also the Inconclusive; (in this way) deviant reason would be of three kinds. (*Kārikā* 72)

M. Thus the state of being deviant is the state of being any one of (the fallacies) Common etc. Common is that which exists (also) in something which is different from that which has that which is to be established and the knowledge of invariable concomitance is prevented by it. Uncommon is a reason which does not exist with that which is to be established; by this the knowledge of the co-occurrence of reason with that which is to be established is prevented. Others however hold that Uncommon is that which does not exist in a definite subject and a definite subject is that which has the certainty of that which is to be established. In this way when it is stated, 'sound is not eternal since it is sound'; then when there is the definite knowledge of that which is to be established in the subject, then there is no uncommonness because there, there is the definite knowledge of

मु. च अत्यन्ताभावाप्रतियोगिसाध्यकादिः, अनेन व्यतिरेकव्याप्ति-ग्रहप्रतिबन्धः क्रियते ।

दि. हेत्वाभासलक्षणमुक्त्वा मूले वक्ष्यमाणेष्वनैकान्तिकादिलक्षणेषु क्वचित् क्वचिद्दोषं हृदि निधाय स्वयमनैकान्तिकादीनां लक्षणान्याह **एवम्** इति । **साधारणादीति** । आदिना असाधारणानुपसंहारिणोः परिग्रहः । नन्वे-तस्यानुमितितत्करणज्ञानान्यतरविरोधिज्ञानविषयत्वाभावात् कथं हेत्वाभा-सत्वमित्यतो दूषकताबीजमाह **तेन च** इति । एवमग्रेऽपि । **क्रियते** इति । व्याप्तिघटकाव्यभिचारांशे व्यभिचारज्ञानस्य प्रतिबन्धकत्वादिति भावः । **प्रतिबध्यते** इति । व्याप्तिघटकीभूतसामानाधिकरण्यग्रहः प्रतिबध्यत इत्यर्थः ।

M. the reason. Inconclusive is that reason which is used to establish that which is not the counterpositive of an absolute absence; by this the knowledge of negative invariable concomitance is prevented.

D. Keeping in mind the fact that the definitions of Deviation etc. which are given in the basic text have defects here and there, having given the definition of fallacy (the author himself) gives the definitions of Deviation and so on with the words **thus** (*evam iti*). **Common etc.** (*sādhāraṇādīti*). By the words etc. both Uncommon and Inconclusive are also taken. Now it may be objected how these can be fallacies since these are not objects of the knowledge which prevents either inferential knowledge or the knowledge of its instrument; therefore (the author) points out the reason of their being fallacies with the words **by this** (*tena ceti*). In subsequent sentences also similar interpretation is to be given. **Is effected** (*kriyate iti*). The idea is that knowledge of Deviation prevents non-deviation which is a constitutive element of invariable concomitance. **Is prevented** (*pratibadhyate iti*). The meaning is that the knowledge of co-ocurrence which is a constitutive element of invariable concomitance is prevented.

दि. एवं च साधारणासाधारणानुपसंहारिणां व्याप्तिज्ञानप्रतिबन्धकतारूप-दूषकताबीजैक्येनैकहेत्वाभासत्वमुपपद्यते साधारणेनाव्यभिचारग्रहस्यासाधारणेन सामानाधिकरण्यग्रहस्यानुपसंहारिणा च व्यतिरेकव्याप्तिग्रहस्य प्रतिबन्धादिति भावः। प्राचीनमतमाह **अन्ये तु** इति। पक्षे साध्यसंदेहदशायामेवासाधारणस्य हेत्वाभासता न तु निश्चयदशायां, तदा पक्षस्यैव सपक्षत्वेन निश्चितसाध्यवद्व्यावृत्तत्वाभावादित्यनित्यदोषत्वं तस्य इत्याह **इत्थं च** इति। असाधारण्यघटकसपक्षत्वस्य निश्चयघटितत्व इत्यर्थः। **तत्र** निश्चितसाध्यवति पक्षे। साधारणादित्रयाणामेकहेत्वाभासत्वानुपपत्तिर्वदन्तीत्यनेनास्वरसः सूचितः।

D. In this way, since preventing the invariable concomitance is the only one reason of their being fallacies, it is appropriate to consider Common, Uncommon and Inconclusive as one fallacy; the idea is that Common prevents the knowledge of non-deviation, Uncommon prevents the knowledge of co-occurrence (with the *sādhya*) and Inconclusive prevents the knowledge of negative invariable concomitance. (The author) mentions the opinion of the old Naiyāyikas by the words **others** (*anye tviti*). Uncommon is a fallacy only at the time of doubt about *sādhya* in the subject and not when there is the certainty (of *sādhya* in the subject). This is because in that case the subject itself is a definite subject (*sapakṣa*); hence there is the absence of non-occurrence (of reason) in that which has the certainty of *sādhya*; hence this is a non-permanent fallacy. Therefore (the author) says **in this way** (*itthaṃ ca*). The meaning is that certainty is a constitutive element of the state of being definite subject which is a constitutive element of the state of being Uncommon. **There** (*tatra*) means in the subject which has the certainty of *sādhya*. By the expression **'they say'** incongruity in the form of the inappropriateness of the state of being one fallacy in the three (fallacies) Uncommon etc. is indicated.

दि. व्यतिरेकव्याप्तिग्रहप्रतिबन्धः इति । केवलान्वयिसाध्यके चान्वय-व्याप्तिज्ञानादेवानुमितिरिति भावः ।

D. Knowledge of negative invariable concomitance is prevented (*vyatirekavyāptigrahapratibandha iti*). Where the *sādhya* is universally positive, inferential knowledge arises only through the knowledge of affirmative invariable concomitance. This is the idea.

Commentary

(p.311, lns 3–6; p.312, lns 3–8)Fallacious reasons are of five kinds: Deviant (*anaikānta*), Opposite (*viruddha*), Unestablished (*asiddha*), that which has a Counterthesis (*satpratipakṣa*) and Contradictory (*bādhita*). Now the authors define and discuss each of these fallacies with their subdivisions.

The first of these fallacious reasons is Deviant (*anaikāntika*). This is the term used by the old Naiyāyikas (Cfr. *Nyāyasūtras* 1.2.46).[1] Modern Naiyāyikas usually denote *anaikāntika* with the expression *savyabhicāra.* This fallacy of deviation (*anaikāntika* or *savyabhicāra*) is defined as any one among common, uncommon or Inconclusive fallacies.[2]

The first of the deviant fallacious reason is Common (*sādhāraṇa*). Common is defined in M. as that which exists also in something which is different from that which has the *sādhya.* But the definition of the fallacy of Common as given in K. is as follows: the reason which exists both in a definite subject and in a definite contradicted subject is Common. D. points out that in certain places there could be a fault in this definition of common. R. has specifically mentioned this fault in the definition: in the definition of Common given by K. the expression 'existing in a

[1] The derivation of the term *anaikāntika* is as follows: *ekaḥ antaḥ sapakṣo vipakṣo vāyasya sa ekāntaḥ, sa na bhavatīyanekāntaḥ.* But the derivation of *anaikāntika* is *ekasminnante bhavaḥ ekantikaḥ, sa na bhavatīyanaikāntikaḥ.*

[2] The definition of *savyabhicāratvam* as given by T.C. is *ubhayakoṭyupasthāpakatāvaccedakarūpavattvam,* i.e. *ubhayakoṭi* is *sādhyakoṭi* and *sādhyābhāvakoṭi.* That which produces the knowledge of both of these *koṭis* is deviant fallacious reason which may be *sādhāraṇa, asādhāraṇa* or *anupasaṃhārin.*

definite subject' is useless; hence the definition will be only that which exists in a definite contradicted subject. Such a definition has overextension in contradictory reason but this overextension does not cause any harm to the division of fallacies. This is because although the contradictory fallacious reason and common fallacious reason are the same, still in the knowledge of these reasons which prevents the inferential knowledge, the object is something qualified. And this something qualified is different because of different qualifications[1] and so there is no overlapping of the division of fallacious reasons.

The fallacy of Common prevents the knowledge of invariable concomitance. D. makes the meaning still clearer: the knowledge of the fallacy of deviation prevents the knowledge of non-deviation which is a part of invariable concomitance. But in this case as R. points out invariable concomitance is to be understood as *sādhyavadanyāvṛttitve sati sādhyasāmānādhikaraṇyam*. And in this definition of invariable concomitance *sādhyavadanyāvṛttitva* is a constituent part and this is prevented by the fallacy of Common which is *sādhyavadanyavṛtti*. When the definition of invariable concomitance is *hetuvyāpakasāmānādhikaraṇya* then the definition of the fallacy of Common is to be understood as *svasamānādhikaraṇābhāvapratiyogitāvacchedaka-sādhyatāvacchedaka*. This means that invariable concomitance is understood as the coexistence of reason with *sādhya* which is the pervader of the reason. Therefore the fallacy of Common is that the determinant of *sādhyatā* is the determinant of the counter-positiveness of the absence existing in the substratum of the reason. As for instance in the case of false inference 'there is

[1] To make clear what is intended here, let us take the example *hrado vahnimān jalāt*; here the reason *jala* is both Contradictory and Common. When it is Contradictory the form of the knowledge which prevents inferential knowledge is *vahnyabhāvavyāptiviśiṣṭam jalam* and when it is Common the form of the knowledge which prevents inferential knowledge is *vahnimadanyavṛtti jalam*. In these instances of knowledge, the qualified is *jalam*, still the qualifications are different; in the former the qualification is *vahnyabhāvavyāpti* and in the latter the qualification is *vahnimadanyavṛtti*. Hence the fallacies are different. This is the point of the argument.

smoke because of fire', smokeness is the determinant of *sādhyatā* and it is also at the same time the determinant of the counter-positiveness of the absence of smoke which coexists with fire in the red hot iron ball. Such a definition of the fallacy of Common is accepted because of the general principle that the knowledge of the absence of a particular thing is a hindrance for the knowledge of the thing (*tadabhāvavattājñānam tadvattājñānam pratibadhnāti*).

(p.311, lns 6–10; p.312, ln 9 – p.313, ln 8) The fallacy of Uncommon is a reason which does not coexist with *sādhya*. As for example in the inference 'sound is eternal because it has soundness', eternity exists in the soul where soundness does not exist. Therefore the reason soundness is not coexistent with *sādhya*. Hence the coexistence of *sādhya* with *hetu* which is a part of invariable concomitance is not grasped. Therefore the reason has the fallacy of Uncommon.

According to the old Naiyāyikas the fallacy of Uncommon is that which does not exist in a definite subject. And a definite subject is that which has the certainty of the *sādhya*. As for example in the inference 'sound is not eternal because it has soundness', when it is certain that sound is non-eternal there is no fallacy of Uncommon. This is because of the certainty of the reason in the subject, and so the definition of the fallacy of Uncommon as the reason which does not exist in a definite subject (*sapakṣāvṛtti*) is not applicable.

Here it should be noted that only when there is the doubt of *sādhya*, there is the fallacy of Uncommon; when there is the certainty of *sādhya* in the subject there is no fallacy of Uncommon because then the subject is also considered as a definite subject and hence the definition of Uncommon (*sapakṣavyāvṛttatva*) does not apply. Hence Uncommon is a non-permanent fallacy.[1]

It may be noted here that the fallacy of Common, Uncommon and Inconclusive are considered as one type of fallacy because they

[1] A fallacy is considered non-permanent (*anitya*) when its existence depends on a condition. When it does not depend on any condition it is a permanent fallacy. As for example, here, in the case of Uncommon, according to the old Naiyāyikas, the existence of such a fallacy depends on the doubt about the existence of the *sādhya* in the subject, and so it is considered as a non-permanent fallacy.

all prevent the knowledge of invariable concomitance. The fallacy of Common prevents the knowledge of non-deviation which is a part of invariable concomitance, Uncommon hinders the knowledge of coexistence of the reason with the *sādhya* which (coexistence) is a part of invariable concomitance and Inconclusive obstructs the knowledge of negative invariable concomitance.[1] If the fallacy of Uncommon is considered as *niścitasādhyavadavṛttitva* (non-existence in a definite subject) as the old Naiyāyikas assert, then its knowledge will not prevent the knowledge of *sādhyavadvṛttitva* (existence in that which has *sādhya*) just as the knowledge of *nīlaghaṭavadavṛttitva* (non-existence in that which has a blue jar) does not prevent the knowledge of *ghaṭavadvṛttitva* (existence in that which has jar). Hence because of the absence of the ground for being a fallacious reason Uncommon will not be a fallacious reason.

(p.311, ln 10 – p.312, ln 2; p.314, lns 1–2) The Inconclusive false reason is a reason the *sādhya* of which is not the counter-positive of an absolute absence. This prevents the knowledge of negative invariable concomitance. The idea here is that in inference where the *sādhya* is only affirmative (*kevalānvayī*) the inferential knowledge arises only through the knowledge of affirmative invariable concomitance. Here it should be noted that the usual doctrine of the Naiyāyikas is that the *kevalānvayisādhyakahetu* is a valid reason. But inferential knowledge is brought about by such a reason by means of the knowledge of invariable concomitance in the form of *vyāpakasāmānādhikaraṇya*, co-occurrence with the pervader (of the reason). In this way acceptance of Inconclusive as a false reason does not conflict with the Nyāya doctrine. This means that *kevalānvayisādhyaka-hetu* is a false reason only in the opinion of those who hold that the knowledge of negative invariable concomitance is also necessary for inferential knowledge.

[1] *vyatirekavyāpti* is *sādhyābhāvavyāpakībhūtābhāvapratiyogitvam*.

Text 7
Fallacy of Opposite Reason

मु. विरुद्धस्तु साध्यव्यापकीभूताभावप्रतियोगी, अयं साध्याभावग्रह-सामग्रीत्वेन प्रतिबन्धकः । सत्प्रतिपक्षे तु प्रतिहेतुः साध्याभावसाधकः, अत्र हेतुरेक एवेति विशेषः, साध्याभावसाधक एव हेतुः साध्य-साधकत्वेनोपन्यस्त इत्यशक्तिविशेषोपस्थापकत्वाच्च विशेषः ।

दि. नन्वेवं साध्याभावसाधकात् सत्प्रतिपक्षाद्विरुद्धस्य भेदो न स्यादत आह **सत्प्रतिपक्षे तु** इति । **प्रतिहेतुः** प्रतिकूलो द्वितीयो हेतुरिति विशेष इत्यनयोर्भेदः । ननु यदि दूषकताबीजैक्येऽपि हेतुभेदे सत्प्रतिपक्षो हेत्वैक्ये

M. Opposite (reason) is that which is the counterpositive of the absence which is the pervader of that which is to be established. It is a preventer (of inferential knowledge) as a causal complex for the knowledge of the absence of that which is to be established. In Counterthesis however the counter-reason establishes the absence of that which is to be established; here (in the case of the opposite reason) there is only one reason. This is the difference. The very reason which establishes the absence of that which is to be established is mentioned as establishing that which is to be established. In this way it shows the special incapacity (of the person who uses this reason). This is a further difference.

D. Now it may be objected that there would be no difference between Opposite reason and Counterthesis since both establish the absence of *sādhya*. Therefore (the author) says **in Counterthesis** (*satpratipakṣe tviti*). **The counter-reason** (*pratihetuḥ*) means opposite, second reason. This is the difference between the two (*ityanayor bhedaḥ*). Now it may be objected that even though the reason for being fallacy is one, there is the fallacy of counterthesis when there is a different reason. When there is only one reason there would be another fallacy in the form of

दि. विरुद्धरूपं हेत्वाभासान्तरमित्युच्यते, तदा यत्रान्वयिना हेत्वन्तरेण प्रतिरोधस्तत्र सत्प्रतिपक्षो, यत्र तु व्यतिरेकिणा तत्र हेत्वाभासान्तरं स्यादतो भेदकान्तरमप्याह **साध्याभावेति** । वस्तुगत्या साध्याभावसाधके हेतावेव तव साध्यसाधकत्वभ्रम इति स्थापनावादिनं प्रति भ्रमरूपाशक्तिसूचकत्वं विरुद्धस्य नत्वेवं सत्प्रतिपक्षस्येति भावः ।

D. Opposite reason. If it is argued in this way then when there is opposition by an affirmative reason, there is Counterthesis ; (when there is opposition) by a negative reason then there would be another fallacy. Therefore (the author) mentions another reason for difference by the expression **the absence of *sādhya*** (*sādhyābhāveti*). In reality with reference to a reason which establishes the absence of *sādhya* you have erroneous knowledge of that which leads to establish the *sādhya*. In this way the Opposite reason shows the incapacity in the form of erroneous knowledge for the defender (in the discussion). Such is not the case with regard to counterthesis. This is the idea.

Commentary

The fallacious reason of Opposite is defined as that which is the counterpositive of the absence which is the pervader of *sādhya*. Such a fallacious reason prevents inferential knowledge since it is the causal complex for the knowledge of the absence of *sādhya*. Now a question may be raised as follows: if the false reason of Opposite establishes the absence of *sādhya* and the false reason having a Counterthesis also brings about the absence of *sādhya* what is the difference between these two kinds of false reasons? The answer is that when there is the fallacy of Counterthesis, it is another reason in the form of a counter-reason that establishes the absence of *sādhya*, whereas when there is the fallacy of Opposition the same reason which is used to establish *sādhya* establishes actually the absence of *sādhya*.

The reason for such a question is brought forward by Rāmarudra as follows: the false reason of having a Counterthesis is the subject which has that which is pervaded by the absence

of *sādhya* and the false reason of Opposite is the reason which is actually used which is the counterpositive of the absence which is the pervader of *sādhya*. In this way there is the difference between these two types of false reasons by their very nature. Still although the false reasons of Common etc. are different from one another, the reason why they are false reasons are the same; so they are considered as one type of fallacy. Similarly the false reasons of Counterthesis and Opposite could be considered as one type of fallacy because the reasons why they are false reasons are the same, viz. they hinder the inferential knowledge by being the causal complex for the opposite inferential knowledge.

But if the answer to this argument as mentioned earlier is accepted then another difficulty arises: even though the reason for being fallacy is one, if it is accepted that when the reasons are different in the establishing inference and in the counter-inference there is the false reason of counterthesis and when the one reason which is used in the establishing inference with the intention of establishing the *sādhya* actually establishes its absence there is the false reason of opposite which is a different fallacious reason, then it could as well be argued as follows: if inferential knowledge is contradicted by an affirmative reason, then there is the fallacy of counterthesis, as for instance the inference 'sound is eternal because it is audible' is contradicted by the counter-inference 'sound is not eternal because it is produced'. Here there is the false reason of counterthesis . But when the same inference is contradicted by the counter-inference 'sound is not eternal because it is produced', if the invariable concomitance accepted here is negative, in the form wherever there is the absence of non-eternity there is the absence of being produced, then there should be a different type of fallacy, since the reason is different on the basis of negative invariable concomitance.[1]

[1] The idea here is that the reason *kṛtakatvāt* in the counter-inference '*śabdo 'nityaḥ kṛtakatvāt* will be different according as it is qualified by negative invariable concomitance or postive invariable concomitance. Hence if the *hetu* qualified by positive invariable concomitance is called *satpratipakṣa* then there should be another fallacy when the *hetu* is qualified by negative invariable concomitance.

This argument cannot be accepted. Therefore another reason why there is a difference between the false reasons of Opposite and Counterthesis is given.

The argument is that the very reason which actually establishes the absence of the *sādhya* is used to establish *sādhya*. This means that the person who uses the inference has erroneous knowledge that the reason he uses establishes the *sādhya* whereas in fact it establishes the absence of *sādhya*. This shows the incapability in the form of erroneous knowledge of the person who uses the reason in the inference. In the fallacy of counterthesis such is not the case since another reason is used to establish the absence of *sādhya*.

Text 8 A
Fallacy of Counterthesis

मु. सत्प्रतिपक्षः साध्याभावव्याप्यवान् पक्षः । अगृहीताप्रामाण्यक-साध्यव्याप्यवत्त्वोपस्थितिकालीनागृहीताप्रामाण्यकतदभावव्याप्य-वत्त्वोपस्थितिविषयस्तथेत्यन्ये । अत्र च परस्पराभावव्याप्यवत्ता-ज्ञानात् परस्परानुमितिप्रतिबन्धः फलम् ।

दि. साध्याभावव्याप्येति । एवं साध्यवदन्यत्वव्याप्यवान् पक्षः, पक्ष-निष्ठौ साध्याभावसाध्यवदन्यत्वव्याप्यावपि बोध्यौ अन्यतमत्वादिनानुगमान्न

M. Counterthesis is the subject which has that which is pervaded by the absence of *sādhya*. Others however hold that counterthesis is the object of the knowledge of the state of having the thing which is pervaded by the absence of that which is to be established. And that knowledge is not known to be invalid and is at the same time as the knowledge of the state of having the thing which is pervaded by that which is to be established. This knowledge also is not known to be invalid. Here the result is the hindrance of each of the instances of the inferential knowledge by means of each of the instances of knowledge of the state of having that which is pervaded by the absence of (the *sādhya*) of each (of the reason).

D. Pervaded by the absence of *sādhya* (*sādhyābhāvavyāpyeti*). In this way (by this expression) the subject which has that which is pervaded by the state of being that which is different from that which has that which is to be established and both of those things which are pervaded by the absence of *sādhya* and pervaded by the state of being different from the *sādhya* existing in the subject should also be understood. Hence, since there is the consecutive characteristic in the form of the state of being

दि. विभागव्याघातः । सत्प्रतिपक्षव्यवहारौपयिकमन्येषां सत्प्रतिपक्षलक्षणमाह **अगृहीतेति** । नित्यत्वव्याप्यशब्दत्ववत्ताज्ञानशून्यकालीनानित्यत्वव्याप्यकृतकत्वपरामर्शसत्त्वेऽपि सत्प्रतिपक्षव्यवहाराभावात् कालीनान्तमुपस्थितिविशेषणम् । गृहीताप्रामाण्यकनित्यत्वव्याप्यवत्ताज्ञानकालीनानित्यत्वव्याप्यकृतकत्वपरामर्शसत्त्वेऽपि तद्व्यवहाराभावादगृहीताप्रामाण्यकेतिप्रथमोपस्थितिविशेषणम् । तादृशकालीनानित्यत्वव्याप्यवत्तापरामर्शसत्त्वेऽपि तत्राप्रामाण्यग्रहकाले तथा व्यवहाराभावादगृहीताप्रामाण्यकत्वं द्वितीयोपस्थितिविशेषणम् । व्यवहारमात्रोपयोगिनो निरुक्तरूपस्य प्रकृतानुपयोगः उपस्थितिघटितस्योक्तरूपस्य स्वरूपसत एवोपयुक्तस्याभासतायामप्रयोजकत्वादित्य-

D. one of them, the classification is not affected. (The author) mentions the definition of counterthesis useful for its usage as given by others, by the expression **is not known** (*agṛhīteti*). When there is the consideration of the state of being produced which is pervaded by non-eternity at the moment when there is the absence of the knowledge of the state of having soundness which is pervaded by eternity, there is no usage of counterthesis; therefore the expression ending with (the words) 'at the same time' is given as a qualification of knowledge. When there is the consideration of the state of being produced which is pervaded by non-eternity at the time when there is the knowledge of the state of being pervaded by eternity the invalidity of which is known, there is no usage of counterthesis, therefore the expression 'the invalidity of which is not known' is given as a qualification to the first knowledge. When there is the consideration of the state of having that which is pervaded by non-eternity at the same time as that (i.e. at the time of the consideration of that which is pervaded by eternity), if there is the knowledge of invalidity there (i.e. in that knowledge) there is no such usage (of counterthesis). Therefore the expression 'the invalidity of which is not known' is given as a qualification for the second knowledge. By the expression **others** (*anye iti*) (the author) shows the incongruity because the form of counterthesis mentioned

दि. स्वरसंसूचयति अन्ये इति । सत्प्रतिपक्षस्य दूषकताबीजं दर्शयति अत्र इत्यादिना ।

D. already is useful only for usage; therefore it has no use in the present discussion (on definition of fallacies). The given definition a constituent element of which is knowledge, is useful only by its own existence and so it is not needed for being a fallacy. (The author) shows the defect which makes counterthesis a fallacy, with the words **here etc.** (*atra ityādinā*).

Commentary

The fallacy of Counterthesis is the subject which has that which is pervaded by the absence of *sādhya*. As for example when one argues that the earth and so on have an agent because they are effects (*kṣityaṅkurādikaṃ sakartṛkaṃ kāryatvāt*) the opponent argues that the earth and so on have no agent because they are not produced by someone having a body (*kṣityaṅkurādikaṃ na sakartṛkaṃ śarīrājanyatvāt*) and so according to the opponent the reason 'being an effect' (*kāryatva*) suffers from the fallacy of Counterthesis. Here the fallacy of Counterthesis is that the earth and so on have the characteristic of not being produced by someone having a body and such a characteristic is pervaded according to the opponent by the absence of having an agent.

The fallacy of Counterthesis can be defined in other ways also as D. points out. It is the subject which has that which is pervaded by that which has the difference from that which has the *sādhya*. Further the reason having the fallacy of Counterthesis is the reason which exists in the subject and which is pervaded by the absence of *sādhya*. Similarly it can also be defined as the reason which exists in the subject and which is pervaded by the difference from that which has the *sādhya*. However it cannot be objected that these are different forms of the fallacy of Counterthesis and so the division of fallacies into five is not correct. This is because any one of these forms of the fallacy of Counterthesis can be considered as the fallacy of Counterthesis.

Other definitions of the fallacy of Counterthesis which are useful for discourse can also be given; i.e. when there is the possibility of two considerations from different reasons, one can speak of the fallacy of Counterthesis. Such a definition is the following: Counterthesis is the object of the knowledge of the state of having the thing which is pervaded by the absence of *sādhya*. This knowledge is not known to be invalid and this knowledge is at the same time as the knowledge of the state of having the thing which is pervaded by *sādhya*. Thus an example for Counterthesis is 'sound is eternal because it is sound', then the opponent argues 'sound is not eternal because it is produced'. Here in order to have the fallacy of Counterthesis there should be two opposite forms of considerations with reference to the same subject. The forms of these two considerations in the present instance are: sound has soundness which is pervaded by eternity and sound has the state of being produced which is pervaded by non-eternity. Here it should be noted that we cannot speak of the fallacy of Counterthesis when there is no consideration in the form 'sound has soundness which is pervaded by eternity' although there is the consideration in the form 'sound has the state of being produced which is pervaded by non-eternity'. Similarly when there is the knowledge of the invalidity of the consideration in the form that sound has soundness which is pervaded by eternity although there is the contradictory consideration in the form that sound has the state of being produced which is pervaded by non-eternity, still it is not called the fallacy of Counterthesis. When there is consideration in the form 'sound has soundness which is pervaded by eternity' if there is the contradictory consideration in the form 'sound has the state of being produced which is pervaded by non-eternity' and if this consideration is known as invalid, we cannot speak of the fallacy of Counterthesis .

Now D. and R. point out the drawbacks of the definition of Counterthesis purely from the point of view of usage. Such a definition has knowledge as its constitutive element, i.e. from the point of view of usage consideration itself which is an instance of knowledge is the hindering factor for inferential knowledge.

And therefore here consideration by its very nature is the hindering factor for inferential knowledge and not the knowledge of consideration. Hence it does not agree with the definition of fallacy given in the beginning, viz. *yadviṣayakatvena jñānasyā-numitipratibandhakatvam tattvam,* the state of having that object of knowledge which (i.e. knowledge) prevents inferential knowledge. In this way the particular definition of fallacy from the point of view of usage does not agree with the general definition of fallacy. Hence if one accepts such a definition of fallacy of Counterthesis purely from the point of view of usage it cannot anymore be considered as a fallacy according to the general definition.

Now the question is why the fallacy of Counterthesis should be considered as a fallacy or in other words what is the defect which makes Counterthesis a fallacy (*dūṣakatābījam*). It is the fact that each of the considerations prevents the inferential knowledge caused by the other consideration. As for example the consideration that sound has soundness which is pervaded by eternity prevents the inferential knowledge that sound is non-eternal and the consideration that sound has the state of being produced which is pervaded by non-eternity prevents the inferential knowledge that sound is eternal. In this way when there is the fallacy of Counterthesis no inferential knowledge arises.

Text 8 B

View of Ratnakośakāra and its Refutation

मु. अत्र केचित् यथा घटाभावव्याप्यवत्ताज्ञानेऽपि घटचक्षुःसंयोगे सति घटवत्ताज्ञानं जायते यथा च शङ्खे सत्यपि पीतत्वाभाव-व्याप्यशङ्खत्ववत्ताज्ञाने सति पित्तादिदोषे 'पीतः शङ्खः' इति धीः, एवं कोटिद्वयव्याप्यदर्शनेऽपि कोटिद्वयस्य प्रत्यक्षरूपः संशयो भवति, तथा सत्प्रतिपक्षस्थले संशयरूपानुमितिर्भवत्येव। यत्र चैककोटिव्याप्यदर्शनं तत्राधिकबलतया द्वितीयकोटिभानप्रति-बन्धान्न संशयः, फलबलेन चाधिकबलसमबलभावः कल्प्यत इत्याहुः। तन्न। तदभावव्याप्यवत्ताज्ञाने सति तदुपनीतभानविशेष-

M. With regard to this some people say that even when there is the knowledge of the state of having that which is pervaded by the absence of jar, when there is the conjunction of eye with jar the knowledge of the state of having jar arises. In the conch even though there is the knowledge of the state of having conchness which is pervaded by the absence of being yellow, when there is the defect of bile, the knowledge of yellow conch arises. In a similar manner, when there is the knowledge of those which are pervaded by two alternatives, then the doubt of the two alternatives arises in the form of perceptual knowledge. Similarly in the case of Counterthesis inferential knowledge arises indeed in the form of doubt. Where there is the perception of that which is pervaded by one alternative there is no doubt because of the opposition to the knowledge of the second alternative since it has greater strength. On the strength of the result greater strength or equal strength (of alternatives) is assumed. This cannot be accepted, because when there is the knowledge of the state of having that which is pervaded by the absence of one particular thing, knowledge arising from the

मु. शाब्दबोधादेरनुदयाल्लौकिकसन्निकर्षाजन्यदोषविशेषाजन्य-ज्ञानमात्रे तस्य प्रतिबन्धकता लाघवान्नतूपनीतभानविशेषे शाब्दबोधे च पृथक् प्रतिबन्धकता । गौरवात् । तथा च प्रतिबन्धकसत्वात् कथमनुमितिः । न हि लौकिकसन्निकर्षस्थले प्रत्यक्षमिव सत्प्रति-पक्षस्थले संशयाकारानुमितिः प्रामाणिकी येनानुमितिभिन्नत्वेनापि विशेषणीयम् । यत्र च कोटिद्वयव्याप्यवत्ताज्ञानं तत्रोभयत्राप्रामाण्य-ज्ञानात् संशयः, नान्यथा, अगृहीताप्रामाण्यकस्यैव विरोधिज्ञानस्य प्रतिबन्धकत्वादिति ।

M. apprehensional connection in the form of knowledge itself, verbal knowledge etc. do not arise. Therefore on account of simplicity it is only a hindrance for all instances of knowledge which are not produced by ordinary apprehensional connection and some particular defect. There is no separate hindrance for a particular instance of knowledge arising from the apprehensional connection in the form of knowledge itself and verbal knowledge because of cumbersomeness. In this way how can there be inferential knowledge because of the presence of hindrance. The reason is that the opinion that when there is ordinary sense contact there is perceptual cognition, so also in the case of Counterthesis, there could be inferential knowledge in the form of doubt is not acceptable; hence the expression 'other than inferential knowledge' need not be used as a qualifier (i.e. *tadvattājñānam* need not be qualified by *anumitibhinnatva*). Where there is the knowledge of the state of being pervaded by two alternatives, because of the knowledge of invalidity in both instances of knowledge, there arises doubt; not in other cases because only the knowledge of opposition which is not apprehended as invalid is the hindering factor.

दि. सत्प्रतिपक्षस्य संशयजनकत्वं दूषकताबीजं नत्वनुमितिप्रतिबन्धकत्वं तदभावव्याप्यवत्ताज्ञानस्यानुमितिप्रतिबन्धकत्वे मानाभावादिति रत्नकोशकारमतं दूषयितुमुपन्यस्यति **अत्र केचित्** इत्यादिना । **अनुमितिर्भवत्येव** इति । अनुमितिं प्रति तदभावव्याप्यवत्ताज्ञानस्य प्रतिबन्धकत्वे मानाभावात् क्लृप्ततत्तदभावानुमितिसामग्रीभ्यामेव तत्तदभावकोटिकसंशयानुमित्युत्पत्तौ संशयानुमितिं प्रत्युभयव्याप्यवत्तानिश्चयत्वेनातिरिक्तहेतुताकल्पनप्रयुक्तगौरवाभावाच्चेति भावः । ननु यद्युभयभासकसत्व उभयभानं तदा पित्तादिदोषसत्त्वेऽपि पीतत्वशुक्लत्वोभयस्मृतावुभयोर्भानापत्तिरित्यत आह

D. The defect which makes Counterthesis a fallacy is that it produces doubt and not that it prevents inferential knowledge. This is because there is no proof to show that the knowledge of the state of having that which is pervaded by the absence of that (i.e. of *sādhya*) is a hindering factor for inferential knowledge. In order to refute this opinion of the author of Ratnakośa, (the author) explains with the words **with regard to this some people** (*atra kecit*). **Inferential knowledge arises indeed** (*anumitirbhavatyeveti*). This is because there is no proof to show that the knowledge of the state of having that which is pervaded by the absence of that (i.e. of *sādhya*) is a hindering factor for inferential knowledge. Besides there is the absence of cumbersomeness which is due to the acceptance of special cause in the form of the definite knowledge of the state of having that which is pervaded by both that (i.e. *sādhya*) and the absence of that (i.e. *sādhyābhāva*) for the inferential knowledge in the form of doubt. This is because inferential knowledge in the form of doubt having the absence of that (i.e. the absence of *sādhya*) arises from the accepted causal complex of inferential knowledge of that and the absence of that. This is the idea. Now it may be objected that if there are the causes of knowing both, there arises the knowledge of both; then even if there is the defect of bile and so on, when there is the recollection of yellowness and whiteness, there should be the

दि. फलबलेन इति । तथा च तत्र पीतत्वसाक्षात्कारस्यैवानुभविकतया शुक्लत्वग्रहे पित्तरूपदोषस्य प्रतिबन्धकत्वं कल्पयित्वा पीतत्वसाक्षात्कार-सामग्र्या अधिकबलवत्वम्, एवं दूरत्वदोषे सत्यपि स्थाणुत्वपुरुषत्वयोः स्मृतौ संशयस्यैवोदयात्तत्सामग्र्याः समबलवत्त्वमेव कल्प्यत इति भावः । **ज्ञानमात्रे** तादृशज्ञानत्वावच्छिन्ने । **विशेषे** दोषविशेषाजन्ये । **गौरवात्** कार्यकारण-भावद्वयकल्पने गौरवादिति भावः । **कथमनुमितिः** इति । अनुमितेरपि तत्प्रतिबध्यतावच्छेदकाक्रान्तत्वादिति भावः । कथं तर्ह्युभयव्याप्यवत्ता-निश्चयात् प्रात्यक्षिकः संशय इत्याशङ्क्य न भवत्येव तावद्यावत्तन्निश्चयेऽप्रा-माण्यं न गृह्यते इत्याह **यत्र च** इति ।

D. knowledge of both; therefore (the author) says **on the strength of the result** (*phalabalena*). In this way since there is the experience of the perception of yellowness, the defect of bile is accepted as the hindering factor for the knowledge of whiteness. Hence the causal complex of the perception of yellowness has more strength. Similarly even when there is defect of distance if there is the recollection of stumpness and manness only doubt arises. Therefore the causal complex (of this doubt) is considered as having equal strength only. This is the idea. **All instances of knowledge** (*jñānamatre*) that which is determined by the state of being that knowledge. **For a particular instance** (*viśeṣe*) for that instance of knowledge which is not produced by a particular form of defect. **Because of cumbersomeness** (*gauravāt*) because of cumbersomeness arising from the postulation of two kinds of the relationship of cause and effect. **How can there be inferential knowledge** (*kathamanumitiriti*) since inferential knowledge also comes under the determinant of the state of being prevented by that. This is the idea. Then it is objected how can doubt in the form of perception arise from the definite knowledge of the state of having that which is pervaded by both. (Such a doubt in the form of perception) does not indeed arise till the invalidity of the definite knowledge is not apprehended. Therefore (the author) says **where there is** (*yatra ca*).

Commentary

Now the authors discuss the opinion of *Ratnakośakāra*[1] and rejects it. According to Ratnakośakāra the reason why Counterthesis is a fallacy is that it produces inferential knowledge in the form of a doubt and not that it prevents inferential knowledge. The reason why he holds this opinion is that there is no argument to show that the knowledge of the state of having that which is pervaded by the absence of *sādhya* prevents inferential knowledge.[2] This is explained by M. as follows: even when there is the knowledge that the floor has that which is pervaded by the absence of jar still we can have the perceptual knowledge that the floor has jar when there is the conjunction of the eyes with jar. Similarly in the case of conch where there is the knowledge of conchness pervaded by the absence of yellowness, if there is the defect of bile the knowledge yellow conch arises. Therefore even when there is the knowledge of that which is pervaded by the two alternatives (in the example of jar and absence of jar, yellowness and absence of yellowness), there is doubt in the form of perception. Similarly in the case of Counterthesis inferential knowledge in the form of doubt indeed arises. This is because as Dinakara points out there is no proof to show that the knowledge of the state of having that which is pervaded by the absence of *sādhya* is a hindering factor for inferential knowledge. Here someone might object as Rāmarudra points out,

[1] The Ratnakośakāra referred to here is Taraṇi Miśra, the author of the treatise called *Ratnakośa*. He lived around 1300 A.D. His work, *Ratnakośa*, is neither available in print nor in manuscript. He is very often referred to and quoted even by name by Maṇikaṇṭha, the author of *Nyāyaratna*, Gaṅgeśa, Gadādhara, Vardhamāna and others. For fuller details *History of Navyanyāya in Mithilā* by Dineshchandra Bhattacharya, Mithila Institute of Post-Graduate Studies and Research in Sanskrit Learning, Darbhanga, 1958: Mithila Institute Series, 3, Studies No. 2, pp. 76ff.

[2] Cfr. *Nyāyaratna*, p.178, lns 1–2: *saṁśayavirodhitulyadvayaviṣayānumitijanakatvaṃ satpratipakṣatvam iti ratnakośaḥ* and TC., p.885, ln 3 to p.886, ln 1: *Ratnakośakāras tu satpratipakṣābhyām pratyekam svasādhyānumitiḥ saṁśayarūpā janyate viruddhobhayajñānasāmagryāḥ saṃśayajanakatvāt saṃśayadvārā asya dūṣakatvam.*

that there is cumbersomeness in the opinion of Ratnakośakāra. Such a cumbersomeness comes about in the following way: according to Ratnakośakāra, the knowledge of the state of having a particular thing (*tadvattājñānam*) is not prevented by the knowledge of the state of having that which is pervaded by the absence of that thing. Therefore although in the case of the fallacy of Counterthesis, though each one of the considerations does not prevent the other inferential knowledge, still one has to assume that the two instances of knowledge which have in themselves the power to produce definite knowledge produce knowledge in the form of doubt when they are joined together and this is cumbersome. Dinakara points out a way to avoid this cumbersomeness supposed to be present in the opinion of Ratnakośakāra. The inferential knowledge in the form of doubt of the existence of one thing and its absence arises from the causal complex of the inferential knowledge of the thing and the causal complex of the inferential knowledge of the absence of that thing. Therefore there is no cumbersomeness of assuming an additional reason in the form of the definite knowledge of the state of having the thing which is pervaded by both (i.e. *tattadabhāvavyāpyavattājñāna*) for the inferential knowledge in the form of doubt. Rāmarudra explains this further: the state of being inferential knowledge of that particular thing which arises from that particular consideration is the determinant of effectness existing in inferential knowledge and such a determinant is not the state of being definite knowledge existing in inferential knowledge. In non-technical language this just means that an instance of consideration produces the inferential knowledge of that particular thing. But this inferential knowledge need not necessarily be an instance of definite knowledge. When there is only one consideration there is the absence of the causal complex of the knowledge of the other alternative. Hence inferential knowledge arises in the form of definite knowledge. But when there are two considerations both alternatives are apprehended as contradictory to each other. Therefore owing to the presence of the causal complex of doubt, doubt indeed arises. Hence there is no need of postulating an additional cause-effect relationship

for inferential knowledge in the form of doubt in the opinion of Ratnakośakāra.

Now it may be objected that if there is the cause of the knowledge of both the existence of one thing and its absence, then knowledge of both arises. Hence when there is the defect of bile, if there is the remembrance of both whiteness and yellowness, the knowledge of both should arise. The reason for this is given by Rāmarudra. In case of doubt both alternatives are apprehended through the extraordinary apprehensional connection in the form of knowledge. Therefore when there is the apprehension of two alternatives, yellowness and whiteness, there should be doubt only from the defect of bile and not the definite knowledge of yellowness. This possible objection is answered by Muktāvalīkāra as follows: when there is the knowledge of that which is pervaded by one alternative there is no doubt at all because the knowledge of the second alternative is prevented by the knowledge of that which is pervaded by the first alternative. This is because the causal complex for the knowledge of the first alternative already exists. It is the result in the form of perceptual knowledge of the thing that decides which of the alternatives is stronger. As for example when there is the defect of bile, the perception of yellowness is experienced. Therefore the knowledge of whiteness is prevented by the defect of bile. Hence the causal complex of the perceptual knowledge of yellowness is assumed to have more strength. Similarly when there is the defect of distance after the recollection of the state of being stump and the state of being man, doubt alone arises. Therefore the causal complex is assumed to be equally capable of producing the knowledge of both.

Such an opinion of Ratnakośakāra cannot be accepted. This is because when there is the knowledge of the state of having that which is pervaded by the absence of the particular thing, knowledge arising from the apprehensional connection in the form of knowledge, verbal knowledge etc. do not arise. Therefore the general form of the relationship of the hindering factor and of what is hindered (*sāmānyapratibadhyapratibandhakabhāva*)

is the following: the knowledge of the state of having that which is pervaded by the absence of one particular thing is the hindering factor for all instances of knowledge which are not produced by ordinary apprehensional connection and some particular defect. Hence that which is hindered includes all instances of knowledge which are produced by the apprehensional connection in the form of knowledge, all instances of verbal knowledge and all instances of inferential knowledge. Hence there is no need of accepting a separate relationship of the hindering factor and that which is hindered between the knowledge of the state of having that which is pervaded by the absence of one particular thing and the knowledge arising from the apprehensional connection in the form of knowledge and verbal knowledge. And therefore when there is the knowledge of the state of having that which is pervaded by the absence of one thing (here *sādhya*) there cannot arise any inferential knowledge. Thus the general definition of fallacy applies also to the defect of having Counterthesis and therefore it should be considered a separate fallacy in the sense it prevents inferential knowledge as opposed to the opinion of Ratnakośakāra according to whom Counterthesis is a fallacy because it produces inferential knowledge in the form of doubt. Therefore the argument that when there is ordinary sense contact there is valid perceptual cognition, but in the case of Counterthesis inferential knowledge in the form of doubt arises is not accepted as valid. Hence a statement of the relationship of the hindering factor and that which is hindered in which the expression 'other than inferential knowledge (*anumitibhinnatva*)' is used need not be accepted; i.e. the relationship of hindering factor and that which is hindered in the form that the knowledge of the state of having that which is pervaded by the absence of a particular thing is the hindering factor for all instances of knowledge other than inferential knowledge and which are not produced by ordinary apprehensional connection and by a particular defect need not be accepted. Now it may be objected by the followers of Ratnakośakāra that when there is the definite knowledge of the state of having that which is pervaded by one thing and the absence of that thing

there cannot be doubt even in the form of perceptual knowledge. The answer is that only when there is the knowledge of invalidity of both instances of knowledge of the state of having that which is pervaded by one thing and the absence of that thing, there is doubt in the form of perceptual knowledge. When there is no such knowledge of invalidity, there is no doubt at all, because only the knowledge of opposition in which the invalidity is not apprehended is the hindering factor for the alternative form of knowledge.

Text 9

Fallacy of Unestablishedness of Reason

मु. असिद्धिस्तु आश्रयासिद्ध्याद्यन्यतमः ।[1] आश्रयासिद्धिः पक्षे पक्षतावच्छेदकस्याभावः । यत्र काञ्चनमयः पर्वतो वह्निमानिति साध्यते तत्र पर्वतो न काञ्चनमय इति ज्ञाने विद्यमाने काञ्चनमये पर्वते परामर्शप्रतिबन्धः फलम् । स्वरूपासिद्धिस्तु पक्षे व्याप्यत्वाभिमतस्याभावः । तत्र च ह्रदो द्रव्यं धूमादित्यादौ पक्षे व्याप्यत्वाभिमतस्य हेतोरभावे ज्ञाते पक्षे साध्यव्याप्यहेतुमत्ताज्ञानरूपस्य परामर्शस्य प्रतिबन्धः फलम् । साध्याप्रसिद्ध्यादयस्तु व्याप्यत्वा-

M. Unestablishedness is one of the fallacies beginning with Unestablishedness of the subject and so on. Unestablishedness of the subject is the absence of the determinant of the state of being subject in the subject. Where it is established that the golden mountain has fire, there when there is the knowledge that the mountain is not golden, the prevention of consideration the object of which is golden mountain is the result. Unestablishedness of nature is the absence in the subject of that which is considered as pervaded (by *sādhya*). Here in such instances as the lake is a substance because it has smoke and so on when in the subject the absence of the reason which is considered as pervaded is known, the result is the prevention of consideration in the form of the knowledge that the subject has the reason which is pervaded by *sādhya*. Unestablishedness of *sādhya* and so on are Unestablishedness of invariable concomitance.

[1] *asiddhi* which is a feminine noun should have its adjective in the feminine. Therefore the text should be *anyatamā* and not *anyatamaḥ*. Still we have kept the traditional text *anyatamaḥ* making it to agree with *hetvābhāsaḥ* which is understood.

मु. सिद्धिः ।[1] साध्ये साध्यतावच्छेदकस्याभावः साध्याप्रसिद्धिः । एतज्ज्ञाने जाते काञ्चनमयवह्निमानित्यादौ साध्यतावच्छेदकविशिष्ट-साध्यपरामर्शप्रतिबन्धः फलम् । एवं हेतौ हेतुतावच्छेदकाभावः साधनाप्रसिद्धिः यथा काञ्चनमयधूमादित्यादौ । अत्र हेतुताव-च्छेदकविशिष्टहेतुज्ञानाभावात् तद्धेतुकव्याप्तिज्ञानादेरभावः फलम् । एवं वह्निमान्नीलधूमादित्यादौ गुरुतया नीलधूमत्वस्य हेतुतानवच्छे-दकत्वमपि व्याप्यत्वासिद्धिरित्यपि वदन्ति ।

M. The absence of the determinant of the state of being that which is to be established in that which is to be established is Unestablishedness of that which is to be established. When this knowledge arises, the result is the prevention of consideration of that which is to be established which is qualified by the determinant of that which is to be established in such instances as it has golden fire etc. Similarly the absence of the determinant of the state of being reason in the reason is Unestablishedness of reason, as for instance (the mountain has fire) because it has golden smoke. Here the result is the absence of the knowledge etc. of invariable concomitance because of the absence of the knowledge of the reason qualified by the determinant of the state of being reason. Similarly they say that in inferences such as 'it has fire because it has blue smoke' blue smokeness is not the determinant of the state of being reason because of cumbersomeness (and therefore) there is also Unestablishedness of invariable concomitance.

[1] Although according to D. the text seems to be *vyāpyatvāsiddhimadhye'ntar-bhūtāḥ* we follow the text as corrected by Prīkṣit Thampurān (S., p.171, ln 10) viz. *vyāpyatvāsiddhiḥ*.

दि. आश्रयासिद्ध्यादीति । आदिना स्वरूपासिद्धिव्याप्यत्वासिद्ध्योः परिग्रहः । साध्याप्रसिद्ध्यादीनामाधिक्यं निराकरोति **साध्याप्रसिद्ध्याद-यस्तु** इति । आदिना साधनाप्रसिद्धिपरिग्रहः । केषांचिन्मतमाह **एवं वह्निमान्** इत्यादिना । **वदन्ति** इत्यनेनास्वरसः, तद्बीजं तु नीलधूमे व्याप्तिसत्त्वात् कथं व्याप्यत्वासिद्धिः । न च तत्र व्याप्तिसत्त्वेऽपि नील-धूमत्वस्यानवच्छेदकतया तदवच्छेदेन व्याप्यत्वासिद्धिरेवेति वाच्यम् । अन-तिरिक्तवृत्तित्वरूपावच्छेदकत्वस्य नीलधूमत्वेऽपि सत्त्वात् । स्वरूपसंबन्ध-रूपावच्छेदकत्वाभावाद्व्याप्यत्वासिद्धिरित्यपि न । तथा सति पशुमान्

D. Unestablishedness of subject etc. (*āśrayāsiddhīti*), By the expression 'etc.', Unestablishedness of nature and Unestablishedness of invariable concomitance are included. (By the expression) **Unestablishedness of** ***sādhya*** **and so on** (*sādhyā-prasidhyādayastviti*) (the author) rejects that Unestablishedness of *sādhya* and so on are separate fallacies. (By the expression) 'and so on' Unestablishedness of reason is included. (By the expression) **similarly ... it has fire etc.** (*evam vahnimānityā-dinā*) (the author) mentions the opinion of some others. (By the expression) 'they say' incongruity (is indicated). The reason for this is that there is invariable concomitance in blue smoke and so how can there be Unestablishedness of invariable concomitance. Nor should it be argued that although there is invariable concomitance blue smokeness is not the determinant (of invariable concomitance) and therefore there is Unestablishedness of invariable concomitance with that as determinant. This is because in blue smokeness also there is the determinant of invariable concomitance in the form of occurrence in something not different from that thing where it occurs. It cannot also be argued that there is Unestablishedness of invariable concomitance because of the absence of the state of being determinant in the form of self-sameness. If this is admitted there would be Unestablishedness of invariable concomitance

दि. सास्नादिमत इत्यादावपि व्याप्यत्वासिद्ध्यापत्तेः । सास्नाद्यपेक्षयागोत्वादिजातेर्लघुत्वेन सास्नादेः स्वरूपसंबन्धरूपावच्छेदकत्वाभावात् । अस्तु वा नीलधूमत्वादेः स्वरूपसंबन्धरूपावच्छेदकत्वाभावात्तदवच्छेदेन व्याप्त्यभावरूपव्याप्यत्वासिद्धिः, न तु तस्याः हेत्वाभासत्वं अनुमितितत्कारणीभूतव्याप्तिज्ञानाविरोधित्वात् । न च वह्निमदन्यावृत्तिप्रमेयवानिति प्रमेयत्वसामानाधिकरण्येन व्याप्त्यवगाहिज्ञानादनुमित्यापत्तिवारणाय हेतुतावच्छेदकावच्छेदेन व्याप्तिज्ञानस्यैव कारणतया तद्विरोधितया निरुक्तव्याप्यत्वासिद्धिर्हेत्वाभास इति वाच्यम् । तावताप्यनतिरिक्तवृत्तित्वरूपावच्छेदकत्वज्ञानस्य कारणत्वेऽपि तत्र स्वरूपसंबन्धरूपावच्छेदकत्वाभाव-

D. in such inferences as 'it has an animal because it has that which has dew lap.' This is because in comparison with dewlap etc. the universal of cowness etc. is simple and so dewlap and so on are not determinants in the form of selfsameness. Or let there be Unestablishedness of invariable concomitance in the form of the absence of invariable concomitance determined by blue smokeness because there is the absence of the state of being determinant in the form of selfsameness, but this is not a fallacy since it does not prevent inferential knowledge or the knowledge of invariable concomitance which is the cause of inferential knowledge. In order to avoid inferential knowledge from the knowledge of invariable concomitance as having the same substratum with knowability (i.e. invariable concomitance in any one of the reasons) in the form it has knowability which is not existing in something different from that which has fire, knowledge of invariable concomitance in all reasons is to be considered as the cause of inferential knowledge. And as preventing this the mentioned Unestablishedness of invariable concomitance is a fallacy. One cannot argue in this way. Even with this the knowledge of the state being determinant in the form of occurrence in something which is not different from that substratum of that thing is the cause (of inferential knowledge) but the knowledge of the absence of the state of being the determinant in the form

दि. ग्रहस्य ग्राह्याभावानवगाहितयाविरोधित्वात् । तस्माद्व्यर्थविशेषणस्थले न व्याप्यत्वासिद्धिः हेत्वाभासः, पुरुषस्त्वधिकेन निगृह्यत इति ।

D. of the relation of selfsameness is not hindering factor (for the knowledge of invariable concomitance) because this knowledge has not the absence of the thing which is apprehended as object. Therefore in the case of useless qualification there is no fallacy of Unestablishedness of invariable concomitance, but the person is defeated since he uses a superfluous qualification.

Commentary

(p.336, lns 3–6; p.338, lns 1–2) Now the discussion is about the fallacy of Unestablishedness of reason. This fallacy is defined as one of the fallacies beginning with Unestablishedness of the subject and so on. This means that Unestablishedness is either Unestabilishedness of the subject, Unestablishedness of nature or Unestablishedness of invariable concomitance. Unestablishedness of the subject is the absence of the determinant of subjectness in the subject. When the proposed inference is 'golden mountain has fire', if there arises the knowledge that mountain is not golden, then such a knowledge prevents the knowledge that the golden mountain has that which is pervaded by fire. In this way the absence of the knowledge of the goldenness of the mountain hinders the inferential knowledge 'golden mountain has fire' by preventing the consideration that the golden mountain has that which is pervaded by fire. Here it may be noted as Parīkṣit Thampurān points out (S.,p.170, ln 25ff) that the knowledge of Unestablishedness of the subject prevents also directly inferential knowledge. As for instance, the knowledge of the absence of the goldenness of the mountain prevents the inferential knowledge 'golden mountain has fire'. But it is mentioned that the knowledge of Unestablishedness of the subject hinders inferential knowledge by preventing consideration. This is because all kinds of fallacies of Unestablishedness, i.e. Unestablishedness of the subject, Unestablishedness of nature

and Unestablishedness of invariable concomitance, have the same reason for being fallacies, viz. they prevent consideration.

(p.336, lns 6–9) Unestablishedness of nature is the absence of that which is considered as pervaded by *sādhya* in the subject. As for example, in the inference 'lake is a substance because it has smoke', there is the fallacy of Unestablishedness of nature. The reason is that in the subject, lake, when the absence of the reason, smoke, which is considered to be pervaded by substanceness which is the *sādhya*, is apprehended, consideration in the form 'lake has smoke which is pervaded by substanceness' does not arise. In this way by preventing consideration the fallacy of Unestablishedness of nature hinders inferential knowledge, viz. lake is a substance.

Here Parīkṣit Thampurān (S.,p.171, ln 1ff) raises a pertinent question, why does the author speak of the absence of that which is considered to be pervaded by the absence of *sādhya* instead of the absence of that which is pervaded by *sādhya* (*vyāpyatvābhimatasyābhāvaḥ, na tu vyāpyābhāvaḥ*). This is because if we speak only of the absence of that which is pervaded, then in the inference, jar is substance because it has qualityness, there would be no fault of *svarūpāsiddhi* which is accepted by all in the present instance. The reason is that qualityness is not pervaded by substanceness (i.e. wherever there is qualityness, there is no substanceness). But when it is stated that the absence of that which is considered as pervaded by the *sādhya*, then the absence of qualityness also is the absence of that which is considered as pervaded by substanceness. Therefore there is the possibility of the fault of Unestablishedness of nature. The idea here is that just as the absence of that which is pervaded, the absence of that which is determined by the determinant of the state of being reason also is to be considered as the fault of Unestablishedness of nature even though it may not be actually pervaded by *sādhya*. Therefore it is stated by Muktāvalīkāra that the knowledge of the subject as having the reason is prevented, i.e. something which is used as reason which is considered to have invariable concomitance, is absent in the subject.

But other Naiyāyikas hold that the expression *vyāpyatvābhimatasya abhāva* is used instead of *vyāpyābhāva* because of the following reason: the absence of that which is pervaded by *sādhya* in the subject (*pakṣe sādhyavyāpyābhāva*) is a kind of fallacy of Unestablishedness of invariable concomitance and not the fallacy of Unestablishedness of nature. According to them the fallacy of Unestablishedness of nature is: while there is no hindrance for the knowledge of qualified reason, there is hindrance for grasping that which has the reason. Or in other words the fallacy of Unestablishedness of nature is the knowledge of the absence of the *hetu* in the *pakṣa,* not the knowledge of the *vyāpyahetu* (=*viśiṣṭahetu* i.e. reason as pervaded by the *sādhya*). Therefore, according to them, the fallacy of Unestablishedness of nature prevents the knowledge of the existence of the *hetu* in the *pakṣa* and not of the *sādhyavyāpyahetu* in the *pakṣa.* But Prīkṣit Thampurān points out that this is not accepted by Muktāvalīkāra because to use the expression *vyāpyatvāsiddhi* in this sense is incongruous.

(p.336, ln 9 – p.337, ln 7; p.338, ln 2 – p.340, ln 2) Fallacies like Unestablishedness of *sādhya* (*sādhyāprasiddhi*) and so on are included in the fallacy of Unestablishedness of invariable concomitance (*vyāpyatvāsiddhi*). By this it is shown that *sādhyāprasiddhi* and so on (i.e. *sādhanāprasiddhi* also) are not additional kinds of fallacies. The absence of the determinant of the state of being *sādhya* in *sādhya* is the fallacy of Unestablishedness of *sādhya* (*sādhyāprasiddhi*). When the knowledge of the fallacy of *sādhyāprasiddhi* arises, consideration of the *sādhya* as determined by the determinant of the state of being *sādhya* does not arise. In this way in the inference 'mountain has golden fire because it has smoke' the knowledge of *sādhyāprasiddhi* hinders the consideration 'mountain has smoke which is pervaded by fire qualified by goldenness'. Similarly the absence of the determinant of the state of being reason in the reason is the fallacy of Unestablishedness of reason, as for instance, in the inference 'mountain has fire because it has golden smoke'. Here there is no knowledge of the reason as qualified by the determinant of the state of being reason i.e. in the example there

is no knowledge of smoke as qualified by goldenness. Hence since invariable concomitance is always grasped in the reason as qualified by the determinant of the state of being reason, here there is no knowledge of invariable concomitance in the form that smoke as qualified by goldenness has the invariable concomitance of fire.

Dinakara points out why *sādhyāprasiddhi* and *sādhanāprasiddhi* could be considered as additional kinds of the fallacy of *asiddhi*. The reason is that K. does not discuss at all *sādhyāprasiddhi* and *sādhanāprasiddhi*. Therefore M. states that *sādhyāprasiddhi* and *sādhanāprasiddhi* are included in *vyāpyatvāsiddhi*.

R. further shows that the absence of the coexistence of the reason with *sādhya* which is qualified by the absence of deviation (*avyabhicāriviśiṣṭasādhyasāmānādhikarṇyābhāva*) and that which is pervaded by it (*tadvyāpya*) (i.e. the absence of the coexistence of the reason with *sādhya* which is qualified by the absence of deviation) are considered to be kinds of *vyāpyatvāsiddhi*. As for instance in the inference 'lake has fire because of water', there is the absence of the coexistence of the reason with *sādhya* which (absence of the coexistence of the reason in the *sādhya*) is qualified by the absence of deviation in water. Similarly in the inference 'lake has fire because it has lakeness', the absence of the coexistence of the reason with *sādhya* which (absence of the coexistence of the reason in the *sādhya*) is qualified by the absence of deviation in water and it (absence of the coexistence of the reason in the *sādhya*) pervades lakeness. The consecutive characteristic in all kinds of *vyāpyatvāsiddhi* is the state of being one of them *(anytamatva)*. Here the reason of being fallacy (*dūṣakatābīja*) is the state of being hindering factor for the knowledge of invariable concomitance. It cannot be further objected that in this way the fallacies of Unestablishedness and Deviation have the same reason for being fallacies, and so they are not different kinds of fallacies. This is because although the reason for being fallacies is the same in both cases they are to be considered as separate fallacies since Gautama has so stated, as in the case of Contradiction and Counterthesis.

Dinakara has explained the M. accepting the text *sādhyāprasidhyādayastu vyāpyatvāsiddhimadhye'ntarbhūtāḥ*. Here Parīkṣit Thampurān makes the following remark (S.,171, ln 6ff). The readers do not know yet the definition of *vyāpyatvāsiddhi*. Therefore it is not possible to state that *sādhyāprasiddhi* and *sādhanāprasiddhi* are additional fallacies and are to be included in *vyāpyatvāsiddhi*. Besides Muktāvalīkāra does not seem to accept the fallacy of *vyāpyatvāsiddhi* in the inference 'mountain has fire because it has blue smoke'. Therefore the text *sādhyāprasiddhyādayastu vyāpyatvāsiddhi* seems to be better since it explains the nature of *vyāpyatvāsiddhi*. If this text is accepted, then the singular number of the noun *vyāpyatvāsiddhi* is to be explained in the same way as *vedāḥ pramāṇam*. Here *pramāṇa* is used in the sense of *pramitikāraṇatāvacchedaka* which is only one, though Vedas are many. If the text *sādhyāprasiddhyādayastu vyāpyatvāsiddhimadhye antarbhūtāḥ*, is accepted then by *vyāpyatvāsiddhi* is to be understood the absence of the coexistence of the reason with *sādhya* which has no deviation and in this way *sādhyāprasiddhi* and *sādhanāprasiddhi* can be included in *vyāpyatvāsiddhi*.

Further in the inference 'it has fire because it has blue smoke', the determinant of the state of being reason is blue smokeness. This is a cumbersome property and so this cannot be accepted as the real determinant of the state of being reason. The reason is that when there is a property which is less cumbersome, a cumbersome property cannot be accepted as the determinant of the state of being reason and here blue smokeness is cumbersome in comparison with mere smokeness which can really be accepted as the determinant of the state of being reason. Hence in the inference 'it has fire because it has blue smoke', there is the fault of Unestablishedness of invariable concomitance (*vyāpyatvāsiddhi*). This is the opinion of some Naiyāyikas.

With reference to this an objection may be raised in the following way as given in D. There is indeed the invariable concomitance of fire in blue smoke because blue smoke is not

different from smoke. Therefore how can there be the fault of *vyāpyatvāsiddhi*? A possible answer to this objection is that although there is invariable concomitance of fire in blue smoke, blue smokeness is not the determinant of the state of being reason. Therefore there is no invariable concomitance as determined by such a determinant, viz. blue smokeness. Hence there is the fault of *vyāpyatvāsiddhi*. The argument here is based upon the general principle pointed out by Rāmarudra: when a particular characteristic is not the determinant of a particular thing we can speak of the absence of that particular thing as determined by that characteristic (*yo dharmo yasyānava-cchedakas tadavacchedena tadabhāvaḥ*). As for example we can speak of the absence of the conjunction of the monkey as determined by the root of the tree since the root of the tree is not the determinant of the conjunction of the monkey. This argument cannot be admitted because blue smokeness is the determinant of the state of being reason in the form of occurrence in what is not different from that (substratum of the state of being reason). Thus there is no fault of Unestablishedness of invariable concomitance (*vyāpyatvāsiddhi*) in the reason 'blue smoke'.

It may further be objected that blue smokeness is not the determinant of the state of being reason in the form of the relation of selfsameness and so there is the fault of the absence of invariable concomitance. The idea here as R. points out is that though the root exists in that thing which is not different from the substratum of the conjunction of monkey with the tree, still the root is not the determinant in the form of the relation of selfsameness. Therefore the absence of the conjunction of monkey with the tree is accepted as determined by the root. This objection also cannot be admitted because in that case there would also be the fault of the Unestablishedness of invariable concomitance in such inference as 'it has an animal because it has that thing which has dewlap'. This is because here in this inference cow is the actual reason and therefore cowness is the determinant of the state of being reason. And cowness is only one and so for reasons of simplicity, it should be taken as the determinant of

the state of being reason. Hence dewlap cannot be the determinant of the state of being reason in the form of the relation of selfsameness. Therefore there would be the fault of the Unestablishedness of invariable concomitance in this valid inference also. Rāmarudra here points out the basic principle behind this argument. If it is accepted that where there is the absence of the determinant in the form of the relation of selfsameness, there there is the absence of the state of being pervaded determined by that characteristic, then even in the absence of useless qualification of the reason, there will be the possibility of *vyāpyatvāsiddhi* in the instances where the state of being reason is determined by a characteristic which is cumbersome[1].

Now an objection is raised accepting Unestablishedness of invariable concomitance (*vyāpyatvāsiddhi*) in all those cases where the state of being reason is determined by a cumbersome characteristic. But even if this is accepted it only means that there is the absence of invariable concomitance determined by blue smokeness which is not the determinant in the form of the relation of selfsameness. It does not mean that such an absence of invariable concomitance is a fallacy, because it does not prevent inferential knowledge or the knowledge of invariable concomitance which is the cause of inferential knowledge. R. gives the reason why such a *vyāpyatvāsiddhi* does not prevent inferential knowledge or the knowledge of invariable concomitance which is its instrumental cause. The knowledge of the occurrence of the reason in the subject in which invariable concomitance is the qualifier is the cause of inferential knowledge. This knowledge does not have as its object the state of being determinant of invariable concomitance, which is in the determinant of the state of being reason. In less technical terms it only means that the

[1] It should be noted here that in the instances of inferences such as 'there is fire because of blue smoke' there is the fallacy of *vyāpyatvāsiddhi*, since here blue is a useless qualification and blue smokeness is a cumbersome property. But in inferences such as 'it has an animal because it has that thing which has dewlap', although the state of having dewlap is a cumbersome property in comparison with cowness, still the reason 'it has that thing which has dewlap' has no useless qualification, and hence there is no fault of *vyāpyatvāsiddhi*.

determinant of the state of being reason is not apprehended as the determinant of invariable concomitance i.e. something is apprehended as the determinant of invariable concomitance; but this something is not known at the same time as the determinant of the state of being reason.[1] This is because we accept inferential knowledge even from verbal consideration in the form something has that which is pervaded by fire (*vahnivyāpyavān*). Such a consideration does not have as its object the determinant of invariable concomitance. This is because even an instance of consideration in which the *hetutāvacchedaka* is not grasped as *vyāpyatāvacchedaka* is also accepted as the cause of inferential knowledge. Therefore in the case of the inference 'there is fire because of blue smoke', though there is the absence of invariable concomitance as determined by blue smokeness, still there could be inference because of the knowledge of invariable concomitance (as determined by smokeness).

Now a further objection may be raised: this objection according to R. is raised by the Mīmāṃsakas. There could be inference from the knowledge of invariable concomitance in the form 'it has that which is knowable pervaded by fire'; in this knowledge invariable concomitance is the object which coexists with knowability. In order to avoid the possibility of inferential knowledge from such a consideration we should accept the knowledge of invariable concomitance determined by the determinant of the state of being reason, i.e. knowability. Hence the *vyāpyatvāsiddhi* in the case of blue smokeness mentioned earlier hinders the knowledge of invariable concomitance determined by the determinant of the state of being reason. Therefore it is a fallacy.

In less technical terms the argument may be explained as follows: take the inference 'it has fire because it has something knowable'; such an inferential knowledge cannot arise; but when there is invariable concomitance of fire in something

[1] In every valid inference, there should be invariable concomitance determined by *hetutāvacchedaka*. But even when the determinant of the state of being reason is not apprehended there could be inferential knowledge.

which is knowable (e.g. smoke) inferential knowledge should arise. In order to avoid this possibility we will have to admit invariable concomitance as determined by knowability which is the determinant of the state of being reason. And such an invariable concomitance is not present there and therefore such an inference does not arise. In this way invariable concomitance is stated to be determined by the determinant of the sate of being reason. Thus in the case of blue smoke invariable concomitance is not determined by blue smokeness because it is a cumbersome characteristic. Hence there is the absence of such an invariable concomitance. Therefore there is the fallacy of Unestablishedness of invariable concomitance (*vyāpyatvāsiddhi*).

Even if the knowledge of the state of being determinant of the state of being reason in the form of occurrence in that which is not different from the substratum of itself is accepted as the cause of the knowledge of invariable concomitance, the knowledge of the absence of the state of being the determinant in the form of the relation of selfsameness is not a hindering factor for the knowledge of invariable concomitance. This is because the absence of that which is the object of the knowledge of invariable concomitance (viz. *anatiriktavṛttitvarūpāvacchedakatvābhāva*) is not the object of this knowledge (viz. *svarūpasaṃbandharūpāvacchedakatvābhāva*).

The argument here is quite simple. In order that one instance of knowledge is prevented by another instance of knowledge the second instance of knowledge should have as its object the absence of the object of the first instance of knowledge. As for instance, the knowledge that there is a jar is prevented by the knowledge of the absence of the jar. Similarly in the present instance, the knowledge of the absence of *svarūpasaṃbandharūpāvacchedakatva* prevents the knowledge of *svarūpasaṃbandharūpāvacchedakatva* and not the knowledge of *anatiriktavṛttitvarūpāvacchedakatva*. In the definition of invariable concomitance *anatiriktavṛttitvarūpāvacchedakatva* is included, and so the knowledge of the absence of *svarūpasaṃbandha-*

rūpāvacchedakatva cannot prevent the knowledge of invariable concomitance.

Hence the conclusion is that when a useless qualification is added to the reason there is no fallacy of the Unestablishedness of invariable concomitance (*vyāpyatvāsiddhi*). But the person who is arguing is defeated because his reason has a useless qualification.

Here R. comments that the old Naiyāyikas do not accept the fallacy of Unestablishedness of invariable concomitance (*vyāpyatvāsiddhi*) in all places where a cumbersome property is the determinant of the state of being reason. But they accept such a fallacy only where the state of being the determinant of the state of being reason is constituted by another characteristic also. But this characteristic is coexistent with the determinant of the state of being reason.[1] Taking this opinion of the old Naiyāyikas into account D. has mentioned that there is no *vyāpyatvāsiddhi* where the reason has a useless qualification, but there is only a point of defeat (*nigrahasthāna*).

[1] As for example, *nīladhūmatvasamānādhikaraṇavyāpyatāvacchedakadharmāntara* is *dhūmatva, tadghaṭitatva* exists in *nīladhūma*, and therefore *nīladhūma* is *vyāpyatvāsiddha;* but note that in the inference *paśumān sāsnādimattvāt, sāsnādimattva* is cumbersome property; still the reason *sāsnādimān* is not *vyāpyatvāsiddha* because it is not constituted by *svasmānādhikaraṇavyāpyatāvacchedakadharmāntaragotvādi.*

Text 10
Fallacy of Contradiction

मु. बाधस्तु पक्षे साध्याभावादिः, एतस्य त्वनुमितिप्रतिबन्धः फलम्। तद्धर्मिकतदभावनिश्चयो लौकिकसन्निकर्षाजन्यदोषविशेषाजन्य-तद्धर्मिकतज्ज्ञानमात्रे विरोधीति। न तु संशयसाधारणं पक्षे साध्य-संसृष्टत्वज्ञानमनुमितिकारणं तद्विरोधितया च बाधसत्प्रतिपक्षयोर्हेत्वा-भासत्वमिति युक्तम्, अप्रसिद्धसाध्यकानुमित्यनापत्तेः साध्यसंशयादिकं विनाप्यनुमित्युत्पत्तेश्च। एवं साध्याभावज्ञाने प्रमात्वज्ञानमपि न प्रतिबन्धकं मानाभावाद्गौरवाच्च। अन्यथा सत्प्रतिपक्षादावपि तदभाव-व्याप्यवत्ताज्ञाने प्रमात्वविषयकत्वेन प्रतिबन्धकतापत्तेः। किं तु

M. Contradiction is the absence of *sādhya* and so on in the subject; the result of this is the prevention of inferential knowledge. The definite knowledge of the absence of a particular thing in a particular substratum contradicts all instances of knowledge of that particular thing in that particular substratum. (This instance of knowledge which is contradicted) should not be produced by ordinary apprehensional connection and by a particular defect. The knowledge of the state of being related with *sādhya* in the subject which is common to doubt is the cause of inferential knowledge. Contradiction and Counterthesis contradict this (i.e. the knowledge of the relationship of *sādhya* with the subject) and so they are fallacies. This is not proper, because (in that case) there would not be an inferential knowledge where the *sādhya* is not established earlier in anything and also because even without the doubt of *sādhya* and so on there arises inferential knowledge. Similarly the knowledge of validity in the knowledge of the absence of *sādhya* also is not hindering factor because of the absence of any proof and because of cumbersomeness. Otherwise even with reference to Counterthesis and so on, in the knowledge of the state of having the thing pervaded by the absence of that (i.e. *sādhya*), there would be the state of being

मु. भ्रमत्वज्ञानानास्कन्दितबाधबुद्धेः प्रतिबन्धकता । तत्र भ्रमत्व-शङ्काविघटनेन प्रामाण्यज्ञानं क्वचिदुपयुज्यते । न च बाधस्थले पक्षे हेतुसत्त्वे व्यभिचारः पक्षे हेत्वभावे स्वरूपासिद्धिरेव दोष इति वाच्यम् । बाधज्ञानस्य व्यभिचारज्ञानादेर्भेदात् । किं च यत्र परामर्शानन्तरं बाधबुद्धिस्तत्र व्यभिचारज्ञानादेरकिंचित्करत्वाद्बाधस्यानुमितिप्रति-बन्धकत्वं वाच्यम् । एवं यत्रोत्पत्तिक्षणावच्छिन्ने घटादौ गन्धव्याप्य-पृथिवीत्ववत्ताज्ञानं तत्र बाधस्यैव प्रतिबन्धकत्वं वाच्यम् । न च पक्षे घटे गन्धसत्त्वात् कथं बाध इति वाच्यम् । पक्षतावच्छेदक-देशकालावच्छेदेनाभावस्यानुभवसिद्धत्वादिति । बाधतद्व्याप्यभिन्ना

M. hindering factor as determined by the state of having validity as object (of that knowledge). But the knowledge of contradiction which is not affected by the state of being erroneous knowledge is a hindering factor. In the case of (contradiction) knowledge of validity is useful in some places by way of removing the doubt about erroneousness of knowledge. Nor should it be argued that in the case of Contradiction, if reason exists in the subject there is Deviation, if there is the absence of the reason in the subject the fault is indeed Unestablishedness of nature. This is because the knowledge of Contradiction is different from the knowledge of Deviation and so on. Besides where after consideration there is the knowledge of Contradiction, there the knowledge of Deviation and so on is ineffective; therefore (the knowledge of) Contradiction should be considered as hindering factor for inferential knowledge. Similarly where there is the knowledge of the state of having earthness pervaded by smell in jar and so on at the moment of their origination, there (the knowledge of) Contradiction only should be considered as hindering factor. Nor should it be argued how there can be Contradiction since jar which is the subject has smell. This is because we experience absence as determined by particular time and place which are determinants of the state of being subject. The fallacies and those

मु. ये हेत्वाभासास्तद्व्याप्या अपि तन्मध्य एवान्तर्भवन्ति, अन्यथा हेत्वाभासाधिक्यप्रसङ्गात् । बाधव्याप्यसत्प्रतिपक्षो भिन्न एव स्वतन्त्रेच्छेन मुनिना पृथगुपदेशात् सत्प्रतिपक्षव्याप्यस्तु न प्रतिबन्धक इति ।

दि. साध्याभावादिः इति । आदिना साध्यवदन्यत्वस्य पक्षावृत्तिसाध्यादेश्च परिग्रहः । **तद्धर्मिकतदभावनिश्चयः** अनाहार्याप्रामाण्यज्ञानानास्कन्दित-तद्धर्मिकतदभावनिश्चयः । बाधबुद्ध्युत्तरक्षणे लौकिकसन्निकर्षजन्यविशिष्ट-बुद्धेरानुभविकत्वादाह **लौकिकसन्निकर्षाजन्येति** । नन्वेवं तदिन्द्रियजन्य-

M. which are pervaded by those fallacies which are different from Contradiction and those which are pervaded by Contradiction are included in them. Otherwise there would be more than accepted number of fallacies. Counterthesis which is pervaded by Contradiction is indeed a different fallacy. This is because the sage who is free has mentioned it as a separate (fallacy). That which is pervaded by Counterthesis is not a hindering factor.

D. The absence of that which is to be established and so on (*sādhyābhāvādiḥ*). By the expression **and so on** the state of being different from that which has that which is to be established and of that which is to be established and so on which do not exist in the subject are to be understood. **The definite knowledge of the absence of a particular thing in a particular substratum** (*taddharmikatadabhāvaniścaya*) means the definite knowledge of the absence of a particular thing in a particular substratum, not affected by the knowledge of invalidity and not produced by desire (at the time of Contradiction). In the moment next to the moment of Contradiction, there is the experience of qualified knowledge produced by ordinary apprehensional connection and so (the author) says **not produced by ordinary apprehensional connection** (*laukikasannikarṣā-janyeti*). Now it may be objected that there would be qualified knowledge of the thing, produced through the ordinary

दि. लौकिकबाधनिश्चयोत्तरं तदिन्द्रियजन्यलौकिकतद्विशिष्टबुद्ध्यापत्तिरिति चेन्न। अलौकिकत्वं प्रतिबध्यतावच्छेदककोटावनिवेश्य तदिन्द्रियजन्यतद्विशिष्टबुद्धौ तदिन्द्रियजन्यलौकिकतदभावनिश्चयत्वेन प्रतिबन्धकत्वोपगमात्। तदिन्द्रियजन्योपनीतभानात्मकबाधनिश्चयोत्तरं तदिन्द्रियजन्यलौकिकतद्विशिष्टबुद्ध्युदयात् प्रतिबन्धकतावच्छेदककोटौ लौकिकत्वनिवेशः। न च लौकिकतदिन्द्रियजन्याभावप्रमास्थले तदधिकरणे प्रतियोगिनोऽसत्त्वादेव न तद्विशिष्टलौकिकप्रत्यक्षापत्तिरित्यलं तथाविधप्रतिबध्यप्रतिबन्धकभावेनेति वाच्यम्। यत्र प्रतियोग्यधिकरण एव संनिकृष्टाधिकरणान्तरवृत्तेरभावस्य

D. apprehensional connection by the same sense organ after the definite knowledge of the Contradiction produced by ordinary apprehensional connection by the particular sense organ. This cannot be admitted. This is because without adding the state of being non ordinary apprehensional connection in the determinant of the state of being prevented, the definite knowledge of the absence of that thing produced by the ordinary apprehensional connection by a particular sense organ is accepted as a hindering factor for the qualified knowledge produced by that particular sense organ. After the definite knowledge of Contradiction caused by the apprehensional connection in the form of previous knowledge and produced by that particular sense organ, that qualified knowledge produced by ordinary apprehensional connection and by that particular sense organ arises; hence in the determinant of the state of being hindering factor, the state of being ordinary apprehensional connection is included. Nor can it be argued that in the place where there is the valid knowledge of the absence caused by a particular sense organ and ordinary apprehensional connection, there is the absence of the counterpositive in that substratum; therefore there would not be the possibility of qualified perceptual knowledge caused by ordinary apprehensional connection. Hence there is no need of such a relation of that which prevents and that which is prevented. This is because in the substratum where the counterpositive exists ordinary perceptual erroneous knowledge of the absence

दि. लौकिकप्रत्यक्षात्मकारोपो दोषेण जनितस्तदुत्तरं तदधिकरणे प्रतियोगिनो लौकिकप्रत्यक्षापादनात् । तत्राभावलौकिकप्रत्यक्षजनकदोषस्य प्रतिबन्धकत्वादेव नेयमापत्तिः, अन्यथाभावारोपोत्पत्तिक्षणे प्रतियोगिप्रत्यक्षापत्तिरिति तु न । यत्र विनश्यदवस्थदोषेणाभावलौकिकप्रत्यक्षात्मकारोपस्तदुत्तरं प्रतियोगिप्रत्यक्षापादनात् । यत्राभावलौकिकप्रमासमकालं तद्द्वितीयक्षणे वा तदधिकरणे प्रतियोगिप्रकारकानुभूयमानारोपजनकदोषसमवधानं तत्राभावप्रमोत्तरं प्रतियोगिनो लौकिकप्रत्यक्षात्मकारोपापादनवारणाय वा इन्द्रियभेदेन तथाविधप्रतिबध्यप्रतिबन्धकभावोपगमात् । 'शङ्खो न पीतः,' 'वंशो नोरगः' इति

D. existing in any other substratum arises from defects; after this there should be the possibility of ordinary perception of the counterpositive in that substratum. There the defect which is the cause of the ordinary perceptual knowledge is the hindering factor; therefore there is no possibility of such a fault; otherwise there would be perception of counterpositive at the moment of erroneous knowledge of absence (of the same counterpositive). This also is not accepted because where the erroneous ordinary perceptual knowledge of the absence arises from defect in the state of destruction, after that there would be perceptual knowledge of the counterpositive. Or where at the moment of the valid knowledge of absence by means of ordinary apprehensional connection or in the next moment, in the substratum of that there is existence of the defect which is the cause of erroneous experience in which the counterpositive is a qualifier, there after the valid knowledge of absence, there should be erroneous perceptual knowledge of the counterpositive by means of ordinary apprehensional connection. To avoid this objection such a relationship of that which prevents and that which is prevented should be admitted on the basis of (knowledge arising from) different sense organs. Even when there are the instances of definite knowledge 'conch is not yellow', 'bamboo is not snake',

दि. निश्चयेऽपि पित्तमण्डूकवसाञ्जनादिदोषवशात् 'शङ्खः पीतः' 'वंश उरगः' इत्यारोपोदयात्तत्र व्यभिचारवारणायाह **दोषविशेषेति** । दोषसामान्याजन्यत्वनिवेशे भ्रममात्रस्यैव बाधाप्रतिबध्यत्वापत्तिरतो विशेषेति । तथा च पित्तमण्डूकवसाञ्जनादिदोषान् विशिष्योपादाय तदजन्यत्वं प्रतिबध्यतावच्छेदककोटौ निवेशनीयमिति भावः । न च पित्तद्रव्यात्मकदोषाजन्यत्वनिवेशो व्यर्थः 'शङ्खः पीतः' इति भ्रमे शङ्खांशेऽनुभूयमानस्यैव पित्तद्रव्यपीतिम्न आरोपोपगमेन तदंशेऽपि लैकिकत्वादलौकिकत्वस्य प्रतिबध्यतावच्छेदके निवेशादेव तत्र व्यभिचारवारणादिति वाच्यम् । पित्तद्रव्यस्यान्तरानवस्थानदशायामपि तत्पीतिम्नः शङ्खादौ प्रत्यक्षोदयेन स्मर्यमाणा-

D. the instances of erroneous knowledge in the form 'conch is yellow', 'bamboo is snake', arise from the defect of bile and the ointment made from the fat of a frog; therefore there would be deviation. Hence (the author) says **by a particular defect** (*doṣa-viśeṣeti*). If the expression 'not produced by defects in general' is used then all instances of erroneous knowledge would not be hindered; therefore the author uses the expression 'particular (defect).' Therefore the idea is that taking the defects such as bile and ointment from the fat of a frog etc. in particular, one should add the expression 'not being produced by these' in the determinant of the state of being prevented. It may be objected as follows: the addition of the expression 'not produced by defect in the form of yellow substance' is useless because in the case of erroneous knowledge of yellow conch the imposition of the yellowness of the yellow substance which (i.e. imposition of yellowness) is experienced on the conch is accepted as produced by ordinary apprehensional connection. Hence by addition of the state of being produced by extraordinary apprehensional connection in the determinant of the state of being prevented, the deviation is avoided.

This cannot be accepted because even when there is the absence of the substance of bile in between, the perceptual

दि. रोपस्यैव तत्र नवीनैः स्वीकारात्तदंशे तस्यालौकिकत्वात् । तथा सति 'शङ्खः पीतः' इति प्रत्यक्षोत्तरं 'पीतं साक्षात्करोमि' इति साक्षात्कारत्व-ग्रहानुपपत्तिस्तद्व्यञ्जकलौकिकविषयतायास्तत्राभावादिति तु न । लौकिक-विषयताया इव दोषविशेषजन्यत्वस्यापि साक्षात्कारत्वव्यञ्जकत्वात्, अन्यथा 'अयमुरगः' इति स्मर्यमाणारोपे साक्षात्कारत्वग्रहानुपपत्तेः 'शङ्खो न पीतः' इत्यादितदिन्द्रियजन्यबाधबुद्ध्युत्तरं पित्तादिदोषवशात्तदिन्द्रियजन्यः 'शङ्खः पीतः' इत्यारापो यद्यनुभवसिद्धस्तदा पूर्वोक्तेन्द्रियभेदभिन्नप्रतिबध्यप्रतिबन्धक-भावेऽपि दोषविशेषाजन्यत्वं प्रतिबध्यतावच्छेदके निवेशनीयमिति ध्येयम् ।

D. knowledge of that yellowness arises in the conch and so on. Therefore the moderns accept here the erroneous knowledge in the form of recollection, and this is produced by extraordinary apprehensional connection. If this is admitted, after the perceptual knowledge of yellow conch, there would not be the knowledge of the state of being immediate perception in the form 'I perceive yellowness', because there is no state of being object (of knowledge) produced by ordinary apprehensional connection which (i.e. the state of being object) indicates that perception.

This also cannot be admitted because just as the state of being the object of knowledge produced by ordinary apprehensional connection, so also the state of being produced by particular defect manifests the state of being immediate perception; otherwise there would not be the apprehension of the state of being immediate perception in erroneous recollection in the form 'this is a snake.' After the knowledge of Contradiction produced by particular sense organ in the form 'the conch is not yellow,' if the erroneous knowledge in the form 'the conch is yellow' produced by the particular sense organ due to the defects of bile and so on is experienced, then in the case of the relation of that which is prevented and that which prevents which is different (in different instances) on the basis of different sense organs as mentioned earlier, there 'the state of being not produced by particular defect' should be added in the determinant of the state of being prevented. This also should be understood.

दि. ननु बाधप्रतिबध्यतावच्छेदककोटौ लैकिकान्यत्वस्य निवेशे बाधनिश्चयोत्तरं लौकिकसन्निकर्षजन्यसंशयापत्तिरिति चेन्न। 'भूतलं घटवत्' इत्याद्याकारकलौकिकप्रत्यक्षोत्पत्तिकाले स्वातन्त्र्येण कथंचिदुपस्थितस्य घटाभावादेर्भूतले प्रकारतया भानवारणाय समानधर्मितावच्छेदककतत्कोटिकलौकिकप्रत्यक्षसामग्र्या विपरीतकोटिभानप्रतिबन्धकत्वमवश्यमङ्गीकरणीयम्। तथा च बाधनिश्चयोत्तरमपि नापत्तिर्लौकिकसन्निकर्षजन्यसंशयस्य, तत्कोटिकलौकिकप्रत्यक्षसामग्र्याः प्रतिबन्धिकायाः सत्त्वेन विपरीतकोटिभानासंभवात्। तर्हि क्वापि लौकिकसन्निकर्षजन्यसंशयो न स्यादिति चेदोम्। ज्ञानलक्षणाप्रत्यासत्त्यैव

D. Now it may be objected as follows: if in the determinant of the state of being prevented by Contradiction, the state of being different from that which is produced by ordinary apprehensional connection is included, then after the definite knowledge of Contradiction there should be doubt produced by ordinary apprehensional connection.

This also cannot be admitted: at the moment when the perception in the form 'floor has jar' arises by ordinary apprehensional connection, then in order to prevent the knowledge in which the absence of jar which is presented somehow by any independent source is the qualifier, the causal complex of perception of a particular alternative produced by ordinary apprehensional connection and which (i.e. causal complex) has the same determinant of the substratum should necessarily be accepted as a hindering factor for the knowledge of the opposite alternative. In this way even after the definite knowledge of Contradiction there would not be doubt which is produced by ordinary apprehensional connection because there is the hindering factor in the form of the causal complex of the perception of that alternative produced by ordinary apprehensional connection. Hence there would not be the knowledge of the opposite alternative.

If it is objected that in that case there would not be any doubt produced by ordinary apprehensional connection, the answer is yes. This is because it is by means of extraordinary apprehensional connection in the form of previous knowledge

दि. पूर्वोपस्थितकोट्योर्भानसंभावादिति । यत्तु संशयपूर्वं तत्कोट्यंशे लौकिकसन्निकर्षसत्त्वे कथं संशयस्य न लौकिकत्वं कथं वा तत्र संशये विपरीतकोटिभानं तत्कोटिकलौकिकप्रत्यक्षसामग्र्याः प्रतिबन्धिकायाः सत्त्वादिति तन्न । तत्र लौकिकसन्निकर्षसत्त्वेऽपि संशयजनकदूरत्वादिदोषस्य लौकिकप्रत्यक्षप्रतिबन्धकस्य सत्त्वेन लौकिकप्रत्यक्षसामग्र्यभावादुभयोपपत्ते-रित्यन्यत्र विस्तरः । कस्यचिन्मतं दूषयति **न तु** इति । इति युक्तमित्यने-नान्वयः । नन्वेवं बाधनिश्चयकाले संसृष्टत्वज्ञानाभावादेवानुमित्यभावोपपत्तौ बाधनिश्चयस्य नानुमितिविरोधित्वमिति हेत्वाभासत्वं न स्यादत आह

D. that there occurs the knowledge of the two alternatives which have been experienced earlier. The argument that there is the ordinary apprehensional connection (of the sense organs) with that particular alternative before doubt, and so how is it that the doubt is not produced by ordinary apprehensional connection or how is it that there is the knowledge of the opposite alternative in the case of doubt because there is the hindering factor in the form of the causal complex of perception of that alternative produced by ordinary apprehensional connection, cannot be admitted. This is because even if there is the ordinary apprehensional connection there is defect in the form of distance etc. which is the cause of doubt and this is a hindering factor for the perception produced by ordinary apprehensional connection. Hence in the absence of the causal complex of perception produced by ordinary apprehensional connection, both are possible. This is discussed at length in other places.

Now (the author) finds fault with the opinion of someone with the words **this is not** (*na tu iti*). This is syntactically connected with (the expression) 'proper'. It may be objected that at the time of the definite knowledge of contradiction by the absence of the knowledge of the state of being connected (with *sādhya*) one can explain the absence of inferential knowledge. Hence the definite knowledge of Contradiction is not a hindering factor for inferential knowledge and therefore (Contradiction) would not

दि॰ **तद्विरोधितया** इति । अनुमितिकारणीभूतस्य साध्यसंसृष्टत्वज्ञानस्य विरोधितयेत्यर्थः । नन्वप्रसिद्धसाध्यकानुमितिः कुत्रापि न भवत्येवेत्यत आह **साध्यसंशयेति** । ननु संशयशून्यकालेऽपि सिषाधयिषाकालीनसाध्यनिश्चयात्मकं साध्यसंसृष्टत्वज्ञानमस्त्येवेत्यत आह **आदीति** । आदिना सिषाधयिषाकालीनसिद्धिपरिग्रहः । न च संशयोत्पत्त्यैवानुमितिरिति वाच्यम् । सति विशेषदर्शने संशयायोगात् । पक्षविशेष्यकसाध्याभावज्ञाने प्रमात्वनिश्चयोऽनुमितिप्रतिबन्धकस्तदभावः कारणमतस्तादृशप्रमात्वमेव बाध इति प्राचीनमतं दूषयति **एवं** इति । **प्रमात्वज्ञानमपि** प्रमात्वनिश्चयोऽपि ।

D. be a fallacy. So (the author) says **contradicting that** (*tadvirodhitayā*). The meaning is that it hinders the knowledge of the state of being connected (with *sādhya*) which is the cause of inferential knowledge. In answer to the objection that the inferential knowledge of something which is not established earlier does not arise anywhere, the author says **doubt of that which is to be established** (*sādhyasaṃśayeti*). In answer to the objection that even at the time of the absence of doubt there is indeed the knowledge of the sate of being connected with that which is to be established in the form of the definite knowledge of that which is to be established at the same time as the desire to establish the same, (the author) says, **etc.** (*ādīti*). By the word 'etc.' the certainty of that which is to be established at the same time as the desire to establish the same is to be understood. Nor can it be argued that only when doubt arises there is inferential knowledge. This is because when there is perception of the distinguishing characteristic, doubt does not arise.

The definite knowledge of validity in the knowledge of the absence of that which is to be established in which the subject is the qaulificand is the hindering factor for inferential knowledge; the absence of that is a cause (for inferential knowledge). Therefore only such a validity is a contradiction. (The author) refutes this opinion of the old Naiyāyikas with the words **similarly** (*evam iti*). **The knowledge of validity also** (*pramātvajñānamapi*) means the definite knowledge of validity also.

दि. **मानाभावात्** इति । ग्राह्याभावानवगाहिनस्तादृशज्ञानस्य विरोधित्वे मानाभावादित्यर्थः । ननु पक्षे साध्याभावज्ञानेऽपि तत्राप्रमाण्यज्ञानकाले-ऽनुमितेरुदयान्न साध्याभावज्ञानं प्रतिबन्धकम् । अस्मन्मते तु तदा साध्या-भावज्ञानप्रमात्वनिश्चयाभावादेवात्रानुमित्युत्पत्तिरत आह **गौरवात्** इति । तथा च तत्रानुमितिनिर्वाहाय संशयनिश्चयसाधारणाप्रमाण्यज्ञानाभाव एव प्रतिबन्धकतावच्छेदककोटौ निवेश्यते, न तु पक्षविशेष्यकसाध्याभावज्ञानप्रमा-त्वनिश्चयत्वेन प्रतिबन्धकत्वं गौरवादित्यर्थः । यत्र पक्षे साध्याभावज्ञानमस्ति न तु तत्र प्रामाण्यज्ञानं न वाप्रामाण्यज्ञानं तत्राप्यनुमितिर्न भवत्येवेति भावः ।

D. Because of the absence of any proof (*mānābhāvāditi*). There is no proof to establish that the knowledge which does not have as object the absence of that thing which is to be known is hindering factor. This is the meaning.

It may be objected that even though there is the knowledge of the absence of that which is to be established in the subject, at the time of the knowledge of its invalidity inferential knowledge arises and therefore the knowledge of the absence of that which is to be established is not a hindering factor (for inferential knowledge). In our opinion (i.e. in the opinion of the old Naiyāyikas) inferential knowledge arises there because of the absence of the definite knowledge of validity in the knowledge of the absence of that which is to be established. Therefore (the author) says **because of cumbersomeness** (*gauravāditi*). Therefore in order to bring about inferential knowledge only the absence of the knowledge of invalidity which is common to doubt and definite knowledge is to be inserted in the side of the determinant of the state of being hindering factor and it is not the case that the definite knowledge of validity in the knowledge of the absence of that which is to be established where the subject is the qualificand is the hindering factor because of cumbersomeness. This is the meaning. Where in the subject there is the knowledge of the absence of that which is to be established but there is the knowledge of neither validity nor of invalidity, there also inferential knowledge does not indeed arise. This is the idea.

दि॰ साध्याभाववत्पक्षघटितप्रमात्वविषयकत्वेऽनुमितिप्रतिबन्धकतानतिरिक्त-वृत्तित्वसत्त्वात्तस्याभासत्वं दुर्वारमिति तु न। प्रमेयत्वविशिष्टव्यभिचारादेरिव तादृशविशिष्टान्तरघटितत्वेनाभासत्वायोगादिति। नन्वगृहीताप्रामाण्यक-साध्याभावनिश्चयस्य प्रतिबन्धकत्वे प्रथमोपस्थितप्रमात्वनिश्चय एव तथा स्यादत आह **अन्यथा** इति। **सत्प्रतिपक्षादौ** इति। आदिना विरोधादिपरिग्रहः। 'प्रतिबन्धकतापत्तेः' इत्यस्य 'अनुमित्यादौ' इत्यादिः। ननु साध्याभाव-ज्ञानप्रमात्वज्ञानेऽनुमितिप्रतिबन्धस्तदभावे तु नेत्यन्वयव्यतिरेकाभ्यां प्रमात्व-ज्ञानस्यानुमितिप्रतिबन्धकत्वमत आह **किं तु** इति। **क्वचिदुपयुज्यते** इति।

D. The state of being occurrent in that which is not different from the substratum of the state of being hindering factor for inferential knowledge exists in the state of having validity as object which consists of the subject which has the absence of that thing which is to be established. Therefore its state of being fallacy cannot be avoided. This cannot be accepted because this consists of the thing which is different from that particular qualified thing (i.e. fallacy). Therefore this is not fallacy just as deviation qualified by knowability (is not a fallacy). Now it may be objected that if the definite knowledge of the absence of that which is to be established where invalidity is not known is the hindering factor, then only the definite knowledge of validity which is first grasped should be considered as the hindering factor. Therefore (the author) says **otherwise** (*anyathā iti*). By the term 'etc.' in the expression 'Counterthesis etc.' Opposition etc. are to be taken. Before the expression 'the state of being hindering factor' the expression 'for inferential knowledge etc.' (is to be added). Now it may be objected that when there is the knowledge of validity in the knowledge of the absence of that which is to be established, inferential knowledge is hindered. In the absence of that it is not (hindered). Thus because of positive and negative concomitance knowledge of validity is hindering factor. Therefore (the author) says **but** (*kiṃtu iti*). **(Knowledge of validity) is useful in some places** (*kvacidupayujyate iti*).

दि. तथा चानुमितितत्कारणज्ञानान्यतरं प्रति साक्षात्प्रतिबन्धकीभूतज्ञान-विषयत्वाभावान्न साध्याभावज्ञानप्रमात्वं हेत्वाभास इति भावः । **व्यभिचार-ज्ञानादेः** इति । आदिनासिद्धिज्ञानपरिग्रहः । **भेदात्** इति । तथा च बाधस्थलेऽसिद्धिव्यभिचारान्यतरनियमेऽपि बाधज्ञानस्य व्यभिचारादिविषयक-त्वाभावेन तस्य हेत्वाभासान्तरत्वमिति भावः । न च 'हेतुमान् पक्षः साध्या-भाववान्' इत्याकारक एव बाधग्रहः कुतो न भवति सामग्रीसत्त्वात्, तथा च व्यभिचारात्मिकैव बाधबुद्धिरिति वाच्यम् । परामर्शात्मकाव्यभिचारज्ञानरूप-प्रतिबन्धकसत्त्वेन बाधबुद्धेर्व्यभिचारविषयकत्वासंभवात् एकत्र हेतौ व्यभिचारा-व्यभिचारविषयैकनिश्चयासंभवाच्च । नन्वयोगोलकपक्षकधूमसाध्यकवह्निहेतुके

D. In this way validity in the knowledge of the absence of that which is to be established is not the object of the knowledge which hinders directly either inferential knowledge or the knowledge of its cause and so it is not a fallacy. This is the idea. **The knowledge of Deviation etc.** (*vyabhicārajñānādeh iti*). By the word 'etc.' the knowledge of Unestablishedness is to be taken. **Because of difference** (*bhedāditi*). Thus although where there is Contradiction there would invariably be either (the fallacy of) Unestablishedness or (the fallacy of) Deviation, still the knowledge of Contradiction has no Deviation etc. as its object. Therefore contradiction is a separate fallacy. This is the idea. It may be objected why is it that the knowledge of Contradiction does not occur in the form 'the subject which has the reason has the absence of that which is to be established' since there is the causal complex (for that form of knowledge). Hence the knowledge of Contradiction is the same as the knowledge of Deviation. This cannot be admitted because when there is the hindering factor in the form of consideration which is the knowledge of non-deviation, the knowledge of Contradiction does not have Deviation as its object and because one and the same reason cannot be the object of the definite knowledge of Deviation and non-deviation. (In an inference) where the red hot iron ball is the subject, smoke is that which is to be established and fire the reason, though there

दि. बाधलौकिकप्रत्यक्षवद्व्यभिचारलौकिकप्रत्यक्षमपि व्याप्तिनिश्चये सत्यपि भविष्यतीत्यत आह **किं च** इति । **अकिंचित्करत्वात्** इति । व्यभिचार-ज्ञानं ह्यनुमितौ न साक्षात्प्रतिबन्धकं किं तु परामर्शप्रतिबन्धद्वारा, तथा च परामर्शोत्तरकालीनं व्यभिचारज्ञानमकिंचित्करमिति तत्र बाधबुद्धिरेव प्रतिबन्धिकेति भावः । व्यभिचाराद्यसंकीर्णमपि बाधं प्रदर्शयति **एवं** इत्यादिना । **बाधस्यैव** इति । तत्र पक्षे हेतुसत्त्वेन स्वरूपासिद्धेः प्रतियोगि-व्यधिकरणसाध्याभाववद्वृत्तित्वरूपस्य व्यभिचारस्य चाभावादिति भावः । बाधतद्व्याप्यभिन्ना ये हेत्वाभासास्तद्व्याप्या अपि तन्मध्ये एवान्त-र्भवन्तीति पाठः । बाधः साध्याभावविशिष्टपक्षादिस्तद्व्याप्यः सत्प्रति-

D. is the definite knowledge of invariable concomitance, there will arise the perceptual knowledge of Deviation caused by ordinary apprehensional connection just as perceptual knowledge of Contradiction caused by ordinary apprehensional connection. Therefore (the author) says **besides** (*kiṃceti*). **Ineffective** (*akim-citkaratvāditi*).This is because the knowledge of Deviation does not hinder directly inferential knowledge, but through the fact that it hinders consideration. In this way the knowledge of Deviation which occurs after consideration is ineffective. Therefore only the knowledge of Contradiction is the hindering factor. This is the idea. (The author) shows an instance of Contradiction which is not mingled with Deviation, with the words **similarly** (*evam-ityādinā*). **Contradiction only** (*bādhasyaiveti*). There is the absence of Unestablishedness of nature because the reason exists in the subject and there is also the absence of Deviation in the form of the occurrence in the substratum of the absence of that which is to be established which (i.e. the absence of that which is to be established) does not exist along with its counterpositive. This is the idea. The fallacies which are pervaded by those fallacies which are different from Contradiction and those which are pervaded by Contradiction are included in them. This is the text. The meaning is that Contradiction is the subject qualified by the absence of that which is to be established and so on. That which

दि. पक्षस्तद्भिन्ना व्यभिचारविरुद्धासिद्धास्तद्व्याप्यानां तत्रैवान्तर्भाव इत्यर्थः । **अन्यथा** इति । व्यभिचारादेरिव व्यभिचारादिव्याप्यस्यापि व्याप्तिग्रह-प्रतिबन्धकज्ञानविषयत्वेन पञ्च हेत्वाभासानन्तर्गतत्वे तस्यातिरिक्तहेत्वाभासत्वं स्यादित्यर्थः । **न प्रतिबन्धकः** इति । साध्याभावव्याप्यव्याप्यवत्ताज्ञानस्य साध्यवत्ताज्ञानविरोधित्वे मानाभावादिति भावः ।

D. is pervaded by it is Counterthesis. (The fallacies) other than these are Deviation, Opposition and the Unestablished. Those fallacies which are pervaded by them are included in them only. This is the meaning. **Otherwise** (*anyatha iti*). That which is pervaded by Deviation and so on like Deviation etc. is also the object of the knowledge which hinders the knowledge of invariable concomitance. And so if this is not included in the five fallacies, then it would be an additional fallacy. This is the meaning. **Not a hindering factor** (*na pratibandhakaḥ*). This is because there is no proof to show that the knowledge of the state of being that which is pervaded by that which is pervaded by the absence of that which is to be established is the hindering factor for the knowledge of the state of having that which is to be established. This is the idea.

Commentary

(p.350, lns 3–5; p.352, lns 4–7) The fallacy of Contradiction is defined by M. as the absence of *sādhya* and so on in the subject. And such a fallacy directly prevents inferential knowledge. As for example, the inferential knowledge 'the lake has fire' is prevented by the knowledge 'the lake has no fire'.Therefore the absence of fire in the lake (*hrade vahnyabhāvaḥ*) is the fallacy of Contradiction. Similarly the lake is different from that which has fire (*hrade vahnimadanyatvam*, i.e. *hrado vahni-madanyaḥ*), fire not existing in lake (*hradāvṛttiḥ vahniḥ*) are given as further examples of fallacy of Contradiction in D. In the same way the subject having the absence of that which is to be established (e.g.*vahnyabhāvavadd hradaḥ*) and the subject which is different from that which has that which is to be established

(e.g. *hradaḥ vahnimadbhinnaḥ*) are given as further examples of the fallacy of Contradiction by R.

It was pointed out that the fallacy of Contradiction directly prevents inferential knowledge. This is because of the general principle that the definite knowledge of the absence of a particular thing in a particular substratum contradicts all instances of knowledge of that particular thing in that particular substratum. This instance of knowledge which is contradicted should not be produced by ordinary apprehensional connection and by a particular defect (*taddharmikatadabhāvaniścayo laukikasannikarṣājanyadoṣaviśeṣājanyataddharmikajñānamātre virodhī*). The way in which this principle is to be understood is explained in detail by Dinakara. The definite knowledge of the absence of a particular thing in a particular substratum (*taddharmikatadabhāvaniścayaḥ*) should be understood as the definite knowledge of the absence of a particular thing in a particular substratum, not affected by the knowledge of invalidity and not produced by desire at the time of Contradiction (i.e. at the time of the knowledge of the absence of the particular thing). This is because, if the knowledge of the absence of a particular thing in a particular substratum is known to be invalid it does not prevent any instance of the knowledge of that particular thing, as for instance, if the knowledge of the absence of the jar on the ground is known to be invalid it does not prevent the knowledge 'jar is on the ground.' Similarly if there is the knowledge of Contradiction in the form that there is no jar on the ground, and if there is the knowledge of the jar on the ground caused by desire then the knowledge of contradiction does not prevent the knowledge that jar is on the ground. Therefore Dinakara has added these two qualifications 'the state of being not produced by desire (*anāhāryatva*) and the state of not being affected by the knowledge of invalidity (*aprāmāṇyajñānānāskanditatva*) to the knowledge that prevents. The knowledge that is to be prevented should not be produced by ordinary apprehensional connection. This is because, according to our experience, immediately after the knowledge of Contradiction (but not by ordinary apprehensional connection) one can have the knowledge of that thing produced by ordinary apprehensional connection. As for example, we

know from someone that there is no jar in the room, but on opening the room we see there a jar. This knowledge of the jar is not prevented by the previous knowledge of Contradiction that there is no jar in the room. That is why it is stated that the instance of knowledge which is to be prevented should not be produced by ordinary apprehensional connection.

(p.352, ln 7 – p.354, ln 8) An objection may be raised against this as follows: after the definite knowledge of Contradiction of a particular thing produced by ordinary apprehensional connection of a particular sense organ, there would be the possibility of the knowledge of that particular thing produced by the ordinary apprehensional connection of that particular sense organ. The idea here is that when there is the perceptual knowledge of the absence of a jar produced by ordinary apprehensional connection this knowledge prevents the knowledge of the jar produced by the same apprehensional connection of the same sense organ. But if the *pratibadhyapratibandhakabhāva* (i.e. the relation of that which is prevented and that which prevents) mentioned earlier is accepted then the knowledge that jar is on the ground after the definite knowledge of Contradiction, will not be prevented.

This objection is answered by pointing out the sense in which the *pratibadhyapratibandhakabhāva* is to be understood: it is not meant that the knowledge which is to be prevented is produced by extraordinary apprehensional connection. And hence the accepted *pratibadhyapratibandhakabhāva* has the following form: a qualified knowledge of a particular thing which is produced by a particular sense organ by ordinary apprehensional connection is prevented by the definite knowledge of its absence produced by ordinary apprehensional connection of that particular sense organ. If this form of *pratibadhyapratibandhakabhāva* is accepted there would not be the possibility of the qualified knowledge produced by ordinary apprehensional connection of a particular sense organ after the knowledge of Contradiction produced by ordinary apprehensional connection of the same sense organ. And there is the possibility of qualified knowledge produced by ordinary apprehensional connection after the definite knowledge of Contradiction in the form of an

instance of knowledge other than ordinary perception. As for example, after the knowledge of the absence of jar on the floor by means of ordinary apprehensional connection there will not arise the knowledge that the floor has jar by means of ordinary apprehensional connection. But if the knowledge that the floor has no jar arises by apprehensional connections other than ordinary there could arise the knowledge that the floor has jar by means of ordinary apprehensional connection. It is stated that the instance of knowledge which hinders should be produced by ordinary apprehensional connection. This is because after an instance of definite knowledge of the Contradiction of a particular thing produced by the extraordinary apprehensional connection in the form of previous knowledge by a particular sense organ there could arise the knowledge of that thing by means of the ordinary apprehensional connection of the same sense organ.

Now it may be objected that after the valid knowledge of the absence of a particular thing by means of ordinary apprehensional connection, there does not arise the knowledge of that particular thing by means of the ordinary apprehensional connection of the same sense organ. This is because there is no connection of the sense organ with the counterpositive of the absence. This is due to the absence of the counterpositive on the substratum. Therefore there is no need of accepting a different *pratibadhya-pratibandhakabhāva* mentioned earlier (i.e. *tadindriyajanyatad-viśiṣṭabuddhiṃ prati tadindriyajanyalaukikatadabhāvaniścayaḥ pratibandhakaḥ*).

This objection is answered as follows: take the instance, there is jar on the ground but there is also the absence of a jar on the table. The absence of the jar on the table is erroneously cognised as existing on the ground because of some defect. After the erroneous cognition of the absence of jar on the ground there should arise the ordinary perceptual knowledge of the jar on the ground since the jar which is the counterpositive of the absence exists there. But actually such ordinary perceptual knowledge does not arise. Therefore the *pratibadhyaprati-bandhakabhāva* mentioned earlier should be accepted.

The opponent however argues that there would not be the possibility of ordinary perception of the counterpositive because

the defect which is the cause of ordinary perception of the absence of the thing is the hindering factor for the ordinary perception of its counterpositive; otherwise, i.e. if the defect is not accepted as the hindering factor, there would be the possibility of the ordinary perception of the counterpositive at the moment of the origin of the erroneous cognition of the absence of that particular thing. This is because the causal complex for the perception is then present. Therefore there is no need of accepting the *pratibadhyapratibandhakabhāva* mentioned earlier.

This is not correct because of the following reason: take the instance of the erroneous ordinary perception of absence that arises owing to the defect which is about to be destroyed. After this erroneous cognition there would be the possibility of the ordinary perception of its counterpositive. This is because the defect which is about to be destroyed cannot hinder the ordinary perception of the counterpositive, because at the moment of the erroneous perception of the absence, it (defect) does not exist because it is destroyed. If it is argued that a defect which is about to be destroyed cannot produce erroneous cognition, then another argument to establish the *pratibadhyapratibandhakabhāva* under discussion is given. Where at the moment of the valid ordinary perceptual knowledge of absence or in the second moment of such a perception of absence, in the substratum of that absence there is the presence of the defect which is the cause of the erroneous cognition of the counterpositive in the substratum of absence, there after the valid knowledge of absence there should be the erroneous ordinary perception of the counterpositive because there is the existence of the defect. In order to avoid this possibility of the perception of the counterpositive, the *pratibadhyapratibandhakabhāva* based upon each different sense organ should be accepted.

In the argument given by Dinakara it is stated that the defect arises in the same moment as the valid knowledge of the absence of the thing or in the second moment of such a knowledge. Parīkṣit Thampurān gives (S., p.172, lns 6–8) the reason why Dinakara gives also the alternative that the defect arises in the second moment. This is because at the moment when the valid knowledge of absence arises there is no possibility that the

defect also arises. The reason is that if there is the defect there will not arise the valid knowledge of the absence of the thing because the absence of the hindering factor should exist at same time as the effect. This means that for the ordinary perception of the counterpositive (of the absence of a particular thing) produced by a particular sense organ, the ordinary perception of the absence of that counterpositive produced by the same sense organ is the hindering factor.[1] In this way Dinakara solves the problem of

[1] Here the accepted *pratibhadhyapratibandhakabhāva* is *tadindriyajanyatallaukika-pratyakṣaṃ prati tadindriyajanyatadabhāvalaukikapratyakṣaṃ pratibandhakam.* Here Parīkṣit Thampurān discusses (S., p.172, ln 9ff) the opinion of certain Naiyāyikas that such a *pratibadhyapratibandhakabhāva* should not be accepted. The argument of these Naiyāyikas is the following: to avoid the possibility of the perceptual knowledge of earthness in atoms through the apprehensional connection of *ghaṭāntarbhāvena mahattvāvacchinnacakṣussaṃyuktasamavāya,* inherence with what is conjoined with the eye and determined by middle dimension, constituted by jar, one should accept the principle *yadghaṭita-sannikarṣaḥ yatra tatraiva tatpratyakṣam*, i.e. there is the perception of only that thing which is a constituent part of the apprehensional connection. Therefore jar which has middle dimension and which is the constituent part of the apprehensional connection becomes the qualificand in the perception *ghaṭaḥ pṛthivītvavān* and not the atoms which are not a part of the apprehensional connection. Therefore the conclusion of the *pūrvapakṣin* is that the apprehensional connection constituted by one *dharmin* cannot produce the perception in another *dharmin*. Hence the apprehensional connection with the substratum of the absence of jar cannot produce the perception of the absence of jar on another substratum as Dinakara argues. Hence the accepted *pratibadhyapratibandhaka-bhāva* is to be rejected.

This argument is not correct, because in atoms there is the absence of middle dimension and so there is no possibility of perception of earthness in atoms. And it is quite acceptable that when there is the perception of eartheness in jar, there through the extraordinary apprehensional connection in the form of knowledge, the perception of the existence of earthness in atoms takes place. Therefore there is no need of such a rule i.e. *yadghaṭitaḥ sannikaraṣaḥ tatraiva tatpratyakṣam.* Similarly there is no perception of the absence of jar in a dark place because although there is the apprehensional connection of the absence of the jar, still there is no apprehensional connection with the absence of jar as determined by the conjunction of light with the ground. In this way, the objection raised by some Naiyāyikas is refuted.

Further the argument of some Naiyāyikas against the position of Dinakara that after the valid knowledge of the absence of a thing the possibility of the erroneous knowledge of its counterpositive by defect also is not acceptable. This is because the erroneous knowledge of the counterpositive is experienced after the valid knowledge of its absence only where there is the defect of bile and so

the possibility of the knowledge of a particular thing produced by ordinary apprehensional connection after the definite knowledge of the absence of that thing produced by ordinary apprehensional connection. Therefore according to Dinakara in the *pratibadhyapratibandhakabhāva* mentioned earlier *laukika-sannikarṣājanyatva* is a qualifier of the hindering knowledge whereas according to Muktāvalīkāra *laukikasannikarṣājanyatva* is a qualifier of the hindered knowledge. This is the difference between the positions of Muktāvalīkāra and Dinakara.

What this means in less technical language is the following: when the definite knowledge of the absence of a thing is in the form of verbal knowledge, inferential knowledge or knowledge from extraordinary apprehensional connection, the knowledge of the counterpositive by ordinary apprehensional connection can arise. But when the definite knowledge of the absence of a thing is produced by ordinary apprehensional connection, the knowledge of the counterpositive does not arise by ordinary apprehensional connection. Therefore the definite knowledge of the absence of a thing in general cannot be mentioned as hindering factor for the knowledge of the counterpositive. Therefore according to Dinakara *pratibadhyapratibandhaka-bhāva* should be made more precise by stating that *tadindriya-janyalaukikasannikarṣajanyatadvattābhuddhiṃ prati tadindri-yajanyalaukikasannikarṣajanya tadabhāvabuddhiḥ pratibandhikā.*

(p.354, ln 8 – p.358 ln 6) Now the discussion is about the qualification in the form 'not produced by a particular defect (*doṣaviśeṣājanya*)' mentioned by Muktāvalīkāra for the instances of knowledge which are hindered. The reason for this qualification

on. Hence it is not possible that in all cases where knowledge arises through connection constituted by another *dharmin*, knowledge of the counter-positive arises. Similarly according to some Naiyāyikas, after the definite knowledge of Contradiction, there is the possibility of conjunct knowledge, as for example, after the definite knowledge of *bhūtalaṃ ghaṭābhāvavat* there is the possibility of the knowledge *bhūtalaṃ ghaṭavad ghaṭābhāvavac ca* by *laukikasannikarṣa* when there is *avirodhitvajñāna* between *ghaṭa* and *ghaṭābhāva*. This is not correct because there is no stimulating factor (*uttejaka*) in the form of the knowledge of opposition (*virodha*). Hence there is no *uttejakābhāvaviśiṣṭaghaṭābhāvajñāna* and therefore it is possible to have the knowledge *bhūtalaṃ ghaṭavad ghaṭābhāvavac ca.*

is that even when there is a definite knowledge of the absence of something the knowledge of that thing can arise. As for instance even when one knows that conch is not yellow the knowledge that conch is yellow arises because of the defect of bile. Similarly, when there is the knowledge that this is a bamboo stick, still the knowledge that this is a snake arises by the application of the ointment made from the fat of a frog. By the use of the qualification 'not produced by a particular defect' for the instances of knowledge which are hindered, the above instances of knowledge which are produced by particular defects are excluded from being instances of knowledge which are hindered.

Now the question may be raised: why is it that the expression *doṣaviśeṣa* indicating particular defects such as bile etc. are used and not *doṣasāmānya* i.e. defects in general. In other words why not the *pratibadhyapratibandhakabhāva* be in the form *doṣājanyatadvattājānaṃ prati tadabhāvavattāniścayaḥ pratibandhakaḥ*. Such a *pratibadhyapratibandhakabhāva* would mean that any instance of erroneous knowledge of a particular thing which is produced by any defect will not be hindered by the definite knowledge of its absence. As for instance a person having the defect of *kāca* in the eye, on looking at a conch shell from a distance has the erroneous cognition 'this is silver'. When he approaches the conch shell he has the definite knowledge 'this is not silver.' When the person has such a certainty of the absence of silver, the defect of his eye does not produce the erroneous knowledge 'this is silver.' This means that certain defects would not produce erroneous cognition of a thing when there is the certainty of its absence (*bādhaniścayakāle*), whereas certain other defects such as bile would produce erroneous cognition of yellow colour even when there is the definite knowledge of its absence. Similarly when the ointment produced by the fat of a frog (*maṇḍūkavasāñjana*) is applied on the eye of a person he has the erroneous cognition 'the bamboo stick is a snake' (*vaṃśoragabhrama*) although he has a definite knowledge that the bamboo stick is not a snake. For these reasons in the qualification *doṣaviśeṣājanya* the word *viśeṣa* is used.[1]

[1] Here the nature of error brought about by *doṣaviśeṣa* and *doṣasāmānya* may be clearly distinguished. In the error produced by *doṣaviśeṣa* like *maṇḍūka-*

Now an objection may be raised: it is useless to add the expression 'not produced by defect in the form of the yellow substance (*pittadravyātmakadoṣājanyatvam*)' as a qualification for the instance of knowledge which is to be hindered.[1] This is because the erroneous knowledge of yellowness is produced by ordinary apprehensional connection. This is due to the fact that the yellowness which exists in the bile is experienced by the connection of the eye with the yellow substance viz. bile and this is imposed on the conch. Therefore, by the use of the expression 'not produced by the ordinary apprehensional connection (*laukikasannikarṣājanyatva*)' as qualification for the instance of the knowledge which is to be hindered, the deviation in the *pratibadhyapratibandhakabhāva* is avoided. In other words, the instances of knowledge which are produced by such defects as bile and so on are excluded from being instances of knowledge which are hindered, by the use of the expression 'not produced by the ordinary apprehensional connection'.

This objection cannot be admitted for the following reason. Take the following case: in the first moment there is the bile in the eye and therefore there is apprehensional connection with the bile and hence there is also the perception of yellowness. In the second moment bile ceases to exist and then there is no ordinary apprehensional connection. Still in the third moment the perception of yellowness takes place in the conch. This perception is accepted by modern Naiyāyikas as extraordinary because it takes place through the apprehensional connection in the form of knowledge i.e. recollection.

vasāñjana, one knows that the thing in front of him is a bamboo stick but cognizes it as a snake because of the ointment. Since he really knows that it is only a bamboo stick the erroneous knowledge of snake is not contradicted afterwards. If the erroneous knowledge that the rope is snake is produced by *doṣasāmānya*, as for instance by *dūratva* etc., the person does not know that this is a rope and therefore the erroneous knowledge that it is a snake is contradicted afterwards, for example when he comes near it.

[1] Here Parīkṣit Thampurān (S., p.172, ln 19 ff) gives the reason why the example of bile is given. This is because erroneous knowledge of bamboo stick as snake is accepted as extraordinary perception by early Naiyāyikas also. Therefore, the qualification *doṣājanyatva* (i.e. *doṣaviśeṣājanyatva*) should be given for all instances of knowledge which are hindered.

Nor can it be argued that in such a case there would not be a reflective knowledge (*anuvyavasāya*) in the form 'I perceive yellowness in the conch' after the perception of yellowness in the conch because there is the absence of ordinary objectness which is the sign of ordinary perception.[1] The reason is that the knowledge which arises from ordinary apprehensional connection is accepted as perceptual knowledge; similarly knowledge which arises through a particular defect is also considered as perceptual knowledge. If erroneous knowledge is considered as the erroneous recollection of a thing previously experienced, then after the erroneous recollection there would not be the reflective knowledge in the form, I perceive this is a snake. Therefore after the knowledge of Contradiction by a particular sense organ 'conch is not yellow,' if the erroneous knowledge that conch is yellow arises by means of the same sense organ through a particular defect, then the state of being not produced by a particular defect must be used as a qualification for the instance of knowledge which is hindered. Here R. comments that the expression in D. 'if it is experienced' indicates that in fact after such a knowledge of Contradiction by a particular sense organ 'conch is not yellow', erroneous knowledge that conch is yellow does not arise by means of the same sense organ. Therefore there is no need of giving the qualification 'the state of not being produced by a particular defect for the instance of knowledge which is hindered.'

A further objection may be raised as follows: according to the accepted *pratbadhyapratibandhakabhāva* after the definite knowledge of Contradiction, any instance of knowledge which is not produced by ordinary apprehensional connection does not

[1] Here Parīkṣit Thampurān (S., p. 172, lns 21–3) gives the reason why *laukikaviṣayatā* is essential for the reflective knowledge of perception. This is because after the visual perception in the form 'jar has air' (Here visual perception of 'jar has air' takes place through the apprehensional connection in the form of previous knowledge, i.e. air has been known earlier and this knowledge serves as the apprehensional connection) the reflective knowledge in the form 'I percieve a jar' takes place, but not the reflective knowledge in the form 'I perceive air.' Therefore, for the reflective knowledge of perception there should be *laukikaviṣayatā*. Since there is no *laukikaviṣayatā* in air reflective knowledge of air does not take place.

arise. But after the definite knowledge of Contradiction an instance of knowledge in the form of doubt produced by ordinary apprehensional connection can also arise. But actually according to our experience after the definite knowledge of Contradiction doubt does not arise.

The answer to this objection is as follows: it is true that according to the accepted *pratibadhyapraibandhakabhāva* the definite knowledge of Contradiction does not prevent doubt produced by ordinary apprehensional connection. It is also true that according to our experience after the definite knowledge of Contradiction doubt does not arise. The reason for this is the following. Take the instance of knowledge 'Floor has jar'. At the moment when this knowledge arises there could arise also the knowledge of the absence of the jar in the floor known by some independent source.[1] To avoid the possibility of the knowledge of the absence of jar in the floor, we will have to accept the causal complex of the perception of one alternative caused by the ordinary apprehension in the same substratum as the hindering factor for the knowledge of the opposite alternative. Therefore after the definite knowledge of the Contradiction, doubt produced by ordinary apprehensional connection cannot arise because the causal complex of the perception of jar which is the one alternative prevents the knowledge of the absence of jar which is the other alternative. Therefore there would not be the possibility of doubt produced by ordinary apprehensional connection after the definite knowledge of Contradiction. But if this is accepted there would not at all be

[1] Here Parīkṣit Thampurān (S., p.172, ln 23 – p.173, ln 5) raises an objection and gives the answer. When there is the visual perception of jar the perception of the absence of jar which arises through some other source should be accepted as erroneous knowledge. Therefore it is necessary to hold that certain defects produce such an erroneous knowledge. When there is defect there will not be ordinary perception of jar but only erroneous knowledge of jar. If there is no defect there will be no possiblity of erroneous knowledge. Hence we should accept the earlier mentioned *pratibadhyapratibandhakabhāva* in the form *samānadharmitāvacchedakakatatkoṭikalaukikapratyakṣasāmagrīviparītakoṭibhānaṃ prati pratibandhikā.*

This objection cannot be admitted because for the definite knowledge of the opposite alternative, defect is the hindering factor. But for doubt of the opposite alternative, defect is useful. Therefore to avoid the possibility of the doubt of the opposite alternative we have to accept the *pratibadhyapratibandhakabhāva* as mentioned earlier.

doubt produced by ordinary apprehensional connection. This is acceptable. The knowledge of the two alternatives which are necessary for doubt is produced by apprehensional connection in the form of previous knowledge.

A further objection is that when there is doubt there is also actually ordinary apprehensional connection with the object which is present. Therefore how can doubt be not produced by ordinary apprehensional connection? Further how can there be the knowledge of the opposite alternative since the causal complex of the perception of one alternative prevents the perception of the other alternative? The answer is that there is indeed the ordinary apprehensional connection with the object which is present. But there is also the defect such as distance etc. which hinder the perception of the object. Therefore because of the absence of the causal complex of the ordinary perception there is no ordinary perception, though one of the causes of perception, i.e. ordinary apprehensional connection is present. Hence in the case of doubt the apprehension of both alternatives arises by extraordinary apprehensional connection. In other words, doubt is not produced by ordinary apprehensional connection and it has also the opposite alternative as an object.

Here Rāmarudra points out what the expression *anyatra vistaraḥ* in D. means: according to him Dinakara indicates that when there is a generic absence of defect which produces doubt there only the definite knowledge of one alternative connected with the sense organ arises. Further discussions like this on this point are to be found in other places.[1]

(p.350, lns 5–8; p.358, ln 6 – p.359, ln 6) Now the opinion of certain Naiyāyikas on the nature of the fallacy of Contradiction is refuted. According to these Naiyāyikas the cause of inferential knowledge is the knowledge of relationship of the

[1] Here Parīkṣit Thampurān (S.,p.173, ln 5ff) also comments on the expression *anyatra vistaraḥ*. According to him the expression *taddharmikatadabhāva-niścayaḥ* is used by the Muktāvalīkāra in order to explain the views of the old Naiyāyikas who hold *samānaviṣayakatvena pratibadhyapratibandhakabhāvaḥ*. The modern Naiyāyikas hold *taddharmāvacchinnadharmikataddharmāvacchinnā-bhāvatvāvacchinnaprakāraniścayatvena pratibadhyapratibandhakabhāvaḥ*. However in the opinion of both old and modern Naiyāyikas *anāhāryatva* etc. should also be given as qualifications for the instances of knowledge which hinder.

sādhya with the subject either as doubt or as definite knowledge. Since Contradiction and Counterthesis contradict this knowledge of the relationship of the *sādhya,* these are treated as fallacies of reason. Rāmarudra points out that this opinion is not that of those who hold that the doubt of *sādhya* is subjectness but of those who hold that subjectness is the relationship of the *sādhya* with the subject by definite knowledge also. As for example even when there is the definite knowledge of self by *śruti,* according to them if there is the desire to establish the self, inferential knowledge of the self arises. Here the relationship with the *sādhya* is brought about by the definite knowledge and this knowledge of relationship with *sādhya* is the cause of inferential knowledge.

S. (p.176, lns 1–12) raises an objection and answers it. If the knowledge of the relationship of the *sādhya* with the subject as common to both doubt and definite knowledge is accepted as cause of inferential knowledge, after the certainty of the *sādhya* bereft of desire to establish, there should arise the inferential knowledge. But it does not arise because the certainty of *sādhya* without the desire to establish it is an independent hindering factor for inferential knowledge. Therefore there would not be inferential knowledge after the certainty of the *sādhya* without the desire to establish it.

Against the position of these Naiyāyikas it may be argued that when there is the definite knowledge of Contradiction, there is the absence of the knowledge of the relationship of the *sādhya* with the subject and therefore there arises no inferential knowledge. Hence the definite knowledge of Contradiction cannot be accepted as hindering factor for inferential knowledge. And if it does not hinder inferential knowledge it cannot be treated as a fallacy of the reason. These Naiyāyikas answer this objection as follows: even though the definite knowledge of Contradiction does not hinder inferential knowledge directly, it hinders the knowledge of the relationship of the *sādhya* with the subject which according to them is the cause of inferential knowledge. Therefore it can be accepted as fallacy of reason.

But this opinion of certain Naiyāyikas cannot be admitted: the reason is that if it is accepted, there cannot by any negative

inference (*aprasiddhasādhyakānumiti* i.e. *vyatirekānumiti*). The expression *aprasiddhasādhyakānumiti* means *vyatirekānumiti*, because just as fire is established in the kitchen before it is established in the mountain, so also *itarabheda* (difference from all others) is not established anywhere before it is established in earth because in the case of negative inference, the relationship of *sādhya* with the subject is not known by any means of valid knowledge. As for example take the inference 'earth is different from all other substances because it has smell (*pṛthvī itaradravebhyo bhidyate gandhavattvāt*)'. Here the form of consideration is, earth has smell which is the counterpositive of the absence which is the pervader of the state of being different from other substances (*pṛthvītaratvavyāpakābhāvapratiyogigandhavatī pṛthivī*). This negative consideration produces the inferential knowledge in which *sādhya* is the qualificand in the form there is difference from other substances in earth. It would be impossible to have such inferences, if the knowledge of relationship of the *sādhya* with the subject is accepted as the cause of inferential knowledge, since in such inferences the *sādhya* (in the present inference *itaradravyabheda*) is not known earlier.

But this argument against these Naiyāyikas is not correct, because inference of a *sādhya* which is not known earlier is not accepted by Udayana. According to Udayana in all cases knowledge of positive invariable concomitance is the cause of inferential knowledge. Even by negative concomitance (*vyatirekasahacāra*) we come to the knowledge of only the positive invariable concomitance. Both the negative and positive considerations together do not produce inferential knowledge. And in the knowledge of positive invariable concomitance *sādhya* also is a constituent part. Therefore at the time of knowledge of the positive invariable concomitance *sādhya* is also known. Hence there is no inferential knowledge where *sādhya* is not known earlier.[1] Therefore M. gives another reason why the opinion of

[1] It may be noted here that although Udayana does not accept *vyatirekavyāpti* still Naiyāyikas in general admit *vyatirekavyāpti* and when there is only *vyatirekavyāpti* they admit also *kevalavyatirekyanumāna* the example of which was discussed in the previous paragraph i.e. *pṛtvī itarebhyo bhidyate gandhavattvāt*. But the Mīmāṃsakas do not admit *vyatirekavyāpti* because according to them

these Naiyāyikas is to be rejected, viz. it is possible to have inferential knowledge without a doubt of the *sādhya*.

Even though there is no doubt about the existence of the *sādhya* there could be the knowledge of the relationship of the *sādhya* with the subject, and this knowledge is in the form of definite knowledge of the *sādhya* when there is the desire to establish it. And such a knowledge of the relationship of the *sādhya* with the subject produces inferential knowledge.

It is also possible to have inferential knowledge without the certainty of the *sādhya* at the time of desire to establish it. As for example, the inferential knowledge of the cloud by the roar of thunder arises even when there is neither doubt of the *sādhya* nor its certainty. Therefore the knowledge of relationship of the *sādhya* with the subject either in the form of doubt or in the form of certainty is not the cause of inferential knowledge. Someone may here argue that even in the case of inferential knowledge of cloud by the roar of thunder, after the knowledge of the roar of thunder in the second moment doubt arises whether there is cloud or not. In the third moment inferential knowledge that there is cloud arises. Therefore it is not possible to object that inferential knowledge does not arise. But this argument cannot be admitted. The reason is that when there is the knowledge of the specific characteristic, doubt does not arise. It means that after the hearing of the roar of thunder, consideration in the form 'roar as pervaded by cloud (*megha-vyāpyagarjitavattā*)' arises. And this consideration hinders the doubt whether there is cloud or not. And hence doubt about the *sādhya* does not arise.

But it may further be argued that in that case there would not be the knowledge about the absence of cloud which is one alternative in doubt, because of the hindrance of the knowledge of the specific characteristic in the form of consideration that roar is pervaded by cloud. Therefore there would be the definite knowledge in the from of mental perception the object of which

vyāpti is *sāhacaryaniyama* and this can only be positive. The Naiyāyikas deny this and assert that just as *sāhacaryaniyama* is *vyāpti* so also *avyabhicaritatva* is *vyāpti* and it can be based on *vyatirekasahacāra* and by means of this there can also be *kevalavyatirekyanumāna*. Cfr. K.M.D.R. p. 498ff (and also Appendix).

is the relationship of the *sādhya* with the subject. This argument cannot be accepted for, in that case, there would not be the possibility of inferential knowledge because of the hindrance of the certainty of the *sādhya*. Further it cannot be argued that after the delay of a moment definite knowledge ceases to exist and therefore inferential knowledge can arise. This argument also is not admissible. This is because at the moment just before the inferential knowledge the consideration is destroyed and so owing to the absence of consideration inferential knowledge also does not arise.[1]

(p.350, ln 8 – p.351, ln 2; p.359, ln 6 – p.362, ln 2) The definite knowledge of the validity of the knowledge of the absence of the *sādhya* in the subject is the hindering factor for the inferential knowledge. Therefore the absence of the definite knowledge of validity of the knowledge of the absence of the *sādhya* in the subject is the cause of inferential knowledge. Hence, according to the old Naiyāyikas the validity of the knowledge of the absence of the *sādhya* in the subject is Contradiction. This opinion of the old Naiyāyikas is rejected because the knowledge of validity of the knowledge of the absence of the *sādhya* in the subject is not a hindering factor since there is no reason to assert this. The argument is that the knowledge of the validity does not have as its object the absence of the *sādhya*. Therefore there is no reason to accept it as a hindering factor for inferential knowledge.

Here Rāmarudra discusses a possible objection that the knowledge of validity of the knowledge of absence of the *sādhya* in the subject has the absence of the *sādhya* also as its object.

[1] Here Rāmarudra makes a reamark on the text of D. According to Rāmarudra *saṁśayāntarotpattyaivānumitiḥ* is the text of D. But he suggests that *saṁśayotpattyaiva* is the correct text because there was no doubt earlier and therefore he concludes that the word *antara* in the sense of another is used wrongly. But he further points out that the text *saṁśayāntarotpattyaiva* can also be justified. In that case the expression *saṁśayam vinā* in M. indicates that because of the recollection of the invariable concomitance, the earlier doubt is destroyed at the moement of consideration. Besides even at the place where there is inferential knowledge by means of the roar of thunder there arises inferential knowledge after a doubt has arisen. For these reasons one can use validly the expresssion *saṁśayāntarotpattyaivānumitiḥ*.

Hence the knowledge of validity of the knowledge of the absence of the *sādhya* can be a hindering factor for inferential knowledge.

This objection is not valid, because in that subject in which the existence of the *sādhya* is apprehended as determined by a particular characteristic in that same subject the apprehension of the absence of the *sādhya* is considered as the hindering factor. Therefore the definite knowledge of validity in the knowledge of the absence of the *sādhya* does not have the characteristic of being a hindering factor. This is because the knowledge of the absence of the *sādhya* in that which has the absence of *sādhya* (*sādhyābhāvavati sādhyābhāvaprakārakaṃ jñānam*), though having the absence of *sādhya* also as the object, does not have the characteristic of being a hindering factor as described above and therefore it does not prevent the inferential knowledge.

Here Rāmarudra raises the following possible objection against the statement of M. If the position of M. is accepted then when there is the definite knowledge of the validity of the doubt of the absence of the *sādhya* there would not be inferential knowledge. This is because doubt of the absence of the *sādhya* is also a form of knowledge and this knowledge (*saṃśayadharamikapramātvajñāna*) would also prevent inferential knowledge. This is acceptable; because the doubt of the absence of the *sādhya* the validity of which is certainly known is similar to the definite knowledge of the absence of *sādhya* in as far as both prevent inferential knowledge. Otherwise in both instances of knowledge (in *sādhyābhāvajñāna* and *pramātvajñāna*) certainty (*niścayatva*) has to be added; this is cumbersome.

The argument against the old Naiyāyikas that the knowledge of the validity of the knowledge of the absence of the *sādhya* is the hindering factor for inferential knowledge, is not acceptable. The reason is that when the knowledge of the absence of the *sādhya* in the subject is apprehended as invalid inferential knowledge arises. Therefore the knowledge of the absence of the *sādhya* is not the hindering factor because when there is the knowledge of invalidity of the knowledge of the absence of the *sādhya* then there is the absence of the definite knowledge of validity of the knowledge of the absence of the *sādhya*. Therefore inferential knowledge arises there. Because of this M. gives

another reason why the knowledge of the validity of the knowledge of the absence of *sādhya* is not a hindering factor for inferential knowledge.

If the knowledge of the validity of the knowledge of the absence of *sādhya* is accepted as a hindering factor for the inferential knowledge, there would be cumbersomeness. The reason is that to account for the possibility of inferential knowledge according to the position of Muktāvalīkāra, it is necessary to add only the absence of the knowledge of invalidity common to both doubt and definite knowledge as qualifier to hindering factor. In the opinion of the old Naiyāyikas however, the definite knowledge of the validity of the knowledge of the *sādhya* in the subject is accepted as hindering factor and so there is cumbersomness.

Rāmarudra explains how this cumbersomeness comes about. First the state of having the knowledge of the absence of *sādhya* as another qualificand in the subject which also is qualificand is cumbersome in comparison with the mere state of having subject as qualificand. The idea here is that when the knowledge of the absence of *sādhya* in the subject is accepted as hindering factor then the state of being qualificand needs to be used only once in the knowledge which prevents. When the knowledge of the validity of the knowledge of the absence of *sādhya* in the subject is accepted as hindering factor then the state of being qualificand has to be used twice. Similarly the state of being definite knowledge having the absence of *sādhya* as qualifier is cumbersome in comparison with the state of being definite knowledge of the absence of *sādhya*. The idea here is that when the definite knowledge of validity of the knowledge of the absence of the *sādhya* is accepted as hindering factor then the state of having the absence of *sādhya* becomes the qualifier of the definite knowledge of validity and when the definite knowledge of the absence of *sādhya* is accepted as hindering factor then the state of having the absence of *sādhya* does not become a qualifier of the definite knowledge of the absence of *sādhya*. Hence there is cumbersomeness in the position of the old Naiyāyikas.

Hence the conclusion of Dinakara is the following: when there is the knowledge of the absence of *sādhya* and when there is neither the knowledge of its validity nor its invalidity, inferential knowledge does not arise.

The generally accepted definition of fallacy is the following: *yadrūpāvacchinnaviṣayakatvam prakṛtānumitipratibandhakatānatiriktavṛtti tattvam* i.e. the state of having that thing as object which is determined by a particular characteristic is not absent from that thing in which the state of being hindering factor for a particular inferential knowledge exists. That particular thing is fallacy. Therefore the *yadviṣayakatva*, the state of having a particular thing as object, exists in the knowledge of validity about the knowledge of absence of *sādhya* in the subject where the state of being hindering factor for inferential knowledge also exists. Therefore the general definition of the fallacy can be applied to the validity of the knowledge of the absence of *sādhya*. Hence there would be the fault of overextension for the definition of fallacy.

But this is not correct because, to avoid the overextension for the definition of fallacy in *prameyatvaviśiṣṭavyabhicāra* (deviation qualified by knowability) the expression *viśiṣṭāntrāghaṭitatva* (the state of not being constituted by another qualified thing) is used in the general definition of fallacy. By this expression *viśiṣṭānatrāghaṭita* the present overextension arising from the use of the expression *pramātva* in the hindering factor for inferential knowledge (*sādhyaābhāvavatpakṣaghaṭitapramātva*) is also removed. This just means that *sādhyābhāvavatpakṣajñāne, pramātva* is constituted by another qualified thing *sādhyābhāvavatpakṣa*. Therefore the *pramātva* about the knowledge of the absence of *sādhya* is not a fallacy of reason.

A further objection is raised: if the definite knowledge of the absence of the *sādhya* not affected by the knowledge of invalidity is accepted as hindering factor then the definite knowledge of validity which arises first may be considered as hindering factor. The knowledge of validity arises first because for the knowledge of the absence of something the knowledge of its counterpositive is the cause and so the knowledge of the absence of validity

presupposes the knowledge of validity which is the counter-positive of the absence of the knowledge of validity.

But this is not acceptable because in the case of the fallacy of Counterthesis also, the knowledge of validity in the knowledge of that which has the thing pervaded by the absence of *sādhya* would be a hindering factor and so the validity in the knowledge of that which has that thing pervaded by the absence of *sādhya* would also be fallacy of Counterthesis. This is quite unacceptable because when there is the knowledge of the validity in the knowledge of that which has that thing pervaded by the absence of *sādhya* inferential knowledge of the absence of *sādhya* arises and so there would be no fallacy of Counterthesis.

A further objection may be raised as follows: when there is the knowledge of validity of knowledge of the absence of *sādhya* inferential knowledge is prevented; but when there is the absence of the knowledge of validity of the knowledge of the absence of the *sādhya* inferential knowledge is not prevented. Therefore by agreement and disagreement the knowledge of validity of the knowledge of the absence of *sādhya* is considered as hindering factor for inferential knowledge. But this is not acceptable because the knowledge of Contradiction which is not affected by the knowledge of invalidity is hindering factor. In some cases the knowledge of validity of the presence of *sādhya* is accepted as useful by removing doubt regarding the invalidity of the presence of *sādhya*. In this way the validity of knowledge of the absence of *sādhya* is not a fallacy because it is not the object of the knowledge which directly hinders inferential knowledge or the cause of inferential knowledge.

(p.351, ln 2 – p.352, ln 3; p.362, ln 2 – p.364, ln 5) A further objection is raised as follows: there would be Deviation in the case of Contradiction if the reason exists in the subject as in the example 'lake has fire because it has water'. In this instance of Contradiction the reason, water, exists in the lake where there is no fire which is the *sādhya*. Therefore there is Deviation. And if the reason does not exist in the subject there is the fault of Unestablishedness of nature, e.g. in the instance of contradiction as lake has fire because it has smoke; here the reason, smoke, does not exist in the lake. Therefore it is an instance of the fault

of Unestablishedness of nature. The idea here is that in the case of Contradiction there is either Deviation or the fault of Unestablishedness of reason. Therefore why should we accept Contradiction as a different fallacy of reason?

This objection cannot be admitted because the knowledge of Contradiction is different from the knowledge of Deviation. The idea here is that though in the case of Contradiction there is necessarily either the fallacy of Unestablishedness of nature or the fallacy of Deviation, still the knowledge of Contradiction does not have Deviation etc. as its object. Therefore Contradiction is accepted as a fallacy different from other fallacies such as Deviation and Unestablishedness of nature.

A further objection is raised: why should not one accept the form of Contradiction in the form that the subject which has reason has the absence of the *sādhya*, since there is the causal complex necessary for this form of the knowledge of Contradiction. This is because there is consideration or direct perception which indicates the presence of the reason in the subject. As for example: in the case of the fallacy of Contradiction in the instance, 'lake has fire because it has water' there is the consideration in the form 'lake has water which is invariably connected with fire.' Hence the knowledge of contradiction has Deviation also as its object. Therefore there is no difference between Contradiction and Deviation.

But this objection also cannot be admitted. The reason is that when there is the knowledge of invariable concomitance as non-deviation in the form of consideration, then the knowledge of Contradiction which arises after this consideration cannot have Deviation as its object. As in the example, lake has fire because it has water, there is consideration in the form lake has water which is invariably connected with fire. And such a consideration hinders the knowledge of Contradiction in the form that the lake which has water has the absence of fire. Therefore Contradiction in the form that the subject which has reason has the absence of *sādhya* does not arise.

According to Rāmarudra Dinakara gives a second reason because of the following possible objection: the knowledge of Contradiction which follows consideration does not have

deviation as its object, but consideration itself may be identical with the knowledge of Contradiction in the form that the subject which has reason pervaded by *sādhya* has the absence of *sādhya*. In this way the knowledge of Contradiction has Deviation as its object. The reason which Dinakara gives is that one reason cannot be at the same time the object of definite knowledge of Deviation and non-deviation. The idea here as explained by Rāmarudra is that the absence of the hindering factor is considered as a cause of the effect, in as far as the absence of the hindering factor exists at the same time as the effect. Further with reference to one subject we cannot have the knowledge of that which is pervaded by *sādhya* and the absence of *sādhya*. Therefore after the consideration of one reason there will not be the knowledge of Deviation of the same reason.

However one may object further in the following way: take the example, red hot iron ball has smoke because it has fire. Here just as ordinary perceptual knowledge of Contradiction arises even when there is the definite knowledge of invariable concomitance in the form that the red hot iron ball has fire which is pervaded by smoke, so also ordinary perceptual knowledge of Deviation in the form 'fire exists where there is no smoke' arises.

Rāmarudra explains this further as follows: it was mentioned earlier that the knowledge which is hindered should not be produced by ordinary apprehensional connection. Therefore with reference to the red hot iron ball the knowledge of Contradiction (i.e. red hot iron ball has no smoke) caused by any apprehensional connection arises. Similarly after that consideration the ordinary perception of Deviation in the form that the red hot iron ball has the fire which exists in that which has absence of smoke arises. In this way the knowledge of Contradiction has deviation as its object.

The answer is as follows: when there is the knowledge of Contradiction after consideration the knowledge of Deviation does not matter. Therefore Contradiction is a hindrance to inferential knowledge. Dinakara explains this further pointing out that the knowledge of Deviation does not hinder directly the inferential knowledge but only indirectly by preventing consideration. Therefore the knowledge of Deviation arising after

consideration does not matter. Only knowledge of Contradiction is the hindering factor.

Now an example for contradiction without the admixture of Deviation is given, where there is consideration in the form 'jar has earthness which is pervaded by smell at the moment of its origination', there is only knowledge of Contradiction in the form 'jar has absence of smell at the moment of its origination.' Only such a knowledge of Contradiction hinders the inferential knowledge. The reason is that there is no fault of Unestablishedness of nature here because the reason earthness exists in the jar. Further it cannot be argued that though there is no fault of Unestablishedness of nature still there is the fault of Deviation since earthness exists in the jar which has absence of smell at the moment of its origination. This is because in the reason, earthness, there is no Deviation in the form of existence in that which has the absence of the *sādhya* which (absence) does not coexist with its counterpositive (*pratiyogivyadhikaraṇasādhyābhāva*). The qualification *pratiyogivyadhikaraṇa* is given to the absence of *sādhya* because otherwise valid reasons such as the state of being this tree in such inferences as 'this tree has conjunction with the monkey because it has the state of being this tree', will also have the fault of Deviation.

A further objection may be raised as follows: in order to avoid the possibility of the fault of Contradiction for the valid reason of the state of being this tree (*etadvṛkṣatvam*), the definition of Contradiction should be given as the subject has the absence of *sādhya* which (absence) is not coexistent with its counterpositive. Similarly in order to avoid the fault of Counterthesis for the same valid reason the fallacy of Counterthesis should also be defined as the subject has that which is pervaded by the absence of the *sādhya* which (absence) is not coexistent with its counterpositive. In this way when smell is established in a jar at the moment of its origin there is no fallacy of Contradiction, since the absence of smell exists in jar with its counterpositive (smell) at the moment of the origin of the jar.

This cannot be admitted. Where space and time are accepted as the determinants of the state of being the subject in the form of the relation of selfsameness, there the subject having the

absence of *sādhya* determined by such time and space is accepted as Contradiction. Therefore the inference, 'jar has smell at the moment of its origin' has the fallacy of Contradiction in the form, jar has no smell determined by the moment of its origin. Therefore this example 'jar has no smell at the moment of its origin' is an example of Contradiction without the admixture of Counterthesis. This is because Counterthesis in the form that that which is pervaded by the absence of smell which (absence) exists in that which has no counterpositive of the absence, does not exist in the jar. If this is not admitted Contradiction will not be a different fallacy because even in this case it will have the admixture of Counterthesis. There is nothing incongruous in the fact that the fallacy of Counterthesis is pervaded by the fallacy of Contradiction. There is no harm if the pervader exists in more places. In other words there are instances of fallacy of Contradiction without the admixture of the fallacy of Counterthesis .

Nor can it be further objected that the absence of smell is universally positive just as the absence of conjunction. Therefore the Counterthesis in the form of that that which has that which is pervaded by the absence of smell which (absence) exists in that which has no counterpositive is possible in this case also. Therefore the Contradiction here has the admixture of Counterthesis .

Some Naiyāyikas raise the following objection against this: it is not right to define the fallacy of Counterthesis in this way. The reason is that there is no Contradiction of *sādhya* when the fallacy of Counterthesis is defined that the subject has that which is pervaded by the absence of *sādhya* which (absence) is not coexistent with its counterpositive. Therefore in the definition of the fallacy of Counterthesis the absence of *sādhya* should not be qualified by the expression 'not coexistent with its counter-positive'. Therefore the valid reason of the state of being this tree (*etadvṛkṣatvam*) does not have the fault of Counterthesis. This cannot be admitted. This is because, if in the definition of the fallacy of Counterthesis the absence of *sādhya* should not be qualified by the expression 'not coexistent with its counter-positive' then, we will have to accept that the knowledge of that thing which has that which is pervaded by the absence of a

particular thing which (absence) is not qualified by the state of being not coexistent with its counterpositive is a hindering factor for all cases of knowledge of that which has that thing. (*pratiyogivaiyadhikaraṇyāghaṭitatadabhāvavyāpyavattājñānasya eva sarvatra tadvattābuddhiṃ prati pratibandhakatva*). But in that case consideration which is the cause of inferential knowledge would not be a hindering factor for the doubt of *sādhya* as mentioned earlier. This is because consideration which is the cause of inferential knowledge has invariable concomitance which has as part of its definition the absence of *sādhya* which is not qualified by coexistence with its counterpositive as its object. Therefore that which is pervaded by the absence of *sādhya* which (that which is pervaded) has invariable concomitance constituted by the state of being not coexistent with its counterpositive will be hindering factor for the *sādhya*. Hence that only should be considered as having the fallacy of Counterthesis. This is not acceptable since if such a Counterthesis is accepted then the valid reason in such inferences such as 'jar has smell because it has earthness' will also become fallacious.[1]

[1] Here Parīkṣit Thampurān points out (S., p.175, ln 1ff) that Contradiction is only the subject which has the absence of *sādhya* by the relation of unqualified selfsameness. The knowledge of the incomplete occurrence is a stimulating factor for the state of being a hindering factor for the knowledge of that which has a particular thing. According to this opinion the valid reason in the inference *kapisaṃyogī etadvṛkṣatvāt* has the fault of Contradiction. But it is not treated as a fallacious reason because the Contradiction which is the cause of the use of fallacious reason is defined as that which has the absence of *sādhya* by the relation of selfsameness not determined by any characteristic. Therefore the valid reason *etadvṛkṣatvam* which is mentioned earlier is not a fallacious reason. The same method should be accepted in the case of Counterthesis also. Deviation has the state of having absence of *sādhya* by the relation of qualifierness not determined by any characteristic as its part. Hence Counterthesis which is mentioned does not have the admixture of deviation.

The statement that the reason which has contradiction either does not exist in the subject or it has deviation is applicable only in the case of inference where the *sādhya* has complete occurrence. This is clearly stated in the chapter on *bādha* by Mathurānātha. The statement that there is Contradiction but it is not considered as false reason is not to be taken into account because it has no argument to support it. According to Parīkṣit Thampurān the expression *alaṃ pallavitena* is used in R. to indicate all these points of view.

Muktāvalīkāra here points out that the fallacies which are pervaded by Deviation, Opposition and the Unestablished are included in them. These are not accepted as different fallacies; if they are accepted as fallacies then we will have to accept more than five fallacies. This is because, just as Deviation hinders the knowledge of invariable concomitance, that which is pervaded by Deviation also hinders the knowledge of invariable concomitance. Therefore, if that also is accepted as a fallacy different from Deviation then we will have to accept more than five fallacies.

Now a question may arise. How is it that the fallacies which are pervaded by Deviation etc. are included in them and not considered as different fallacies, whereas the fallacy which is pervaded by Contradiction, i.e. Counterthesis, is not included in Contradiction but considered as a different fallacy? There is no answer to this question except that the sage has so enjoined in N.S. The fallacy which is pervaded by Counterthesis is not considered as a fallacy because it does not prevent the inferential knowledge of *sādhya*.

Text 11
Fallacy of Deviant Reasons
(According to Old Naiyāyikas)

का. यः सपक्षे विपक्षे च भवेत्साधारणस्तु सः ।
यस्तूभयस्माद्व्यावृत्तः स त्वसाधारणो मतः ॥ ७३॥

तथैवानुपसंहारी केवलान्वयिपक्षकः ॥ ७४ab ॥

मु. यः सपक्षे इति । सपक्षविपक्षवृत्तिः साधारण इत्यर्थः । सपक्षः साध्यवान् । विपक्षः साध्यवद्भिन्नः । विरुद्धवारणाय सपक्षवृत्तित्वमुक्तम् । वस्तुतो विपक्षवृत्तित्वमेव वाच्यम् । विरुद्धस्य साधारणत्वेऽपि दूषकताबीजस्य भिन्नतया तस्य पार्थक्यात् ।

K. (The reason) which exists both in a definite subject and in a definite contradicted subject is Common, (the reason) which does not exist in both is considered as Uncommon. Similarly (a reason) the subject of which is only affirmative is Inconclusive. (*Kārikās* 73,74ab)

M. That which is in a definite subject (*yaḥ sapakṣe iti*). The meaning is that that which exists in a definite subject and in a definite contradicted subject is Common. A definite subject has that which is to be established. That which is different from that which has *sādhya* is a contradicted subject. It is mentioned that the reason should occur in a definite subject in order to exclude the Opposite reason. In fact only occurrence in a definite contradicted subject should be mentioned. This is because although Opposite reason is also Common, the reason which makes it fallacious is different. Hence it is stated as a different (fallacy).

मु. यस्तूभयस्मात् इति । सपक्षविपक्षव्यावृत्त इत्यर्थः । सपक्षः साध्यवत्तया निश्चितः । विपक्षः साध्यशून्यतया निश्चितः । 'शब्दोऽनित्यः शब्दत्वात्' इत्यादौ यदा शब्देऽनित्यत्वस्य संदेहस्तदा सपक्षत्वं घटादीनामेव तद्व्यावृत्तं च शब्दत्वमिति तदा तदसाधारणम् । यदा तु शब्देऽनित्यत्वनिश्चयस्तदा नासाधारणम् । इदं तु प्राचां मतम् । नवीनमतं तु पूर्वमुक्तम् । **केवलान्वयीति** । 'सर्वमभिधेयं प्रमेयत्वात्' इत्यादौ सर्वस्यैव पक्षत्वात् सामानाधिकरण्यग्रहस्थलान्तराभावान्नानुमितिः । इदं तु न सम्यक्, पक्षैकदेशे सहचारग्रहेऽपि क्षतेरभावात् । अस्तु वा सहचाराग्रहः तावताप्यज्ञान-

M. (The reason) which does not exist in both (*yastūbhayasmāt iti*). The meaning is that it is absent from a definite subject and a definite contradicted subject. A definite subject is that which is determined as having that which is to be established. A definite contradicted subject is that which is determined as not having that which is to be established. In such instances as 'sound is not eternal because it has soundness' and so on, when there is doubt of eternity in sound, then jar and so on are definite subjects; soundness does not exist there and so it is Uncommon. When there is certainty of eternity in sound, then this is not Uncommon. This is the opinion of the old Naiyāyikas. The opinion of the modern Naiyāyikas has already been stated. **Only affirmative** (*kevalānvayīti*). In such instances as 'all things are nameable because they are knowable' and so on since all things constitute the subject, there is no other place to grasp co-occurrence and therefore there is no inferential knowledge. This is not correct because even if there is the apprehension of co-occurrence in any constituent of the subject there is no harm. Or let there be no apprehension of co-occurrence, then although

मु. रूपासिद्धिरेव न हेत्वाभासत्वं तस्य तथापि केवलान्वयि-साध्यकत्वं तत्त्वमित्युक्तम् ।

दि. दूषकताबीजस्य भिन्नतया इति । साधारणस्याव्यभिचारज्ञाने विरुद्धस्य सामानाधिकरण्यग्रहे प्रतिबन्धकत्वादिति भावः । असाधारण्यघटकं सपक्षत्वं निश्चयगर्भं न तु साध्यवत्त्वमात्रमित्याह **सपक्षे** इति । एवमग्रेऽपि । सपक्षत्वविपक्षत्वयोर्निश्चयत्वनिवेशस्य फलमाह **शब्दः** इत्यादिना । **पूर्वमुक्तम्** इति । 'असाधारणः साध्यासमानाधिकरणो हेतुः' इत्यादिनोक्तमित्यर्थः ।

M. there is the Unestablishedness in the form of ignorance there is no fallaciousness, yet Inconclusiveness is the state of being the reason having that which is to be established as only affirmative. This has been mentioned.

D. The reason which makes it fallacious is different (*dūṣakatā-bījasya bhinnatayeti*). This is because the fallacy of Common is a hindering factor for non-deviation (invariable concomitance), (the fallacy of) Opposition is a hindering factor for the knowledge of co-existence (with that which is to be established). The state of being definite subject which is included in the definition of fallacy of Uncommon consists of the definite knowledge and not merely of the state of having that which is to be established. Therefore (the author) says **definite subject** (*sapakṣeti*). Such is (the interpretation) further on also. (The author) mentions the result of the inclusion of the state of being definite knowledge (in the definition of) the state of being the definite subject and of the state of being the definite contradicted subject by the expression **sound** and so on (*śabda ityādinā*). **Has already been stated** (*pūrvamuktam iti*). It has already been mentioned by the statement that the reason which does not exist along with that which is to be established is Uncommon. This is the meaning.

दि. मूले **केवलान्वयिपक्षकः** इति। अत्र पक्षता साध्यसंशयरूपा गृह्यते तेन 'सर्वमभिधेयं प्रमेयत्वात्' इत्यादौ यदा सिद्धिः सिषाधयिषा च तदा साध्यनिश्चयसंभवेन सामानाधिकरण्यघटितव्याप्तिग्रहसंभवात्तस्य सद्धेतोर-लक्ष्यतया सिषाधयिषाविरहविशिष्टसिद्ध्यभावविशिष्टस्य पक्षस्य तदा केवलान्वयित्वेऽपि तत्र नातिव्याप्तिः। अनुपसंहारिणो हेत्वाभासत्वमुप-पादयति **सर्वमभिधेयम्** इत्यादिना। **सामानाधिकरण्यग्रहस्थला-न्तराभावात्** इति। संशयोत्पत्तिक्षणे निश्चयवारणाय निश्चयं प्रति संशय-सामग्र्याः प्रतिबन्धकत्वस्यावश्यं वाच्यतया प्रकृते सर्वत्र साध्यसन्देहसत्त्वे

D. In the primary text the expression **(the reason) the subject of which is only affirmative** (*kevlānvyipakṣaka iti*) (is to be explained as follows): here subjectness is to be understood in the form of doubt about that which is to be established. Therefore in the inference 'all things are nameable because they are knowable' and so on, when there is the certainty of that which is to be established and the desire to establish it, there the definite knowledge of that which is to be established arises. Hence the knowledge of invariable concomitance constituted by co-occurrence takes place; therefore it is a valid reason; hence it is something which is outside that which is to be defined. Therefore there is no overextension of (the definition) of the fallacy of Inconclusiveness even though there is the subject which is qualified by absence of certainty qualified by the absence of the desire to establish is only affirmative. (The author) explains how Inconclusive reason is a fallacious reason with the words **all things are nameable etc.** (*sarvamabhidheyamityādinā*). **Because there is no other place to grasp co-occurrence** (*sāmānādhi-karaṇyagrahasthalāntarābhāvāditi*). In order to prevent definite knowledge at the moment of the origin of doubt we should necessarily accept that the causal complex of doubt as hindering factor for definite knowledge. Therefore in the present instance if there is the doubt of that which is to be established everywhere, there is the causal complex of doubt before it. Hence nowhere

दि. तत्पूर्वं तत्सामग्र्याः सत्त्वेन साध्यनिश्चयस्य कुत्राप्यसंभवेन व्यापकसाध्यसामानाधिकरण्यविशिष्टप्रमेयत्वादिरूपव्याप्तिग्रहानुत्पादान्न तत्रानुमितिरित्यनुपसंहारिणो हेत्वाभासत्वमिति भावः । **क्षतेरभावात्** इति । तदानीमपि केवलान्वयिपक्षताकत्वस्यानुपसंहारित्वस्य क्षतेरभावादित्यर्थः । तथा च तत्रानुपसंहारित्वस्य सत्त्वात्तस्य व्याप्तिज्ञानानुत्पादप्रयोजकत्वाभावाद्धेत्वाभासत्वानुपपत्तिरिति भावः । न च संशयसामग्र्याः सत्त्वात् कथं पक्षैकदेशे साध्यनिश्चय इति वाच्यम् । सर्वत्वधर्मितावच्छेदककसंशयसामग्रीसत्त्वेऽपि घटत्वादिधर्मितावच्छेदककसाध्यनिश्चयोत्पादे बाधकाभावात् समान-

D. there would be the definite knowledge of that which is to be established. Therefore there will not arise the knowledge of invariable concomitance in the form that the state of being knowable etc. qualified by co-occurrence with that which is to be established which is the pervader (of the reason). Therefore in this case there is no inferential knowledge and so Inconclusive reason is a fallacy. This is the idea. **Because...there is no harm** (*kṣaterabhāvād iti*). Even then nothing prevents the fallacy of Inconclusiveness to arise in the form of the state of having subjectness which is purely affirmative. This is the idea. In this way there is Inconclusiveness. But since it does not prevent the occurrence of the knowledge of invariable concomitance there is no possibility of fallaciousness. This is the idea.

Nor can it be argued that since there is the causal complex of doubt how can there be the definite knowledge of that which is to be established in any constituent of the subjects. The reason is that even when there is the causal complex of doubt where the state of being all is the determinant of subjectness, there is no hindering factor for the origin of the definite knowledge of that which is to be established where jarness and so on are the determinants of subjectness because hindrance occurs only when the qualifiers are the same (in both instances of knowledge).

दि. प्रकारकत्वेनैव विरोधात् । समानविषयकत्वेन प्रतिबन्धकत्वेऽप्याह अस्तु वा इति । तस्य सहचाराग्रहस्य । तस्य स्वरूपसत एव विरोधित्वेन तज्ज्ञानस्यानुमित्यनुत्पादप्रयोजकत्वाभावादिति भावः । न च तत्र सहचाराग्रहप्रयोजकः संशय एव हेत्वाभासः, तस्यापि स्वरूपसत एव विरोधित्वात् । न च संशयविषयस्य साध्याभावविशिष्टपक्षादेरेव तत्राभासत्वमिति वाच्यम् । सर्वमभिधेयमित्यादावभिधेत्वाभावविशिष्टपक्षाप्रसिद्धेरित्यन्यत्र विस्तरः ।

D. This is the idea. Even if hindrance occurs only when the objects are the same (in both instances of knowledge, there is no fallacy) and so (the author) says **or let there be** (*astu vā iti*). **For it** (*tasya*) (means) of non-apprehension of co-occurrence. Since it hinders (inferential knowledge) by itself, the knowledge of it is not the cause of the non-origin of inferential knowledge. This is the idea. Nor can it be argued that the doubt which is the cause of the non-apprehension of co-occurrence is itself the fallacy because it also is a hindering factor by its mere existence. Nor can it be argued that the object of doubt viz. the subject and so on qualified by the absence of that which is to be established is fallacy because the subject which is qualified by the absence of nameability with reference (to inferences such as) everything is nameable is not established. This is discussed in detail in other places.

Commentary

(p.390, lns 4–10; p.392, lns 3–4) Now the author describes the various fallacies according to the old Naiyāyikas. First of all he discusses the various kinds of Deviation. The first type of Deviation is called Common. That reason which exists in that which has *sādhya* and in that which is different from that which has the *sādhya* is Common. Here to avoid overextension in the fallacy of Opposition the expression 'to exist in that which is different from that which has *sādhya*' is used in the definition. M. points out that 'that which exists in that which is different from that which has the *sādhya*' is a sufficient definition of the fallacy of Common. But the fallacy of Opposition also has the

characteristic of the fallacy of Common, still that which causes the fallacy in both is different. Therefore the fallacy of Common is different from the fallacy of Opposition. The idea here is that the fallacy of Common is a hindering factor for the knowledge of invariable concomitance (*avyabhicāra*) (i.e. deviation in the form of *sādhyābhāvavadvṛttitvam* prevents the invariable concomitance in the form of *sādhyābhāvavadavṛttitvam*), whereas the fallacy of Opposition is a hindering factor for the knowledge of coexistence of the reason with the *sādhya* (*sādhyasāmānādhikaraṇya*) (i.e. Opposition in the form *sādhyābhāvavyāpyavān pakṣaḥ* is hindering factor for invariable concomitance in the form *sādhya-sāmānādhikaraṇyam*).

(p.390, ln 5; p.391, lns 1–6; p.392, lns 4–7) The reason which does not exist in both (*sapakṣa* and *vipakṣa*) is considered as the fallacy of Uncommon. Here it should be noted that the *sapakṣa* which is a part of the definition of the fallacy of Uncommon should be understood as that which has the definite existence of *sādhya* and not merely the existence of the *sādhya*. This is because in the case of the fallacy of Uncommon the existence of *sādhya* in the subject is already known at least as object of doubt. Therefore where the definite existence of *sādhya* is known there is no fallacy of Uncommon.

An example of the fallacy of Uncommon is now given. Sound is not eternal because it has soundness: when there is doubt of eternity in sound then the *sapakṣas* are jar and so on and soundeness does not exist in these *sapakṣas* and therefore the reason, soundness, has the fallacy of Uncommon. But if there is the certainty of eternity in sound then there is no such fallacy. This is the opinion of the old Naiyāyikas. According to the modern Naiyāyikas the fallacy of Uncommon is the reason which does not exist along with that which is to be established.

Here Parīkṣit Thampurān discusses (S., p.175, ln 20ff) the idea of the old Naiyāyikas. According to them the knowledge of the characteristics which are coexistent with the two alternatives of the *sādhya* and the absence of the *sādhya* and the knowledge of the characteristics which are not coexistent with the *sādhya*

and the absence of the *sādhya* are the causes of the doubt of the *sādhya*. Further in *Kārikā* 130 it is stated that the knowledge of the common characteristics (or extraordinary characteristics, *asādhāraṇadharmajñānam*) is the cause of doubt and such a doubt hinders the definite knowledge of the *sādhya*. Hence the knowledge of the fallacy of Common is hindering factor for the inferential knowledge because it is included in the causal complex of doubt. According to the opinion of these old Naiyāyikas occurrence in that which has the absence of *sādhya* is only Unestablishedness of invariable concomitance (*vyāpyatvāsiddhi*) and not the fallacy of Deviation in the form of Common. According to the modern Naiyāyikas doubt is not a hindering factor for definite knowledge; in the view of the old Naiyāyikas subjectness in the form of doubt is the cause of inferential knowledge. And therefore the knowledge of common characteristic cannot constitute the causal complex for the hindrance of the inferential knowledge.

(p.390, ln 6; p.391, ln 6 – p.392, ln 2; p.393, ln 1 – p.395, ln 6) Now the authors discuss the fallacy of Inconclusive reason according to the old Naiyāyikas. K. states that the fallacy of Inconclusive reason occcurs where the subject is only affirmative. As for example when it is inferred that all things are nameable because they are knowable everything is taken as subject. Therefore there is no place where the knowledge of co-occurrence of the reason with the *sādhya* can be grasped. Hence no inferential knowledge arises.

This opinion of the old Naiyāyikas may be further explained as follows: it may be objected against the old Naiyāyikas that in the case of the inference 'everything is nameable because it is knowable', when there is the certainty of the *sādhya* and the desire to establish the *sādhya* the definite inferential knowledge of *sādhya* arises. Therefore the knowledge of invariable concomitance is also possible. Hence this is a valid reason and so it is not the object of definition of the fallacy, even though the subject which is qualified by the absence of certainty qualified by the absence of desire to establish is only (*siṣādhayiṣāvirahaviśiṣṭa-siddhyabhāva*) affirmative.

This objection is answered by Dinakara poiniting out that the subjectness is to be understood in the form of doubt. This

means that there is no certainty of *sādhya* anywhere. Hence there is no knowledge of invariable concomitance. Therefore it is mentioned as the fallacy of Incounclusive reason.

Further Rāmarudra mentions that in K. the word 'subject' is to be understood in the sense of subjectness. Otherwise in the inference 'the absolute absence of ether is eternal because it is different from prior absence and destruction' there will be the fallacy of Inconclusiveness. This is unacceptable since it is accepted in gneral that there is no fallacy of Inconclusiveness in such an inference because the subjectness is not *kevalānvayī*.[1] But if the subject is taken in the sense of subjectness there will not be the fault of Inconclusiveness. This is because subjectness here is understood in the form of the doubt of *sādhya* and such a doubt is not present everywhere. Therefore there is no fault of Inconclusiveness.

Now as Rāmarudra has pointed out it may be objected that doubt is not a hindering factor for definite knowledge, since after doubt we have definite knowledge, as for instance, after the doubt whether there is fire in the mountain we have the definite knowledge of fire. Therefore even if there is the doubt of *sādhya* everywhere there could be afterwards at least in some places the definite knowledge of *sādhya* and so there could be the definite knowledge of the co-occurrence of the reason with the *sādhya*.

This objection is answered by Dinakara by poiniting out that in order to prevent the definite knowledge at the moment of the origin of doubt we should necessarily accept that the causal complex of doubt as the hindering factor for the definite knowledge. Thus in the present instance of inference there is everywhere the doubt of *sādhya* (*abhidheyatva*, nameability). Therefore there is the causal complex of doubt before it. Hence there would be nowhere the definite knowledge of *sādhya*. So there will not also arise the knowledge of invariable concomitance in the form that knowability qualified by co-occurrence with the *sādhya* (nameability) which is the pervader of the reason (knowability).

[1] Here it may be noted that *ākāśātyantābhāva* is *kevalānvayī* since *ākāśa* does not exist anywhere, but *ākāśātyantābhāvatva* which is here *pakṣatva* is not *kevalānvayī* because *ākāśātyantābhāvatva* exists only in *ākāśatyantābhāva*.

This position cannot be accepted because even if there is the knowledge of invariable concomitance in one instance of the subject there is the fallacy of Inconclusiveness. This fallacy is in the form of the state of having subjectness which is only affirmative. Therefore there is the possibility of the fallacy of Inconclusiveness because even when there is the definite knowledge of *sādhya* in one instance of the subject, still there is the possibility of doubt whether all instances of the subject have the *sādhya*, viz. nameability. This is because there is no definite knowledge of the *sādhya* in all instances of the subject. Thus there is Inconclusiveness but since it does not prevent knowledge of invariable concomitance it cannot be accepted as a fallacy.

A further objection may be raised: if there is the causal complex of doubt whether all instances of the subject have *sādhya* how can there be definite knowledge of *sādhya* in one instance of the subject? The answer to this objection is that even if one doubts whether all instances of the subject have *sādhya* still there is no contradiction to have the certainty of *sādhya* in one instance of the subject. This is because one instance of knowledge prevents another instance of knowledge only when the qualifiers in both instances of knowledge are the same.

Now it may be pointed out that one instance of knowledge prevents another instance of knowledge even when the qualificands in both instances of knowledge are the same. And therefore it is stated that when there is the causal complex of doubt with reference to all instances of subject definite knowledge does not arise with reference to one instance of the subject. As for example when there is doubt whether everything is nameable or not there cannot arise the definite knowledge that jar is nameable. The reason is that jar is also one of the qualificands.

Therefore Muktāvalīkāra states his final opinion: even if there is no possibility of knowledge of invariable concomitance because of the reason mentioned, still there will not be any fallacy but only absence of the knowledge of the invariable concomitance. This is because the absence of the knowledge of the invariable concomitance in itself is the hindering factor for inferential knowledge. The knowledge of the absence of the

knowledge of invariable concomitance is not the hindering factor for inferential knowledge. Therefore the absence of the knowledge of the invariable concomitance is not considered as the fallacy of reason.

Nor can it be further argued that the doubt which is the cause of the absence of the knowledge of invariable concomitance may be considered as the fallacy of reason. This is because doubt also is in itself a hindering factor for inferential knowledge and not the knowledge of doubt.

Furhter it may be argued that the subject qualified by the absence of *sādhya* which is the object of doubt may be considered as the fallacy of reason. This also is not correct, because in the instance 'everything is nameable' the subject qualified by the absence of nameability is not established.

It may further be objected that in the instance 'everything is nameable' the subject qualified by the absence of *sādhya* is not established but the *sādhya* etc. which is the object of doubt may be considered as the fallacy of reason. This is not correct, because in the valid reason 'mountain has fire because of smoke' in order to avoid overextension of the definition of fallacy it is necessary to define fallacy as the state of having the object which is determined by a particular characteristic and which does not exist where the state of being hindering factor of inferential knowledge does not exist. That thing which is determined by a particular characteristic is fallacy. But the state of having *sādhya* as object exists in the knowledge of mere *sādhya* where the state of being hindering factor for inferential knowledge does not exist. Therefore there is no overextension of the definition of fallacy. In this way *sādhya* which is the object of doubt cannot be a fallacy.

For these reasons according to Muktāvalīkāra the fallacy of Inconclusiveness is the state of having only a mere affirmative *sādhya* in the inference. This is because the invariable concomitance cannot be grasped in anything other than the subject.

Text 12

Fallacy of Opposite Reason (According to Old Naiyāyikas)

का. यः साध्यवति नैवास्ति स विरुद्ध उदाहृतः ॥ ७४cd ॥

मु. यः साध्यवति इति । एवकारेण साध्यवत्त्वावच्छेदेन हेत्व-
भावो बोधितः, तथा च साध्यव्यापकीभूताभावप्रतियोगित्वं तदर्थः ।

दि. तदर्थः इति । तेनासाधारणे नातिव्याप्तिरिति भावः ।

K. That which never exists in that which has that which is to be established is called Opposite (reason). (*Kārikā* 74cd)

M. By the particle *eva* (indeed) the absence of the reason as determined by the state of having that which is to be established is conveyed. Therefore the meaning is the state of being counter-positive of the absence which is the pervader of that which is to be established.

D. Its meaning (*tadarthaḥ iti*). Therefore there is no over-extension in (the fallacy of) Uncommon. This is the idea.

Commentary

Now the author discusses the fallacy of Opposition. That which never exists in that which has the *sādhya* is called the fallacy of Opposition. This means that wherever the *sādhya* exists there is the absence of reason. Therefore the definition of Opposition is the state of being the counterpositive of the absence which is the pervader of *sādhya*. As for example in the inference 'the hill is fiery because of water;' wherever there is fire there is the absence of water. Here water is the fallacy of Opposition. In this way there is also no overextension in the fallacy of Uncommon deviation since in the case of Uncommon reason wherever there is the *sādhya* there is no absence of reason as for example in the inference 'sound is eternal because of soundness'.

Text 13

Fallacy of Unestablishedness of Reason (According to Old Naiyāyikas)

का. आश्रयासिद्धिराद्या स्यात् स्वरूपासिद्धिरप्यथ ।
व्याप्यत्वासिद्धिरपरा स्यादसिद्धिरतस्त्रिधा ॥ ७५ ॥

पक्षासिद्धिर्यत्र पक्षो भवेन्मणिमयो गिरिः ।
ह्रदो द्रव्यं धूमवत्त्वादत्रासिद्धिरथापरा ॥ ७६ ॥

व्याप्यत्वासिद्धिरपरा नीलधूमादिके भवेत् ॥ ७७ ab ॥

मु. असिद्धिं विभजते आश्रयासिद्धिः इत्यादि । पक्षासिद्धिः इति । आश्रयासिद्धिरित्यर्थः । अपरा इति । स्वरूपासिद्धिरित्यर्थः । नील-

K. The first is Unestablishedness of the substratum; the second is Unestablishedness of nature; the other is Unestablishedness of invariable concomitance; therefore Unestablishedness is of three kinds. Unestablishedness of the subject occurs where (for instance) the subject is a mountain of jewels. Then the second instance of Unestablishedness occurs in (such examples as) 'lake is a substance because it has smoke'. Unestablishedness of invariable concomitance is the other where blue smoke and so on are (the reasons). (*Kārikās* 75,76 and 77ab)

M. (The author) divides Unestablishedness with the words **Unestablishedness of substratum** etc. (*āsrayāsiddhirityādi*). **Unestablishedness of the subject** (*pakṣāsiddhiriti*). The meaning is Unestablishedness of the substratum. **The second instance** (*aparā*) means Unestablishedness of nature. **Where blue smoke**

मु. धूमादिके इति । नीलधूमत्वादिकं गुरुतया न हेतुतावच्छेदकं स्वसमानाधिकरणव्याप्यतावच्छेदकधर्मान्तराघटितस्यैव व्याप्यतावच्छेदकत्वात् । धूमप्रागभावत्वसंग्रहाय स्वसमानाधिकरणेति ।

दि. धूमप्रागभावत्वेति । तस्य व्याप्यतावच्छेदकीभूतधूमत्वघटितत्वेन तत्संग्रहो न स्यादिति भावः । स्वस्य स्वाविषयकप्रतीतिविषयत्वरूपस्वाघटितत्वाभावाद्धर्मान्तरेति । न च नीलधूमत्वस्यापि तादृशधर्मान्तराघटितत्वमस्त्येव धूमत्वस्य नीलधूमत्वभिन्नत्वाभावादिति वाच्यम् । स्वाविषयक-

M. and so on are (the reasons) (*nīladhūmatvādike iti*). The state of being blue smoke and so on are not the determinants of the state of being reason because of cumbersomeness owing to the fact that the determinant of the state of being pervaded is accepted as that which is not constituted by another characteristic which is the determinant of the state of being pervaded and which is co-occurrent with itself. In order to include the state of being prior absence of smoke the expression 'co-occurrent with itself' is used.

D. The state of being prior absence of smoke (*dhūmaprāgabhāvatveti*). That (viz. the state of being prior absence of smoke) is constituted by smokeness which is the determinant of the state of being pervaded; therefore it would not be included (as the determinant of the state of being pervaded). This is the idea.

(In order to avoid the fault of too narrow application in that particular thing) the expression 'another characteristic' is used because there is the absence of the state of being not constituted by a particular characteristic which (i.e. the state of being not constitituted) is in the form of the state of being the object of the knowledge which does not have that particular thing as its object. Nor can it be argued that the state of being blue smoke is not constituted by another such characteristic because smokeness is not different from blue smokeness. This is because the meaning of the state of being the object of the

दि. प्रतीतिविषयत्वस्य स्वपर्याप्तावच्छेदकतानिरूपकप्रकारतानिरूपिताव-च्छेदकतापर्याप्त्यनधिकरणत्वपर्यवसितस्य तदर्थत्वात् शुद्धधूमत्वपर्याप्ताव-च्छेदकताकप्रकारत्वनीलत्वादिविशिष्टधूमत्वपर्याप्तावच्छेदकताकप्रकारत्वयो-र्भेदात् । नन्वेवं वह्निमदन्यावृत्तित्वस्य वह्निव्याप्यतावच्छेदकतानुपपत्तिस्तस्य वह्नित्वरूपतादृशधर्मान्तरघटितत्वात् । धूमान्यान्यत्वादेर्व्याप्यतावच्छेदक-त्वापत्तिभिया धर्मान्तरस्य विशेष्यविधयाघटकत्वविवक्षणस्याशक्यत्वादिति चेन्न । स्वसमानाधिकरणपदेन स्वव्यापकस्य विवक्षितत्वात् वह्नित्वस्य

D. knowledge the object of which is not that particular thing, is the state of being non-substratum by the relation of collective extensity of the state of being determinant indicated by qualifierness which is the indicator of the state of being the determinant existing in that particular thing by the relation of collective extensity. Therefore there is difference between the qualifierness which is the indicator of the state of being determinant existing in pure smokeness by the relation of collective extensity and qualifierness which is the indicator of the state of being determinant existing by the relation of collective extensity in smokeness qualified by blueness. Now it may be objected that in this way occurrence in the thing which is different from the substratum of fire would not be the determinant of the state of being pervaded by fire. This is because it is constituted by fireness which is a characteristic different from it. (Therefore in order to avoid this possiblity) it is also not possible to consider the state of being not constituted by another characteristic in the capacity of a qualificand owing to the fear that the state of being different from that which is different from smoke would be the determinant of the state of being pervaded by fire.

This cannot be admitted because by the expression that 'something is coexistent with another' is to be understood as the pervader of that thing. Hence fireness is not the pervader of the occurrence in the substratum which is not the substratum of fire

दि. वह्निमदन्यावृत्तित्वाव्यापकत्वाद्धूमत्वस्य धूमान्यान्यत्वव्यापकत्वाच्चोक्त-दोषासंभवात् । स्वव्यापकत्वं च धर्मान्तरस्य स्वघटकसाध्यसम्बन्धिता-वच्छेदकत्वेन, अन्यथा धूमालोकान्यतरत्वस्य वह्निव्याप्यतावच्छेदकत्वापत्तेः धूमात्वालोकत्वयोः प्रत्येकमन्यतरत्वाव्यापकत्वादिति ।

D. and smokeness is the pervader of the state of being different from that which is different from smoke. Therefore the fault which was mentioned does not exist there. The state of being pervader of a particular characteristic in another characteristic which is a constitutent part of that (should be understood) in the form of the state of being determinant of the state of being related with that which is to be established; otherwise the state of being one or the other, viz. smoke or light, would be the determinant of the state of being pervaded by fire, because smokeness or lightness individually is not the pervader of the state of being one or the other.

Commentary

Now the fallacy of Unestablishedness is being discussed. This fallacy is of three kinds: Unestablishedness of the substratum, Unestablishedness of nature (of the reason) and Unestablishedness of invariable concomitance. When the subject is non-existent the fallacy is Unestablishedness of the subject as for instance 'the golden mountain has fire'. Since the subject, golden mountain, does not exist the reason has the fallacy of Unestablishedness of the subject. The second kind of the fallacy of Unestablishedness is Unestablishedness of nature. This occurs when the reason does not exist in the subject, as for example 'the lake is a substance because it has smoke'. Here smoke does not exist in the lake and so the reason has the fallacy of Unestablishedness of nature.

The third kind of the fallacy of Unestablishedness is Unestablishedness of invariable concomitance. This fallacy occurs when such reasons as blue smoke is used, as for instance in the inference 'mountain has fire because of blue smoke'. Blue

smokeness is not the determinant of the state of being reason because of cumbersomeness. The reason for this is that the determinant of the state of being pervaded is accepted as something not constituted by another characteristic as the determinant of the state of being pervaded. Further this characteristic (*dhūmatva*) is understood as co-occurrent with the determinant of the state of being pervaded (viz. *nīladhūmatva*). In less technical terms this means that when blue smoke is used as reason blue smokeness is the determinant of the state of being pervaded. This blue smokeness includes another characteristic viz. smokeness which itself is the determinant of the state of being the reason. And this is fallacious. The expression 'co-occurrence' is used in order to avoid the overextension in such valid reason as the prior absence of smoke.[1] This is because the state of being prior absence of smoke includes also smokeness, another determinant of the state of being pervaded. Hence the state of being prior absence of smoke would not be the determinant of the state of being pervaded. In order to include this viz. the state of being prior absence of smoke also as the determinant of the state of being pervaded the expression 'co-occurrent with itself is used, and smokeness is not co-occurrent with the state of being prior absence of smoke.

The expression 'another characteristic' is used in order to avoid the fault of too narrow application of the definition of the state of being pervaded in the determinant of the state of being pervaded itself. This too narrow application occurs because the state of being not constituted by itself is accepted as the state of being the object of the knowledge which does not have that particular thing itself as its object. Such a state of being not constituted by itself does not exist in the determinant of the

[1] The inference 'mountain has fire because it has the prior absence of smoke' is valid. The prior absence of smoke is a valid reason, because the prior absence is grasped at the moment of the production of the effect. Thus the prior absence of smoke is grasped only at the first moment of the origin of smoke since the causal complex of smoke is present. It may be noted here that the prior absence is beginningless but it is grasped when there is the causal complex of the effect in question, just as the universal cowness exists without beginning but is perceived in an individual cow.

state of being pervaded. As for example, smokeness is the determinant of the state of being pervaded and smokeness is also the object of the knowledge of smokeness. Therefore it does not have the state of being the object of the knowledge which does not have smokeness as the object. Therefore smokeness being the determinant of being pervaded is constituted by itself. Hence there is the absence of the state of being not constituted by itself. Therefore it cannot be taken as the determinant of the state of being pervaded. But when the expression 'another characteristic' is used then smokeness is not constituted by another characteristic. Hence there is no fault of too narrow application.

Now an objection may be raised: the state of being blue smoke also is not constituted by another characteristic which is the determinant of the state of being pervaded because smokeness is not different from blue smokeness. Therefore blue smokeness also is the determinant of the state of bieng pervaded. Therefore blue smoke does not have the fallacy of Unestablishedness of invariable concomitance and so it is a valid reason.

This objection is answered as follows: the expression 'another characteristic' means the state of being the object of the knowledge which does not have that particular thing as object (*svāviṣa-yakapratītiviṣayatvam*). This means collectively not being the substratum of the state of being the determinant indicated by that qualifierness which is the indicator of the state of being determinant which collectively exists in that particular thing.

In the present instance smokeness is taken as another characteristic. Smokeness is the object of the knowledge of smoke and such a knowledge obviously does not have blue smokeness also as its object. This is because smokeness is not collectively the substratum of the state of being the determinant indicated by the qualifierness which is the indicator of the state of being the determinant existing collectively in smokeness qualified by blueness. The reason is that though there is no difference between smokeness and blue smokeness the qulaifierness which exists in blue smokeness is different from the qualifierness which exists in smokeness. This is because the qualifierness which exists in blue smokeness is the indicator of the determinant which

exists in blueness and smokeness, whereas the qualifierness which exists in smokeness is the indicator of the determinant which exists collectively only in smokeness. This is the reason why blue smokeness is different from smokeness.[1]

Now a furher objection may be made: take the inference 'mountain has fire because it has that thing which does not exist in that which is different from fire.' Here the state of being non-occurrent in that which is different from the substratum of fire cannot be the determinant of the state of being pervaded because the state of being non-occurrent in that which is different from the substratum of fire is constituted by fireness which is also another determinant of the state of being pervaded. Therefore the state of being non-occurrent in that which is different from the substratum of fire which is the determinant of the state of being pervaded is not non-constituted by another characteristic. Therefore there is the fault of too narrow application of the determinant of the state of being pervaded. In order to avoid this fault of too narrow application if the expression 'non-constituted by' is understood as 'not constituted by the thing which is in the form of the qualificand, then the state of being different from the thing which is different from smoke would also become the determinant of the state of being pervaded, though smokeness in this case is the determinant of the state of being pervaded still it is not in the form of the qualificand. Hence the state of being different from that which is different from smoke is not constitituted by any other characteristic which is in the form of

[1] Here Parīkṣit Thampurān notes (S.,176, ln 20ff) that *svāviṣayapratītiviṣayatvam* can be explained as *svaparyāptyavacchedkatāparyāptyanadhikaraṇatvam.* Instead of this D. mentions *svaparyāptyavacchedakatānirūpakaprakāratānirūpitāvacchedakatāparyāptyanadhikaraṇatvam.* The reason is that *nīladhūmatva* is a cumbersome property and so it cannot be *kāraṇatāvacchedaka* or *pratiyogitāvacchedaka,* but it can be *viṣayatāvacchedaka.* This is because *viṣayatā* is different according to the different instances of knowledge. Therefore a cumbersome property can also be *viṣayatāvacchedaka.* But *pratiyogitāvacchedaka* or *kāraṇatāvacchedaka* should be *laghudharma* because absence and cause do not differ when the same instance of absence is denoted by different names of its counterpositive or when the same cause is mentioned by different names.

the qualificand. And so it also would have to be considered as the determinant of the state of being pervaded.[1]

The answer to this objection is that the expression 'co-occurrent with itself (*svasamānādhikaraṇa*)' in the definition of the determinant of the state of being pervaded should be understood as pervader of itself (*svavyāpaka*). Therefore though fireness is the determinant of the state of being pervaded, it is not the pervader of the state of being non-occurrent in that which is different from the substratum of fire. This is because wherever there is the state of being non-occurrent in that which is different from the substratum of fire there is no fireness, as for example, the state of being non-occurrent in that which is different from the substratum of fire exists in light, smoke etc. but in them there is no fireness. But on the contrary smokeness the pervader of the state of being different from that which is different from smoke. Therefore there is no possibility of the fault of too narrow application in the state of being non-occurrent in that which is different from fire nor the fault of overextension in the state of being different from that which is different from smoke.

The state of being pervader of oneself in another characteristic is in the form of the determinant of the state of being pervaded by the *sādhya* which is a constitutive part of the determinant of the state of being pervaded. Otherwise the state of being either smoke or light also would be the determinant of the state of being pervaded by fire. This is because smokeness or lightness individually is not the pervader of the state of being either smoke or light. The reason is that wherever there is the state of being one or the other there is no state of being smokeness or lightness. When another characteristic is understood as the determinant of the state of being pervaded by *sādhya* then the state of being either smoke or light is not the determinant of the state of being pervaded by *sādhya*. Therefore the state of being

[1] *dhūmānyānyatvam* is not considered as *vahnivyāpyatāvacchedakam* because it is *gurudharma*. Only *dhūmatvam* is *vyāpyatāvacchedakam*. The idea behind this principle is that *vahnivyāpti* is grasped in *dhūma* by *dhūmatva* and not by *dhūmānyanyatva*.

either smoke or light cannot be considered as the determinant of the state of being pervaded by *sādhya*.[1]

[1] Here Parīkṣit Thampurān gives the reason (S.,177, ln 3ff) why there is no possibility of *vahnivyāpyatāvacchedakatā* in *dhūmālokānyataratva* when *vyāpakatva* is understood as *svaghaṭakasādhyavyāpyatāvacchedaka*. This is because in the substratum of *dhūmālokānyataratva* there is no absence of *svaghaṭakasādhya-saṃbandhitāvacchedaka*. *svaghaṭakasādhyasaṃbandhitāvacchedaka* is considered as *svavyāpyatāvacchedaka*, but *dhūmālokānyataratva* is constituted by *dhūmatva* which is *sādhyavyāpyatāvacchedaka*. Hence *anyataratva* cannot be considered as the determinant of the state of being pervaded.

In the expression *svaghaṭakasādhyasaṃbandhitāvacchedaka* the word *svaghaṭaka* is used to avoid overextension in *vahnitva* in such inferences as *parvato vahnimān vahnimadanyāvṛtteḥ*. If the word *svaghaṭaka* is not used then *dhūma* which is *vahnimadanyāvṛttii* is in all instances *sādhyasamban-dhitāvacchedaka*. Therefore *vahnitva* also will be pervader of *vahnimadanyā-vṛttiva*. When the expression *svaghaṭaka* is used then, though *dhūmatva* is considered as *sādhyasambandhitāvacchedaka* still it is not *ghaṭaka* of *vahni-madanyāvṛttitva*. Therefore there is no fault of overextension.

Text 14
Fallacy of Counterthesis
(According to Old Naiyāyikas)

का. विरुद्धयोः परामर्शे हेत्वोः सत्प्रतिपक्षता ॥७७ cd ॥

मु. विरुद्धयोः इति । कपिसंयोगतदभावव्याप्यवत्तापरामर्शेऽपि न सत्प्रतिपक्षत्वमत उक्तं 'विरुद्धयोः' इति । तथा च स्वसाध्य-विरुद्धसाध्याभावव्याप्यवत्तापरामर्शकालीनसाध्यव्याप्यवत्तापरा-मर्शविषय इत्यर्थः ।

दि. 'विरुद्धयोः परामर्शे हेत्वोः' इत्यत्र विरुद्धयोर्हेत्वोः परामर्श इति भ्रम-

K. The state of being Counterthesis happens when there is the consideration of two opposite reasons. (*Kārikā* 77cd)

M. Of two opposite (reasons) (*viruddhayoriti*). There is no state of being Counterthesis even when there is consideration of the state of having that which is pervaded by conjunction with a monkey and its absence. Therefore the mention of two opposite reasons (*viruddhayoriti*). In this way the meaning is that the object of consideration of the state of having that which is pervaded by that which is to be established at the moment of consideration of the state of having that which is pervaded by the absence of that which is to be established which is opposed to that which is to be established by its own reason.

D. In order to avoid the erroneous knowledge of consideration of two opposite reasons by the expression 'the consideration of two opposite reasons' (the author) says **that which is to be**

दि. वारणायाह स्वसाध्येति । स्वं सत्प्रतिपक्षत्वेनाभिमतो हेतुः तत्साध्यविरुद्धो यः साध्याभाव इत्यर्थः ।

D. established by its own reason (*svasādhyeti*). Its own reason (*svam*) means the reason which is accepted as the reason having Counterthesis, the absence of that which is to be established which is opposed to that which is to be established by that reason. This is the meaning.

Commentary

When there are two considerations of two opposite reasons there is the fallacy of Counterthesis. The expression 'opposite reasons' is used in order to avoid the possibility of the fallacy of Counterthesis in the case of considerations such as being pervaded by conjunction with a monkey and its absence. Here it may be noted that conjunction with a monkey in a tree has the characteristic of incomplete occurrence and therefore in this case conjunction with a monkey and its absence are not opposed. Therefore the considerations of the two opposite reasons should not be understood as the consideration of two opposite reasons but as the considerations of two reasons which establish at the same time the *sādhya* and its absence which are really opposed.[1]

It may further be noted that the expression 'consideration of two opposite reasons (*vruddhayoḥ hetvoḥ parāmarśe*)' is used in order to avoid the false cognition that it is a consideration of two opposite reasons like smoke and water when it is a question of establishing fire and its absence, and to point out that it is a question of considerations of two reasons which establish the *sādhya* and its absence. This erroneous cognition is rejected by

[1] Here Parīkṣit Thampurān (S., p.177, ln 18ff) points out, that by the expression '*viruddhayoḥ parāmarśe*' it is not accepted that there is only one consideration. Therefore the fallacy of Counterthesis is a characteristic of the reason which is brought forward to establish the *sādhya* and the fallacy of Counterthesis is not a characteristic of the reason which is brought forward which is used in the counter-inference.

the Muktāvalīkāra by the expression *svasādhyaviruddhasādhya-vyāpyavattāparāmarśa* i.e. consideration that reason is pervaded by the absence of *sādhya* which is opposed to the particular *sādhya*. If here the valid knowledge in the form of consideration is taken then there would not be the possibility of Counterthesis in the valid inference 'mountain has fire because of smoke' if at the same time there is the consideration that the mountain has stones which are pervaded by the absence of fire. Here this consideration is not a valid consideration because 'having stones' does not have the invariable concomitance of the absence of fire. But the old Naiyāyikas accept the fallacy of Counterthesis even in this case.

Text 15
Fallacy of Contradiction (According to Old Naiyāyikas)

का. साध्यशून्यो यत्र पक्षस्त्वसौ बाध उदाहृतः ।
उत्पत्तिकालीनघटे गन्धादिर्यत्र साध्यते ॥ ७८ ॥

मु. साध्यशून्यः इति । पक्षः पक्षतावच्छेदकविशिष्ट इत्यर्थः । तेन घटे गन्धसत्त्वेऽपि न क्षतिः । एवं मूलावच्छिन्नो वृक्षः कपि-संयोगीत्यत्रापि बोध्यम् । इति श्रीविश्वनाथपञ्चाननभट्टाचार्य-विरचितायां सिद्धान्तमुक्तावल्यामनुमानखण्डम् ॥

दि. ननु 'उत्पत्तिकालीनघटे' इत्यादिमूलोक्तमयुक्तं तत्र पक्षे घटे गन्ध शून्य-

K.Where the subject is bereft of that which is to be established (the fallacy) is Contradiction; as for example when smell and so on are established in the jar at the moment of its origination. (*Kārikā* 78)

M. Bereft of that which is to be established (*sādhyaśūnyaḥ iti*). **Subject** means that which is qualified by the determinant of subjectness. Therefore there is no harm even though there is smell in jar. Similarly it should be understood (that there is no fault) in the instance 'the tree determined by its root has conjunction with a monkey.'

Thus (ends) the chapter on Inference in the *Siddhāntamuktāvalī* written by Śri Viśvanātha Nyāyapañcānana Bhattācārya.

D. Now it may be objected that that which is mentioned in the primary text (with the expression) 'the jar at the time of its origin' etc. is not proper because jar which is the subject has the

दि. त्वाभावादत आह **पक्षतावच्छेदकेति** । कालस्येव देशस्यापि पक्षतावच्छेदकत्वे बाधसंभवात्तदप्रदर्शनेन मूलस्य न्यूनतां परिहर्तुमाह **एवं** इति । **बोध्यम्** इति । तत्र पक्षे वृक्षे संयोगसत्त्वेऽपि पक्षतावच्छेदक-मूलावच्छेदेन संयोगाभावादिति भावः ।

इति श्रीभारद्वाजकुलाम्बुधिपूर्णचन्द्रबालकृष्णभट्टात्मजमहादेवभट्टविरचिते
मुक्तावलीप्रकाशेऽनुमानखण्डं समाप्तम् ॥

D. absence of absence of smell. Therefore (the author) says **the determinant of subjectness** (*pakṣatāvacchedketi*). Since just as time, so also place is the determinant of subjectness, there is the possibility of contradiction. This is not mentioned in the primary text. In order to remove this deficiency (the author) says **thus** (*evam*). **It should be understood** (*bodhyamiti*). Here though there is conjunction in the tree which is the subject there is absence of conjunction determined by the root (of the tree) which is the determinant of the subjectness. This is the idea.

Thus (ends) the chapter on Inference in the *Muktāvalīprakāśa* written by Mahādeva Bhaṭṭa, son of Bālakṛṣṇa Bhaṭṭa who is the fullmoon of the ocean of the Bhāradvāja family.

Commentary

The fallacy of Contradiction occurs when the subject does not have that which is to be established. As for instance in the inference 'at the moment of its origination jar has smell.' The subject is to be understood as qualified by the determinant of subjectness. And therefore it cannot be objected that the jar which is the subject has the absence of the absence of smell, and so there is no fallacy of contradiction. By the expression 'at the moment of its origination' time is also considered as the determinant of subjectness. And in the subject so qualified by the determinant of time there is no smell and so there is no

fallacy of Contradiction. Similarly space is also considered as the determinant of the subjectness. And so there is the fallacy of Contradiction in the inference 'the tree determined by its root has conjunction with a monkey.' This is because, although the tree has conjunction with a monkey the subject as qualified by the determinant of subjectness, viz. root, does not have conjunction with a monkey. Hence there is no fallacy of Contradiction.

Now an objection may be raised as follows: the fallacy of Contradiction is accepted as the absence of *sādhya* in the subject and such an absence should not be determined by any characteristic. But the absence of smell in the jar is determined by the moment of its origination. Therefore there is no absence of smell in the jar which is not determined by any characteristic. And therefore there is no fallacy of Contradiction.

The answer to this objection is that when the subject is qualified by the determinant of subjectness the state of being superstratum in the absence of smell indicated by the jar which is qualified by the time of its origination, is not determined by any characteristic. Therefore the subject qualified by the moment of its origination has the absence of smell. And this is the fallacy of Contradiction.

The objection may be raised in another way: the fallacy of Contradiction is accepted as the subject which has the absence of *sādhya* which (absence) is not co-occurrent with its counterpositive (*pratiyogivyadhikaraṇa*). Now the absence of smell in jar is not *pratiyogivyadhikaraṇa*. Therefore there cannot be the fallacy of Contradiction here.

The answer to this objection is that here the subject is taken as qualified by the determinant of subjectness, and here space and time are considered as determinants of subjectness. Therefore the absence of *sādhya* determined by the determinant of subjectness is also accepted as the fallacy of Contradiction. Since such an absence of *sādhya* exists here there is also the fallacy of Contradiction in the present instance.

In conclusion it may be noted here that Muktāvalīkāra gives as an example of Contradiction 'the jar qualified by the moment of its origination has smell because it has earthness.' This is

because this inference is an example of the fallacy of Contradiction without any admixture of any other fallacies such as the fallacy of Unestablishedness of nature or Deviation. In such inferences as 'the lake has fire because of smoke' there is also the fallacy of Unestablishedness of nature besides the fallacy of Contradiction.

Here Parīkṣit Thampurān (S.,p.178, ln 3ff) gives another reason why the inference 'lake has fire because of smoke' is not given as an example of fallacy of Contrdiction. Muktāvalīkāra takes the subject as qualified by the determinant of subjectness. Such an explanation would not be required if the inference 'lake has fire because of smoke' is taken as an example for the fallacy of Contradiction. Therefore in keeping with the explanation that the subject is to be understood as determined by subjectness Muktāvalīkāra has given as example of Contradiction the inference 'jar which is qualified by the moment of its origination has smell, because it has earthness'.

IV. Appendix

Text 16 A

Means of Grasping Invariable Concomitance

का. व्यभिचारस्याग्रहोऽपि सहचारग्रहस्तथा ।
हेतुर्व्याप्तिग्रहे तर्कः क्वचिच्छङ्कानिवर्तकः ॥ १३७ ॥

मु. पूर्वं व्याप्तिरुक्ता तद्ग्रहोपायस्तु न दर्शित इत्यतस्तं दर्शयति **व्यभिचारेति** । व्यभिचाराग्रहः सहचारग्रहश्च व्याप्तिग्रहे कारणमित्यर्थः। व्यभिचारग्रहस्य व्याप्तिग्रहे प्रतिबन्धकत्वात्तदभावः कारणम्। एवमन्वयव्यतिरेकाभ्यां सहचारग्रहस्यापि हेतुता । भूयोदर्शनं तु न कारणं व्यभिचारास्फूर्त्तौ सकृद्दर्शनेऽपि क्वचिद्व्याप्तिग्रहात्, क्वचिद्व्यभिचारशङ्काविधूननद्वारा भूयोदर्शनमुपयुज्यते । यत्र तु भूयो

K. Non-apprehension of deviation and likewise apprehension of coexistence is the cause of cognition of invariable concomitance. In some cases hypothetical reasoning prevents the doubt (of deviation). (*Kārikā* 137)

M. Earlier, invariable concomitance has been explained but the means of cognizing it has not been shown. Therefore, (the author) shows it (with the words) **deviation** (*vyabhicareti*). Non apprehension of deviation and apprehension of coexistence is the cause of the knowledge of invariable concomitance. This is the meaning. Since the apprehension of deviation is a hindrance for the knowledge of invariable concomitance, its absence is the cause. Likewise, the apprehension of coexistence through agreement and disagreement is also the cause. But repeated perception is not the cause because, when there is no knowledge of deviation, there is in some cases the apprehension of invariable concomitance.

मु. दर्शनादपि शङ्का नापैति तत्र विपक्षे बाधकस्तर्कोऽपेक्षितः। तथा हि वह्निविरहिण्यपि धूमः स्यादिति यद्याशङ्का भवति तदा सा वह्निधूमयोः कार्यकारणभावस्य प्रतिसन्धानान्निवर्त्तते यद्ययं वह्निमान्न स्यात्तदा धूमवान्न स्यात्,कारणं विना कार्यानुत्पत्तेः। यदि च क्वचिद्वह्निं विनापि धूमो भविष्यति अहेतुक एव वा भविष्यतीति तत्राप्याशङ्का भवेत् तदा सा स्वक्रियाव्याघातादपसारणीया। यदि हि कारणं विना कार्यं स्यात्तदा धूमार्थं वह्नेस्तृप्त्यर्थं भोजनस्य वा नियमत उपादानं तवैव न स्यादिति। यत्र स्वत एव शङ्का नावतरति तत्र न तर्कापेक्षापीति तदिदमुक्तं 'तर्कः क्वचिच्छङ्कानिवर्तकः' इति।

M. even where there is perception only once. In some cases the repeated perception is helpful through the elimination of doubt (of deviation). But where even through repeated perception the doubt (of deviation) is not eliminated, there hypothetical reasoning which contradicts (the knowledge of the existence of *sādhya*) in the definite contradicted subject is required. As for instance if there arises the doubt that there may be smoke even in a place bereft of fire, there that doubt ceases to exist because of the knowledge of the relation of cause and effect between fire and smoke in the form 'if this has no fire it will not have smoke, because without the cause the effect will not arise'. If in some cases there is doubt that even without fire smoke will arise or it will arise without any cause, then that doubt is to be eliminated because of the contradiction to one's own action. If there would be an effect without a cause then you also will not necessarily seek fire for obtaining smoke or seek food for obtaining satisfaction (from hunger). Where doubt does not originate by itself, then there is no need for hypothetical reasoning. Therefore it is said, 'hypothetical reasoning removes doubt (of deviation) in certain cases'.

दि. ननु प्रामाण्यमनुमानगम्यं तदा भवेद्यद्यनुमानं प्रमाणं भवेत्तदेव न संभवति व्याप्तेर्ग्राहकाभावेनाज्ञानादित्यतः प्रामाण्यानुमितिप्रयोजकतया 'व्यभिचारस्याग्रहोऽपि सहचारग्रहस्तथा' इति मूलेन व्याप्तिग्रहोपायो दर्श्यते, स चायुक्तः स्वकारणीभूतव्याप्तिस्वरूपज्ञानाभावादित्यत आह **पूर्वं व्याप्ति-रुक्ता** इति । व्यभिचाराग्रहस्य व्याप्तिग्राहकतामुपपादयति **व्यभिचार-ग्रहस्य** इति । सहचारग्रहस्य तामुपापदयति **एवं** इति । भूयोदर्शनस्य कारणत्वं खण्डयति **भूयोदर्शनं तु** इति । व्यतिरेकव्यभिचारमाह **सकृद्दर्शनेऽपि** इति । भूयोदर्शनस्याहेतुत्वेऽपि क्वचित्प्रयोजकतया तदादर

D. It may be objected: validity (of knowledge) is to be known through inference if inference is a proper means of valid knowledge. This is not at all possible, because there is no apprehension of invariable concomitance owing to the absence of the means of cognizing it. Therefore, by the basic text 'non apprehension of deviation and likewise apprehension of co-existence' the means of knowing the concomitance is shown as the cause of inferential knowledge of validity. This is not proper because of the absence of knowledge of the nature of invariable concomitance which is its (i.e. of inferential knowledge) cause. Therefore, (the author) says **earlier invariable concomitance has been explained** (*pūrvaṃ vyāptiruktā iti*). (With the words) **apprehension of deviation** (*vyabhicāragrahsya iti*) (the author) explains the non-apprehension of deviation as bringing about the knowledge of invariable concomitance. (With the words) **likewise** (*evam iti*) (the author) explains how the apprehension of coexistence brings about (the knowledge of invariable concomitance). By (the words) **but repeated perception** (*bhūyodarśanaṃ tviti)* (the author) refutes the causality of repeated perception. By (the words) **even where there is perception only once** (*sakṛddarśane api iti*) (the author) points out the negative deviation. Although repeated perception is not a cause (of the knowledge of invariable concomitance) in some cases it is useful and so it is also taken into account.

दि. इत्याह **क्वचित्** इति । **तर्कोऽपेक्षितः** इति । शङ्कापनयनार्थं तर्कोऽपेक्षित इत्यर्थः । तद्दर्शयति **तथा हि** इत्यादिना । **यद्ययं** इति । **अयं** धूमवान् पर्वतः । **कारणं विना** इति । तथा च धूमो वह्निव्यभिचारी स्याद्वह्निजन्यो न स्यादिति तर्काकारो बोध्यः । यथाश्रुते वह्निमान्न स्याद् धूमवान्नस्यादिति तर्कस्य विषयपरिशोधकस्य व्याप्तिग्रहानौपयिकतयासङ्गतेः । **तत्रापि** तादृशतर्क-कारणीभूतकार्यकारणभावग्रहेऽपि । **आशङ्का भवेत्** आशङ्का प्रतिबन्धिका भवेत् । व्याघातमेव दर्शयति **यदि हि** इत्यादिना । ननु तर्कप्रत्यापाद्य-व्याप्यापादकवत्ताज्ञानं कारणं, तत्र व्याप्तिज्ञानप्रतिबन्धकव्यभिचारशङ्का-निवर्त्तकस्तर्कोऽपेक्षितः, एवमग्रेऽपीत्यनवस्थेत्यत आह **यत्र** इति ।

D. Therefore (the author) says **in some cases** (*kvacit* iti). **Hypothetical reasoning is required** (*tarko'pekṣitaḥ iti*) means hypothetical reasoning is required in order to remove doubt. (The author) shows this (with the words) **as for instance** etc. (*tathā hi ityâdinā*). **If this** (*yadyayam iti*) , 'this' means the mountain which has smoke. **Without cause** (*kāraṇaṃ vinā iti*). Therefore the hypothetical reasoning is to be understood in the form 'if smoke deviates from fire then it cannot be produced by fire'. If understood as mentioned (in M.), the hypothetical reasoning 'if it has no fire it will not have smoke' will only establish the existence of the objects alone and so it will be irrelevant as it is not useful for the knowledge of invariable concomitance. **Even there** (*tatrāpi*) means even where there is the knowledge of the cause-effect relation which is the cause of such hypothetical reasoning. **There would be doubt** (*āśaṅkā bhavet*) means the doubt will be the hindering factor. With (the expression) **if etc.** (*yadi hi ityādinā*) (the author) shows the contradiction.

It may be objected that the cause of the hypothetical reasoning is the knowledge of that which has that which causes imposition which is pervaded by that which is imposed. There the hypothetical reasoning which removes the doubt of deviation which hinders the knowledge of invariable concomitance is needed. In this way there would be infinite regress further also. Therefore (the author) says **where** (*yatra iti*).

दि. स्वत एव शङ्कासामग्रीविरहादेव । न तर्कापेक्षेत्यनन्तरमतो नानवस्थेति शेषः । ननु तर्कस्य न व्यभिचारशङ्कानिवर्तकत्वं तर्ककारणीभूतव्याप्तिज्ञानेनैव तन्निवृत्तेः संभवादिति चेत् । अत्र केचित् । अनाहार्यशङ्कायास्तर्ककारणीभूतव्याप्तिज्ञानेन निराससंभवेऽप्याहार्यशङ्कायास्ततो निवृत्तिर्न संभवति, आहार्यज्ञानस्य तदप्रतिबध्यत्वात्, किं तु तर्केणैव । तथा हि अनिष्टप्रसंजनात्मकेन तर्केणापादकज्ञाने आपाद्यज्ञानरूपानिष्टसाधनत्वज्ञानजननद्वारा आपादकज्ञाने द्वेषो जन्यते, तेन चापादकज्ञाने इच्छाप्रतिबन्धः क्रियते, एवं चेच्छारूपकारणविरहादेव नाहार्यशङ्कोत्पत्तिरित्यर्थवशसंपन्नमेव तर्के तन्निवर्तकत्वमिति । केचित्तु तर्कस्य शङ्कानिवर्तकत्वं व्याप्तिज्ञान-

D. By itself (*svata eva)* means because of absence of the causal complex of doubt only. After (the words) 'there is no need of hypothetical reasoning' (the expression) 'there is no infinite regress' follows.

It may be objected that the hypothetical reasoning does not prevent the doubt of deviation because it can be prevented only by the knowledge of invariable concomitance which is the cause of the hypothetical reasoning.

To this some say: even when there is the possibility of prevention of a non assumed doubt by the knowledge of invariable concomitance which is the cause of hypothetical reasoning, there is no possibility of prevention of an assumed doubt by that because the assumed knowledge is not prevented by that, but only by hypothetical reasoning. Thus, through the hypothetical reasoning which is of the nature of that which causes the possibility of the unacceptable, there arises in the knowledge which causes imposition, the knowledge of that which produces the unacceptable which is of the nature of knowledge of that which is imposed. Through that there arises aversion for the knowledge which causes the imposition. By that (aversion) the hindrance for the desire for the knowledge which causes the imposition is produced. Thus, because of the absence of the cause in the form of desire there is no origination of assumed

दि. कारणीभूतो यो व्यभिचारशङ्काविरहस्तत्संपादकत्वम् । एवं च व्यभिचार-शङ्काप्रतिबन्धकतायां तर्कस्योत्तेजकतयोत्तेजकाभावविशिष्टव्यभिचारशङ्का-विरहसंपादकत्वमक्षुण्णमेव तर्कस्येत्याहुः । परे तु तदापादकापत्तित्वेना-हार्यानाहार्यसाधारणतद्विशिष्टबुद्धित्वावच्छिन्नं प्रति प्रतिबन्धकतया तर्कस्य व्यभिचारशङ्कानिवर्तकत्वमित्याहुः । तर्कश्चाहार्यारोपविशेषः । तत्त्वं च मानसत्वव्याप्यो जातिविशेषस्तर्कयामीत्यनुभवाज्जिज्ञासाविशेषनिवर्तकतया वा सिद्ध इति । तर्कश्च द्विविधो विषयपरिशोधको व्याप्तिग्राहकश्चेति ।

D. doubt. Thus the hypothetical reasoning removes the assumed doubt fulfilling the purpose.

Some others say: hypothetical reasoning prevents doubt by being that which brings about the absence of doubt of that deviation which (absence) is the cause of the knowledge of invariable concomitance. Thus, because hypothetical reasoning is the stimulating factor in the prevention of doubt of deviation, (it) brings about indeed the absence of the doubt of deviation qualified by the absence of the stimulating factor.

Sill others say: hypothetical reasoning as an imposition of that which causes imposition prevents the doubt of deviation because it is the hindering factor for that which is determined by the state of being qualified knowledge common to assumed and non assumed knowledge.

Hypothetical reasoning is a kind of imposition in the form of assumed knowledge. The state of being that (i.e. hypothetical reasoning) is a kind of universal pervaded by the state of being mental knowledge. (Hypothetical reasoning) is established through the experience 'I reason hypothetically ' or through removing a particular desire to know.

Hypothetical reasoning is of two kinds viz. that which examines an object and that which brings about the knowledge of invariable concomitance.

दि. तत्र विषयपरिशोधको निर्वह्निः स्यान्निर्धूमः स्यादित्यादिः । धूमो यदि वह्निव्यभिचारीस्याद्वह्निजन्यो न स्यादित्यादिश्च व्याप्तिग्राहकः । विस्तरस्त्वन्यत्रानुसन्धेयः ।

D. An example for that which examines the object is 'if something has no fire then it will have no smoke'. An example for that which brings about the knowledge of invariable concomitance is 'if smoke deviates from fire then it will not be that which is produced by fire'. Further details should be learnt elsewhere.

Commentary

(p.419, lns 3–8; p.421, lns 1–6) In the main section on Inference in K.M.D.R., though there is an elaborate discussion on the nature of Invariable Concomitance, there is no mention of the means of grasping invariable concomitance. Therefore M. describes the means of grasping invariable concomitance in the last section on qualities. The Relevance for treating the means of grasping invariable concomitance is that the section on qualities just before discussing the present topic, deals with the validity of knowledge. And here it is stated that the validity of knowledge is not known by itself but by other means, viz. inference. Therefore D. raises the question: validity of knowledge can be known through inference if only inference is a proper means of valid knowledge. But inference is a proper means of valid knowledge, if only there is the knowledge of invariable concomitance. But this is not possible without the knowledge of the means of grasping invariable concomitance. Therefore since M. has already elucidated the nature of invariable concomitance earlier, now it explains the means of grasping invariable concomitance. This is the Relevance of treating the means of grasping invariable concomitance. R.[1] determines more accurately such a Relevance as Connection (*prasaṅga*). This is because the means of grasping

[1] It may be noted that the R. written by Rāmarudra ends with his commentary on the *Śabdakhanda*. The commentary on K. M. and D. in *guṇanirūpaṇam* though called R. was actually written by Pandit Rājeśvaraśāstri Dravid.

invariable concomitance is the cause of knowledge of invariable concomitance which is the cause of knowledge of validity. Therefore this relation of indirect causality is the cause of the recollection of the means of grasping invariable concomitance. Hence the Relevance is Connection (*prasaṅga*).

According to M. the means of grasping invariable concomitance are non-apprehension of deviation and apprehension of co-existence of the *sādhya* with the reason. This is because the apprehension of deviation is a hindrance for the knowledge of invariable concomitance since it prevents the knowledge that the *sādhya* is the pervader. And this is a part of the definition of invariable concomitance. Therefore the absence of the knowledge of deviation is the cause for grasping invariable concomitance. Similarly the knowledge of the co-existence of the *sādhya* with the reason, through agreement and disagreement (i.e. through the knowledge that wherever there is reason there is *sādhya* and wherever there is the absence of *sādhya*, there is the absence of reason) is also a cause for grasping invariable concomitance.

Here R. raises an objection that there is no proof to show that the knowledge of the co-existence of the *sādhya* with the reason is cause of grasping invariable concomitance. One answer to this objection is that knowledge of invariable concomitance is a qualified knowledge. But in order to have a qualified knowledge, one should have the knowledge of the qualification and here the qualification is co-existence (of the *sādhya* with the reason). Therefore the knowledge of such a co-existence is the cause of grasping invariable concomitance. But this answer cannot be accepted because in that case knowledge of deviation will also be cause of grasping of invariable concomitance since deviation is also a part of the definition of invariable concomitance.[1] Therefore the knowledge of the co-existence of the *sādhya* with the reason is to be considered as an independent cause of grasping invariable concomitance. Hence there would not be the fault of superfluity (*anyathāsiddhi*) by taking the knowledge of co-existence as the cause of the qualified knowledge of co-existence.

[1] i.e. if invariable concomitance is defined as non deviation (*avyabhicaritatva*)

Thus the knowledge of co-existence is the cause of the knowledge of invariable concomitance in any form. This is the opinion of the old Naiyāyikas. According to the modern Naiyāyikas, invariable concomitance is defined as smokeness etc. which exists in that which is co-existent with fire which is the pervader of smoke (*dhūmavyāpakavahnisamanādhikaraṇavṛttidhūmatvādikameva vyāptih*) and not merely the co-existence of the *sādhya* which is the pervader of the reason (*hetuvyāpakasādhyasāmānādhikarṇya*). Otherwise there would be inferential knowledge by such instances of knowledge as mountain has a donkey which co-exists with fire which is the pervader of smoke. In this definition of invariable concomitance, the co-existence of the *sādhya* is included as a qualifier. And in this way, when the knowledge of co-existence is the cause of the knowledge of invariable concomitance there is no possibility of agreement[1] and disagreement in order to establish the knowledge of co-existence as a separate cause for grasping invariable concomitance. But then there could be the objection that if the causality of knowledge of co-existence is established since it is qualifier in qualified knowledge, then the knowledge of deviation would also be a cause of grasping invariable concomitance. This cannot be accepted since the authors do not consider the knowledge of deviation to be the cause of the knowledge of invariable concomitance.

(p.419, lns 8–10; p.421, ln 6 – p.422, ln 1) Repeated perception of the reason along with *sādhya* is not a cause of grasping invariable concomitance. This is because there could arise the knowledge of invariable concomitance even by one perception of the reason and the *sādhya* provided there is no deviation. But repeated perception is useful when there is doubt of deviation. Here according to R. repeated perception is not many perceptions of one and the same thing in one place, e.g. many perceptions of smoke and fire in the kitchen; but many perceptions of smoke and fire in different places. Many perceptions understood in this way in different places are useful. This is because

[1] i.e. *anvyavyatirekasiddhi,* i.e. *sahacāragrahasatve vyāptigrahaḥ, sahacāragrahābhāve vyāptigrahābhāvah.*

when one perceives smoke and fire in the kitchen there could be the possibility of that kitchenness is an additional condition. The reason is that one may doubt kitchenness is the pervader of fire and at the same time not the pervader of smoke. There could even be certainty of additional condition. This doubt or certainty is removed when there is repeated perception of smoke and fire in different places as for instance when there is the perception of smoke and fire in the courtyard, there is no perception of kitchenness and so it is grasped as the non-pervader of *sādhya*. Hence kitchenness is not an additional condition. In this way many perceptions can be of use for grasping invariable concomitance.

(p.419, ln 10 – p.420, ln 9; p.422, ln 1 – p.425, ln 3) Even when many perceptions of reason and *sādhya* do not remove doubt of deviation, one has to make use of hypothetical reasoning which will contradict the knowledge of the existence of *sādhya* in a definite contradicted subject, i.e. it will remove the knowledge of anything opposed to the knowledge of invariable concomitance. The form of the hypothetical reasoning according to M. is that if this has no fire it will not have smoke, because without the cause the effect will not arise. This argument is naturally based on the relation of cause and effect between fire and smoke. Here it should be noted that the hypothetical reasoning in the form 'if this has no fire, it will not have smoke' is an instance of hypothetical reasoning to establish the existence of an object (*viṣayapariśodhakatarka*). But as R. points out it does not remove doubt of deviation. This is because that which imposes (*āpādaka*) viz. the knowledge of the absence of fire prevents the knowledge of that which is imposed, viz. smoke. But the knowledge of the absence of fire which is the *āpādakajñāna* does not lead to the knowledge of invariable concomitance of fire with smoke. Therefore D. gives another form of hypothetical reasoning (*vyāptigrāhakatarka*): if smoke deviates from fire, then it cannot be produced by fire. Such a hypothetical reasoning removes the doubt of deviation and in this way helps one to grasp invariable concomitance of fire with smoke.

But if there would still be doubt that smoke arises even without fire, or smoke arises without any cause, then such a doubt is to be removed by the contradiction of practical activity, i.e. one would not try to get fire in order to produce smoke, nor would one try to get food in order to appease hunger. But as D. points out it may be further objected that the basis of hypothetical reasoning is the knowledge of that which imposes which is pervaded by that which is imposed. As for example the hypothetical reasoning, if there is the absence of fire there is the absence of smoke, presupposes the invariable concomitance between the absence of fire and the absence of smoke. In order to establish this invariable concomitance, another hypothetical reasoning is needed and in this way there would be infinite regress. The answer to this objection is that there is no such infinite regress because where there is no causal complex of doubt of deviation there is also no doubt and so there is no need of hypothetical reasoning.

A more fundamental objection is the following: hypothetical reasoning does not remove the doubt of deviation because such a doubt is removed by the knowledge of invariable concomitance which is the cause of hypothetical reasoning. Three different answers are given in D. as responses to this objection. According to some Naiyāyikas, non assumed doubt (*anāhārya-śaṅkā*) may be removed by the knowledge of invariable concomitance. But an assumed doubt (*āhāryaśaṅka*) cannot be removed by the knowledge of invariable concomitance; such an assumed doubt can be removed only by hypothetical reasoning. This means that the hypothetical reasoning produces the knowledge of that which brings about the unacceptable thing. And the unacceptable thing is in the form of the knowledge of that which is imposed. By this process, the hypothetical reasoning produces aversion for the knowledge which imposes. As for example, the hypothetical reasoning in the form, if smoke deviates from fire, then smoke would not be produced by fire, produces the unacceptable thing in the form of the absence of being produced by fire in smoke. This is the knowledge of that which is imposed. This process of hypothetical reasoning produces aversion for the knowledge that imposes viz. knowledge of the deviation of

fire in smoke. This aversion hinders the desire for the knowledge which causes imposition. In this way, hypothetical reasoning removes the doubt of deviation by hindering the desire which produces the assumed doubt. R. points out that this opinion is not acceptable because immediately after the use of one hypothetical reasoning, there is still the possibility of another assumed doubt and in this way there could be infinite regress. And so another answer is given.

Hypothetical reasoning removes doubt of deviation by bringing about the absence of the doubt of deviation. And the absence of the doubt of deviation is the cause of the knowledge of invariable concomitance. Hypothetical reasoning brings about the absence of the doubt of deviation in the following way: the hindering factor for the knowledge of invariable concomitance is not merely the doubt of deviation, but doubt of deviation qualified by the absence of hypothetical reasoning. The idea here is that when there is hypothetical reasoning, doubt of deviation does not hinder the knowledge of invariable concomitance. Therefore the absence of doubt of deviation qualified by the absence of the hypothetical reasoning brings about the knowledge of invariable concomitance. In this way hypothetical reasoning brings about the absence of the doubt of deviation. R. points out that there is the fault of logical cumbersomeness in this opinion since hypothetical reasoning is accepted as the stimulating factor in the causality of the absence of the doubt of deviation for the knowledge of invariable concomitance. And besides there is no proof to establish that the hypothetical reasoning is a stimulating factor for the knowledge of invariable concomitance. Therefore another answer to the objection raised earlier is given.

Hypothetical Reasoning is in the form of the imposition of that which imposes. Therefore it is an imposed knowledge of deviation as for instance in the hypothetical reasoning, if smoke deviates from fire, smoke would not be produced by fire. Here the knowledge of deviation of fire is an instance of imposed knowledge. Since it is a knowledge of deviation, it prevents the doubt of deviation which is common to both assumed and non assumed instances of knowledge. This answer also suffers from

the fault of logical cumbersomeness (cfr. S., p.300, ln 1ff.) because of the assumption of the relation of preventer and that which is prevented. This shows that according to D. the first answer seems to be the correct one; this opinion is also followed by Parīkṣit Thampurān, though R. finds fault even with the first answer.

Hypothetical reasoning is a kind imposition in the form of an assumed knowledge. If smoke deviates from fire smoke would not be produced by fire is an instance of hypothetical reasoning. Here imposition is the knowledge of the deviation of fire in smoke, and this is a kind of assumed knowledge. And the state of being hypothetical reasoning is a kind of universal pervaded by the state of being mental knowledge. This just means that hypothetical reasoning is a kind of mental knowledge. The existence of such a hypothetical reasoning is established by our experience that we argue hypothetically. It is also established by removing the desire for knowledge of deviation. Such a hypothetical reasoning is of two kinds viz. that which examines the existence of a particular thing, as for instance, if something has no fire, it will have no smoke; and that which brings about the knowledge of invariable concomitance, as for instance, if smoke deviates from fire, it would not be produced by fire. D. also mentions that details should be known from other places. The details to which here reference is made are the following: the cause of hypothetical reasoning is *āpādyavyāpyāpadakavattā-jñānam* (i.e. the knowledge of that which has that which cause imposition which is pervaded by that which is imposed). Here the invariable concomitance of that which is imposed should not be affected by the knowledge of invalidity. Further the defects of hypothetical reasoning should be examined, as for instance *iṣṭāpattiḥ,* the acceptance of that which is imposed, e.g. to accept that if smoke deviates from fire, it would not be produced by fire.

Text 16 B

Additional Condition (*upādhi*)

का. साध्यस्य व्यापको यस्तु हेतोरव्यापकस्तथा ।
स उपाधिर्भवेत्तस्य निष्कर्षोऽयं प्रदर्श्यते ॥ १३८ ॥

सर्वे साध्यसमानाधिकरणाः स्युरुपाधयः ।
हेतोरेकाश्रये येषां स्वसाध्यव्यभिचारिता ॥ १३९ ॥

व्यभिचारस्यानुमानमुपाधेस्तु प्रयोजनम् ॥ १४०ab॥

मु. इदानीं उपाधिं निरूपयति **साध्यस्य** इति ॥ साध्यत्वाभिमतव्यापकत्वे सति साधनत्वाभिमताव्यापक उपाधिरित्यर्थः । ननु स श्यामो मित्रातनयत्वादित्यत्र शाकपाकजन्यत्वं नोपाधिः

K. That which is the pervader of that which is to be established and which is not the pervader of the reason is the additional condition. Its essence is being described. All additional conditions will be coexistent with that which is to be established but they deviate from themselves and from that which is to be established in one of the substrata of the reason. The purpose of additional condition is the inference of the deviation. (*Kārikā* 138, 139, 140 ab)

M. Now (the author) explains the additional condition (with the words) **of that which is to be established** (*sādhyasya iti*). The meaning is: while being the pervader of that which is considered as that which is to be established, that which is not the pervader of that which is considered as reason is additional condition.

Now it may be objected: in (the inference) 'he is of dark complexion because he is the son of Mitrā', the state of being

मु. स्यात् तस्य साध्यव्यापकत्वाभावात् श्यामत्वस्य घटादावपि सत्त्वात् । एवं वायुः प्रत्यक्षः प्रत्यक्षस्पर्शाश्रयत्वादित्यत्रोद्भूतरूपवत्त्वं नोपाधिः स्यात् प्रत्यक्षत्वस्यात्मादिषु सत्त्वात् तत्र च उद्भूतरूपवत्त्वाभावात् । एवं ध्वंसो विनाशी जन्यत्वादित्यत्र भावत्वं नोपाधिः स्याद्विनाशित्वस्य प्रागभावेऽपि सत्वात् तत्र भावत्वाभावादिति चेन्न । यद्धर्मावच्छिन्नसाध्यव्यापकत्वं तद्धर्मावच्छिन्नसाधनाव्यापकत्वमित्यर्थे तात्पर्यात् । मित्रातनयत्वावच्छिन्नश्यामत्वस्य व्यापकं शाकपाकजत्वं तदवच्छिन्नसाधनाव्यापकं च ।

M. produced by the digestion of the vegetable will not be additional condition because it is not the pervader of that which is to be estabilished since the state of being dark coloured is found in jar etc. also. Likewise in (the inference) 'air is perceptible because it is the subtratum of perceptible touch', the state of having manifested colour will not be an additional condition since perceptibility is found in the self etc. and there is the absence of manifested colour in them. Likewise, in (the inference) 'destruction is destructible because it is produced', the state of being an existent is not an additional condition since destructibility is found in the case of prior absence also, in which there is the absence of the state of being an existent.

This objection is rejected, because the intended meaning is that the state of being the pervader of that which is to be established which is determined by a particular characteristic is the state of not being the pervader of the reason which is determined by that characteristic. The state of being produced by the digestion of the vegetable is the pervader of the dark complexion which is determined by the state of being the son of Mitrā, and this is not the pervader of the reason determined by that (the state of being the son of Mitrā).

मु. एवं पक्षधर्मबहिर्द्रव्यत्वावच्छिन्नप्रत्यक्षत्वस्य व्यापकमुद्भूत-रूपवत्त्वं बहिर्द्रव्यत्वावच्छिन्नसाधनस्याव्यापकं च । एवं ध्वंसो विनाशी जन्यत्वादित्यत्र जन्यत्वावच्छिन्नसाध्यव्यापकं भावत्वम् । सद्धेतौ त्वेतादृशधर्मो नास्ति यदवच्छिन्नस्य साध्यस्य व्यापकं तदवच्छिन्नस्य साधनस्य चाव्यापकं किंचित् स्यात् । व्यभिचारिणि तु उपाध्यधिकरणं यत्साध्याधिकरणं यच्चोपाधिशून्यं साध्यव्यभि-चाराधिकरणं तदन्यतरत्वावच्छिन्नस्य साध्यस्य व्यापकत्वं साध-नस्य चाव्यापकत्वमुपाधेरन्ततः संभवतीति । अत एव लक्ष्य-मप्युपाधिस्वरूपमेतदनुसारेण दर्शयति **सर्वे** इत्यादिना ॥

M. Likewise the state of having manifested colour is the pervader of perceptibility determined by the state of being an external substance which is the characteristic of the subject and it is not the pervader of the reason determined by the state of being an external substance. Likewise in (the inference) 'destruction is perishable', the state of being an existent is the pervader of that which is to be established as determined by the state of being produced. In a valid reason there is no such characteristic so that there can be something which can be the pervader of that which is to be established as determined by that particular characteristic and which is not the pervader of the reason as determined by that same particular characteristic. In the case of the deviant reason the additional condition will ultimately be as not pervading the reason (but) as pervading that which is to be established as determined by the state of being one of the two viz. the substratum of the additional condition which (viz. substratum) is the substratum of that which is to be established and that which is the substratum of deviation of that which is to be established (but) bereft of the additional condition. Therefore in accordance with this (explanation) (the author) explains the nature of additional condition which is the thing to be defined (with the words) **all** etc. (*sarve ityādinā*).

मु. **स्वसाध्येति** । स्वं च साध्यं च स्वसाध्ये तयोर्व्यभिचा-रितेत्यर्थः । उपाधेर्दूषकताबीजमाह **व्यभिचारस्य** इति । उपाधि-व्यभिचारेण हेतौ साध्यव्यभिचारानुमानमुपाधेः प्रयोजनमित्यर्थः । तथा हि यत्र शुद्धसाध्यव्यापक उपाधिस्तत्र शुद्धेनैवोपाधिव्यभि-चारेण साध्यव्यभिचारानुमानं यथा धूमवान् वह्नेरित्यादौ वह्नि-र्धूमव्यभिचारी तद्व्यापकार्द्रेन्धनसंयोगव्यभिचारित्वादिति व्यापक-व्यभिचारिणो व्याप्यव्यभिचारावश्यकत्वात् । यत्र तु किंचिद्धर्मा-वच्छिन्नसाध्यस्य व्यापक उपाधिस्तत्र तद्धर्मवति उपाधिव्यभिचारेण

M. Themselves and that which is to be established (*svasādhyeti*).The meaning is: themselves and that which is to be established; their deviation.

By (the words) **of the deviation** (*vyabhicārasya iti*), (the author) explains the reason which makes additional condition a cause of defect (in the inference). The meaning is: the purpose of the additional condition is the inference of deviation of that which is to be established (in the reason) by means of the deviation of the additional condition. For example, where the additional condition is the pervader of that which is to be established which is unqualified there there is the inference of deviation of that which is to be established by the deviation of the unqualified additional condition. For instance in (the inference) 'it has smoke because it has fire', fire has the deviation of smoke because it has the deviation of conjunction with wet fuel which is the pervader of that (smoke). This is because that which has the deviation of the pervader necessarily has the deviation of the pervaded. But where the additional condition is the pervader of that which is to be established which is determined by some characteristic there is the inference of deviation of that which is to be established through the deviation of the additional condition in that which has that characteristic. For instance in

मु. साध्यव्यभिचारानुमानं यथा स श्यामो मित्रातनयत्वादित्यादौ मित्रातनयत्वं श्यामत्वव्यभिचारि मित्रातनये शाकपाकजत्वव्यभिचारित्वादिति । बाधानुन्नीतपक्षेतरस्तु साध्यव्यापकताग्राहकप्रमाणाभावात् स्वव्याघातकत्वाच्च नोपाधिः । बाधोन्नीतस्तु उपाधिर्भवत्येव यथा वह्निरनुष्णः कृतकत्वादित्यादौ प्रत्यक्षेण वह्नावुष्णत्वग्रहे वह्नीतरत्वमुपाधिः । यस्य तूपाधेः साध्यव्यापकत्वादिकं संदिह्यते स संदिग्धोपाधिः । पक्षेतरस्तु संदिग्धोपाधिरपि नोद्भावनीयः कथकसंप्रदायानुरोधात् । केचित्तु सत्प्रतिपक्षोत्थापनमुपाधेः फलम् ।

M. (the inference) 'he is dark in complexion because he is the son of Mitrā', the state of being the son of Mitrā has deviation of the dark colour since in the case of the son of Mitrā there is deviation of being produced by the digestion of the vegetable. But when it is sure that there is no contradiction in the subject, then a thing which is different from the subject is not an additional condition, because there is no means of knowing the state of being the pervader of that which is to be established and also because of its being self-contradictory. On the other hand when it is sure that there is contradiction in the subject, then a thing which is different from the subject is an additional condition, as for example in (the inference) 'fire is not hot because it is produced' when there is the knowledge that fire is hot through direct perception, the state of being different from fire is an additional condition. But, that additional condition about which there is doubt of its pervasion of that which is to be established, is a doubtful additional condition. That thing which is different from the subject, on the other hand, should not be considered as doubtful additional condition according to the tradition of debaters.

Some say that the purpose of the additional condition is to point out a Counterthesis. For instance, there is possibility of

मु. तथा हि अयोगोलकं धूमाभाववदार्द्रेन्धनाभावादिति सत्प्रतिपक्षसंभवात्। इत्थं च साधनव्यापकोऽपि क्वचिदुपाधिः यथा करका पृथिवी कठिनस्पर्शवत्त्वादित्यादौ अनुष्णाशीतस्पर्शवत्त्वम्। नचात्र स्वरूपासिद्धिरेव दूषणमिति वाच्यम्। सर्वत्रोपाधेर्दूषणान्तरसांकर्यात्। अत्र च साध्यव्यापकः पक्षावृत्तिरुपाधिरित्याहुः।

दि. इदानीं व्याप्तिग्रहोपायनिरूपणोत्तरं व्याप्तिनिश्चयाभावप्रयोजकव्यभिचारशङ्काकारणज्ञानविषयत्वेनोपाधेः स्मरणे सति। तथा च प्रसङ्गसङ्गत्योपाधिनिरूपणमिति भावः। सिद्धिविषयत्वरूपसाध्यत्वस्य सिद्धिजनकत्वरूपसाधनत्वस्य च सोपाधावभावात् **अभिमतेति**। यो यदवच्छिन्न-

M. Counterthesis in (the inference) 'the red hot iron ball has no smoke because there is no wet fuel'. In this way, in some cases the pervader of the reason can also be additional condition, as for instance, in (the inference) 'the hail stone is earthy because it has compact conjunction', the state of having neither hot nor cold touch (is the additional condition). It should not be argued that here the Unestablishedness of nature (of the reason) is the fallacy, because, in all cases of additional condition there is the cross division of other fallacies. They say that, here, the additional condition is the pervader of that which is to be established which does not occur in the subject.

D. Now (*idānīm*) (means) after the explanation of the means of knowing the invariable concomitance, when there is the remembrance of the additional condition as the object of the knowledge which is the cause of doubt of deviation which (doubt) is the cause of the absence of the definite knowledge of the invariable concomitance. Consequently the idea is that the discussion on additional condition is through the Relevance Connection. The word 'considered' (*abhimata*) is used because in the case of (an inference) where there is additional condition, there is the absence of the state of being that which is to be established in the form

दि. व्यापकत्वे सति यदवच्छिन्नाव्यापकः स तदवच्छिन्नसाध्यकतदवच्छिन्न-हेतावुपाधिरित्यर्थः । यथाश्रुतेऽभिमतस्य विशेषणत्वे यत्र न तदभिमानस्तत्राव्याप्तिः स्यात्, यदवच्छिन्नविवक्षणाद्गुणकर्मान्यत्वविशिष्टसत्तावाञ्जातिमत्त्वादित्यादौ संयोगी गुणकर्मान्यत्वविशिष्टसत्त्वादित्यादौ च नाव्याप्त्यतिव्याप्ती । व्यापकत्वाव्यापकत्वे एकप्रकारेणैकसंबन्धेन च विवक्षिते तेन द्रव्यत्वत्वेन समवायसंबन्धेन च वह्निं प्रति व्यापकस्य द्रव्यत्वस्य द्वित्वादिना संयोगादि-संबन्धेन च धूमं प्रत्यव्यापकत्वेऽपि वह्निमान् धूमादित्यत्र द्रव्यत्वादौ नातिव्याप्तिः ।

D. of the state of being the object of establishment and of the state of being reason in the form of being that which brings about establishment. When there is the state of being the pervader of something which is qualified by some particular thing, that which is not the pervader of something which is qualified by some (other) particular thing is the additional condition in the reason which is qualified by that particular thing and which has that which is to be established qualified by that particular thing. This is the meaning. If (the term) 'considered' is an attribute as actually expressed (in the M. text), when there is no such consideration there will be (the fault of) too narrow application; when it is intended that it is determined by something there will not be (the fault of) too narrow application and (the fault of) over-extension respectively in (the inferences) 'this has existence qualified by difference from quality and action because this has a generic attribute' and 'this has conjunction because this has existence qualified by difference from quality and action'. The state of being the pervader and the state of not being the pervader are intended through the same qualifier and through the same relation and therefore even though substanceness as determined by substance-nessness is the pervader of fire through the relation of inherence and (it is) not the pervader of smoke as determined by duality and through the relation of conjunction, yet there is no overextension in substanceness in (the inference) 'it has fire because of smoke'.

दि. स श्यामः इति । काकः श्यामो मित्रातनयत्वादित्यादावित्यर्थः । तेन वक्ष्यमाणेन ध्वंसो विनाशी जन्यत्वादित्यनेन न पौनरुक्त्यम् । अस्य साधनावच्छिन्नसाध्यव्यापकत्वादग्रिमस्य साधनरूपपक्षधर्मावच्छिन्नसाध्यव्यापकत्वात् । साध्याव्यापकत्वमुपपादयति **श्यामत्वस्य** इति । ननुसाधनावच्छिन्नसाध्यव्यापकत्वं विवक्षणीयमतो नोक्ताव्याप्तिरतः पक्षधर्मावच्छिन्नसाध्यव्यापकोपाधावव्याप्तिमाह **एवं वायुः** इति । अत्र प्रत्यक्षं प्रत्युद्भूतरूपस्य व्यापकत्वे रूपस्य सुतरां व्यापकत्वमित्युद्भूतपदं व्यर्थं तथाप्युपाधेः साध्यव्यापकत्वे कार्यकारणभावलक्षणानुकूलतर्कदर्शनार्थं तदिति ध्येयम् ।

D. He is dark in complexion (*sa śyāmaḥ iti*). The meaning is: in such cases as 'the crow is black because of being the son of Mitrā' etc. Therefore there is no defect of repetition by the subsequent statement 'destruction is destructible because it is produced'. For here (in the first one) additional condition is the pervader of that which is to be established as qualified by the reason and in the case of the second one (it is) the pervader of that which is to be established which is qualified by the characteristic of the subject in the form of the reason. (With the words) **the state of being dark coloured** (*śyāmatvasya iti*) (the author) explains the state of not being the pervader of that which is to be established.

It may be objected: the state of being the pervader of that which is to be established which is determined by the reason is what is to be intended and therefore there is no fault of too narrow application mentioned earlier. Hence (the author) by the words **likewise air** (*evaṃ vāyuḥ iti*) points out the fault of too narrow application in the additional condition which pervades that which is to be established as qualified by the characteristic of the subject. Here it should be understood that when the manifested colour is the pervader of perception, colour is all the more its pervader and therefore the word 'manifested' is useless, yet in order to show the hypothetical reasoning in the form of cause and effect relationship favourable to establishing the state of being pervader in the additional condition, this word (manifested) is used.

दि. पक्षधर्मावच्छिन्नसाध्यव्यापकत्वोक्तौ तु पूर्वोक्तशाकपाकजत्वाव्याप्तिरिति भावः । अव्याप्तीः परिहरति **मित्रातनयत्वेत्यादिना** । **व्यभिचारिणि तु** इत्यादि । वायुः प्रत्यक्षो द्रव्यत्वादित्यादौ प्रत्यक्षत्वरूपसाध्याधिकरणमात्मा उद्भूतरूपात्मकोपाधिशून्यं साध्यव्यभिचाराधिकरणं गगनं तदन्यतरत्वाव-च्छिन्नसाध्यव्यापकत्वस्योद्भूतरूपेऽभावादुक्तं 'उपाध्यधिकरणं' इति । उद्भूद-रूपाधिकरणपरमाण्वाकाशान्यतरत्वावच्छिन्नसाध्याप्रसिध्या तद्दोषतादव-स्थ्यमतः 'साध्याधिकरणं' इति । उद्भूतरूपाधिकरणं यत्प्रत्यक्षत्वाधिकरणं

D. When the state of being the pervader of that which is to be established qualified by the characteristic of the subject is mentioned there is (the fault of) too narrow application mentioned erarlier in the state of being produced by the digestion of the vegetable. This is the idea.

(With the words) **the state of being the son of Mitrā** etc. (*mitrātanayatvetyādinā*) (the author) eliminates the faults of too narrow application. **In the case of deviant reason** (*vyabhicāriṇi tviti*). The expression 'substratum of additional condition' is mentioned (in the definition of addition condition in the M. text) because with reference to the inference 'air is perceptible because it is a substance' in the manifested colour, there is the absence of the state of being the pervader of that which is to be established qualified by the state of being either of the self which is the substratum of that which is to be established viz. perceptibility, or of ether which is the substratum of the deviation of that which is to be established and which is bereft of the additional condition viz. manifested colour. (The expression) 'the substratum of that which is to be established' is mentioned (in M. text) because the defect (of too narrow application) will continue to exist since there is the unestablishedness of that which is to be established which is qualified by the state of being either the ether or the atom which is the substratum of manifested colour. (The expression) 'and that which' etc. is mentioned (in M.text) because of the absence of the state of being the pervader of that which is to be established qualified by the characteristic

दि. घटादिस्तद्वृत्तिद्रव्यत्वात्मकधर्मावच्छिन्नसाध्यव्यापकत्वाभावादुक्तं 'यच्च' इत्यादि । तत्रापि साध्यव्यभिचाराधिकरणपरमाणुघटान्यतरत्वावच्छिन्न-द्रव्यत्वात्मकसाधनव्यापकत्वात् 'उपाधिशून्यं' इति । तत्रैवोपाध्यधिकरण-साध्याधिकरणं घट उपाधिशून्यमधिकरणमात्मा तदन्यतरत्वावच्छिन्नसाध्य-व्यापकत्वाभावात् साध्यव्यभिचाराधिकरणमिति । उद्भूतरूपाधिकरणं यत्प्रत्यक्षत्वाधिकरणं घटः यच्चोद्भूतरूपशून्यं प्रत्यक्षत्वाभावाधिकरण-मतीन्द्रियरूपादि तदन्यतरत्वावच्छिन्नद्रव्यत्वरूपसाधनाव्यापकत्वस्योद्भूत-रूपेऽभावात् साध्याभावाधिकरणमिति परित्यज्य साध्यव्यभिचाराधिकरण-

D. of substanceness which exists in the jar etc. which is the substratum of perceptibility and which is the substratum of manifested colour. Even in that case, (the expression) 'bereft of the additional condition' is mentioned because (the additional condition viz. the manifested colour) is the pervader of the reason viz. substanceness which is qualified by the state of being either the jar or the atom which is the substratum of the deviation of that which is to be established. Even in that case the expression 'the substratum of the deviation of that which is to be established' is mentioned because of the absence of the state of being the pervader of that which is to be established which is qualified by the state of being either the self which is the substratum having the absence of the additional condition or the jar which is the substratum of that which is to be established and which is the substratum of the additional condition. (The expression) 'the substratum of the deviation of that which is to be established' is mentioned abandoning the mention of 'the substratum of the absence of that which is to be established' because in manifested colour there is the absence of the state of not being the pervader of the reason viz. substanceness qualified by the state of being either imperceptible colour which is the substratum of the absence of perceptibility and which is bereft of the manifested colour or the jar which is the substratum of perceptibility and which is the substratum of manifested colour. The meaning is the state of being

दि. मित्युक्तं, तदर्थश्च साधननिष्ठसाध्यव्यभिचारनिरूपकाधिकरणत्वम् । **अन्ततः** इति । तादृशधर्मान्तरस्यास्फूर्तावित्यर्थः । न च साध्यव्यापकत्वं साध्यनिष्ठव्याप्तिनिरूपकत्वं, तथा च शुद्धसाध्यव्यापके धूमादिनिष्ठव्याप्तेः केवलधूमत्वावच्छिन्नत्वात् कथं तादृशधर्मान्तरावच्छिन्नधूमादिनिष्ठव्याप्तिनिरूपकत्वमार्द्रेन्धनादीनामिति वाच्यम् । तद्धर्माधिकरणीभूतसाध्याधिकरणनिष्ठाभावाप्रतियोगित्वरूपस्यैव तद्धर्मावच्छिन्नसाध्यव्यापकत्वस्य लक्षणे प्रवेशः, न तु यद्धर्मावच्छिन्नसाध्यनिष्ठव्याप्तिनिरूपकत्वस्येत्याशयात् । धूमवान् वह्नेरित्यादावयः पिण्डमहानसान्यतरत्वावच्छिन्नसाध्यव्यापकं व्यञ्जनवत्त्वादिकं सङ्ग्राह्यमेवेति ध्येयम् ।

D. the substratum which indicates the deviation of that which is to be established which (deviation) exists in the reason. **Ultimately** (*antataḥ iti*) means when there is no knowledge of such a different characteristic.

It cannot be further objected: that which pervades that which is to be established means that which indicates the invariable concomitance existing in that which is to be established; consequently because the invariable concomitance existing in smoke is qualified by unqualified smokeness, how can the wet fuel etc. be the indicator of the invariable concomitance existing in smoke etc. qualified by any other characteristic.

This is because the idea here is that the state of being the pervader of that which is to be estabilished qualified by the particular characteristic in the form of not being the counterpositive of the absence which exists in the substratum of that which is to be established and which is the substratum of the (same) particular characteristic is included in the definition, but not the state of being the indicator of the invariable concomitance existing in that which is to be estabilished qualified by any characteristic. In (inferences such as) 'it has smoke because it has fire', one should understand that there is the inclusion of edible thing etc. which is the pervader of that which is to be established qualified by the state of being either the iron ball or the kitchen.

दि. अत एव यद्धर्मावच्छिन्नत्वघटितनिरुक्तलक्षणस्य तात्पर्यविषयत्वादेव । **एतदनुसारेण** निरुक्तलक्षणानुसारेण । स्वस्य साध्यमिति षष्ठीतत्पुरुषभ्रमं व्यावर्तयितुमाह **स्वं च** इति । नव्यास्तु यदभावेन यद्वदन्यत्वेन वा साधनवति साध्याभाव उन्नीयते स उपाधिर्लाघवात् । अत एव जलत्वतेजस्त्वयोस्त-दुभयत्वेन रूपेण न कश्चिदप्युपाधित्वमित्याहुः । **तद्धर्मवत्युपाधिव्यभि-चारेण** तद्धर्माधिकरणीभूतं यदुपाध्यभावाधिकरणं तद्वृत्तित्वेन । वायुः प्रत्यक्षः प्रमेयत्वादित्यादौ तु प्रमेयत्वं प्रत्यक्षत्वव्यभिचारि बहिर्द्रव्ये उद्भूतरूपव्यभिचारित्वादित्यादि द्रष्टव्यम् । ननु पक्षेतरत्वेऽतिव्याप्तिः।

D. Therefore (*ata eva*) means because the definition mentioned which is constituted by the state of being qualified by a particular characteristic is what is intended. **In accordance with this (explanation)** (e*tadanusāreṇa*) means in accordance with the definition which was mentioned. In order to avoid the erroneous knowledge of the genitive *tatpuruṣa* compound (in the phrase *svasādhyavyabhicāritā* in the *kārikā*) in the sense of its own *sādhya* the author says **themselves and** (*svaṃ ca iti*).

The modern Naiyāyikas say: additional condition is that through the absence of which or through the difference of which from that which has that, the absence of that which is to be established in that which has the reason is inferred because of simplicity. Hence waterness and fierness, cannot be additional conditions as determined by the state of being both. **Through the deviation of the additional condition in that which has that characteristic** (*taddharmavatyupādhivyabhicāreṇa*) means by the existence in that which is the substratum of the absence of the additional condition and which is the substratum of that particular characteristic. In (the inference) 'air is perceptible because it is knowable' knowability has deviation of perceptibility because in the case of external substances there is the deviation of manifested colour; and such instances have to be taken into account.

It may be objected that there is overextension in the case of the state of being that which is different from the subject.

दि. न च तस्य लक्ष्यत्वमेव 'एकाश्रये येषाम्' इत्यादिमूलेन प्रदर्शितस्य लक्ष्यतावच्छेदकस्य तत्राभावात् । तत्र हेतौ पक्षेतरत्वव्यभिचारस्य पक्ष-मादायैव संभवात् साध्यव्यभिचारस्य तमादायासंभवादत आह **बाधानु-न्नीतेति** । **स्वव्याघातकत्वात्** इति । उपाधिमात्रस्य दूषकत्वव्याघातक-त्वादित्यर्थः । पक्षेतरत्वस्योपाधित्वे सर्वत्रानुमाने पक्षेतरत्वस्योपाधेः संभवा-दनुमानमात्रोच्छेदापत्त्या व्यभिचारानुमानाधीनस्योपाधेर्दूषकत्वस्यासंभवादिति भावः । ननु तथापि यत्र साध्यव्यापकताग्राहकं प्रमाणमस्ति तत्र पक्षेतरत्वे

D. It cannot be further argued that it is that which is to be defined because there is the absence of the determinant of the state of being that which is to be defined as pointed out in the basic text (*Kārikā* 139c) 'in one of the substrata' (*ekāśraye yeṣām*); there (in the additional condition) the deviation of the state of being different from the subject in the reason is possible only by taking into account the subject (and) the deviation of that which is to be established is not possible by taking into account the subject. Therefore (the author) says **when it is sure that there is no contradiction in the subject** (*bādhānunnīteti*). **Because of its being self-contradictory** (*svavyāghātakatvāt iti*) because it (that which is different from the subject) removes the characteristic of being the cause of defect with regard to all instances of additional condition. This is the meaning. If being different from the subject is accepted as additional condition then, because of the possibility of presence of 'being different from the subject' as additional condition in all instances of inference it would come about that all instances of inference would be destroyed, and consequently additional condition which brings about the inference of deviation will not be the cause of defect. This is the idea.

It may be objected: where there is the means of valid knowledge which brings about the knowledge of pervasion (of additional condition) in that which is to be established, there the overextension of the definition in that which is different from the subject cannot be avoided. Therefore (the author) says **when**

दि. लक्षणातिव्याप्तिर्दुर्वारित्यत आह **बाधोन्नीतस्तु** इति । बाधेन पक्षे साध्याभाववत्तया उन्नीतः साध्यव्यापकत्वेन निश्चित इत्यर्थः । **संदिग्धोपाधिरपि** इति । पक्षे साध्यसंदेहेन साध्यव्यापकतासंदेहस्य पक्षेतरत्वे संभवादिति भावः । न च स्वव्याघातकत्वेनानुपाधित्वादेवानुद्भावनसंभवे संप्रदायमात्रे तद्धेतुत्वकथनमसंगतमिति वाच्यम् । यत्र साध्यव्यापकताग्राहकतर्कावतारस्तत्र व्यापकव्यभिचारिणो व्याप्यव्यभिचारावश्यंभावेन व्यभिचारानुमापकत्वरूपस्य दूषकत्वस्य व्याघातासंभवात् । सत्प्रतिपक्षोन्नायकत्वेनोपाधेर्दूषकतावादिनां मतमाह **केचित्तु** इति । **इत्थं च** इति । सत्प्रति-

D. it is sure that there is contradiction in the subject (*bādhonnītastu iti*). What is determined as the pervader of that which is to be established is brought about by the contradiction in the form of the absence of that which is to be established in the subject. This is the meaning. **Doubtful additional condition** (*saṃdigdhopādhirapi*). In the state of being other than the subject, there could be doubt about the pervaderness of that which is to be established because of the doubt about that which is to be established in the subject. This is the idea.

It should not be objected that because of its being self-contradictory the state of being different from the subject is not to be considered as an additional condition and so it cannot be mentioned; hence in all traditions (of debate) it is not proper to state that as a reason. For, where there is the possibility of the hypothetical reasoning which brings about the knowledge of pervaderness of that which is to be established there because the deviation of the pervader necessarily produces the deviation of the pervaded, there is no possibility of the destruction of the causality of defect which is in the form of that which brings about the inference of deviation. (The author) explains the view of those who hold that the additional condition brings about the fallacy of Counterthesis and so it is a cause of defect (with the words) **some** (*kecit tu iti*). **In this way** (*itthaṃ ca iti*). When the additional condition is the cause of the defect because it brings

दि. पक्षोत्थापकतया दूषकत्वे चेत्यर्थः । अत्र च सत्प्रतिपक्षोत्थापकत्वपक्षे च । पक्षावृत्तिः इति । पक्षवृत्तित्वे तु पक्षे तदभावेन साध्याभावासाधनादिति भावः।

D. about the fallacy of Counterthesis. This is the meaning. **And here** (*atra ca*) means in the opinion that additional condition brings about the fallacy of Counterthesis. **Which does not occur in the subject** (*pakṣāvṛttir iti*). When (in the definition of the additional condition) occurrence in the subject (is mentioned) there is the absence of the additional condition in the subject and so the additional condition does not establish the absence of that which is to be established. This is the idea.

Commentary

(p.437, lns 6–8) First of all the Relevance for treating additional condition is given by Dinakara since it is not expressly mentioned in M. After discussing the means of grasping invariable concomitance, one remembers additional condition. This is because it is the object of knowledge which causes doubt of deviation. And this doubt of deviation brings about the absence of the definite knowledge of invariable concomitance. Therefore, the Relevance here is Occasion (*prasaṅga*).

(p.432, lns 3–4; p.432, ln 8 – p.435, ln 2; p.437, ln 8 – p.442, ln 9) Additional condition is defined in M. as follows: while being the pervader of that which is considered as that which is to be established, that which is not the pervader of that which is considered as reason. But K. defines additional condition as that which is the pervader of that which is to be established and that which is not the pervader of the reason. Therefore D. gives the reason why M. adds the expression 'that which is considered (*abhimata*)' as the qualification of both *sādhya* and the reason. Such a qualification is used because when there is actually an additional condition, there is in fact no real *sādhya* and reason. This is because when there is a real additional condition, *sādhya* is not the object of a valid inferential knowledge nor does the reason bring about a valid instance of inferential knowledge. Therefore, the qualification 'that which is considered' is given

both to *sādhya* and the reason. But then there could be the fault of too narrow application because when there is no such consideration in the form of an erroneous knowledge (*abhimāna*) there is no possibility of additional condition.

In order to avoid this fault D. makes the definition more precise: when there is the state of being pervader of something which is qualified by some particular characteristic, that which is not the pervader of something which is qualified by some (other) particular characteristic is the additional condition in the reason which is qualified by that particular characteristic and which has that which is to be established qualified by that particular characteristic. As for example, in the inference, 'it has smoke because it has fire', there is the additional condition in the form of conjunction with wet fuel. This conjunction with wet fuel is the pervader of that which is qualified by smokeness and it is the non-pervader of that which is qualified by fireness. By making the definition precise in this way, there will not be the fault of too narrow application in substanceness (*dravyatva*) which is a real additional condition in the inference, 'this has existence qualified by difference from quality and action because this has a generic attribute'. This is because substanceness is the pervader of that which is determined by *viśiṣṭasattātva*. The reason is that qualified existence which is determined by the state of being qualified existence (*viśiṣṭasattatvāvacchinna-viśiṣṭasattā*) exists only in substance where there is substanceness. Further substanceness does not pervade the reason of generic attribute since wherever there is generic attribute, there is no substanceness, as for instance in quality there is generic attribute, but no substanceness. Therefore, the definition of additional condition can be applied to susbtanceness with reference to the inference mentioned. Hence, there is no fault of too narrow application. Further by making the definition more precise in this way, there will not be the fault of overextension in substanceness which is not a real additional condition with reference to the inference, 'this has conjunction because this has existence qualified by difference from quality and action'. This is because substanceness pervades qualified existence which is the reason and so there is no

sādhanāvyāpakatva. Hence there is no possibility of the application of the definition of additional condition to substanceness.

In the definition of additional condition, being the pervader of *sādhya* and not being the pervader of the reason should be understood by the same qualifier and by the same relation. Therefore there will not be overextension in substanceness in such valid inferences as 'this has fire because this has smoke', even if substanceness pervades fire as determined by substancenessness and by the relation of inherence and it is not the pervader of smoke as determined by duality and by the relation of conjunction. In other words, in the definition of additional condition, *sādhya-vyāpakatve sati sādhanāvyāpakatvam,* the determinant of the state of being additional condition should be the same. Similarly *sādhyavyāpakatva* cannot be taken by the relation of inherence and *sādhanāvyāpakatva* by the relation of conjunction; both should be taken by the same relation.

Now an objection may be raised as follows: in the invalid inference 'he is of dark complexion because he is the son of Mitrā', the state of being produced by the digestion of vegetable will not be an additional condition, because the state of being produced by the digestion of vegetable does not pervade the dark colour in jar and so on. The pronoun 'he' in the expression 'he is of dark complexion' should be understood as referring to crow and so on;[1] this is because in the inference 'crow is black because it is son of Mitrā' the additional condition of the state of being produced by the digestion of vegetable pervades the *sādhya* as determined by the reason of the state of being son of Mitrā, i.e. wherever

[1] The reason is that if the pronoun is taken as standing for son of Mitrā, then the inference would be 'the son of Mitrā is dark because he is son of Mitrā'. Here the additional condition, viz. the state of being produced by the degestion of vegetable is determined by the characteristic of the subject in the form of the reason. But in the subsequent inference given in M. 'destruction is destructible because it is produced' the additional condition of the state of being existent (*bhāvatva*) is also determined by the characteristic of the subject in the form of the reason. Therefore there would be repetition. But if the pronoun 'he' in the inference 'he is of dark of complexion because he is the son of Mitrā' is understood as referring to crow, then there would be no such repetition.

there is blackness qualified by the state of being the son of Mitrā, there is the state of being produced by the digestion of vegetable. In the case of the inference 'destruction is destructible because it is produced', the state of being an existent is the additional condition and it pervades the *sādhya* as determined by the characteristic of the subject in the form of the reason, i.e. wherever there is the state of being destructible qualified by the state of being produced *janyatva-viśiṣṭavināśitvam*) there is the state of being an existent (*bhāvatvam*).

Here D. points out a possible objection that the general definition of additional condition is to be understood as the pervader of that which is to be established as qualified by the reason and therefore there would not be any fault of too narrow application in inferences such as the crow is black because it is the son of Mitra. Hence the fault of too narrow application is shown in another example where additional condition is the pervader of that which is to be established as qualified by the characteristic of the subject. But the example for it as given in M. is 'air is perceptible because it is the substratum of perceptible touch'. However in this inference there is the additional condition of manifested colour and it is the pervader of the *sādhya* as qualified by reason, i.e. wherever there is perceptibility qualified by the state of being the substratum of perceptible touch, there is manifested colour. Hence there would be no fault of too narrow application. Therefore Dinakara changes the reason in the inference as substanceness i.e. 'air is perceptible because it is a substance'. This is the interpretation of Parīkṣit Thampurān (S., p.301, ln 12) according to whom Dinakara accepts the text of M. as *vayuḥ pratyakṣah dravyatvāt*. Here manifested colour is an additional condition. But manifested colour cannot be taken as additional condition that pervades perceptibility as qualified by substanceness. This is because perceptibility qualified by substanceness exists in soul and so there is the fault of too narrow application.[1]

[1] Here it may be noted that Rāmarudra shows that there would be the fault of too narrow application even when the reason is taken as the substratum of perceptible touch. This is because Rāmarudra takes *pratyakṣasparśāsrayatva* as *pratyakṣa-viṣayatāsrayatva*. Hence wherever there is *pratyavisayatāsrayatvaviśiṣṭapratya-kṣtvam*, there is no manifested colour, since in soul there is *pratyakṣaviṣayatā-srayatvaviśiṣṭapratyakṣatvam* but there is no manifested colour.

Here it may be noted that manifested colour need not be considered as additional condition but just colour, since if manifested colour is the pervader of perception which is the *sādhya*, then colour is all the more its pervader. But still manifested colour is considered as additional condition in order to show the relationship of cause and effect in the form of hypothetical reasoning between manifested colour and perception. If however the state of being the pervader of that which is to be established qualified by the characteristic of the subject (*pakṣadharmāva-cchinnasādhyavyāpakatvam*) is accepted as additional condition, then there would be the fault of too narrow application of the definition of additional condition in the state of being produced by the digestion of vegetable (*śākapākjanyatva*) with reference to the inference, 'crow is black because it is the son of Mitrā'. The reason is that *śākapakajanyatva* is not the pervader of the black colour as qualified by crowness (i.e. *śakapākajanyatvam* is not the pervader of *kākatvāvacchinnaśyāmatvam*).

Similarly the state of being existent will not be an additional condition in the inference, 'destruction is perishable because it is produced', since perishability exists also in prior absence where there is no state of being existent. Therefore the state of being existent, cannot pervade perishability which is the *sādhya*.

In order to avoid all these faults of too narrow application, the definition of additional condition is made more precise: additional condition is the pervader of that which is to be established which is determined by a particular characteristic and at the same time not the pervader of the reason which is determined by that particular characteristic (*yaddharmāvacchinna-sādhyavyāpakatvam taddharmāvacchinnasādhanāvyāpakatvam*). Thus the state of being produced by the digestion of vegetable is the pervader of black colour qualified by the son of Mitra and it is at the same time not the pervader of the state of being the son of Mitrā (i.e. *yatra yatra mitrātanyatvaviśiṣṭaśyāmatvam tatra tatra sākapākajanyatvam*, but *yatra yatra mitrātanyatvam tatra tatra na sākapakajanyatvam*).

Similarly in the inference 'air is perceptible because it is a substance' manifested colour is an additional condition. This

is because manifested colour pervades perceptibility qualified by the characteristic of the subject, viz. the state of being an external substance. In other words, only external substances which have manifested colour are perceptible. At the same time manifested colour does not pervade substanceness which is the reason. In other words, all substances do not have manifested colour, as for instance air, space etc. Therefore manifested colour is an additional condition in the inference 'air is perceptible because it is a substance'.

In the same manner, 'the state of being an existent' is an additional condition in the inference, 'destruction is perishable because it is produced'. Here the state of being an existent (*bhāvatvam*) pervades perishability as qualified by the state of being produced which is the reason; in other words only existent things which are produced are perishable. At the same time, the state of being existent does not pervade the state of being produced, i.e. all existent things are not produced e.g. soul, time etc. Therefore the state of being an existent is an additional condition. Hence all these reasons are fallacious reasons.

In a valid reason there is no such additional condition, i.e. there is no such thing which pervades the *sādhya* and which does not pervade the reason. In a deviant reason however, there will always be an additional condition which will pervade the *sādhya*, as qualified by the state of being one of the two viz., the substratum of the additional condition which (viz. substratum) is the substratum of the *sādhya* and that which is the substratum of deviation of that which is to be established (but) bereft of the additional condition. Thus in the inference 'there is smoke because of fire' the additional condition is conjunction with wet fuel (*ārdrendhanasaṃyogaḥ*). Here the substratum of additional condition is kitchen; kitchen is also the substratum of the *sādhya*, viz., smoke; red-hot iron ball is bereft of additional condition, but it is also the substratum of the deviation of *sādhya* which is determined by the state of being red-hot iron ball. The additional condition viz. conjunction with wet fuel pervades the *sādhya* which is determined by the state of being either kitchen or red-hot iron

ball. At the same time such an additional condition does not pervade the reason, viz. fire.

D. explains the purpose of various elements of this developed form of the definition of additional condition. In the inference, 'air is perceptible because it is a substance', manifested colour is the additional condition. Let us take as the substratum of the *sādhya*, viz. perceptibility, the soul. Ether is bereft of the additional condition, viz. manifested colour, and it is also the substratum of the deviation of *sādhya*. But the additional condition, viz. manifested colour does not pervade the *sādhya* which is determined by the state of being either the soul or ether. Therefore there is the fault of too narrow application of the definition. But when it is stated that the substratum of the *sādhya* should also be the substratum of the additional condition, we cannot take soul as the substratum of *sādhya* since it is not also the substratum of additional condition. Hence there is no fault of too narrow application.

In the same inference with the same additional condition, the atoms can be taken as the substratum of additional condition in the form of manifested colour. But in atoms there is no *sādhya* viz. perceptibility as determined by the state of being atom or ether which is the substratum of the deviation of *sādhya* and which is also at the same time bereft of additional condition. Therefore the same fault of too narrow application remains. But when it is stated that the substratum of additional condition should also be the substratum of *sādhya*, the atoms cannot be taken as the substratum of additional condition, because it is not the substratum of *sādhya*. Therefore there is no fault of too narrow application.

Again with reference to the same inference with the same additional condition, jar etc. can be taken as the substratum of the additional condition of manifested colour and the substratum of *sādhya*, viz. perceptibility. But the additional condition viz. manifested colour does not pervade perceptibility as determined by substanceness which exists in soul etc. since the soul is perceptible. Therefore there is the fault of too narrow application. But when it is stated also *yaccopādhiśūnyam sādhyavayabhicārādhikaraṇam*

tadanyataratvāvacchinnasya sādhyasya vyāpakatvam, then substanceness cannot be taken as the determinant of the substratum of the deviation of *sādhya* which (substratum) is bereft of additional condition. But the state of being either jar or ether is to be taken as the determinant of the substratum of the deviation of *sādhya* which (substratum) is bereft of the additional condition. Therefore in jar, there is perceptibility which is determined by the state of being either jar or ether. Therefore there is no fault of too narrow application.

Here also one can take atoms as the substratum of the deviation of *sādhya* of perceptibility and jar as the substratum of the additional condition of manifested colour and *sādhya*. But here the reason, viz. substanceness is determined by the state of being either atom or jar. This is pervaded by the additional condition of manifested colour. Therefore there is the fault of too narrow application. But when it is stated that the substratum of the deviation of *sādhya* should also be bereft of additional condition then atoms cannot be taken as the substratum of the deviation of *sādhya* since it has the additional condition of manifested colour. Therefore there is no fault of too narrow application.

Again, jar can be taken as the substratum of the additional condition of manifested colour and of the *sādhya* of perceptibility. Soul can be taken as the substratum of the absence of additional condition. But here the additional condition of manifested colour does not pervade the *sādhya* of perceptibility which exists in both jar and soul as determined by the state of being either jar or soul because in the soul, there is no manifested colour. Hence there is the fault of too narrow application. But when it is stated that the substratum of the deviation of *sādhya* should at the same time also be the substratum of the deviation of additional condition, then soul cannot be taken as the substratum of the deviation of *sādhya* because in the soul there is the *sādhya* of perceptibility. Hence there is no fault of too narrow application.

Further, jar can be taken as the substratum of the additional condition of manifested colour and at the same time as the substratum of the *sādhya* of perceptibility. Imperceptible colour (e.g. colour in atoms is *atīndrya* though *udbhūta*) is the substratum

of the deviation of the additional condition in the form of manifested colour[1] and it also does not have perceptibility which is the *sādhya*. But here the additional condition of manifested colour pervades the reason of substanceness as determined by the state of being either jar or imperceptible colour, i.e. substanceness which is the reason exists only in jar and the additional condition of manifested colour pervades this substanceness. Therefore there is the fault of too narrow application. But when it is stated that the substratum of the deviation of additional condition should also be the substratum of the deviation of *sādhya*, there will be no fault of too narrow application. This is because the substratum of the deviation of *sādhya* (*sādhyavyabhicārādhikaraṇam*) means the substratum which indicates the deviation of *sādhya* in the reason. As for instance, in the inference there is smoke because of fire, the red-hot iron ball indicates the deviation of *sādhya* of smoke in the reason of fire. But imperceptible colour does not indicate deviation of perceptibility in substanceness which is the reason, but ether etc. indicates the deviation of perceptibility in substanceness. Therefore there is no fault of too narrow application.

A further objection may be raised: that which pervades the *sādhya* means that which indicates the invariable concomitance that exists in the *sādhya*. Thus in the inference 'there is smoke because of fire', the invariable concomitance in smoke is indicated by the additional condition of conjunction with wet fuel. Such an invariable concomitance is determined only by smokeness without any further qualification. Therefore in the present case, there cannot be any invariable concomitance determined by another characteristic such as the 'state of being one of the two' etc.

This cannot be admitted. The reason is that invariable concomitance here is understood as not being the counterpositive of the absence that exists in the substratum of the *sādhya* which is also the substratum of that particular characteristic, i.e. kitchenness, the state of being one of the two etc. Thus in the inference there

[1] This is based on the principle that there is no quality in quality (*guṇe guṇānigīkārāt*). Therefore there cannot be manifested colour in imperceptible colour.

is smoke because of fire, the substratum of smoke is the substratum of kitchenness, viz. kitchen; there is no absence of the conjunction of wet fuel there and therefore it is not the counterpositive of the absence which exists in the substratum of smoke which is the kitchen etc. And it is not the case that in the definition of additional condition invariable concomitance is understood as determined by any other characteristic such as kitchenness, the state of being one of two etc. But if someone insists that in the definition of additional condition if *anyataratvādyavacchinna-sādhyavyāpakatvam* is to be used then it should be noted that *anyataratvacchinnasādhyavyāpakatva* does not exist in conjunction with wet fuel etc. and so they cannot be considered as additional conditions. This is because *ayogolakamahānasatvānyataratvam* exists both in *ayogolaka* and *mahānasa*. Hence since *ardrendhana-saṃyoga* does not exist in *ayogolaka,* we cannot say that *ardrendhanasaṃyoga* is *ayogolakamahānasānyataratvāva-cchinnasādhyavyāpaka.* In that case edible things (*vyajñana*) etc. which are present in the frying pan (a form of red hot iron) and in the kitchen should be taken as additional condition.

Now according to this definition of additional condition which has been discussed, the nature of additional condition is described. First of all, all additional conditions are coexistent with the *sādhya*. Further in one of the substratum of the reason, there will be the deviation of the additional condition and of the *sādhya*. As for example in the inference 'there is smoke because of fire', there is always the coexistence of conjunction with wet fuel which is the additional condition, with smoke which is the *sādhya*. In red hot iron ball which is one of the substrata of fire which is the reason here, there is neither conjunction with wet fuel which is the additional condition nor smoke which is the *sādhya*.

D. points out that the modern Naiyāyikas give a different definition of additional condition. According to them for reasons of simplicity additional condition is to be defined as that through the absence of which or through the difference of which from that which has that (i.e. additional condition) the absence of that which is to be established in that which has the reason is inferred. As for instance, with reference to the inference, there

is smoke because of fire, the absence of conjunction with wet fuel brings about the knowledge of the absence of smoke in red hot iron ball. Therefore it is additional condition. Similarly the difference from that which has the conjunction with wet fuel (e.g. difference from kitchen which has conjunction with wet fuel brings about the knowledge of the absence of smoke in red hot iron ball. Hence, this also is additional condition. Since it is mentioned that additional condition is also that through the difference from that which has something, the absence of *sādhya* is established, waterness and fireness as determined by the state of being both cannot be considered as additional conditions.

Here Parīkṣit Thampurān (S., p.305, ln 7ff.) raises a question and answers it. The question is that since the absence of waterness and fireness as determined by the state of being both is purely affirmative, it cannot bring about the knowledge of the absence of *sādhya*. This is because we cannot assert that wherever there is the absence of waterness and fireness as determined by the state of being both there is the absence of smoke. This is because there is the absence of waterness and fireness as determined by the state of being both even when there is smoke. The answer to this question as given by Thampurān is that in the inference, 'jar has ether (*ghaṭo gaganavān*)', the absence of waterness and fireness as determined by the state of being both brings about the knowledge of the absence of ether, since wherever there is the absence of waterness and fireness as determined by the state of being both, there is the absence of ether (since ether does not exist in anything), because both are purely affirmative characteristics. Therefore, waterness and fireness as determined by the state of being both will be additional conditions. But this is not admitted by anybody. Therefore, it is stated that additional condition is that through the differences from that which has something, the absence of *sādhya* is established. In this case that which has both waterness and fireness is not established and therefore the difference from that which has both waterness and fireness is also not established. Therefore waterness and fireness as determined by the state of being both cannot be considered as additional condition.

(p.432, ln 7; p.435, ln 2 – p.436, ln 8; p.443, ln 5 – p.445, ln 7) Now the purpose of additional condition is pointed out. Additional condition brings about the knowledge of the deviation of the *sādhya* in the reason or in other words, the deviation of additional condition in the reason brings about the inferential knowledge of the deviation of *sādhya* in the reason. Thus when the additional condition pervades the *sādhya* without any qualification, by the deviation of the additional condition without any qualification, there will be inference of the deviation of *sādhya*. As for example in such inference as there is smoke because of fire, the additional condition of conjunction with wet fuel (which has no qualification) pervades the *sādhya* in the form of smoke which has also no qualification. Therefore fire deviates from smoke because fire deviates from the additional condition of conjunction with wet fuel. This is because when there is the deviation of that which pervades, there will necessarily be the deviation of that which is pervaded.

But sometimes the additional condition pervades the *sādhya* as qualified by some particular characteristic. Then the existence of the reason in the substratum of the absence of the additional condition which substratum has that particular characteristic also brings about the inferential knowledge of the deviation of the *sādhya*. As for example he is dark because he is the son of Mitrā. Here being produced by the digestion of vegetable is the additional condition. Because of the deviation of additional condition of being produced by the digestion of vegetable, there is the possibility of the inferential knowledge in the following form: 'the state of being son of Mitrā has the deviation of dark colour becaue it has the deviation of the additional condition of being produced by the digestion of vegetable'. Similarly in the inference 'air is perceptible because it is knowable', knowability has the deviation of perceptibility because knowability has the deviation of the additional condition of manifested colour with respect to external substances. In this way, it is shown that from the deviation of additional condition it is possible to infer the deviation of *sādhya*.

Now it may be objected that there is overextension of the definition of additional condition in the state of being that

which is different from the subject (*pakṣetaratva*). Against this objection, it cannot be argued that the state of being that which is different from the subject is also that which is to be defined, viz. additional condition. This is because the definition of additional condition cannot be applied to the state of being that which is different from the subject since in some places, though there is the deviation of the additional condition, there is no deviation of *sādhya*. As for instance, 'mountain has smoke because of fire', smoke exists in the mountain which has the absence of the state of being that which is different from the subject, since mountain is the subject. But there is no deviation of the *sādhya* in mountain since mountain has smoke. In this way, the definition of additional condition cannot be applied to the state of being that which is different from the subject.

Thus when it is sure that there is no contradiction in the subject, then a thing which is different fom the subject (*pakṣe-taraḥ*) is not an additional condition. This is because there is no means of knowing that the additional condition of *pakṣetaratva* pervades the *sādhya*. As for instance, in the inference 'mountain has smoke because of fire', there is no way of establishing that *pakṣetaratva*, here *parvatetaratva*, pervades smoke; i.e. it is not known that wherever there is smoke, there is *parvatetaratva*. Further if *pakṣetaratva* is accepted as an additional condition, then such an additional condition is present in all instances of inference including valid inferences. As for instance in the case of the valid inference 'mountain has fire becaue of smoke', *parvateratva* pervades fire, i.e. wherever there is fire, there is *parvatetaratva* (it should be noted here that fire is not yet established on the mountain). And it is not established that wherever there is *parvatetaratva* there is smoke, since there is smoke on the mountain. Hence it is impossible to have any instance of inferential knowledge. Therefore the deviation of *pakṣetaratva* cannot bring about the inferential knowledge of deviation of *sādhya* in the reason. Thus taking *pakṣetaratva* as additional condition is self contradictory.

But when it is sure that there is contradiction in the subject, *pakṣetaratva* can be taken as additional condition. As for instance

in the inference 'fire is not hot because it is produced', we know from direct perception that fire is hot. Hence in this case *pakṣetaratva* can be taken as additional condition. This is because the deviation of *pakṣetaratva* (here *vahnītaratva*) brings about the knowledge of deviation of the *sādhya,* i.e. not being hot (*anuṣṇatva*) in the reason of the state of being produced.

When it is doubted whether the additional condition pervades the *sādhya* or not, then there is doubtful additional condition. An objection may be raised against this: according to some Naiyāyikas, as Rāmarudra points out, in the definition of additional condition the expression *pramānavatve sati svāvyāghatatvam* is also introduced. *pramāṇavatve sati* means *vyāpakatāgrahakapramāṇavatve*. This means that the pervaderness (*vyāpakata*) of additional condition such as 'conjunction with wet fuel' (in the case of the inference 'there is smoke because of fire') must be the object of some means of valid knowledge, such as perception. At the same time additional condition should not be self-contradictory i.e. the nature of additional condition to infer the deviation of *sādhya* should not be destroyed. Therefore *svāvyāghatakatva* in this sense cannot be used as a reason to refute *pakṣetaratva* as an additional condition.

This argument cannot be accepted because when there is a hypothetical reasoning which brings about the knowledge of the pervaderness of *sādhya* in the additional condition, there is always the possibility of the inferential knowledge of the deviation of the *sādhya* in the reason. This is because when there is the deviation of the pervader, there is always necessarily the deviation of the pervaded. As for example in the case of the additional condition of conjunction with wet fuel the hypothetical reasoning to establish the pervaderness of the *sādhya* in the additional condition is the following: if smoke deviates from conjunction with wet fuel it would not be produced by conjunction with wet fuel. Here the pervader is conjunction with wet fuel and the deviation of conjunction with wet fuel brings about the knowledge of the deviation of smoke. In this way additional condition is not self contradictory i.e. it does not destroy the nature of additional condition to bring about the inferential

knowledge of the deviation of *sādhya*. It may be further noted that being different from the subject (*pakṣetaratva*) is not accepted even as a doubtful additional condition according to all schools of debaters.

(p.436 ln 8 – p.437, ln5; p.445, ln 7 – p.446, ln 2) According to some other Naiyāyikas the purpose of additional condition is to point out a Counterthesis. With reference to the inference red hot iron ball has smoke, the Counterthesis would be 'the red hot iron ball has no smoke because it has no conjunction with wet fuel'. In this way since additional condition gives rise to the fallacy of Counterthesis it is defect, i.e. it prevents a valid inference. If this view is accepted, then something which is the pervader of the reason can also be taken as additional condition, as for example in the inference 'hail stone is earthy because it has compact conjunction'. Here the state of having neither hot nor cold touch is an additional condition since it pervades the reason because wherever there is compact conjunction there is the state of having neither hot nor cold touch, i.e. whatever has compact conjunction has the characteristic of being neither hot nor cold.

It may be further objected that here there is the fault of Unestablishedness of nature, since compact conjunction which is the reason does not exist in hail stone which is the subject. This is because hail stone is only a form of water and water has only soft conjunction and not compact conjunction. This objection cannot be admitted because in all instances of additional conditions, there is a mixture of various fallacies. Therefore according to those who hold that the purpose of additional condition is to point out a Counterthesis, additional condition is defined as the pervader of that which is to be established which does not occur in the subject. As for instance with reference to the inference red hot iron ball has smoke because it has fire, conjunction with wet fuel is the additional condition which pervades smoke, but such an additional condition does not exist in the subject, viz. the red hot iron ball. In this way the definition can be applied.

However Parīkṣit Thampurān suggests (S., p.306, lns 21–3) that there is incongruity in the opinion of these Naiyāyikas who hold that the purpose of additional condition is to point out

a Counterthesis. The reason is that in this case, when it is sure that there is contradiction in the subject, then it would not be possible to consider a thing which is different from the subject (*pakṣetara*) as an additional condition. As for instance in the inference 'fire is not hot because it is produced' something different from fire is an additional condition since being different from fire pervades being not hot and being different from fire does not pervade being produced. In this case, being different from fire cannot be considered as additional condition because absence of additional condition does not bring about the knowledge of the absence of *sādhya*, viz. not being hot in the subject which is fire. This is because with reference to the inference 'fire has the absence of not being hot because fire has the absence of not being different from fire (*vahnih anuṣṇatvā-bhāvavān vahnitaratvābhāvāt*)', the absence of the state of being different from fire exists only in fire (in the subject). Therefore the reason (i.e. *pakṣetaratvābhāva*) has the fault of deviation in the form of uncommon.

Text 16 C

Kinds of Inference

**का. त्रैविध्यमनुमानस्य केवलान्वयिभेदतः ।
द्वैविध्यं तु भवेद्व्याप्तेरन्वयव्यतिरेकतः ॥ १४२ ॥
अन्वयव्याप्तिरुक्तैव व्यतिरेकादिहोच्यते ।
साध्याभावव्यापकत्वं हेत्वभावस्य यद्भवेत् ॥ १४३ ॥**

मु. त्रैविध्यमिति । अनुमानं हि त्रिविधं केवलान्वयिकेवलव्यतिरेक्यन्वयव्यतिरेकिभेदात् । तत्रासद्विपक्षः केवलान्वयी यथा घटोऽभिधेयः प्रमेयत्वादित्यादौ । तत्र हि सर्वस्यैवाभिधेयत्वाद्विपक्षासत्त्वम् । असत्सपक्षः केवलव्यतिरेकी यथा पृथिवी इतरेभ्यो भिद्यते गन्धवत्त्वादित्यादौ । तत्र हि जलादित्रयोदशभेदस्य पूर्वमनिश्चिततया

K. The threefoldness of inference is due to the difference as purely affirmative (etc.). The twofoldness of invariable concomitance is due to its being positive and negative. The positive invariable concomitance has already been stated. (Invariable concomitance) due to negation is described here; it occurs when the absence of that which is to be established has the pervasion of the absence of reason. (*Karika* 142, 143)

M. The threefoldness (*traividhyam iti*). Because inference is threefold due to the difference of being purely affirmative, purely negative and affirmative cum negative. There the purely affirmative is that where there is no definite contradicted subject; as for example 'jar is nameable because it is knowable' and so on. Here, since all things are nameable there is no definite contradicted subject. The purely negative is that where there is no deninite subject; as for example 'earth differs from other things because it has smell' and so on. This is because there is the absence of the definite

मु. निश्चितसाध्यवतः सपक्षस्याभावात् । सत्सपक्षविपक्षोऽन्वय-व्यतिरेकी यथा वह्निमान् धूमादित्यादौ । तत्र सपक्षस्य महानसादे-र्विपक्षस्य जलह्रदादेश्च सत्त्वादिति । तत्र हि व्यतिरेकिणि व्यतिरेक-व्याप्तिज्ञानं कारणं तदर्थं व्यतिरेकव्याप्तिं निर्वक्ति **साध्याभावेति** । साध्याभावव्यापकीभूताभावप्रतियोगित्वमित्यर्थः। अत्रेदं बोध्यम् । यत्संबन्धेन यदवच्छिन्नं प्रति येन संबन्धेन येन रूपेण व्यापकता गृह्यते तत्संबन्धावच्छिन्नप्रतियोगिताकतद्धर्मावच्छिन्नाभाववत्ताज्ञानात् तत्संबन्धावच्छिन्नप्रतियोगिताकतद्धर्मावच्छिन्नाभावस्य सिद्धिरिति ।

M. subject which has the certainty of that which is to be established since it is not earlier determined that it is different from the thirteen (categories) beginning with water. The affirmative cum negative is that where there are definite subject and definite contradicted subject; as for example 'it has fire because of smoke' and so on; here there are the definite subject viz. kitchen etc. and the definite contradicted subject viz. water, lake etc. In the negative (inference) the cause is knowledge of the negative invariable concomitance, and for that purpose (the author) explains the negative invariable concomitance (with the words) **absence of that which is to be established** *(sādhyābhāveti)*. This means the state of being the counterpositive of the absence which is the pervader of the absence of that which is to be established. The following is to be understood here: by what relation and by what characteristic the pervaderness is grasped with reference to something by a particular relation and determined by a particular characteristic, from the knowledge of that which has the absence of that which is determined by that particular characteristic and which has the counterpositiveness determined by that particular relation, the absence of that which is determined by that particular characteristic and which has the counterpositiveness determined by that particular relation is established.

मु. इत्थं च यत्र विशेषणतादिसंबन्धेनेतरत्वव्यापकत्वं गन्धात्यन्ताभावे गृह्यते तत्र गन्धाभावाभावेनेतरत्वात्यन्ताभावः सिद्ध्यति। यत्र तु तादात्म्यसंबन्धेनेतरव्यापकत्वं गन्धाभावस्य गृह्यते तत्र तादात्म्यसंबन्धेनेतरस्याभावः सिद्ध्यति स एवान्योन्याभावः। एवं यत्र संयोगसंबन्धेन धूमं प्रति संयोगसंबन्धेन वह्नेर्व्यापकता गृह्यते तत्र संयोगसंबन्धावच्छिन्नप्रतियोगिताकवह्न्यभावेन जलह्रदे संयोगसंबन्धावच्छिन्नप्रतियोगिताकधूमाभावः सिद्ध्यति। अत्र च व्यतिरेकव्याप्तिग्रहे व्यतिरेकसहचारज्ञानं कारणम्। केचित्तु व्यतिरेकसहचारेणान्वयव्याप्तिरेव गृह्यते न तु व्यतिरेकव्याप्तिज्ञानमपि कारणम्

M. In this way where the pervaderness of the state of being different from others by the relation of qualifierness etc. is grasped in the absolute absence of smell there the absolute absence of the difference from others is established through the absence of the absence of smell. Where the pervaderness of the thing different (from earth) is grasped by the relation of identity in the absence of smell there the absence of the thing different (from earth) is established by the relation of identity and this indeed is mutual absence. Similarly, where the pervaderness of fire by the relation of conjunction with regard to smoke by the relation of conjunction is grasped, there in water, lake (etc.) the absence of smoke the counterpositiveness of which is determined by the relation of conjunction is established because of the absence of fire the counterpositiveness of which is determined by the relation of conjunction. And here the knowledge of negative coexistence is the cause for grasping the negative invariable concomitance.

Some however say: through negative coexistence only the positive invariable concomitance is grasped and the knowledge of the negative invariable concomitance also is not the cause. Where there is the knowledge of invariable concomitance through

मु. यत्र व्यतिरेकसहचाराद्व्याप्तिग्रहस्तत्र व्यतिरेकीत्युच्यते साध्य-प्रसिद्धिस्तु घटादावेव जाता पश्चात् पृथिवीत्वावच्छेदेन साध्यत इति वदन्ति ॥

दि. तत्र तेषु मध्ये । **असद्विपक्षः** इति । अत्यन्ताभावाप्रतियोगिसाध्यक इत्यर्थः । यथाश्रुते सिद्ध्यसिद्धिव्याघातात् । अत्यन्ताभावाप्रतियोगित्वस्य च प्रमेयत्वादौ सत्त्वाल्लक्षणसमन्वयः । नचैतन्न संभवति प्रमाविषयत्वरूपस्य तस्य नानात्वेनाननुगमादिति वाच्यम् । प्रमात्वस्यैव परम्परासंबन्धेनानु-गतत्वात् । इत्थं च प्रमेयत्वादेर्व्यतिरेकित्वसंभवेऽपि केवलान्वयित्वमेवेति मन्तव्यम् । **असत्सपक्षः** इति । सिद्ध्यसिद्धिव्याघातादत्राप्यगृहीतहेतु-

M. the negative coexistence, it is called negative (inference), but the existence of that which is to be established is known indeed in jar etc. and afterwards (the difference from others) is established in that which is dertermined by earthness.

D. There (*tatra*) (means) among them. **Where there is no definite contradicted subject** (*asadvipakṣaḥ iti*) means that which has that which is to be established which is not the counterpositive of an absolute absence. This is because if the expression is understood as mentioned (in M.) there is contradiction both by the establishment and non-establishment (of the contradicted subject). The definition is applied since knowability and so on are not the counterpositives of absolute absence. Nor can it be argued that this is not possible because knowability which is of the form of the state of being the object of valid knowledge is of many kinds and so it is not consecutive. The reason is that the state of being valid knowledge is consecutive by indirect relation. And thus it should be understood that even if there is the possibility of negative (reason) knowability etc. are only purely affirmatives. **Where there is no definite subject** (*asatsapakṣaḥ iti*). Even here because of contradiction by both establishment and non-establishment, the meaning is that the state of having that which is to be established which has negative invariable concomitance where

दि. सहचारं यद्व्यतिरेकिसाध्यं तत्कत्वमर्थो बोध्यः। **सत्सपक्षेति**। गृहीता-न्वयव्यतिरेकिसाध्यकमित्यर्थः। **यत्संबन्धेन यदवच्छिन्नं प्रति** इति। यत्संबन्धावच्छिन्नयद्रूपावच्छिन्नव्याप्यतानिरूपितव्यापकता गृह्यत इत्यर्थः। **इतरव्याप्यतेति**। इतरस्य व्याप्यतेत्यर्थः। तादात्म्येनेतरव्यापकतेति पाठे तादात्म्यसंबन्धावच्छिन्ना या इतरनिष्ठव्याप्यता तन्निरूपितव्यापकतेत्यर्थः। **तादात्म्यसंबन्धेन** इति। तादात्म्यसंबन्धावच्छिन्नप्रतियोगिताकाभावः सिद्ध्यतीत्यर्थः। 'येन सम्बन्धेन व्याप्यता गृह्यते' इत्यनुक्तौ तु तादात्म्येने-तरस्य व्याप्यता यत्र गृहीता तत्रेतरात्यन्ताभावस्य सिद्धिः स्यादिति भावः। 'संयोगसंबन्धावच्छिन्नप्रतियोगिताकवह्न्यभावेन' इति सावधारणम्। तेन

D. the co-occurrence of the reason is not grasped. This is to be understood. **Where there is definite subject** (*satsapakṣeti*) means having that which is to be established where the positive and negative (concomitance) is grasped. **With reference to something by a particular relation and determined by a particular characteristic** (*yatsaṃbandhena yadavacchinnaṃ prati iti*) means the pervaderness indicated by the pervadedness determined by a particular characteristic and by a particular relation, is grasped. **Pervaded by the other** (*itaravyāpyateti*) means the state of being pervaded indicated by others. If the reading is 'the state of being pervader of others by the relation of identity' (*tādātmyenetaravyāpakatā)* the meaning is that the pervadedness existing in other things which indicates the pervaderness. **By the relation of identity** (*tādātmyasaṃbandhena iti*) means the absence having the counterpositiveness determined by the relation of identity, is established. If it is not mentioned by what relation pervadedness is grasped then where the pervadedness of the thing different (from earth) (is grasped) by the relation of identity, there the absolute absence of the thing different (from earth) will be established. This is the idea. The absence of fire the counterpositveness of which is determined by the relation of conjunction is the restriction. Therefore an absolute absence the counterpositiveness of which is determined by any other relation is not established. This is the meaning. By this also the purpose

दि. संबन्धान्तरावच्छिन्नप्रतियोगिताकेन न तत्सिद्धिरित्यर्थः । अनेन च येन संबन्धेन व्यापकता गृह्यते इत्यस्य फलं सूचितम् । प्रदर्शितरीत्यैव येन रूपेण यदवच्छिन्नेत्यनयोरपि प्रयोजनमूह्यम् । ननु साध्यसाधनसहचारज्ञानाभावात् कथं व्यतिरेकव्याप्तिज्ञानमित्यत आह **अत्र च** इति । तथा च व्यतिरेक-सहचारेणैव व्यतिरेकव्याप्तिग्रहान्नान्वयसहचारग्रहापेक्षेति भावः । ननु साध्य-प्रसिद्धिं विना तदभावाज्ञाने व्यतिरेकव्याप्तेर्दुर्ग्रहत्वं स्यात् । साध्यप्रसिद्धौ च सिद्धसाधनमिति चेन्न । साध्यस्य घटादावेव प्रत्यक्ष सिद्धत्वात् पृथिवी इतर-भिन्नेत्युद्देश्यप्रतीतेरसिद्धत्वान्न सिद्धसाधनम् पक्षतावच्छेदकनानात्व एवांशतः सिद्धसाधनस्य दोषत्वात् । अत एवानित्ये वाङ्मनसे इत्यत्र अनित्या वागिति

D. of the expression 'by what relation the pervaderness is grasped' is indicated. In the manner explained the purpose of the expressions 'by what characteristic' and 'determined by what' is to be inferred.

It may be objected: how can there be knowledge of negative invariable concomitance since there is the absence of the knowledge of coexistence of that which is to be established with the reason and so (the author) says **and here** (*atra ca iti*). Hence, since there is the knowledge of the negative invariable concomitance only through negative coexistence there is no need for the knowledge of the positive coexistence. This is the idea.

Now it may be objected that if that which is to be established is not established (anywhere) there would not be the knowledge of its absence and so it would be difficult to grasp the knowledge of negative invariable concomitance. If that which is to be established is established (somewhere) then there would be the fault of establishing what has already been established.

This cannot be admitted. That which is to be established is established in jar and so on by means of perception and so there is no fault of establishing what has already been established, because the knowledge of the subject that the earth is different from all other things is not established. Only when the determinants

दि. बुद्धेरुद्देश्याया सिद्धत्वे नांशतः सिद्धसाधनमिति । ननु तथापि घटः कथं पक्षः साध्यस्य निश्चयेन तत्संदेहसिषाधयिषयोरभावादिति चेन्न । सर्वा पृथिवी इतरभिन्ना न वेति संशयस्य तत्प्रकारकसिषाधयिषायाश्च घटविषयत्वाद्घटत्वेन विशेषदर्शने सिद्धौ वा तेन रूपेण संशयसिषाधयिषे न भवतः पृथिवीत्वेन तु भवत एवेति । ननु पृथिवी इतरभिन्ना पृथिवीत्वात् घटवदित्यन्वयिनैवेतर-भेदसिद्धौ व्यतिरेकिवैयर्थ्यमिति चेन्न । अन्वयव्याप्तेरग्रहे व्यतिरेकव्याप्ति-स्फूर्तिदशायां व्यतिरेक्यनुमितिजननसंभवेन व्यतिरेक्यनुमानप्रवृत्तेर्निष्प्रत्यू-हत्वात् । आचार्यमतमाह **केचित्तु** इति । **व्यतिरेकसहचारेण** अन्वय-

D. of subjectness are many, partially establishing what has already been established is a fault. Therefore in the case of (the inference) 'word and mind are non-eternal' since the subject in the form of the knowledge that word is non eternal is established there is no fault of partially establishing what has already been established.

Now it may be objected: how can jar be taken as subject since that which is to be established is certain and so there is no doubt about it nor the desire to establish it. This cannot be admitted because the doubt whether all instances of earth are different from other things and the desire to establish that as a qualifier have jar as object. When the particular (instance of earth) is apprehended as jar or established (as different from other things) then there is neither doubt nor desire to establish in that form, but when (earth is apprehended) as earth there is indeed both.

It may be objected that when difference from other things is established by means of positive inference in the form that the earth is different from other things because it is earth just as jar, there would be no need of negative inference. This cannot be admitted, because when the positive invariable concomitance is not apprehended and when the negative invariable concomitance is grasped, there is the possibility of negative inferential knowledge and therefore the process of negative inference is unimpeded.

(The author) describes the opinion of the Ācārya (with the words) **some however** (*kecit tu iti*). **Through the negative**

दि. सहचारनिरपेक्ष व्यतिरेकसहचारेण । **अन्वयव्याप्तिरेव** इति एव-कारेण व्यतिरेकव्याप्तेर्व्युदासः । नन्वेवं व्यतिरेकव्याप्तिज्ञानरूपकारणाभावात् कथं व्यतिरेक्यनुमितिरत आह **न तु** इति । 'व्यतिरेकव्याप्तिज्ञानं' इत्यस्या-नुमितावित्यादिः । नन्वन्वयव्याप्तिज्ञानस्यैव हेतुत्वे कथं व्यतिरेकीति व्यवहार इत्यत आह **यत्र** इति । ननु पृथिवी इतरेभ्यो भिद्यते पृथिवीत्वादित्यादौ साध्यस्येतरभेदादेरप्रसिध्दत्वात् कथमन्वयव्याप्तिग्रह इत्यत आह **साध्य-प्रसिद्धिस्तु** इति । ननु घटादौ साध्ये निर्णीते कथं तत्रेतरभेदानुमितिरत आह

D. coexistence (*vyatirekasahacāreṇa*) means through the negative coexistence without recourse to positive coexistence. **Only positive invariable concomitance** (*anvayavyāptir eva iti*). By the word 'only' in (the expression) the negative invariable concomitance is excluded.

Now it may be objected that how there can be negative inferential knowledge because of the absence of the cause in the form of the knowledge of negative invariable concomitance? Therefore (the author) says **and....not** (*na tu iti*). (The expression) 'in inferential knowledge' precedes (the expression) 'knowledge of negative invariable concomitance'.

It may be objected that when the cause is only the knowledge of positive invariable concomitance how can there be the usage of (the expression) 'negative inference'. Therefore (the author) says **where** (*yatra iti*).

It may be objected that in (such inferences as) 'the earth is different from other things because it is earth', since that which is to be established, 'difference from other things', is not established, how can there be the knowledge of positive invariable concomitance? Therefore (the author) says **the existence of that which is to be established** (*sādhyaprasiddhistu iti*).

It may be objected that when that which is to be established in jar etc. is established how can there be the inferential knowledge of difference from others? Therefore (the author)

दि. पश्चात् इति । अवच्छेदकावच्छेदेनानुमितौ सामानाधिकरण्येन साध्य-सिद्धेरप्रतिबन्धकत्वादिति भावः । अत्र चान्वयव्याप्तिघटकतावत्पदार्थ-ज्ञानादेवान्वयव्याप्तिज्ञानोत्पत्तौ व्यतिरेकसहचारज्ञानस्य तद्धेतुत्वे मानाभावः । नच 'व्यतिरेकसहचारेण' इत्यत्र प्रयोजकत्वं तृतीयार्थः, तच्च नानुपपन्नम् । अन्वयव्याप्तिज्ञानप्रतिबन्धकव्यभिचारशङ्कानिरासद्वारा व्यतिरेकसहचार-ज्ञानस्य तत्र प्रयोजकत्वादिति वाच्यम् । व्यतिरेकसहचारग्रहेऽप्यधिकरणान्तरे व्यभिचारशङ्कातादवस्थ्यात् । तदधिकरीणीयव्यभिचारशङ्कानिरासद्वारा तत्र तस्योपयोगित्वमित्यपि न, तदधिकरणे साधनाभावग्रहमात्रेणैव तदधि-करणीयव्यभिचारशङ्कानिवृत्तेरित्यस्वरसो 'वदन्ति' इत्यनेन सूचितः ।

D. says **afterwards**(*paścāt iti*). The idea is that with regard to the inferential knowledge in that which is determined by the determinant (of subjectness) the establishment of that which is to be established qualified by co-occurrence (with the determinant of subjectness) is not a hindering factor.

Here when the knowledge of positive invariable concomitance has arisen only through the knowledge of all things constituting the positive invariable concomitance, there is no means of valid knowledge to establish the knowledge of negative coexistence as its cause.

Nor can it be argued that the meaning of the instrumental case in (the expression) 'by negative co-existence' is that it is an indirect cause and this is not inappropriate. This is because the knowledge of negative coexistence is the indirect cause by removing the doubt of deviation which is the hindering factor for the knowledge of the positive invariable concomitance. The reason is that even when the negative co-existence is apprehended, still there will be the doubt of deviation in another substratum. Nor is it the case that it is useful by removing the doubt of deviation in its substratum, because the removal of doubt of deviation in a particular substratum is only through the knowledge of the absence of the reason in that particular substratum. This incongruity is indicated by 'they say'.

Commentary

(p.462, lns 3–4; 7–8; p.465, lns 4–9) There are three different kinds of inference: purely affirmative (*kevalānvayī*), purely negative (*kevalavyatirekī*) and affirmative cum negative (*anvaya-vyatirekī*). The purely affirmative inference is that in which there is no contradicted subject (*vipakṣa*) as for instance jar is nameable because it is knowable. Here there is nothing where there is the absence of knowability; hence there is no contradicted subject (i.e. a subject where there is no *sādhya*)

In other words, a purely affirmative inference is that in which the *sādhya* is not the counterpositive of an absolute absence. If the purely affirmative inference is defined as that in which there is no contradicted subject (*vipakṣa*) as given in M. then the definition cannot be applied. The reason is that if the contradicted subject exists, then the definition of purely affirmative inference cannot be that which has non existent contradicted subject; if the contradicted subject does not exist (*aprasiddha*) then there will not be the knowledge of the contradicted subject. This is technically called contradiction by establishment and non-establishment (*sidhyasidhivyāghāta*). But when the purely affirmative inference is defined as that in which the *sādhya* is not the counterpositive of an absolute absence, then the definition can be applied in the case of knowability etc., since knowability etc. are never the counterpositive of an absolute absence.

But here D. takes the M. text as *yathā ghaṭah prameyo abhidhayatvāt tatrahi sarvasyaiva prameyatvāt vipakṣāsattvam* as Parīkṣit Thampurān explicitly points out (S., p.315, ln 20) and on this basis raises an objection: the individual knowable things are different and so knowability (*prameyatva*) is also different in different instances and so knowability is not a consecutive characteristic.[1] This objection is answered by pointing out that although the *prameyatva* is not a consecutive characteristic *pramātva* (state of being valid knowledge) is so. This is because *pramātva* exists in all obejects by indirect relation (i.e. *svāva-*

[1] Note that *prameyatva* is *pramāviṣayatva* which is the same as *visayatā* which is different in different objects of knowledge. This is the idea.

cchinnanirūpakatānirūpitaviṣayatāsambandha).[1] In this way, although there is the absence of one instance of *prameyatva* in another thing, still the state of being valid knowledge could be considered as a consecutive characteristic which exists by the already mentioned indirect relation.

(p.462, ln 10 – p.463, ln 1; p.465, ln 9 – p.466, ln 1) The purely negative inference is that where there is no definite subject (*sapakṣa*), as for example 'the earth is different from other things because it has smoke'. This is because it is not established earlier that there is something which is different from the thirteen categories (i.e. five categories i.e. quality, movement, universal, particularity, inherence and eight other substances, viz. water, fire, air, ether, time, space, soul and mind)[2] and so no example of definite subject (*sapakṣa*) can be given. That which has the mutual absence of these thirteen categories is earth.

Here also it may be objected that if *sapakṣa* is established, then one cannot speak of *asatsapakṣa*; if on the contrary *sapakṣa* is unestablished (*aprasiddha*), then there would not be any knowledge of *sapakṣa* and so one cannot speak of it. This objection is answered by pointing out that what is meant is that which is established by negative invariable concomitance without the knowledge of the co-occurrence of the reason. Here Parīkṣit Thampurān (S., p.316, lns 9–11) points out the reason for using the expression 'without the knowledge of the co-occurrence of the reason (*agrahītahetusahacāram*)'. It means only that here the *saddhetu* which has no positive concomitance is not established and not that there is the knowledge of an *asaddhetu*. The word *vyatirekī* is used in the expression *vyatirekisādhya* because where there is the *vyatirekitvabhrama* in *kevalanvayī* there would be overextension because there also *hetusahacāra* is not grasped.

(p.463, lns 1–3; p.466, lns 1–2) Inference which is affirmative cum negative (*anvyavyatirekī*) is that where there are both

[1] Here *svam* is *pramātvam. tadavacchinnanirūpakatā* is in *pramā. tannirūpitā-viṣayatā* is in all objects of knowledge.

[2] It should be noted that here only positive categories are taken into account following *praśastapādabhāsya*.

definite subject and definite contradicted subject. As for instance in the case of the inference 'it has fire because of smoke', the definite subject is kitchen and so on and the definite contradicted subject is lake etc.

(p.463, ln 3 – p.464, ln 8; p.466, ln 2 – p.468, ln 8) In the case of a negative inference, knowledge of negative invariable concomitance is the cause and therefore negative invariable concomitance is defined. There is negative invariable concomitance when the absence of that which is to be established has the pervasion of the absence of reason; i.e. in the case of the inference 'there is fire because of smoke', the negative invariable concomitance is, where there is the absence of fire there is the absence of smoke. This means that negative invariable concomitance is the state of being counterpositive of the absence which is the pervader of the absence of that which is to be established. This means more precisely: by what relation and by what characteristic, the pervadedness is grasped with reference to something by a particular relation and determined by a particular characteristic, from the knowledge of that which has the absence of that which is determined by that particular characteristic and which has the counterpositiveness determined by that particular relation, the absence of that which is determined by that particular characteristic and which has the counterpositiveness determined by that particular relation is established. Thus for example when the pervadedness of fire by the relation of conjunction with regard to smoke by the relation of conjunction is grasped, then in lake and so on, the absence of smoke the counterpositiveness of which is determined by the relation of conjunction is established because of the absence of fire the counterpositiveness of which is determined by the relation of conjunction. In non technical language this just means that where there is smoke by the relation of conjunction, there is also fire by the relation of conjunction and therefore where there is the absence of fire by the relation of conjunction, there is also the absence of smoke by the relation of conjunction.

Therefore in the inference, 'earth is different from other things because it has smell' when the pervadedness of the state of being different from other things by the relation of qualifierness

is grasped in the absolute absence of smell, there by the absence of the absence of smell, the absolute absence of the difference from other things is established. In non technical language, this just means that where there is the absence of the difference from the thing different from earth (*itarabhedābhāvah*) existing in water etc. there is the absolute absence of smell. But where in the absence of smell the pervadedness of the thing different (from earth) is grasped by the relation of identity, there the absence of the thing different from earth is established by the relation of identity. This means that in mutual absence the counterpositiveness is determined by the relation of identity. Thus where there is the mutual absence of that which is different from earth, there is the absence of smell. In this way, the mutual absence of that which is different from earth is established.

D. mentions the reason why the relation and the determining characteristic of pervadedness are specified. If it is not mentioned by what relation pervadedness is grasped, then it is possible that if pervadedness is grasped by the relation of identity, the absolute absence of the thing different from earth could be established. Thus also only when the absence of fire is grasped by the relation of conjunction then one can establish the absence of smoke by the relation of conjunction and not by any other relation. Similar is the reason for mentioning the determining characteristic of pervadedness; i.e. if the pervadedness of smoke is grasped by the determining characteristic of substanceness, then the absence of smoke cannot be established in lake etc. by the absence of fire in the lake etc.; but only when the pervadedness of smoke is grasped by the determining characteristic of smokeness can the absence of smoke be established in lake etc.

Now it may be objected as follows: there cannot be the knowledge of negative invariable concomitance since there is the absence of the knowledge of the positive coexistence of *sādhya* with the reason. The answer to this objection is that the knowledge of negative invariable concomitance is obtained through the absence of the co-existence of the *sādhya* with the absence of the reason (*vyatirekasahacāra*). As for instance where there is the absence of fire, there is the absence of smoke.

Therefore, there is no need of the knowledge of positive co-existence in order to grasp negative invariable concomitance.

A further objection is that if the *sādhya* is not established anywhere the knowledge of its absence cannot arise. Hence the knowledge of negative invariable concomitance is not possible. But if the *sādhya* is established somewhere, then there would be the fault of establishing what has been already established, since the existence of the *sādhya* is already established. This objection is answered by pointing out that the *sādhya* i.e. *itarabheda* (difference from something different from earth) is established in jar and so on by perception. Therefore there is no difficulty in grasping the absence of the *sādhya*. Further in the inference 'earth is different from other things' although earthness in jar and so on is established, still the proposition, the earth is different from other things is not established. Therefore, there is no fault of establishing what has been established. Only when the determinants of subjectness are many there is the fault of establishing what has already been established, as for instance, if it is stated that jar and ether are substances, when substanceness in jar is already established and it is not established in ether there is partially the fault of establishing what has already been established. Further in the case of the inference, 'word and mind are non-eternal', if the statement 'word is non-eternal' is already established, then it is not a case of the fault of partial *siddhasādhana* because there are not many *pakṣatāvacchedaka*s but only one since in this inference the state of being word-mind (*vāṅmanastva*) is the determinant of subjectness.

A further objection is the following: how can jar be taken as subject because in jar the existence of the *sādhya* i.e. *itara-bhinnatva* (being different from something different from earth) is certain and so there cannot be doubt about it nor desire to establish it. The answer to this objection is that the doubt whether all instances of earth are different from other things or the desire to establish that all instances of earth are different from other things have certainly jar also as object since jar is one instance of earth. Hence when a jar is apprehended as a particular instance of earth, there is no doubt that jar is different

from other things (*itarabhinna*). Further when a jar is established as different from other things there will not be any desire to establish the same. But still there can be doubt whether all instances of earth are *itarabhinna*; therefore there can also arise the desire to establish that all instances of earth are *itarabhinna*.

A further objection is that there is no need of negative invariable concomitance since it can be established that the earth is different from other things by means of positive invariable concomitance. Then the form of the inference will be, 'the earth is different from other things because it is earth just as jar'. This objection is answered by pointing out that when the positive invariable concomitance is not grasped and when the negative invariable concomitance is easily grasped, negative inferential knowledge arises by means of negative invariable concomitance. As for instance we have no knowledge of the positive invariable concomitance wherever there is earthness there is difference from other things (*itarabheda*). But we have the knowledge of negative invariable concomitance in the form wherever there is the absence of difference from other things (*itarabhedābhāva*), there is the absence of earthness.

R. does not seem to approve all these objections because it has been already stated in M. that for the inferential knowledge of the absence of a particular thing, the knowledge of the counterpositive of the absence which is the pervader of the absence of that particular thing is the cause. But even when the *sādhya* is not established the inferential knowledge where the *sādhya* is the qualificand can arise. This means that even when there cannot arise any inferential knowledge *prithvī itarabhedavatī* since *itarabheda* is not known as existing in *prithvī* as a qualifier, still the *prithvyām itarabhedah* can be established, since *itarabheda* here is not a qualifier but a qualificand.[1]

[1] This is similar to the case of *śaśasṛngam*. Just as we cannot have the knowledge of *śaśasṛngam asti* (there is the horn of the rabbit) where *śaśasṛngam* is qualifier, but we can have the knowledge *saśe sṛngam nāsti* (in rabbit there is no horn) where *sṛngam* is qualificand.

(p.464, ln 8 – p.465, ln 3; p.468, ln 8 – p.470, ln 9) According to Udayana, through the negative co-existence positive invariable concomitance only is grasped. Hence negative invariable concomitance is not a cause of inferential knowledge. However the term negative inference is used when the invariable concomitance is grasped through negative co-existence. This opinion is based on the idea that there is only positive invariable concomitance. The reason for this position is that only by positive invariable concomitance we can establish the *sādhya*; by negative invariable concomitance we can establish only the absence of the reason.

An objection may be raised here: in inferences such as 'earth is different from other things because it is earth', since *sādhya* viz., difference from other things is not established how can there be the knowledge of positive invariable concomitance? The answer to this objection is that the *sādhya* is known in jar etc. and afterwards it is established in that which is determined by earthness, i.e. in all instances of earth. The reason for this is that with regard to the inferential knowledge in that which is determined by the determinant of subjectness the establishment of that which is to be established qualified by co-occurrence with the determinant of subjectness is not a hindering factor. This means only that even if *sādhya* is established in one instance of the subject, there is no hindrance for establishing *sādhya* in all instances of the subject.

This view of Udayana involves incongruity as explained by D. and so it is not acceptable. The reason is that positive invariable concomitance is grasped by the knowledge of all those things which constitute positive invariable concomitance, as for instance all the things that are involved in the definition of positive invariable concomitance. But negative co-existence is not an element constituting positive concomitance and so its knowledge is not needed for the knowledge of positive concomitance. Further it cannot be argued that knowledge of negative concomitance is an indirect cause (*prayojaka*) for the knowledge of positive invariable concomitance, since knowledge of negative concomitance removes the doubt of deviation which is a hindering

factor for the knowledge of positive invariable concomitance. This is because even if negative co-existence is grasped in one particular substratum, there could still be doubt of deviation with reference to another substratum. Again it is not the case that the knowledge of negative co-existence is useful because it removes the doubt of deviation on the other substratum also. The reason is that on the other substratum, the knowledge of the absence of the reason alone would remove the doubt of deviation and there is no need of the knowledge of negative co-existence to arrive at the knowledge of the absence of deviation; this means that when the doubt of deviation is removed in the first substratum by means of negative co-existence, (e.g. where there is the absence of fire, there is the absence of smoke) in other substrata the doubt of deviation is removed merely by the knowledge of the absence of the reason.

Text 16 D

Presumption is Included in Negative Invariable Concomitance

का. अर्थापत्तिस्तु नैवेह प्रमाणान्तरमिष्यते ।
व्यतिरेकव्याप्तिबुद्ध्या चारितार्था हि सा यतः ॥ १४४ ॥

मु. **अर्थापत्तिः** इति । अर्थापत्तिं प्रमाणान्तरं केचन मन्यन्ते । तथा हि यत्र देवदत्तस्य शतवर्षजीवित्वं ज्योतिःशास्त्रादवगतं जीविनो गृहासत्त्वं च प्रत्यक्षादवगतं तत्र शतवर्षजीवित्वान्यथानुपपत्त्या बहिःसत्त्वं कल्प्यते । तदप्यनुमानेन गतार्थत्वान्नेष्यते । तथा हि यत्र जीवित्वस्य बहिःसत्त्वगृहसत्त्वान्यतरव्याप्यत्वं गृहीतं तत्रान्यतर-सिद्धौ जायमानायां गृहसत्त्वबाधाद्बहिःसत्त्वमनुमितौ भासते । एवं

K. Presumption is not at all recognized as a separate means of valid knowledge in this (system), because its purpose is served by the knowledge of negative invariable concomitance. (*Kārikā* 144)

M. Presumption (*arthāpattir iti*). Some accept Presumption as a separate means of valid knowledge. As for example, when it is known through astrology that Devadatta has a life of hundred years and his absence in the house while he is alive is known through perception, since having a life for hundred years cannot be explained otherwise, his existence outside the house is presumed. This (argument) also is not accepted because the purpose (of Presumption) is served by inference. As for example when the state of being alive is understood as pervaded by either existence outside or existence within the house, then, when either of the two is established, since the existence in the house is contradicted, existence outside becomes the object of the inferential knowledge. Similarly in (the instances such as)

मु.‘पीनो देवदत्तो दिवा न भुङ्क्ते’ इत्यादौ पीनत्वस्य भोजनव्याप्यत्वावगमाद्भोजनसिद्धौ दिवाभोजनबाधे रात्रिभोजनं सिद्ध्यतीति। अभावप्रत्यक्षस्यानुभविकत्वादनुपलम्भोऽपि न प्रमाणान्तरम्। किं चानुपलम्भस्याज्ञातस्य हेतुत्वे ज्ञानाकरणकत्वात् प्रत्यक्षत्वं, ज्ञातस्य हेतुत्वे तु तत्राप्यनुपलम्भान्तरापेक्षेत्यनवस्था। एवं चेष्टापि न प्रमाणान्तरं तस्याः संकेतग्राहकशब्दस्मारकत्वेन लिप्यादिसमशीलत्वाच्छब्द एवान्तर्भावात्। यत्र च व्याप्त्यादिग्रहस्तत्रानुमितिरेवेति।

दि. केचन मीमांसकाः। तदपि अर्थापत्तेः प्रमाणान्तरत्वमपि। दिवा न भुङ्क्ते इति। आदिना ‘मयूरः पर्वतेतरस्मिन् न नृत्यति नृत्यति च’

M. ‘the fat Devadatta does not eat during the day’ and so on, because fatness is known to be pervaded by eating, eating is established. Hence when eating during day is contradicted (by perception) the fact of eating during night is established. Even non apprehension is not another means of valid knowledge because the perception of absence is experienced. Moreover, if non apprehension which is not known is accepted as the cause (of valid knowledge of absence), it would be perception because it is not produced by knowledge, and when non apprehension which is known is accepted as the cause of knowledge, there would be need for another non apprehension and so there would be infinite regress. Likewise even gesture is not another means of valid knowledge because being of the same nature as the script etc. it is a reminder of the word which conveys the conventional meaning and so it is included in word. Where there is the knowledge of invariable concomitance there is indeed inferential knowledge.

D. Some (*kecana*) means the Mīmāmsakas. **This (argument) also** (*tad api*) means that Presumption also is a separate means of valid knowledge. **Does not eat during day and so on** (*divā na bhuṅkte iti*) Here (the word) ‘and so on’ includes (the statement)

दि. इत्यस्य संग्रहः । नन्वेतद्वाक्यान्मयूरः पर्वते नृत्यतीति ज्ञानमुत्पद्यते न त्वेतद्व्यतिरेकिणः संभवति पर्वतनृत्यस्य साध्यस्याप्रसिद्धौ व्यतिरेक-व्याप्त्यनिरूपणादिति कथं नार्थापत्तिः प्रमाणान्तरमिति चेन्न । मयूरनृत्यं पर्वताधिकरणकं पर्वतेतरानधिकरणत्वे सति साधिकरणत्वात् पर्वतत्ववदित्यन्वयव्यतिरेकिणैव पर्वताधिकरणकमयूरनृत्यज्ञानसंभवात् ।

D. 'the peacock does not dance on anything other than the mountain but it dances'. It may be objected that from this statement the knowledge that the peacock dances on the mountain arises but this (knowledge) does not arise from negative (inference), because when that which is to be established viz. dancing on the mountain is not known earlier there is no knowledge of negative invariable concomitance. Therefore how cannot Presumption be another means of valid knowledge?. This cannot be admitted. The reason is that there arises the knowledge of the dancing of the peacock having mountain as the substratum by means of positive cum negative (inference) in the form 'the dancing of the peacock has the mountain as the substratum because it has a substratum while not having as substratum anything other than mountain, like mountainness.

Commentary

The Naiyāyikas aruge further that Presumption is not an independent means of valid knowledge. The Mīmāmsakas on the contrary hold that Presumption is an independent means of valid knowledge. As for example if one knows that Devadatta is alive and if he is not in the house, then it is presumed that he is somewhere outside of the house. The Mīmāmsakas hold that in instances of knowledge such as this, a separate means of valid knowledge is to be accepted. This is rejected by the Naiyāyikas because such a knowledge can be obtained through negative invariable concomitance. As for example if it is known that Devadatta is alive, then it is also known that he is either in the house or outside the house. If he is not in the house, then it is

inferred that he is outside the house. The form of the inference is: Devadatta is outside the house because being alive he is not in the house.[1] Similarly there are instances of knowledge such as 'the fat Devadatta does not eat during the day'; but here it is known that fatness is pervaded by eating. Hence the necessity of the fact of eating is established. Therefore, when it is not perceived that Devadatta is eating during the day it is concluded that he is eating during the night.

D. gives also another example of Presumption which is included in positive cum negative inference. The peacock does not dance on anything other than the mountain but it dances. Therefore it dances on the mountain. It may be objected here that this knowledge that peacock dances on the mountain does not arise from the knowledge of negative invariable concomitance since dancing on the mountain which is the *sādhya* is not known earlier. And when the *sādhya* is not known earlier, there cannot be any knowledge of negative invariable concomitance. This objection is answered by pointing out that dancing of the peacock on the mountain is not the *sā*dhya, but the state of having mountain as substratum is the *sā*dhya. The knowledge of such a *sā*dhya arises from negative cum positive inference in the form, the dancing of the peacock has the mountain as the substratum because it has a substratum while not having as substratum anything other than mountain like mountainness.

R. explains the basis of the argument in order to show that Presumption is included in inference. According to the Mīmāmsakas, Presumption is a kind of imposition (*āpatti*) and in order to have an instance of knowledge by imposition one should have the knowledge of that which causes imposition which is pervaded by that which is imposed (*apādhyavyāpyāpādakavattājñānam*). In the present instance, if Devadattah does not have the absence of either existence in the house or outside the house, then he would have the absence of being alive. This imposition along with the denial of existence in the house bring

[1] *Devadattah bahisattvavān jīvitve sati grahāsattvāt; yannaivam tannaivam.*

about the knowledge of existence outside the house. Such an imposition is possible only when there is definite knowledge of invariable concomitance between that which causes imposition and that which is imposed. But this kind of definite knowledge of invariable concomitance will be an instance of the definite knowledge of negative invariable concomitance in the form wherever there is absence of existence of a person outside the house, there is the absence of the absence of existence in the house, if the person is alive. In this way Presumption is reduced to negative inference.

Further, non-perception (*anupalaṃbha*) is also not a means of valid knowledge as opposed to the opinion of the Bhatta Mīmāmsakas and the Vedāntins who hold that it is a valid means of knowledge. The reason is that non apprehension of jar is considered as the cause of the knowledge of the absence of jar. But if non apprehension itself is not known earlier, then the knowledge which arises from non apprehension would be perceptual knowledge. This is because knowledge which does not arise from another knowledge is defined as perceptual knowledge. If the non apprehension however is known earlier, then for this knowledge of non apprehension there should be another instance of the knowledge of non apprehension. In this way there would be the fault of infinite regress.

Similarly, bodily gesture is also not to be considered as a different means of valid knowledge. This is because gesture brings about the remembrance of the word, appropriate to it, just as a script gives rise to the remembrance of the appropriate word. In this way gesture is included in word one of the valid means of knowledge. Although a person who is deaf and dumb from birth onwards cannot remember the word he infers the intention of the person from his gesture. Therefore, this is included in inferential knowledge.

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Glossary

ādheyatā	=	state of being superstratum
adhikaraṇatā	=	state of being substratum
adṛṣṭa	=	unseen
āhāryajñāna	=	knowledge produced by desire when there is contradiction
alaukikasannikarṣa	=	extraordinary apprehensional connection
anaikānta	=	deviation
āropa	=	erroneous knowledge
āśryāsiddhi	=	unestablishedness of the subject
anatiriktavṛtti	=	not occurring in something which is not its own substratum
anityadoṣa	=	non-permanent fallacy
anugatadharma	=	consecutive characteristic
anumiti	=	inferential knowledge
anumitsā	=	desire to infer
anupasaṃhārin	=	inconclusive
anuyogin (of relation)	=	subjunct
anyathāsiddha	=	superfluous

aprāmāṇya	=	invalidity
aprāmāṇyajñānānā-skandita	=	not affected by the knowledge of invalidity
aprasiddha	=	unestablished
aprasiddhasādhyakānu-miti = *vyatirekanumiti*	=	negative inferential knowledge
asaṃbhava	=	fault of impossibility
asvarasa	=	incongruity
atiriktavṛtti	=	occurring in something which is not its own substratum
avacchedaka	=	determinant
avacchedakatāparyā-ptyadhikaraṇatva	=	the state of being substratum of the state of being determinant by the relation of collective extensity
avasara	=	occasion
avyāpti	=	fault of too narrow application
bādha	=	contradiction
bhrama	=	erroneous knowledge
ekādhikaraṇya	=	co-occurrence
ghaṭaka	=	constituent part
hetutā (*saṅgati*)	=	(Relevance of) causeness
kālikasaṃbandha	=	relation of temporality
kārya	=	effect
kāryaikya	=	having the same effect
kevalanvyī	=	universally affirmative

laukikasannikarṣa	=	ordinary apprehensional connection
liṅga	=	reason
mahākāla	=	infinite time
nigrahasthāna	=	point of defeat
nirvāhakaikya	=	having the same cause
niścaya	=	definite knowledge
pakṣa	=	subject
parāmarśa	=	consideration
paricāyaka	=	indicative of
paryāptisaṃbandha	=	relation of collective extensity
phalamukhagaurava	=	cumbersomeness depending on result (i.e. on the relation of cause and effect)
prakāra	=	qualifier
prāmāṇya	=	validity
prasaṅga	=	connection
pratibandhaka	=	hindrance, preventer
pratibandhyapratibandhakabhāva	=	the relation in the form of that which is prevented and that which prevents
pratipakṣita	=	that which has a counterthesis
pratiparāmarśa	=	counter consideration
pratiyogin (of a relation)	=	adjunct
pratiyogin (of an absence)	=	counterpositive

pratiyogitāvacchedaka-saṃbandha	=	the relation which determines counterpositiveness
pratiyogivyadhikaraṇa	=	not occurring along with its counterpositive
prayojaka	=	mediate cause
sādhāraṇa	=	common
sādhanāprasiddhi	=	unestablishedness of reason
sādhyāprasiddhi	=	unestablishedness of that which is to be established
sādhyatāvacchedaka-saṃbandha	=	the relation which determines the state of being that which is to be established.
sāmānādhikaraṇye-nānumiti	=	inferential knowledge qualified by co-occurrence
saṃskāra	=	impression
saṇgati	=	relevance
satpratipakṣa	=	counterthesis
siṣādhayiṣā	=	desire to establish
svarūpasaṃbandha	=	relation of selfsameness
svarūpāsiddhi	=	unestablishedness of nature
tarka	=	hypothetical reasoning
udbodhaka	=	reviver
upajīvaka	=	effect

upalakṣana	=	adventitious qualifier; indicative of
upanītabhāna	=	knowledge caused by apprehensional connection in the form of previous knowledge
upodghāta	=	introduction
uttejaka	=	stimulating factor
vṛttiniyāmaka-saṃbandha	=	occurrence exacting relation
vibhū	=	omnipresent
viṣayapariśodhaka-tarka	=	hypothetical reasoning which examines the existence of a particular thing.
viṣayatāsaṃbandha	=	relation of the state of being the object
viṣayitāsaṃbandha	=	relation of the state of having object
viśeṣaguṇa	=	special quality
viśeṣya	=	qualificand
viśiṣṭābhāva	=	qualified absence
viśiṣṭabuddhi	=	qualified knowledge
viśiṣṭasattā	=	qualified existence
vinigamanāviraha	=	absence of a clinching argument
virodhivyāpti	=	opposing invariable concomitance
viruddha	=	opposite

vṛttitā = (ādheyatā)	=	state of being occurrent (= state of being superstratum)
vṛttyaniyāmaka-saṃbandha	=	occurrence non-exacting relation
vyabhicāra	=	deviation
vyāpāra	=	operation
vyāpti	=	invariable concomitance
vyāptigrāhakatarka	=	hypothetical reasoning which brings about the knowledge of invariable concomitance
vyāpyatvāsiddhi	=	unestablishedness of invariable concomitance
vyāsajyavṛttidharma	=	characteristic which occurs simultaneously in many things
vyatirekasahacāra	=	negative co-occurrence
yogya	=	perceptible

Index